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ABSTRACT-OF THESIS. 
The characterisation of Iatin American social formations is a',, 
matter of some bontrdversy for Marxists and non-Marxists aUke.. This 
thesis attempts'to contribute to an understanding of-the problems of 
transition encountered by Latin American states after*ln4ependence, in 
-the context of their colonial history and their partial integration. 
-into world capitalism. The first three chapters are consequently devotea 
to a variety of philosophical -and methodological issuesr notably to the 
theory of modes of production, the nature of the Stat-69 and issues of. 
xace and class. 
These themes, are then explored through an examination of the complex 
development of the Peruvian social formation from the 'Inca mode of. 
production' to Independencel as evidenced by persistent intra-elits 
conflict and racik cleavages; a fractionalisation of class processes 
which is expressed in turn in the failure to re-construct an effective 
national 'state. These issues are examined -in the context of the emergence 
of a crystallised re-feudalisation, based on the need of Britain and the 
U. S. A. for a series of 'primary" products. In this way, aspects of 
Peru's stWating transition are linked to the partial determination 
exercised by international capital. 
These', strands convergd in the empirical : focus of the study, 
the 
ýWar of the Pacific waged 
'by Chile against Peru and Bolivia. 
The War not only. reveals the specificity of Peruvian class 'configurations rand 
the fictional, nature of the Peruvian nation-stater but also 
illustrates 
the ielationships both with and between the dominant metropolitan powers. 
S. 
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CHAFrER lt IMPRODUMON. 
A. Orientation. 
The War of the Pacific occupies a central place in Peruvian historio- 
graphy; a succession of observerst from contemporaries to modern 
academicBt have offered a variety, of interpretations of both itsý 
causes and effects. This thesis subjects these views to a re-examinationt 
set in the context..: of current debates around the theories of Imperial- 
ism and Under-development. It will be argued that much of the debate 
concerning the attribution of guilt over the Pacific War is misguided; 
constructed around a model of expanding Capitalism which suffers from 
hyper-intentionality (cf. Shanin, 1978)l and which is often used by 
bourgeois critics of historical materialism as a kind of theoretical 
Aunt Sally. This is not to deny agency in the historical processo but 
to imply that it should be perceived as resting in class development, 
conflict and change, not in anthropozorphised and homogenised states. 
The ideological element in this debate can be clearly seen in the 
origin o. L' tho myth of the war as an aspect of direct intervention in 
the hemisphere by Britain. In 1882 the Secretary of Sta-te of the 
U. S. A. said to Congress; 
"It is a perfect mistake to speak of this 
as a Chilean War on Peru. It is, an English 
War on Peru, with Chile as the instrument. " 
(in Kiernan, 1955, p. 23). 
This notion of the War as predicated upon an overt and aggressive 
British imperialism took root among Peruvian scholars. Mariano Paz 
Soldan alleged that the (mainly British) sharebolders'of the Antofagasta 
Nitrate Co. had persuaded the Chilean Government to go to war, (1884t 
PP 87-89). Mariategui concurred with this interpretation; 
-1- 
"El guano y el salitre despertaron la 
codicia de las potencias extranjeias, 
mas espicificamente del imperialismo 
ingles, que alento y empujo al Gobierno 
Chileno para que este prepara cuidadosa 
y alevosamente el ataque militar. " 
( Mariategui, cited in Roelp 1976, P. 70) 
Basadrel even while discussing another author's rejection of this 
view, concludes, ".. el CaPitalismOingles ayudo y sostuvo a Chile 
en la guerra, contra el Peru. "(1976, p 38. ) 
Accompanying this version . of the causality of -the War has been an .- 
interpretation of the War as a $watershed I 'in Peruvian history, where 
a sophisticated economic structure, -which included modern financing 
and communications systems, was destroyedt along with the prospect of 
a self-sustaining capitalist development( cf, Bonilla, 1970t Ps ý42s) 
The obverse of this thread of argument is that provided by what 
almost represents a school of apologists for British merchant capital. 
A series of microscopic studies -have focussed on the individual 
activities of particular diplomats or merchants, and their behaviour 
is measured against the template of a model of Imperialism, which 
must be proved by the existence of mechanisms of formal controll or 
at the very least some intention of gaining formal control. The 
key notions of informal control and dependency are rejected. 
". .- it would be as well to state at this 
stage that the key term here is taken to be 
subordination, and the indicative phenomenon 
the employment of economic and military superiority 
as a means to force concessions, secure privileges 
or remove impediments on economic activity in 
foreign territories, To argue that dominance 
alone is sufficient token of economic imperialism 
that the heavy dependence of one country on another 
for its markets, its imports, and its capital is 
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representative of colonial status is clearly 
unsatisfactory. " (Matthew, 1968 PP- 562-3). 
Platt (1977, P. 14) points to the significance of internal factors 
such as inadequate capitalisation, labour shortages, deficiencies in 
the means of production and the infrastructurev as being far more 
significant than the effect of British involvement in Latin American 
enterprises, and states that these problems, "must have rade the 
alternatives to foreign connection as uninviting to Latin Americans 
at ihe time as they seem speculative to the historian today. " (ibid. ) 
Platt's self-identification as an historian is one of the crucial 
features of this perspective, especially since the definition of the 
profession is so narrow as to exclude consideration of the debates 
around dependency theory, IIwb i--- ých ha$ pow rQaghed a level of abstract on 
difficult to associate with what may be understood to have happened 
in the past" (op. cit., p. 2). Thus, in opposition to the Grand Theory 
of 'dependency', this school engages in an abstracted empiricism 
which extends to bizarre hagiographies of long-dead merchants* 
"Despite well publicised disputes and criticisms 
old established and respectable British merchants 
in fact worked reasonably well with the emergent 
governments of Latin America. A. Gibbs and Sons 
had an instinct for cooperation which depended 
much on their moderationg their conformity to 
a strict code of business morality, and their 
rejection of capitalism's more free-wheeling 
ethics .......... These were honest, 
liberal, 
intelligent and patient men, working long hours, 
whnRP wIvPR saw IlUip or thpm, irul w1iosp rpcovil 
of philanthropy was creditable. "' ( Greenhill, 
, 1977, P. 252 and p. 188). 
Blakemore ( 1975) in his study of the Foreign office's response to 
1. This passage is worth quoting at length if only because it is 
one of the few occasions in which women appear in historical analysis 
of Peru, even if they only feature as a contingency of being the wives 
of businessmen! 
the complaints of the Bondholders, emphasises that the lukewarm 
reception they got demonstrates that Latin American States were 
truly 'sovereign,, and that variations in HMG's willingness to inter- 
vene were purely a function of changing personnel. This interpretation 
will be dealt with in detail below; what concerns us immediately is 
that, based in a detailed reading of Foreign Office papers. BlAkemore's 
thesis is meant to represent a corrective to dependency theory. 
We need not pursue the same theme through the work of Ferns (1960), 
the earlier work of Platt (4972, pp 295-311) or that of Miller to 
see the way in which detailed source analysis has become a pre- 
occupation to the exclusion of any hermeneutic reading of 19th Century 
Peruvian history. 1 By concentrating on the predilections or moral 
character of individual actors, the processes and effects of the 
international system on class formation and class interests in the 
soi-disant sovereign states' of the 'periphery' are ignored. 
The work which follows attempts to provide a different reading of 
the historical subject matter. it is unlikely that anyone will be 
able to improve substantially on Kienian's examination of the source 
material concerning the involvement of HMG in the Pacific War 
( 1955)- 
Howpverq there is certainly space for a reinterpretation and supplement- 
ation of this material, which situates the event within a-Marxist 
analysis of developments in the post-Independence Peruvian social 
formation and its relationships with the outside world. Since I 
view the framework within which empirical material is located to be 
almost as important as the material itself, a substantial portion of 
the thesis will be devoted to the theoretical background to Peru! s 
experience in the 19th Century. The thesis is accordingly 
divided 
into two sections. The first of these, consisting of the rest of 
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this chapter, and the entirity of that which follows, represents a 
theoretical prospectusg identifying the parameters within which I 
consider any historical investigation of the global phenomenon of 
uneven development should take place. This section is intended to 
I 
confront the reductionism inherent in both the functionalism of 
Rostowian *stage theory"t and the structuralism which appears to 
have overtaken the debates on the transition from feudalism to Capitalismt 
and the question of modes of production in general. 
The second section examines the historical material bearing on the 
social and economic consequences of Peru's contacts with the outside 
world # commencing with a treatment of the secondary material available 
on the period from just before the Conquest, and continuing in a close 
examination of the period leading up to the pacific War. It is hoped 
that by locating the evidence firmly in the framework identified in 
the first section, critics of theories of dependency and imperialism 
such as Platt, who complain of the distance between theory and evidenceo 
will be answered. 
Itwill be recognised that the project outlined above begs a number 
of important questions. In particulart the relationship between 
'Lhaory* and 'balpIfIcal CB66avuhl, pofiltod 1iy tho 1zcqt1on-O1iiL Of tha 
work, requires, some justificationg particularly in the light of the 
current debate between structuralism* and 'historicismi. One of my 
prime concerns must be that of method, and it is to that central problem 
that I tu: tn now. 
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B. Methodological ArK=ent. 
The whole question of the formulation of theory in the historical 
materialist tradition has in the past few years become the focus of 
intensive debate ( c. f. particularly, Hindess & Hirst, 1975; Anderson, 
198Q; Cutleret al., 1977; Thompson, 1978; Anderson# 1979), and this 
has been reflected In a sharpening debate on the adequacy of theories, 
of Imperialism and Under-developmentg from within the Marxist tradition 
(for reviews of this material, see Brewer, 1980; Taylor$ 1979; Foster- 
Carter, 1978). There have been common denominatý, prs to these debates; 
namely the adequacy of the units of analysis used to categorise or 
identify historical transformations. 
The problem ultimately concerns the entire basis of the Marxian 
analytical methodq but as an exemplar, I shall begin by looking at the 
problem of periodisation in historical materialism. One recent trend 
in Parxist analysis has been to stress the relative autonomy of 
analytical categories from their 'historical' origins, citing Capital- 
as an authority; 
"Definite historical conditions are necessary that 
a product may become a commodity. This does not 
mean that the theoretical analysis of commodities 
As a historical Analysis in the mmse of being an 
examination of the concrete conditions of commodity 
production and their actual development. The theory 
in Capital, is historical only in so far as the 
categories it deploys are historically specific 
to the capitalist mode of production'and are not 
applicable, to any other form of society. " (KaYt 1975P 
P. 13n). 
In this approach there lies the danger of a tautology which is 
likely to cause particular problems for those investigating the 
history of the contact between Capitalism and other fOrMS Of 
-6- 
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uction. How are we to define a 'capitalist mode of production'? 
By the existence within that specific form of categories such as 
'commodity production'. How are we to identify this as being a 
necessary condition of the existence of a capitalist mode of production'? 
Because these categories ogpur only within Qapitallsm. It Is ironic that 
Althusser, from whom this perspective originatest should have developed 
it supposedly to avoid teleology, since his idea of historical material- 
ism ultimately appears as a closed hermeneutic circle; 
" It has been possible to apply Marx's 
theory with success because it isltrue'; 
it is not true because it has been applied 
with success. " (Althusser, 1970P P-59)- 
If one is to follow Althusser (and also, for example, Hindess and 
Hirst, 1975)9 one will only be able to accept *pure' and integral 
*je 'modes of production* as being Ireal't since only have the requisite A 
internal logical consistency. It would be quite useless to look for 
examples of these in the 'historical record', and hence history is 
considered of little une to the contemporary Marxist. 
Other neo-Althusserians have actually engaged in historiographical 
explorations of their own, but have been careful to follow Althusser's 
stf-Ictures on the notion of 'historical time'; 
"We must grasp in all its rigour the absolute 
necessity of liberating the theory of history 
from any compromise with empirical temporality't 
with the ideological concept of time which 
underlies and overlies it, or with the ideo- 
logical idea that the theory of historyt as 
theory, could be subject to the 'concrete" 
determinationsof 'historical time'. " (197O, PlO5)- 
When Anderson undertakes the task of a comparative history spanning 
a milennium and the entire globe, he finds it necessary to d isarticulate 
I 
the linear temporality of traditional' historical Investigation; 
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"Although all historians are naturally aware 
that rates of change vary between different 
layers or sectors of society, convenience and 
custom usually dictate that the form of the work 
implies or conveys a chronological monism ........ 
Since the specific object of this study is the 
whole spectrum of European Absolutism, no single 
temporality covers Its underlying unity 
is profound, but it is not that of a linear 
continuum. " (Anderson, 1979, p-10). 
A similar approach is adopted by the non-Marxist Barrington Moore, in 
his analysis of the origins, courses and outcomes of bourgeois 
revolutions (1977). The value of the Qlaws' produced by these authors 
to identify the nature of epochal transformations is somewhat problem- 
atic. In dealing, as Marx did, with the model of industrial develop- 
ment 
1 from feudalism, a degree of autonomy on the part of the form 
studied can be assumed. Similarly, the societies studied by Anderson 
and Moore are subject to identifiably endogenous influences on their 
development at the stage at which they aresubjected to study.. Given 
the contempoiary development of CapitAlism, and its Gontrol over 
world markets, let alone political systems, a study of political and 
social development either within national boundariest or in a theoret- 
ical system of temporal disjuncture, would be nonsensical. Hencet as 
Roxborough points out, it is no longer simply the components of the 
'system* which need to be examined, but also the stage of its insertion 
into the world system (1979, passim). An evolutionary model of 
capitalist development which allowed only one route to change, 
composed of a'succession of modes of production of invariant formt 
would be, in its own way, as idealist and unsatisfactory as Rostowian 
'Stage Theory. I Explicit opposition to this epistemological approach 
is in evidence in much of Marx's work; 
I- 
-IL Ib -16uc%l Uy auLhaim 
ain lav cxpa4A am AILlitiminc., 011-1 
TI I'll 
that Marx was not in fact arguing closely from the English experience, 
but it remains a fact that Marx did not have an alternative model. 
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"The premises from which we begin are not 
arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises 
from which abstraction can only be made in the 
imagination. They are the real individuals, their 
activity and the material conditions under which 
they-live, both those which they find. existing 
and those produced by their activity. These 
premises can be verified in a purely empirical 
way. " (Marx, 1970, p. 42). l 
An expanded version of this argument characterizes Marx's assault on 
Proudhon in the "Poverty of Philosophy", and Thompson identifies 
numerous references in the work of Marx and Engels resting on a 
fizm notion of empiricism. ( 1978, cf PP- 259 279). However, 
these criticisms are raised not to jump on the band-wagon of Thompson's 
rebuttal of Althusserianism, but to raise some questions which now 
inevitably arise about the theory of under-development. 
If we were to follow a rigid catego risation of integral and discrete 
modes of pxoduction, the problem of periodising Latin American under- 
development* would become acute. Some have followed Frank (1972p passim) 
in asserting that Latin America was integrated into a world capitalist 
system from the moment of colonisationp and theiefore from this point 
on under-development was to be the inevitable result of the demands 
of capital reproduction. Laclau (1977)t and Banaji both point to the 
absuidity of assuming that capitalism can be characterised solely as 
a set of exchange relations; 
"The initial impulse which sustained the vast 
network of world commodity exchanges before the 
eighteenth century derived from the expanding 
consumption requirements of the jords. Moreover, 
at its inceptiont the colonisation of Latin America 
was a feudal colonisation, a response to the cxýlsis 
of feudal pxofitability which all the landowning 
1. The -iý-o iln-11 sentences of this paragraph -a-ctually represent a 
rare instance of, correspondence I between the theories of Marx and 
Althusser, since 
; 
his is close to the concept of I over-de termination' 
which will prove particularly useful in our later examination of Peru. 
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classes of Europe were facing down to the 
latter part of the 
, sixteenth century. 
" 
(Banaji, 19779 P. 31. ) 
This f olm of tiade was in fact outside the orbit of capitalism as a 
mode of produc tion, largely because mercantile Capital, as Marx points 
out, is only involved in the sphere of capital circulation, not 
capital accumulation, 'with a major proportion of any extracted sux'Plus 
being directed towaids consumption (a theme which will strike reson- 
ances when we come to examine 19th Century Peru) - Theref ore, any I 
commodity produc*ton taking place within colonial societies functions 16 
only as a mediation of consumption. Banaji quotes from the Grundrisse 
in support of this argument; "if a nobleman brings the free worker 
together with his serfs, even if he re-sells a part of the worker's 
product, ana the worker thus creates value for him, then this exchange 
takes place only ..... for the sake of superfluity. for luxury consumption. " 
(ibid. ) The correct characterisation of the 'Metropolitan' intervention 
in Peruvian society is important, as is an accurate assessment of the 
nature of the mode of production which precedes it; 
"Commerce ..... has a more or less dissolving 
influence everywhere on the producing organ- 
isations which it finds to hand ...... what new 
mode of production will replace the old does 
not depend on commercel but on the chaTacter 
of the old mode of production itself. " 
(Marx, 19729 Vol III p PP 331-332). 
This quotation accurately identifies the Increasing complexity of our 
task; not only must weýattempt a global periodisation of the insertion 
oi Peru into the world system,, but also an accurate as: seb6biwit ol Lh-- 
elements within-the structure of pre-conquest, colonial, and post- 
Independence Peru which might either have led to, or alternative2y 
were inimical to capitalist development. The--paradoxical nature of' 
mercantile capital plays a crucial role here. Kay points out that 
"it 
corroded the feudal order, but in the last analysis was always 
-10- 
dependent on it .......... it was revolutionary and conservative at the 
same time. " (1975, p. 97. )l This chaiacter imprinted itself deeply 
on Peruvian development, in particular on the specific nature of the 
town/country dichotomy (more accurately portrayed as a trichotomy, 
perhaps; town/hacienda/siex3a. in Peru's case) in colonial Latin 
America. Morse (1971) points to the centriýugal character of the 
Latin American town as opposed to the centripetal EUropean town; 
this development finds its origins primarily in the mercantilist 
external orientation of the Empire. To a degree, this tendency was 
accentuated by independence, and the closer articulation of the 
continent into the world economy (Roberts, 1978t PP 44-45)- 
However,, we must be careful in our delineation of the relationships 
between the external influences of tiade, and the inteinal systems of 
production. In examining the aetiology of under-development, it is 
not enough to simply divide the subject matter into lendogenous, and 
lexogenous' factors, as Rokborough exhorts us to, even though this may 
take us a few steps beyond some previous dependency theorists. The 
problem' arises of our unit of analysis (and Roxborough explicitly ref ers 
to this problem, 1979, p. 49), in that the 'nation-state, in Latin 
America is not the coherent entity that the title implies, but contains 
a bourgeoisie whose referent is partially exogenous and partially 
endogenous (and whose internal alliances are with a pre-capitalist 
oligarchy in the Peruvian instance). Consequently, the production and 
market systems in which they are involved occupy a category which can 
be accurately categorisea neither as exogenous nor endogenOUB;. the whole 
process is further complicated by historical progression. ý'or example 
the expoi. t-oxiented haciendas of the sierm. were indirectly linked to 
lcf Bartra, Is analysis of the ambivalent effect of capitalism on the 
peasantry in Mexico (1971). 
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the $world system,, but obvious3y had a xecipiocal relationship of 
I 
effectivity with local factors. Do we therefore characterise them as 
specifically endogenous or exogenous? Rokborough is clear that the 
answer must be rooted in historical analysis; 
I 
"There is no easy resolution of the question 
of the unit of analysis, if only because the 
leal world is neither a perfectly functioning 
system, nor a loose collection of autonomously 
functioning national societi, es. The boundaries 
Are drun, it may be guggeoted, by the hiztorical, 
formation of social classes. " (1979, p. 52). 
Whilst pointing to a way out of our 'unit-of-analysis I dilemma, this 
raises further problems. Firstly, how are we to accurately identify 
our social class categories?, The, precise difficulty with., a Marxist 
analysis. ol' class in Latin America is the identification of class 
consciousness; the group most commonly identified as 'bourgeois' in 
Republican Pexu prior. to-Ahe Pacific War, is not identifiable by, any 
hegemonic class project as such,, but is more concerned with consumption- 
oriented enterprises (MariateSul, 1976, p. 26). At this point we can 
perceive the importance of over-determination from previous, modes of 
production. In his analysis of elite formation in 17th Century Peru, 
(Mfo) 
Fred Bronner emphasises the importance of conspicuous consumption as 
a means ol' e6tabli: ihing status in the criol-LO hituarchY, and U10 
ludicrous extent to which the imitation of peninsular life was taken. 
According to Minister Noboa, this characteristic persisted two centuries 
later; 
"Notase como un caracter muy marcado del 
comercio entre nosotrost la venta abundante 
de articulos de lujo; y hay espiritus a quienes 
esto sobresalta. Semejante he-Chov mas grande 
en la apariencia que en la realidadv tiene 
explicaeion muy seneilla. En la cap#a1, que' 
encierria credido numero de familias acomodads, 
se contreran y lu'cen con todo su brillo 
12 
esos objetos fascinadores; pero saliendo de 
Lima los articulos que marchan por nuestros 
caminos con dirreccion a todos los demas puntos 
de la Republica son, en sus nueve decimas partes, 
de primera necessidad. " (1861). 
This variety of consciousness, apparently genuinely feudal in its 
orientation, is evidently derived from a feudal colonisationg and 
simultaneously, represents a barrier to capital accumulation; that 
small surplus which is not realized outside Perup is spent almost 
entirely on consumption, and the, resulting struggles axe not class 
struggles as suche but intra-class struggles over 'booty'. 
A conscientious awlysis of under-development* must attempt to 
determine the extent to which this sort of behaviour is a self- 
reinforcing function of its feudal origins# or a function of the 
continued external orientation of the economyg encouraging an emphasis 
on I, compradorl activity. This would entail an examination of the 
historical development of class structure and consciousness, and of 
the extent to which these factors were articulatedg both inwazdly and 
outwardly. 
This example, is offen&, 
'not as a ddidtiV6 treatiOnt of this 
form of consciousness, or to claim a particularly great importance 
for the theoretical point, but as an illustration of method. cutler 
and his colleagues (19770 passim) emphasise the complexity of 
the 
interlocking categories required in Marxist analysist in the course Of 
challenging; 
".. not merely the economic monist causality 
of Marxism# but the very pertinence of all 
such general categories of causality and the 
privilege they accord to certain orders of 
causes as against others. " (op. cit. 9 p. 128). 
In this 9 they are in fact only following Marx himself# since 
in the 
detailed discussion of method engaged in towards the end of the 
Introduction to the Grundrisse (197jj pp 100f), Marx insists on the 
rooting of economic categories in the complex specificity of their 
historical occurrence and inter-relations with other categories 
(cf ParticulArly h1a diamralon Qf epopuUtion ')ý 
"This example of labour shows strikin ly how 
even the most abstract categories, despite 
their validity- precisely because of their 
abstractness-for all epochs, are nevertheless, 
in the specific character of this abstractiong 
themselves likewise a product of historic 
relations, and possess theirfull validity 
only for and within these relations. " (19739 
P- 105). 
Following this method, this thesis will seek to avoid either excessive 
quantities of amorphous empirical investigationg or introverted and 
unreferenced theoretical discussion. To facilitate the analysis, I- 
will begin by examining the matrix of theoretical categories most 
relevant to a Marxist discussion of the subject matter. It should be 
stressed immediately that I do not intend, nor could I hope to provide 
illuminating discussion or first-hand material for all the categories 
in the matrix (this would be following Marx in ambition rather than 
method). Nevertheless. this clarification is essential Initiallys so 
that the context of subsequent usages of the categories will be clear. 
Additionallyl as indicated aboveg these categories can not be considered 
exclusive or exhaustive; delineating them will often require the use of 
what orthodox social science would refer to as 'second (or middle-) 
order categories'. This is unavoidableg as a brief perusal of either 
of Anderson's works of synthesis demonstrates (197ýt 1979). 
The remainder of this section will be devoted to a more detailed 
discussion of this theoretical frameworkg anticipating the contextual 
and historical discussion which will make up the initial chapters of 
the second section. 
u. lLf... 
Fi9ture 1. Analytical scheme. 
I 
ature of linkage ýrticulation aE Articulation Articulation 
b en between social 
Iy tica 
Ana- be 
t formations ytica 
Q etwe f 
linkage of 
separates 
as 
transformatioi 
as restriction. t 
categories 
in social 
folzations 
Xode of Production 
Nature of Surplus 
Class Forms 
Inaiitutional Forms 
(State and Church) 
Class and Racial 
Consciousness 
This matrix is constructed around two axes. The vertical axis is 
concerned with the categories customarily employed in the examination 
of social fOrDiations. There ist of course; a considerable debate about 
the relationship which these categories bear towards each othere 
centring around the notion of economic determination *in the last 
instancelp and the relegation of some of the categories, such as '' 
racial or class consciousness, to an epiphenomenal status# in Marxist 
often mole than bourgeois social science. I will examine some of these 
debates below (Ch. 2-). As they stando howeverp these categories are 
problematic. They represent Althusser's synchronic notion of Marxisms 
which in attempting to do away with - historical time, renders 
itself 
peculiarly Inefficacious when attemptW an analysis of subject 
matter such as nineteenth century Peruvian historyo which epitomi6es 
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tO A groat extent the ConfiWed eh&nge ana compromise of history. 
Some conceptualisation which allows for a historical review of the 
developing relationships between different social formationsg with 
different antecedents, is requiredl and It is to this that I now 
wish toýturn. 
C. Articulation. - 
The horizontal axis' of the matrix is headed 'Nature of Linkage 
Most'commentators, on the relationship between the nation-states of 
Europe and the rest of the world have been concerned with some precise 
delineation of' the form and content of this relationship. The most 
1POPIlt S&I'dut Fol L111P IR larL14, ul"Llulle. ; &, &&I Ligo JoiLlual alfijaiaLuo 
that g6es'with the term; it is, however used in 8, confusing variety 
of contextel' and I so we must be clear of the range Of waY6 in which it 
can be used. - II 
Some schemas assume a set of separate unitst which are given their 
identity largely through their exploited or exploitative relationship 
with another unit. This analysis has little room for the subtleties 
of class structure; 
"These metropolis-satellite relations are not 
limited to the imperial or international level 
but penetrate and structure the very economic# political 
and social life of Latin American colonies and 
countries. just as the colonial and national 
capital and its export sector become the satellite 
of the Iberian (and later of other) metropoles-of 
the world economic 
: system, this satellite immediately 
becomes a colonial and then IL national metropolis 
with respect to the productive sectors and 
POP14ation of the interior, Furthernore 
thO Pr6VIhCIAI capitals, which thus are 
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themselves satellites of the national 
metropolis - and through the latter of 
the world metropolis - are in turn provincial 
centres around which their own local satellites 
orbit. " (Fmnk, 19691 p. 6). 
There seems to be some confusion herej as though% geographer had 
suddenly discovered the idea of exchange relations. The units of 
analysis are mixedp since in describing the continuity of exploijationt 
Frank is using the geographical ideas of *nation-states'll regions 
and provinceag which have bilateral economic relations with each other. 
As Brewer points out, he is conflating very different kinds of relations 
on the basis of very superficial similarities (1980t P. 171). Above 
all, the image provided by Frank is of an almost infinitely fissiparous 
hierarchyt in which it is difficult to perceive any substantial identities 
of class interest. Ultimatelyt this notion of linkage is little more 
useful than the old adage concerning big fleas and little fleast 
though it is possible to perceive Frank's intention of identifying the 
ambivalence of class interests in a world economic system. 9 and this is 
a theme to which I will return later. A whole area of social and 
juridicial relations is absent from this conception however. 
Frank's categories can not be considered adequate to characterize 
systems of production in a differentiated Sensel this is to a 
degree 
entirely in keeping with hits overall perspectivet with 
its emphasis 
on Capitalism as a world system fairly unif orm, in its effects 
( and 
of far greater antiquity then most commentators would assume). 
This 
pualtluti wao adopLad In oxylluIL uounLospoInt to tho duAlir-m Of 
thp 
contemporary prevailing orthodoxy in the sociology of 
development, 
with its Parsonian overtones. Recently, howevere 
dualism has emerged 
in a rather more respectable guise. 
This dualisa normany takes the fom o: f positing 
two distinct typest 
spheres, systems or modes of production, the existence of one of which 
is largely predicated uppu the other. For Geertz and McGee# this 
conceptualisation is described as the lbazaar'economyl (Geertz. 1963t, 
pp 90-103 McGeeq 1971). and represents again more of a geographer's 
framing of the problem, based largely as it is cn the urban/rural 
dichotomy. However, the fact that McGee extends the concept to include 
the systems of production implied by bazaar and $firm, economies' 
foieshadows the work on articulation, by the-French economic anthro- 
pologists. The crucial differentiation between the two economies" is 
the ratic between constant and variable capital; in the 'bazaar 
economy' production'is predominantly labour-Intensive. Since a mingling 
of the two sectors in terms of production relations would affect the 
character of the. 'bazaar economy" e the link-. Ivr effected through market 
relations. 
A considerable amount of work has recently been carried out Within 
the Marxist tradition identifying the way in which Capitalism uses 
1 
pre-capitalist zelations of production to reduce the costs inherent in 
the i-sprodug., Iton of labour power (cf Dandler et al., 1976, on the 
agrarian sector in Latin America, and MeIllasoux on Africa, 1977). 
In many instances v this does not simply rely on the mechanism of I 
exchange relations, but actually employs extra-economic coercion. 
, Marx described the options for historical development &rising from 
extexual conquest of 'one social formation by another with a different 
dominant mode of production; 
"In all cases of conquests three things are 
possible. The conquering people subjugates 
.... 
the conquered under its own mode of production 
(eg the English in Ireland in this centurys and 
partly In India; or it leaves the old mode intact 
and contents itself with a tribute (eg Turks and 
Romans); or a ieciprocal Interaction takes place 
whereby something new, a synthesis, arises 
(the 
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Germanic Conquestog in part). " (1973P P 97)- 
Although this delineation from the GrundriBBe is criticised by Taylor 
for being (apparently simultaneously) Feuerbachian and Hegelian (1979# 
p. 1.54), it does not differ substantially from his own conclusions, 
defi I ning *Third World I foluations, as he does p as transitional. Hence 
for Taylor, the notion :, of articulation transcends the idea of a 
functional linkageq which is the danger inherent'in taking a synchronic 
view of modes of production, and becomes an active historical process 
Of tMAf0rutign- U211AA1, for Roy* the end point of larticuUtion' 
is the genesis of capitalism. Foster-Carter characterises his argument; 
"Whereas faudalisa acts as an integuaent, a 
cocoon for eabryonic capitalsjpj other pre- 
capitalist modes of production are fiercely 
resistant to itj so much so that the resist- 
ance invariably for Rey must be broken in the 
first instance by violence. " (1978t P . 
58-) 
Where Bey parts company from Taylor and Others ( like Bradby) is in 
his insistance on what Foster-Carter describes as the 'homeficence' 
(having the same effect) of Capitalism, which places him filmlY in 
the 'progressivist" camp. Taylors conception of articulations On the 
other handq eschews simple evolutionismo and identifies as crucial 
variables the structure of the internal relations between the different 
iactors in social formations (eg between forceB of productioutT014tI01111 
of production and the ideological determinants which accompany them)q 
and the historical stage at which these formations intersect (Yepes 
adopts a similar approach to Peruvian history with his concept of 
scission, 1974). Bradby, cruciallye points to the different reqtdre- 
zents of capitaliza from undeveloped econýaies at the different 
stages of its historical development (1975)- 
The position we have reached with Bradby and Taylor seems the most 
useful conoeption of articulation. it can be deceptivelY easY 
tO GPOt 
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a non-capitalist' or pre-capitalist' form of Production# exchanget 
labour relations and so cn, and confuse the historical origin of these 
categories with their persistence in a mediated form. Similarlyq it can 
be tempting to identify as nascent-capitalist folus instances which are 
nothing of the sort. Marx pointed to this danger; 
"Bourgeois societyýis the moat developed and the 
most complex historic organization of production. 
The categories which express its relations, the 
comprehension of its structure, thereby also 
allows, insights into the structums and relations 
of productim of all the vanished social formations 
out of whose ruins and elements it built itself 
UP .............. But not at all in the manner of 
those economists who smudge over all the historical 
differences and see bourgeois relations in all foms 
of society. " (197ý, p. 105). 
This should be borne in mind when we address the arguments of Bollinger 
and Weaver on the class composilion, of Peru in the nineteenth century. 
However, some important questions are still begged. The length of 
the transformation period may be seen as more crucial than the idea 
of articulation as transformation itself. For example, certain quasi- 
institutional or institutional relationships take on a particularly 
durable foxu. In Perul the issue of racial divisions and consciousness 
may be seen as a particularly important instance both in the internal 
structure of the social formation, and'its relationships with Europe- 
Taylor points to more generalised factors hindering the penetration by 
Capitalism of the agrarian sector of latin America, (1979o P- 222)- 
This then poses considerable problems for any conception of a 'mode of 
production's and has led to some attempting to fashion a 'colonial mode 
of pxoduction' (Alavit 1975). 1 shall approach this problem in two 
ways; by a more detailed discussion of the concept Of omode of, production' 
and the other elements of social foriations in the following chapter. 
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I will then attempt to delineate the succession of social formations 
existing in Peru ( Inca Yýp, Colonial/Mercantile aft , neo-colonial 
export) so that the theoretical basis for understanding the 'laws of 
notion' of each are as clear as possible. In the empirical section, 
the inter-ielationship of the differentiated social formations will 
demonstrate the inefficacy of expecting pure laws of motion to operate 
for any of these forms, given the limitations which are to a degree 
inherent in their co-existence. 
Because the concept of articulation has such a bearing on our earlier 
discussion of historic., al time ,I make no apology for introducing the 
matrix with it. However, we need to, at learst briefly ) examine 
the way 
in which Marxist theory has conceived of the objeCU to be articulateds 
social formations, and these will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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WAY. rh3i 2: 13UCIAL 10tiMATION. 
A. Intzoduction. 
Many modern Marxists are dismissive of attempts to construct a basis 
for a modern theory of Imperialism or uneven developmentg or even the 
articulation of modes of production, on the basis of Marx*s writings. 
"The fallacy consists in extracting the different 
concepts that Marx used in analysing non-capitalist 
formations at different periods of his work without 
adequately situating them in his discourse. Such an 
approach necessarily avoids the crucial problem of 
the theoretical adequacy of these concepts in 
analysing particular non-capitalist formations. "' 
(Taylor, 1979, p. 1529 his emphasis). 
Brewer (1980, p 5Uf) agrees that Marx's writings on colonialism are 
slightp and produced under circumstances which daaa e their theoretical 
credibility. Although I would agree that the main source of impiration 
should be the groundwork of Marx's method, both his writings on 
colonialism and pre-capitalist modes of production are wOr-th,. a rOviO'W- 
This chapter will largely be concerned with the categories use& by 
Marx and Engels to identify historical transformationst but I Will 
begin with a brief exegesis of his direct writings-on colonialism- 
The only time that 'Imperialism I appears (in translation) In Marx's 
writing is in the analysis of its ideological function# in# specificallyt 
the Empire of Napoleon III; 
"Imperialism isg at the same time, the most 
p: rostitute and ultimate form of the state 
power which nascent middle class societY 
had commenced to elaborate as a means of 
its own emancipation froa feudalismo and 
W1114,11 full glown boulgoosix a0tolf-bILY IPII 
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finally tiansformed into A means for the 
enslavement of Labcur by Capital. " (in 
Feuer, 1959, p 404). 
This particular analysis of expansionist and adventurist exercises as 
a means of' consolidating the political stucture for class control is 
in fact of particular use when we come to examine the problematic 
category of 'Nation-state and I-ts theoretical relationship to the 
specific Marxist categories of social formation and mode of, production. 
However, it is evident that Marx's concern here is notýwith this phenom- 
enon as a generalised function or stage of capitalist developmento but 
rather with the historical specificity of' one social formation. 
it is in his writings on India and Ireland that some of the dilemmas 
and potential contradictions emerge - rho work on ! Wi4 wc, " 
of pieces for the'New York Herald Tribunep and suffers both from the 
constiaints endemic to journalism# and , according to Anderson 
(1979t 
pp 488-89) to a considerable degree of Ignorance about India. Other 
writings in correspondence are fragmentaryt and concentrate on tactical 
issues. It is startling, howeverg to see contemporary debates and 
concerns emerge from these pages. Most commentators have perceived the 
main tension to exist around the issue of the impact of emergent 
capitalism on the internal development of other formations. His 
writings on India give a pedigree to analyses which perceive 
the impact 
of capitalism as being ultimately and inevitably progressive 
(eg Bey and 
Warren). The contiguity of capitalism and the eAsiatic Mode of 
production, 
in 
I 
the form of the British penetration of India and Far Eastern markets 
was for him revolutionary. Firstly# he thought that the 
bourgeoisie 
of the colonial power would perceive the development of 
the colonies 
as ultimately in their interestj 
"Once transformeV (from mercantile capitalism) 
"European oapitali= &C4drGS M intOrbat 
'n 
actually developing its colonies" (14arx and 
Engelst 19689 pp 83-87) 
-2-3- 
A great deal of this Interest would naturally lie in the direction of 
the development of new markets. This aspect of the analysiv raise's 
an important theoretical point; how much weight do we give to the 
'drive'out towards new markets in Marx"s theory? In a detailed dis- 
cussion. of Marx's writings on India, Brewer identifies the relation- 
ship between the 'EaBt Indies' and the British cotton industry as a 
highly specific historic instance of the effect of uneven developmento 
on the basis of which general statements about Capitalism*s need fW 
markýts should not be erected (1980). It is, however clear that 
Marx understood that where markets had been uncoveredt they would be 
ruthlessly exploited (op, cit., pp 42-56), and indeed the logic Of 
direct state intervention in India was the need to break down a 
stubbornly resilient textile sector, based on a profoundly conservative 
mode of prodaction. The resulting human misery was a major object of 
Marx's commentary on the development of machinery in Capital, where 
the weavers of India provided a major example (Marxi 1974, p. 406). 
Howeverv Brewer iB right to identify Marx's treatment of Capitalism in 
India with his general treatment of it as a revolutionary force of 
ultimate benefit. He concentrated attention on the fact that the 
technology of the transport network installed by the colonial power 
would inevitably generate industrial capitalism; 
,, You cannot maintain a net of railways over an immense 
country without introducing all those industrial Pro- 
cesses necessary to meet the immediate and c=rent 
wanta of railway locomotiont and out of which there 
must grow the application of machinery to those branchets 
of industry not immediately connected with railways. 
The railway system will therefore becomet in India$ 
truly the forerunner of modern industry. " (1969t P-128)- 
The actual process of colonial rule also provided benefits j, both 
in 
terms of the social relations which cheinged alongside land 
tenure, and 
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the 'benefits* provided by British intervention at the super-structural' 
level; 'political unity', the backbone of a national governments and 
a new class "imbued with European science" (1969P P. 133)t all of which 
would prove invaluable in the self-emancipation necessary for the indi- 
genous population to reap the benefits of this transformation. 
War. Marx unambiguous in this view of capitalism? In their writings 
on Ireland, Marx and Engels attribute Ireland's lack of development to 
the determination of England, as the colonial power, to maintain Ireland 
as puxely agricultural in character (1971, PP. 130-132)1 directlyp 
Ireland's failure to develop from a position of primitive accumulation 
appears to have partly resulted from the absence of protective tariffs. 
Hence it is evident that they could conceive of instances where rivalry 
could inhibit the development of countries under the direct or. indirect 
control of capitalist powers. Brewer explains the difference in the 
analyses in terms of the different modes of production that charact&Tised 
Ireland and India, ( 1980t pp 59-60), but in some of his writng on Carey's 
view of free trade, Marx gives a hint that the interests of England 
might not always be best served by the development of rival embrYDnýc 
capitalist forms(. cf , Capital It 1974 PP 700-1 . Grundrisse # 
1973 9 pp 
If Ireland could be "stunted in its development by the 
English invasion and thrown centuries back ........ by constant oppression" 
and the Irish be "artificially converted into an utterly impoverished 
nation" (Marx & Engels, 1968, P. 319), why should England's relations 
with any other contiguous power lw more productive? There are 
two answers 
to this question; firstly there.. Is the question of time-scale, which 
t 
Brewer uses to let Marx off the hook with regard to his predictions 
concerning India, and secondly, there is the temptation 
to confuse 
Capitalism as a category with the status of Fngland as a nation-state 
whose dominant mode of production was Capitalism. So whilst 
CaPital: lr; lm 
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OF ýORK 
Ll, qRAtiy I 
: 
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as an abstract form, over an indeterminate time-scale, may inevitably 
be progressive, as cori6retely exhibited in the rivalry of formations 
distorted by their state superstructures it may leadl in specific 
historical: cir'cumstances, to the opposite of progress. Hobsbawm finds, 
in slome of Marx'slast correspondencet with Zasulicho evidence that he 
was disenchanted with what we shall describe as the 'progressivist * 
stance (in mark, 1964). 
In'spite of Taylorls strictures, it is'evident thatt although a fully 
delineated theory to explain the interaction of 'Capitalism and other 
social formations in the world system is absent from Marx's work, most 
of the concerns which have been developed by other writers are there 
in a recognisable form. 
It is towards a detailed consideration of the relevance of Marx's 
thoroughly eloborated theory that we must turn now, however. The 
significant areas for underdevelopment theory" have been a6en as 
firstly, the theories associated with historical transforMationst and 
the analytical method associated with them, and secondly the implications 
of the theory of expanded reproduction. 
The, ýmain tension in Marx's historical writings Is between ttle preu: 16e, 
rigour applied to the categories used in, producing a schema of capitalist 
production, and the way inwhich,, in concrete historical analysis, 
the ambiguity of' these categories was admitted in such a way as to 
undertake the application of them, to., Oxe all situations . The most 
complete example is the section of, Feuerbach in The German IdeqlpjM# 
with its suggestive references to world-hiBtorical time (1970# P058)1 
1. cf Ziemann & Lanzendorfer's concept of relatively stagnating 
expanded reproduction' (1977)g discussed further below. 
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but much of Marx's historical writing in Capital shares the same creative 
flexibility. Howevers this does leave some major problemso not merely 
with the hermeneutics of Capital, but also with its epistemology, and 
these are most aptly demonstrated by the problem of modes of production 
JaWl MULACLI fulniaLlull. 
B. Mode of' Production or social formation? 
_ý 
Problems of class. 
convenient starting point for an analysis of the use of these con- 
CePts is Brewer's gloss of Althusser and Balibar's treatment in Feading 
Capital; I 
"They insist that a mode of production (capitalism, 
feudalism etc. ) is an abstract, timeless concept. It 
would be wrong to look for a real example, to assertp 
say, that England in 1850 was a capitalist mode of 
production. A mode of production is defined by a 
particular, exactly'specifiedl relation connecting 
two classes (in the case of class, as opposed to 
classless, modes); it must be defined and analysed 
in the most precise and rigourous fashion. A social 
formation is also a conceptual constructionj but of 
a more concrete kini; a real society can be thought Of 
as a social formation. " (1980, p. 184). 
Brower chooses to side-step what he describes as the Itricky, philosophical 
ioaucral Involyed In this formulation, and zubacquently in hIP MOUNiOn 
of the 'modes of production controversy' tends to dismiss them as 
$about the use of words and no more* and 'as such ... of 
little interest 
(OP-cit-o P. 273). There are two reasons for avoiding this cavalier 
dismissal of the debate, which are directly relevant to the concerns of 
this thesis. Firstly, the theoretical differences (and they are 
theoretical rather than semantic) have implications for the trajectO 
. 
ries 
of societies. Secondly, some of the problems raised are s ufficiently 
difficult to threaten the usefulness of an historical analysis, unless 
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the 
I usage of 
the terms is initially described. 
An Althusserian definition of the rigour indicated above provides 
immediate practical problems. How can a bilateral class system be a 
defining condition of a mode of production only in the context of class- 
based Modell? ThiJa ill to circumscribe the Character of the concept to 
a degree that it becomes tautologous, and ultimately useless; it is 
also to lean too heavily on Volume I of Capital at the expense of the 
planned work on *many capitals'. Whilst we may not expect to find our 
mode of production precisely mirrored in historyl we do at least expect 
it to be recognisable. We have already cited Marx above in opposition 
to this idealist position, but the most succinct criticism may be found 
in Anti-Duhring; 
"The principles are not the starting point of the 
investigation, but its final resultj they arv not 
applied to nature and human historyg but abstracted 
from them; it is not nature and the realm of humanity 
which conform to these principlesg but the principles 
are only valid in so far as they are in conformity 
With natuic tLnCL hiistorl. Irluit. jrj Lile ojjjy libatorialimL 
conception of the question, and Herr Duhring's contrary 
conception is idealistic, makes things stand completely 
on their headsq and fashions the real world out of the 
Idea" (or- Mode of Production? ) 11 out of schematat schemes 
or categories existing somewhere prior to the worlde from 
an eternity, just like -a Hegel,. " (1976, P-43. 
) 
Godelier identiiies with this outline, though modernising the language 
to descAbe modes as "working hypotheses linked to a state of knowledge 
and reality, simultaneously the point of arrival of theoretical reflection 
and the point of departure for a further deciphering of the infinite 
variety of concrete history's (Seddon, 1978, p. 218), and perceives 
seven different forms of ownership of land described by Marx in the 
Grundrisset some of which, like the lslave model and the 'Germanic 
I 
model are highly geographically and historically specific- 
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Ljovotal ul Litcoo ucLLcrorjcc3 plocicilL jjj. E'. Ej(; UjLjob l'ol trio Althubtierlan 
analyst. For example, the Asiatic mode, with its hefty state apparatus*, 
allows for four-'classes' ; peasants, artisans. aristocracy and 'state 
offcials', and the later stages of the 'Ancient Model, allow for a con- 
fusing proliferation of groups standing in a qualitatively different 
relation to the means of production ( cf Godelier in Seddon, 1978P PP 
223-229). If the reply to this is that Marx progressed from this con- 
ception to a two-class analysis between the Gx-undri8se and Capital, we 
have only to examine the third volume of Capital, and Marx* s commentary 
on classes in capitalist society; 
"The owners merely of labour-power,. owners of capital, 
and land-owners, whose respective sources of income 
are wagest profit and ground-rento in other wordsp 
wage-labourers, capitalists and land-ownerst constitute 
then thTee big classes of modern society based upon the 
CaPitalist-mods of production. " (1972, Vol- III P-885 
my emphasis). 
Giddens points out that Marx"s work persistently fails to clarify the 
concept of classl stating that the determinant factor must be the 
position In thcýproduotion process, without working through 0,11 tho 
implications of this point (1971l P. 37). The em1hasis on conflict 
as a defining factor, to be found in much of his works is not much 
more help, even when read off in conjunction with an analysis based 
on production relations, since it Is not clear what are the defining 
elements of class conflict; hence much of the confusion as to how to 
chaxcterise conflict which appears to be based on race or ethnicity 
(see my chapter on the Pacific War and its social conflictsp below). 
The implications of this lack of clarity are quite serious - If we 
are to take this 'two-class, imperative seriously in identifying 
modes of production, then our analysis of the laws of motion' 
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of difierent modes of production will be ludicrously hampered. Smith 
(1979) har. inaicatea, in the context of yural Perup the analytical 
problems encountered when diif"erentiated groups of' petty-commodity 
producers are all subsumed under the heading 01 'peasant-Yyl. This 
theoietical elision implies a parallel with European feudalism and its 
subsequent development which is quite simply inapp: topTiate. 
SimllallYv to assume the existence of capitalism from the existence of 
the f orm of wage labour is mistaken. Marx specifically saw the ex- 
propriation of the labour of direct producers by merclunts. ' capital 615 
a crucial obstacle; 
"to the real capitalist mode of' production ...... 
without revolutionising the mode of productiont it 
only WOTSens the conditions of the direct prodixers, 
turns them into mere wage workers and proletarians under 
conditions worse than those under the immediate control 
of Capital, and appropriates their surplus labour on the 
basis of the old mode of production. " (Capital, 111,19729 
PP 334-335) 
Banaji pursues this to a further stage by demonstrating that feudalis m 
was always supported by a variety of' forms of labour (1977t P-30). The 
converse of this point is that apparently pre-capitalist forms of. ' pro- 
ductiong when closely linked to capitalist producitgn processes, are 
I given a content which belies their appearances; 
"Finally, subsistence production now figures, under 
this system, as the specific form of I -reproduction 
Of 
labour-power, within a capitalist process of production. 
lt becomes misleading, therefore, to regard it as a specifict 
separate mode of production. " (Banaji, op. cit. 9 P-34). 
This analysis has been reiterated, with empi: pical rupportt by Werlhof 
and Neuhoff (1982)# who assert that the support of subsistence plotse 
and unpaid domestic labourp delayed the proletarianisation of agrarian 
produQtjon In 'Venezuela. 
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Unfortunately, we can not entirely find our way out of this raze 
of class and social relations by the simple use of the appear-ance/ 
reality I device (appearance- subs istenc e production but reality- 
capitalist reproduction of the labour force). The crucial aspect is 
not by which analytical category various forms of social relationship 
are contained, but rather what is the dynamic of these social re2ationsg 
and their implication for the trajectory of the society in which they exist? 
There are two dimensions to this problem. lirstly there is the element 
of the subtle gradation of historical change 
1, 
which implies an analysis 
I 
of process9 and secondly there is the vexed question of consciousness, 
which is particularly relevant to a divided society such as Peru. Hence, 
while it may be possible to argue with Mariategui that; 
111, a cuestion indigena arranca de nuestra economia. 
Tiono räuz raicce an al zegimen de propriedad de 
la tierra. ", (1976,. P-35. ) 
liowever, the 'solution can not therefore be seen as necessarily lying 
solely in land reform. As I explain below in this chapter and in 
Chapter 10p the nature of inter-group hostility is determined partially 
by extra-economic factorsg and partially by historic over-determined" 
social relaticnships. Class and race categories will not be coterminous 
in all instances, and this fact may affect the pattern of class alliances 
through which social change is effected. 
The study of actual social structures reveals many such deficiencies 
in correspondence between the different levels of the Althusserian 
model of modes of production. For example; 
"Any social formation may involve not only distinctive 
modes of production but the interpenetration of-their 
levels - e. g. the partial reproduction by one mode's 
ideology, say, of another's particular social reltiOns- 
If one thinks of such cases as Brazil, with its lasting 
1. c. f cS oif f er and Howe (1982) , drawing on Hey 
(1977 ) in the ir analysis 
of the historical changes in the relationships between levels of 
$the mode 
of production in Brazil. 
"patrimonial heritage, from a non-capitalist 
background, this is obviously a suggestive concept. " 
(Henfrey, 1981, p. 40). 
So. for exampleg whilst 'pation-client' relationships may often i'unction 
as class relationships (Ilynn, 1974), they do not do so in an unproblematic 
way; the mode of their functioning may be crucial to the direction taken by 
social movements, and the institutional arrangements set up over them.. 
11' the analysis ol- class relationships is not a good gui(le to the 
identification of a mode of production, is there another component which 
might be more relitble? There is a hint in Banajils work that the labour 
process is the determining variable, but this has been the subject of' 
dixe warnings; 
"The most common error among Marxists is to confuse 
the study of' the production process in society with 
that of the labour process, and to invent as many 
modes of' productIn as there are labour processes. 
lor this reason one cannot speak of agricultural, 
pastoral, cynegetic, or otherlmodes of production'. " 
(Godelier, 1977# P. Z4. ) 
Henfrey takes Long to task for this very error (1981, p. 43)', - 
Since Ilabour processes' are probably even more numerous than 'class 
relationships*, this is no help in enabling us to identify our theoretical 
'mode of pi-oduction' with anything r-ecognisable. 
There are a variety of' offered solutions to this conundrum. oc"Pome 
structulalists simply accept the existence ol' variations, give them 
appropiiate labels, and then juggle them like so many Parsonian pattern 
variables (Taylor). Some formulas provide a catch-all, which allows you 
to take into account or- Ignoxe historical specificities as you choose - 
Godelier advises us to look "f ar beyond the apparent, visible logic" and 
"look for and Jind the structmal and histoxical cixcumstances oJ 
their" 
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(modes of p: t-oduction) " appearance, their reproduction and disappearance 
in history" (1977t P. 25). Similarlyt Banaji describes them as objects 
of long duration', which have to be analysed on a particularly long time 
scale (Op-cit. ). This does not solve our analytical probleml however# 
since we are not to know whether some of' the stranger hybrid arrangements 
are 
I 
woith considering on this epochal scale until they have disappeared, 
and capitalism has finally Imodernised' the globe. 
For many yearsp attempts were made to squash all variations into one 
of the appropriate boxes in the unilinear schema, an enterprise which 
has since the 50's been tainted by Stalinism. Since the early 1970's, 
attempts have been made to develop alternative models, and in this con- 
text, the concept of the 'Asiatic Model has been revived and subjected 
to considerable scrutiny. for Melotti, Marx was quite consistent in 
his adherence to the concept, and it is justifiable in terms of a 
thorough reading of Asiatic society; it therefore forms a part of' his 
multilinear schema of human development (1977). The AMP has received 
severe criticism on the grounds of theoretical incoherence (Hindess and 
IiirBtP 1975 and Anderson, 1979). and has even been resurrected under a 
pseudonym (the 'tribute model' (Amin, 1976)). 
This is not the appropriate place to reiterate these debates. The 
linvuiUmL ftAuL I; i LhaL Lhj; % JQvP1 of dip-riissinn IndieRtes poino considevible 
confusion about the ease with which societies can be analysed in terms of 
a rigid model composed of forces and relations of, production and consist- 
ing o44 two opposed classes; I would tend to agree with lienfxey that 
this 
model can, in fact seriously impede class analysis (198le P. 
44)- On 
the other hand, one must agree with Anderson that attempts to squash 
societies quite widely differentiated temporally and geogi-aphically 
Into 
the 'Asiatic mode I are quite as Inappropriate as to attempt to fit 
them 
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into the mould of European feudalism. In my own discus*ion of p2-e- 
Conquest Peru, the use of both the concept of the Asiatic Mode'. and 
an analytic comparison with the particular nature of S)panish feudalism 
is instructive. 
0 
The confusion which has arisen out of' the debate about the 'original 
ý)7j,, WajjOrg3LVjjj, 197V, It:. dicaLly Ll"Ilr4LIUSIO (ILIILUII, It ij V 
compounded by the debate over how to view colonial and ex-colonial 
societies. As I noted in the previous chapter, the two courses taken 
in conceiving the relationship between fully developed capitalist 
'nations, and other social formations (ignoring Frank and Wallerstein 
and their premature capitalism), are to conceive of the relationship as 
an articulation of two distinct modes of production (and we have already 
discussed some of the drawbacks of this idea), 
_or 
to invent a new 
hybrid 'colonial model (Alavi., 1975)t the problems of which have been 
fully discussed (lioster-Cartert 1978p Banajit 19770 Brewer, 19EO, pp 261- 
273). Whilst Brewer is right to point to the fact that this *colonial 
model shares none of the theoretical features by which we attempt to 
identify modes of production, he is forced to admit that the problem 
posed by the social formations resulting fron colonial rule can not be 
accomodated within a traditional progressive framework, or only with great 
difficulty. 
4101, In and Two other meful concaptualisationz AT@# rQQPOQtIY0IY, la 
Landzendorfer's notion of a. 'relatively stagnating transtion to capital- 
ism,, which I discuss in my section on the State, below, and weva's 
delineation of the particularity of, Latin Americaes developmente with 
a dillerentiated expression of the general laws of capitalist develop- 
ment (1978). The former tends to iocus attention on the internal dynamics 
ot the social : Lo2, mations under study and has the inherent disadvantage of 
being an open definition - how long does the stagnation have 
to continue 
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I befoie the formation can be considered in its own right? In the 
latter perspective, and in Yepes' notion of' 'determined capitalisi', (1974) 
we have a due acknowledgement of' the importance played in the develop- T 
ment of some formations by the expanding Capitalist fOTmations, without 
posing Frank's idealist alternative of autonomous development' (Henfrey. 
l9as P. '44). 
In the discussion that iollows. I will generally employ Imode ol 
production' as an analytical category# which is particularly useful in 
examining the transfoxmation from pre-Conquest to Colonial Peru. The 
moie descriptive category of social jormation, is mainly used subsequent- 
ly, partly to sidestep some of* the difficult debates which continue. over 
the issues discussed above, which bear on the blurxed boundaries of 
the relationships between nation states/modes of production. 
C. Theories of Imperialitm and Dependency - the impact of expanded 
Reproduction. 
At the beginning oi the Twentieth Century, a substantial body of 
klai: x1raL Lh--uiy viam p4u4u.; cLI Lu nooomiL lus Lho '21inGli-O "" a 
fundýLmental crisis in the advanced capitalist nations. This woyk 
sought an explanation for the continued dynamism cf capitalism In 
colonialism and capital export. The theo: tists also wished to distinguish 
between pre-capitalist expansion and national oppression. Inevitably, 
these theoxies were Eurocentric in their approach, and concerned with 
the causality of imperialism, and as a result j suffered from ZL 
lack 
of detailed analysis of' the relations between *metropolitan, and 
'peripheral' states and economies. Furihermoxe, there tends to be an 
inconsistency of focus; at times the concern is with colonialised 
nations, at othe: rsl 'Imperialism' is used in the widest sense, encompass- 
ing all bellicose attempts to obtain abnormal p-rolit abroado by whatever 
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means. howevel . the 'classical I theo-rists are highly relevant to this 
study, since they were concerned to analyse the moment oi contact between 
cPpit'--lism ;, n(l thp -vpst o' thp wovId. 
Hobson's bourgeois liberal paci-Ifist critique ol Imperialism was largely 
concerned with Britain's great formal Empire. He identified iinFAncial 
imperialism as a distinct entity; 
"The new imperialism differs from the oldert first 
in substituting forthe ambition of a* single growing 
empire the theory and practice wf' competing empires, 
each motivated by similar lusts cf political aggrand- 
isement and commercial gain; secondly in the dominance 
of financial or investing o%er mercantile interests. " 
(1902). 
Yet he identifies financial imperialism almost exclusively with 
protectionism - "Imperialism repudiates free trade and rests upon an 
economic basis of protection. Just in so far as an Imperialist is 
logical does he become an open and avowed protectionist. "(1938i p. 67. ) 
He wast moreoverg concerned largely to pursue his under-consumptionist 
thesis in the context of formal conquest and control. Colonial 
impsriallzm wan soen as a necessary If Undulrablo r. 010110TY to the 
expor-t of capital; he accepted that private capital investment might 
lead to forceful military intervention, but his limited theoretical 
framework could not encompass areas in which Britain had considerable 
finanancial interestg but into whose affairs no heavy-handed intervention 
was made. 
The 'problem' oi under-consumption had quite a respectable pedigree 
by the time that Hobson wrote. As early as 1869 'The Times' was 
beginning to express concern at the destination of excess piolits; 
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"The annual profits of our ordinary trade 
coupled with the dividends from existing foreign 
loans and enterprisesg represent a sum of many 
millions for which an outlet must be found. If 
it were sought to invest these In consuls or iallwq 
stocks, no results would be obtainedp since the people 
for whom the purchases were made would be equally at 
a loss what to do with their money. The only legitimate 
means oi disposing of, it must be by lending it to 
foyeign nations or by undertaking great works at 
home which will stimulate the importation of' foreign 
material or produce. " (30th *November 1869) 
Hilferding examined the way in which new financial institutions were 
developed in Germany and the United Statest which facilitated the 
development of finance capital and by thus lowering Interest rates, 
led to the increasing export of capital. Where these institutions had 
not been developed, he noted that capital export was likely to take the 
form of portfolio investment, rather than direct investment In productive 
indUStTy. This eXPOTt of capital rather than goods was interpTeted by 
Hilferding as a response to the predominance of* p-r-otectionism in the 
late nineteenth centuryo and as a major means of the development of 
world capitalism, since the export of capital creates a subsequent demand 
for capital goods. In considering the relationship between Peru and 
Great Britain in the late nineteenth Century, we will obviously be 
concerned with portfolio investment - the consolidation of Capital 
investment in Peru did not take place until after the Pacific War. 
Lenin stressed the formality of control in his theoretical f'ramework. 
He summarised the pTocess of imperialism as follows; 
The concentration of production and capital had 
developed to such a high stage that it has created 
monopolies which play a decisive role in economiý 
life. 
2. The merging of bank capital with industrial capital 
and the creation on the basis of this 
finance capital' 
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of a financial oligarchy. 
The export of capital as distinguished from the 
the export of commodities acquires exceptional 
importance. 
4. The formation of international monopolist capitalist 
cL'zou%; 1aL1Uub WhICh bluirb Lho W011d Wilun6ot 
The territorial division of the whole world amongst 
the bigge-st powex-s Is completed. " (Selected Warks, 
1967, PP 745-746)- 
Obviously, such a rigid characterisation of monopoly capitalism was 
likely to have been inaccurate, and as many writers have pointed out, 
the rate of cartelisation of industry proceeded far more slowly in 
some countries, notably Britain (Landes, 1969, pp 24-5-247). than in 
others; additionally, capital. was exported in large quantities before 
the 'age of Imperialism', and the bulk of this capital export went not 
to the *black colonies' but to independent states or the European 
colonies. Despite these valid criticisms, Lenin's characterisation of 
the epoch in which Britain lost its industrial supremacy as a new stage 
of' capitalism, and his exposition of its predominant elements remains 
I 
useful as a framework from which to view the 1870 Is onwards - 
One particularly interesting aspect ot this epoch, identified by Lenin 
(and by Bukharin) is the transitional form of state dependence', -Where 
countries; 
........ which politically, are formally independent, 
but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial 
and diplomatic, '; dependencel are typical of this 
epoch. We'have already referred to one form of 
dependence - the semi-colony. An example of another 
is provided by Argentina. 
'South America, and especially Argentina, 'writes 
Schulze-Gaevernitz in his work on British Imperialism, 
'is so dependent financially on London that it ought 
to be described as almost., a British commercial colorT 
9-e-**--#-*- it is not difficult to imagine what strong 
connections British f Inance capital (and its faithful 
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'friend' diplomacy) thereby acquires with the 
Argentine bourgeoisies with the circles that 
control the whole of that country's economic 
and political life. " (Selected Workst 1967t V01- Io 
pp 742-743). 
Thus Lenin expands the definition of Imperialism beyond that of a 
stage in capitalism, and a development in the relationship between 
nation states, to encompass class relationshipsg and their ambiguities, 
both within a state, and across national boundaries. In thist he was 
undoubtedly influenced by the work of Bukharing with its conception of 
the "world economy' and the international division of labour (1972a)- 
It is this formulation which renders the tilting at the windmill of 
formal control by Platt and his acolytes so misleading. After the 
adoption of free trade (q. v. Ch. 7),, direct intervention or formal 
control was, on'the whole$ unnecessary, due in part to the largely 
mutually beneficial alliance between the Peruvian export elite and 
British mercantile capital, a class relationship which expressed the 
differing levels of productive relations within the two states (q. v. 
Ch-11). Howevert via this alliance and effective British control of 
Feruvian commercial activities, British capital was able to effect a 
substantial transfer of value from both the Peruvian capitalist and 
non-capitalist sectorst thus retarding capital accumulationp whilst 
also reinforcing the quasi-feudal elite and aspects of the 'pre- 
capitalist, economy. 
There are a number of differences, of opinion and emphasis j between 
Lenin and Bukharin , which are -worth noticing. -' Whereas both 
Buknarin 
and Hilf erding indicate that capital export will be devoted to the 
development of extractive industriesq whose products would return to 
the capital exporters, Lenin appeared to envisage a displacement of 
commodity production towards areas where labour costs were lower. 
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Possibly Bukharin's most distinctive contribution to the theory of 
Imperialism was his treatment of the State (a fact first identified 
i by Lelio Basso, 1972)9 and his concept of the simultaneous national- 
isation and internationalisation of capital. Inevitably, he produced 
a somewhat over-simplified picture (viz. the Itown and country' meta- 
phor for the international division of labourt Imperialism and the 
World Economy, pp. 20-22)t and it is his simplified schema which 
appears as the intellectual ancestor of Andre Gunder Frank. He also 
tended to overestimate the unity of the capitalist nations, and the 
I 
degree of control exercised over the state apparatus. Thus, while 
the following extract provides a striking vision which has produced 
many imitations, it is barely applicable to Peru at the time of the 
Pacific War; 
world capitalism, the worlcl system of proauction, 
assumes in our times the following aspect: a few con- 
solidateds organised economic bodies (@the great civilised 
powers') on the one hand, and a periphery of underdeveloped 
countries with a semi agrarian or agrarian system on the 
other. " (Imperialism and the World Economy, 1972a p. 74) 
The British state of the time was by'no means as monolithic as this 
impliest though it was held together by a fairly coherent ideologyp 
and was capable of interventionism in the affairs of independent 
countries on a fairly massive scale. 
It was Luxemburg's treatment'of this subject that Bukharin found most 
convincing, even though he undertook a very thorough demolition Job 
on hPr t-hpou that TmperiallSm could be understood in terMB of a 
flaw 
in Marx's scheme of expanded reproduction; that Capital could 
not 
realise its surplus value unless there existed a'tthird PartY' 
( Bukharint 
1972b, Luxemburgt 195191972). The main criticism levelled against 
Luxemburg was that of teleology (Bukharin s 1972b PP 
163-4); Bukharin 
saw it as obvious that capital would seek out 
the factors of productiOll 
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with the lowest cost, so there was no need to invent a mythical 
extra-national 'third party The actual motive force behind the 
expanded reproduction of capital is really beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but Luxemburg's analysis of the role that foreign loans 
played in the txansfer of value is of interest; 
"Though foreign loans are indispensable for the 
emancipation of the rising capitalist states, they 
are yet the surest ties by which the old imperialist 
states maintain their influence, exercise finacial. 
control, and exert pressure. " (1951, p. 421). 
The role of foreign loans in bolstering a neo-colonial tutelage hadp 
in fact, already been appreciated by certain individuals in the 
-3 
"peripheral, countries. In India in the 1880's the 'Hindul observed; 
"Where foreign capital has been sunk in a country# 
the administration of that country becomes at once 
a concern of the bondholders. " (quoted in Chandrap, 
1973v p 27). 
'Luxemburg was clearest on this point in her analysis of the fate of 
Egypt; 
"With the building of the Suez Canal# Egypt 
became caught. up in the web of European 
capitalism, neverr again to get free of it. " 
(1931# p. 430)- 
Brewer points out that Luxemburg had an ambiguous attitude to the 
I 
impact of foreign capital on what she described as natural economies". 
On the one hand she recognised the way in which capitalism incorporates 
other forms of organisation into its world economy and the fact that 
PTO-capita -list 
forms traded In large surpluses; on the other handp her 
theoretical framework is predicated on a view of the non-capitalist 
world as an inert object of capitalist modernisation (Brewer, 198D, 
PP 72-73). If there is one over-riding problem with the 'Classical 
theoristslit is this; that their eurocentric view of the world is 
predicated upon an imminent crisis in the 'heartland of capitalism 
. 4].... 
which never occ=ed in quite the way they imagined; hence their 
failure to envisage the durability of some of the pre-capitalist forms 
which capitalism was to encounter, and the capacity of capitalism to adapt 
them to its use. 
Ironically, this tendency to underplay the internal dynamics of 
'dependent' formations, is shared by dependency theory, and as Henfrey( 
has pointed out, this has been a factor in the failure of theorists in 
this school to adequately analyse the-class structure of the societies 
with which they deal. In fact, they are often more concerned to identify 
mythical alternative class structures in an alternative trajectoryll in 
order to bolster their notion of dependent economies and societies (see 
for example Chilcote and Edelstein on Spain# 1974t PP34-35). 
Neverr-thless, the account offered by many dependency theorists of the 
historical development of the relationship between the countries of 
Latin America. and a succession of 'metropolitan' countries? Spain# 
England and the U. S., and the implications of this relationship for 
Latin America, has been of immense descriptive value, though as a 
number of critical accounts have indicated, their theoretical signifi- 
cance has been less easy to gauge. The wide range of theories which 
the term encompasses, ranging from its origins in the ECIA analysis after 
the last war, which wasi arguing from a basically nationalist viewpoint, 
to the contemporary debates between Marini and Cardoso and Faletto (for 
accounts of these, see Roxborough, 1979, p-P27-70, Chilcote and Edelstein, 
1974, pp 14-80; Henfrey, 1961) concern, on the wholestrategic issues 
which post-date the particular historical moment that I am dealing 'With 
Consequently, I shall not devote so much detailed textual analysis to 
them as to Marx, the classical theorists and the issue of modes of 
production-, I shall instead briefly pursue the main elements of their 
analysis which have an important bearing on Peru in the late nineteenth 
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century. 
Firstly# it has been pointed out that dependency can be understood 
in two basic ways (Roxboroughtl979t P. 44)t *external dependency, 
(which is largely concerned with terms of tradet exploitation. transfer 
of' value and unequal exchange)t or " as a conditioning factor which 
alters the internal functioning and articulation of the elements of 
the dependent social formation" (ibid. )g the latter perspective merging 
into our exploration of' the 'articulation of modes of production' con- 
cept. The key weakness has been in the understanding of the structures 
by which this dependency/articulation may be understood. I would suggest 
that the area of class analysisp and its linkages to the form of the 
State, as understood in, some Marxist theoriesp is the most fruitfult and 
this will be a predominant theme of the empirical' chapters of this 
thesis. 
The recent debate over class analysis in dependent formations, between. 
Marini (1973)t and Cardoso (1973,1977, Cardoso and Falettot 1979) 
reiterates some of the concerns of the $articulation, debate - with 
Marini tending to define dependent capitalism as a mode of production 
with its own 'laws* from which he tends to derive rather economistic 
propositions about the social structure, and Cardoso, who stresses the 
historical specificity of dependent situations, structure& by periodicity 
and the social relations of production. The theoretical problem with 
the first formulation is that thel2aws' (export orientation and mass 
transfer of value leading to limited internal marketsq and the vesting 
of power in the landed oligarchy) are predicated on an assumption 
which is derived from Bukharin's theory of international specialisationg 
and which dom... Uot'allow for any determination stemming from the internal 
structure and heritages of dependent formations. Cardoso and Faletto"s 
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"structural history"t with its differentiation of dependent formations 
on the basis of the locus of control of the export commodities 9 of fer3 
more scope for an analysis of fragmented classesq but tends to be uni- 
directional; enclave economies-inorganic ruling class=monoculture 
and therefore weak and unstable economies=caudillaje. In fact, Peru 
in the nineteenth century, whilst according fairly closely to this 
scheme, also owed a great deal to its colonial heritage, and the resulting 
development and institutionalisation of racial categories. Henfrey points 
out that they also fail to distinguish between the types of capital 
involved (mercantile or industrial) in the same way that they identify 
their internal /external control framework. This discontinuity with the 
Marxist method renders their analysis fruitful for Weberian middle-order 
theories, but weaker in identifying the complexities of the relationship 
between the economic and the political. (For a detailed critique, see 
Henfrey, 1981t PP 28-30)- 
Chilcote and Edelstein's discussion of the cultural orientations' 
of Latin America (1974, PP 36-38)# and the way in which they relate 
the perpetuation of what have been seen as feudal/hisPanic orientations 
to the nature of economic demand from Europe is an example of a more 
complete form of analysis, but even hereq some important questions are 
elided. Crucially, the question of the interference of racial categories 
with class analysis is under-played. That this is of more 
than 
merely epiphenomenal status is what I now wish to demonstrate. 
1. jor example, I cite below Cotler's comparison of Chile and 
Peru# 
which owes a great deal to this perspective, but also Point Out 
that 
this formulation omits some crucial factors (Cotlert 1979t see 
Chapter 79 
below). 
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D. Internal-differentiation - Problems of' "race' and 'ethnicity. 
The impact of differentiation resulting from self- or other-ascribed 
rp-cial or ethnic categories in Latin America represents both a problem 
and a challenge for Marxist analysts. Much analysis apprehends class 
nategories above all, in that they derive their existence from concrete 
I 
rviations of production exhibited materially and historically. It is 
correspondingly hostile to categories which appear to derive -their 
existence outside the framework of social relations of production, sinca 
these categories would tend to undermine the significance of the 
sphere of production in determining the nature of socialformations. 
Hence also the persistent rejection by I-larxists of WeberiarL status 
categories, and the importance of fractionalisation of the proletariat 
according to cleavages based either on race or sex. Since all history 0 
is the history of class struggle, conceived of as a process of bilateral 
conflict, a stress on racial conflict, carrying as it does a hint of 
pluralism. must be countered by the assertion that it is simply an 
instaýce of 'false consciousness,. Consequently, the exploration of 
the issue of racism occupies litt le space in many 0 of the standard 
texts on imperialism, and where it occurs, as in Roxbo'rough (1979, p. 4Q) 
appears in a distinctly functionalist guise; 
"Regional differences, ethnic and linguistic 
cleavages, and the simple abrence of any sense 
of nationhood among many of the rural inhabitants 
are one dimension of this lack of internal 
articulation. " (My emphasis). 
There appears to be some considerable confusion here as to the status 
to be accorded to the concept of nationhood; if there was a unified 
and ýelf-conscious 'nation'. then one would imagine that the i-, Ssue of 
articulation of modes of production would hardly arise. It would be 
my contention that it can be precisely the process of interný-i 
aifferentiation which forms a crucial aspect of effective articulation; 
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the word 'articulation I does after all refer to the jointing of clearly 
distinct parts. 
Some of the recent re-interpreters of 'Capital, # have sought to 
produce a more sophisticatede and correspondingly less economistic 
notion of 'culture* which can be used to enhance our appreciation of 
racial categories in Marxist analysis; 
"Political and cultural forms are not determined 
in the last instance or otherwises by the system 
of economic relations. Given that conception of 
social formation, is it possible to conceive of 
political and cultural practices as representing 
economic classes and their interests? " (Cutler et al., 
1977P p. 232). 
This question can be directed at the debate over the 'relative 
autonomy' of the State, and similarly, used to develop a theory of 
the 'relative autonomy' of racial and ethnic categories. The issue is 
complicated in Latin America by the fact that class and race categories 
often appear as coterminous; indeed, Piel states that the very concept 
of the 'Indian, was created_: by the ruling class of. Peru to describe 
the objects of colonial racism, (1970, P108), and Galeano describes 
how many of the admired traditional' costumes have been imposed or 
borrowed from other cultures (1973t p. 58). In this contextv one can 
understand the Marxist's suspicion that lethnicity' is simply the 
class existence of the peasantry masquerading under another name. 
This complex issue has a bearing on both the endogenous and exogenous 
elements of our framework. Firstlyt I shall consider the impact of 
I 
racial ideology on the relationship between Peru and the 'metropolitan' 
powers. Whilst racialist ideology has been seen as relevant to the 
colonial and imperial adventures of Europe in k, siag Africa and the 
Americas, in the latter case, attention has focussed onthe Colonial era. 
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In part, this is the consequence of the direct correspondence 
generally assumed between racism and historical events which Rex has 
described as 'frontier situations'( 1970 PP 36-37 ). where racism is 
seen as functional in some sense, either to the process of conquest 
and pillage, or to the subsequent formal institutions of subjection 
created by the conquerors; 
"A frontier situation of this kind, of course, 
comes to an end when a cofiquered people are in- 
corporated by another society. Rarely is it the 
case, however, that they are incorporated on terms 
of absolute equoility. From the start there is a 
distinction far more fundamental than any class 
distinction between the conquerors and the con- 
quered. And, if the conquered retain any, visible 
sign such as their own distinctive physical 
characteristics or distinct cultural practicest 
there will be no possibility of mobility from 
one group to another. " (Rex, 1970, P-36) 
This is the cautious definition of a Weberian; early Marxists 
were far more forthright in their attribution. Hilferding was 
quite specific; 
"(Finance Capital).. does not believe in the 
harmony of capitalist interests, but knows that 
the competitive struggle becomes more and more 
a political struggle.. The ideal of peace fades, 
and the idea of humanity is replaced by the ideal 
of the grandeur and power of the state .... The 
ideal is to ensure for one's own nation the 
domination of the world ..... Founded 
in economic 
needs, it finds its justific. ation in this 
remarkable reversal of national consciousness... 
Racial ideology is thus'a rationalisation, dis- 
guised as science, of the ambitions of finance 
capital. " (Hilferding, 1970j pp 452-4). 
This assertion needs to be carefully examined; whilst it may be true 
that the emergence of certain racial ideologies and t eir 
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popularisation in the Nineteenth Century was useful in assisting 
colonial powers to justify their actionsl racism may also be seen 
as having played an important role in affecting events where there 
was no direct colonial relationship; in this instance it is crucial 
to examine racism as a partly self-sustaining ideology. 
(i) Pezu and European Racism in the Nineteenth Century. 
As early as 1923# professional anthropologists had begun to detect 
deep flaws in the epistemological origin of their 'discipline*. A. L.. 
Kroeber, then Professor at California identified the fault as originat- 
ing, if not in Darwinism, then in evolutionism; 
"It became common practice in social anthropology 
to explain, any part of human civilisation by 
arranging its several forms in an evolutionary 
sequence from lowest to highest and allowing each 
successive stage to flow spontaneously from the 
preceding - in other words without specific cause 
Whatever seemed most different from our 
customs was therefore reckoned as earliest, and 
other phenomena disposed wherever they would best 
contribute to the straight even-ness of the climb 
upward. " (Kroeberg 1923t p. 8). 
The Isciencel of anthropology was thus a form of hermeneutic circle; 
'commoneensel constructs (e. g. hierarchical orderings of the races 
of whom Europeans had knowledge) were elevated to scientific statust 
and evidence' was then collected to prove both the general shapet 
and some of the more bizarre details, of this theory. 
Banton (1967) and Street (1975) examine the religious elements in 
racist anthropological writing which preceded Darwin. The most 
important element in this discourse was the debate between. the 
'polygenists', who believed that the various races distibuted around 
the globe were separately created, and hence could not be mixedl 
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and the Imonogenists', whose thought appears to descend from the 
'Great Chain of Being' biologists of the eighteenth century, believing 
in the common origin, and the mutability, of species. The %scipline' 
of anthropology in the nineteenth Century largely consisted of the 
collection of evidence to support one or other of these propositions. 
Both could be seen as having equally racist implications, since the 
systems of classification on which the monogenists leant, those of 
Linnaeus, Blumenbach, Buffon and other biologists, laid great stress 
on the rigidity of the distinctions between races, and used physical 
measurement asa determining indicator of these distinctions. When 
added to Cuvier's theory that race determined culture (Banton, 1967P 
p 26), and viewed through the hierarchical prism of European ethno- 
centricity, this classificatory approach to groups with an admitted 
common origin was as racist in effect as polygenism. 
It is hardly surprising that JAtin America should be a particular, 
object of interest in this discourse, since Brazil and the Andean 
States offered interesting comparisons and contrasts in the mixture 
of races. W. Bollaert, a prominent polygenist member of the Anthropo- 
logical Society, the breakaway organisation from the Ethnological 
Society (inaugurated by a pro-slavery speech from its President, James 
Hunt). produced a series of articles on the 'New World, designed 
to 
prove the sparate origin of races and the-folly of miscegination. 
He took great care to provide a detailed breakdown of the racial 
permutations extant in Peru, and then undertook a criminological 
analysis of the society based on this division 
(1865, pp 96-97). 
Pausing only to produce anecdotal *evidence' of the widespread 
desire 
of Indians to be 'whitelg he then spoke of the "immense advantage 
of 
a country possessing a pure race" which could only be understoodl 
"by those who have resided for a time in countries populated 
by mixed 
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breeds. " (1865P pp 98-99) For Bollaert, purity, of race was an 
essential prerequisite for the achievement of civilisation, and a 
'society of' half-breeds' could not attain a comparable level, no matter 
how much it modelled itself on European institutions. His view of 
the indigenous traces' is evident from his assessment of Pre-Columbian 
civilisation; 
(The people of the New World) 11 may appear to have 
arrived at the apex of civilization at which their own 
organisation and intelligence permitted them to arrive 
..... not a high standard, if compared to the powers of 
mind and body of the white man. " (1863t P. 73. ) 
Iiis major preoccupation was with the study of the population according 
to the degree of its mixed blood'; himself identifying twenty-three 
, 
different varieties of 'half-castelt and recounting their supposed 
racial characteristics with some relish, he expressed irritation with 
Paz Soldan for failing to take much of an interest in this form of 
demographic analysis in his Geografia del Perug and expressed the view 
that this ommission would "please the soi-disant Tombres Blancos" of 
Spanish, Americall (1865o P- 97)- Correspondinglyt Chile met with an 
approval which was subsequently to be echoed by many other commentators, 
anthropological, journalistic and diplomatic; 
"While the greater portion of Spanish Americas where 
, 
there is a large body of mixed breedst is in a state 
of anarchy, Chile is tranquil and pacific, increaBing 
its commerce, its riches and its population; and if 
now and then it experiences one of those periods of' 
political excitability characteristic of the Spanish 
race, the attack is of but short durations and 
the 
progressive march of the nation goes on". 
(1865, P-99) 
1. Bollaert alsog bizarrely, viewed the climatological environment 
as specifically suited to respective races 
(which were therefore or- 
dained to occupy specific regions of the globe), and 
thought that 
civilised races degenerated in an unsuitable environment. 
Chile's 
EUrOpean climate also indicated its suitability for a superior 
race. 
in this thinking he was following his mentort Ijunt 
(1863)- 
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He also quoted with approval Squieres commentary on Central America 
for his "Startling conclusions" that-, 
"We need only point to the anarchical states of 
Spanish America to verify the truth of' the pro- 
positions laid down, where we find a people (gen- 
erally) not only demoralised from the unrestrained 
association of different racesq but also the superior 
stocks becoming gradually absorbed into the lower, 
and their inr-t5tutions disappearing under the relative 
barbarism of which the latter are the exponents. " 
(1865, P 117). 
Torbes (1870) was a member of the Ethnological Societyl and a monogenist, 
and as an ethnologist was more concerned with the physical anthropology 
of his subjectsl the Aymara Indians of the Andean highlands. His belief 
in the mutability of species led him to compile pages of painstaking 
tabulations of the respective measurements of Aymaras from the 'cold 
highlands' and the 'hot low valleys' of Bolivia and Peru (pp 90-94, for 
example) and then compare these measurements to Europeans and West African 
negroes (when the nature of some of these measurements is considered - 
'Abdomen, distance from umbilicus to fork in legal# for example - one 
can only admire his courage and persistence). Although Forbes' society 
was supossedly anti-racist, his intellectual commitment to the mutability 
. of' the species did not render him any the less ethnocentric in his viewsg 
or any the moie favourably disposed towards miscegenation; 
"Although in external appearance they" (the 'mixed 
races') "may be regarded as an improvement upon the 
Indianp my belief is that, in moral character at least, 
the Cholada..... are, if anything, inferior in that they 
have retained most, if not all the vices of botht with 
very few of the virtues of either race. " (1870# P. 30) 
Even the 'pure' Indian women didn't find much favour in his eyes, since 
they were "far too robust as well as heavy in their movements to possess 
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anything like grace". Kiernan has demonstrated how this attitude, or 
set of attitudes, was a general-ised phenomenon among commentators on 
latin America (19729 PP 286-318)t with many of the key features of 
anthropological thought retained or transmogrified; a tendency to view 
'moral character, as transmitted through heredity to the same degree 
as phenotypical characý'eristics, and a persistent predisposition to 
view nations' in evolutionary terms, their status in the hierarchy 
of' civilisation determined by their racial composition. Their scheme 
of evolution was able to accomodate the idea of the *advancement' of 
a race only with the greatest difficulty, but could on the other hand 
propogate the idea of "degeneracy, and indeed employ it as a form of 
'grand peur'. 
As Miles reminds us (1982, pp95-120), the crucial problems however, 
is to avoid idealism in our analysis (assuming that racist ideology 
determines the behaviour of institutions and Individuals), as much as 
crude economism (assuming that the ideology derives in a directly 
functional way from the need to rationalise the demands of capitalism); 
"If : racism had become an element of the ideology of 
the dominant class, it was as a consequence of a complex 
interaction of economic, political and ideological re- 
lations, in the course of' which the economics was' only 
determinate in specific circumstances ..... as an element 
of bourgeois class ideology, racism was not a direct andý 
conscious production of the bourgeoisie, although at least 
at certain stages of its generations it was the result of 
an attempt to represent and understand the social con- 
sequences of realt material problems of production. " 
I (Miles, op. cit., p. 120) 
One of these 'real material problems of production' 
(or relations, of 
production) with which the European bourgeoisie had to cOPe. 
In Jatin 
America was the distinction' between form and content in the 
juridicial 
superstructure. The Icivilising' project of British colonialism 
and 
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neo-colonialism consisted to a large degree of the export of the 
apparatus of 'possessive individualismIt which MacPherson 
1 
has identified 
as forming a Predominant ideological background to the partnership 
which arose in Britain between capitalism and constitutional govern- 
ment. Even this was rendered into anthropological science, by Sir 
H. Bartle Frere in his 1881, in his article "On the Laws affecting the 
re, lations between civilised and Savage Life as bearing on the Deal 
, 
ings 
of Colonists with aborigines", where Icivilisation' and therefore 
'peace, were seen as guaranteed by - laws of : individual propertye 
legislation 'of a European type' which would involve restrictions on 
2 the use of drugs and alchohol, and a system of taxation. 
The English found the existence of the form of Idemocracyl. and laws 
of property and contractq with the content of pre-capitalist clientelist- 
ic relations and a feudal orientation towards luxury consumption, both 
inclining the Peruvian ruling classes towards fraud (see Kiernan, 1972, 
PP 313-314)gcontemptible. This view of civilisation as being coterminous 
with the government and the property laws of capitalist Britain 
circumscribed the reactions to other groups and nations of even the 
most liberal* of nineteenth century commentators(see for example the 
comments of' Duffield cited, in Chapter 7). 
This belief system, and its interpretation of 'the known world' I'lau 
subsequently to be propdgated in a quite syst ematic fashion. 
3 lioweverg 
1. The theories of possessive individualism also rationalised class 
differences in an analagous fashion to the subsequent racist ideologies 
(MacPherson, 1962, PP 222-238). 
2. The use of alchohol and drug dependence as a means of guaranteeing 
the availability of labour was of course a characteristic of pre- 
capitalist, and particularly refeudalised economies. Restrictions 
arrived when the extraction of absolute surplus value became 
important. 
3. for example, in the "People of All Nations" volumes, edited 
by 
Hammerton after the First War, which reproduced Boliaert's homily 
to 
Chile. 
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the days when embxyonic diplomats had their imaginations fed by the 
likes of Rider Haggard and Conan Doyle post-date our period (in any 
event, apart from HaggardIs Heart of the World, few works of popular 
ethnographic adventure concerned themselves with Latin America). 
The actual attitudes of diplomats, the rationalisations of science" 
and the crude propaganda of popular literature should be seen as 
refracted images of the same response, not necessarily as being 
causally related to each other. 
We are fortunate in that two of the diplomats on whose records we 
rely for this period left autobi'ographical accounts, and commentaries 
on nations where they had served, behind them. St. John, the British 
Consul to Peru during the Pacific War, had an astonishing careers which 
was initiated in assisting 'Rajah' Brooke in his assumption of power on 
an 'independent" basis in Sarawak, ara. saw him subsequently heading the 
British mission in Haiti, the 'Black ]Republic's before arriving in 
Lima. He left revealing accounts of both these experiences. His 
history of Haiti aroused considerable hostility, both in France and 
Haiti, on account of, its lurid hearsay reports of voodoo practices, 
which were interpreted as racist. In his second edition, St. John 
defended himself with spirit; 
"Brought up under Sir James Brooke , whose enlarged 
sympathies could endure no prejudice of race or 
colour, I do not remember ever to have felt any 
iepugaance to my fellow creatures on account of a 
difference of complexion. " (1889t p X) 
Howeverg the comments immediately surrounding this statement demon- 
strate that St. John's interpretation of non-racist sentiment is not 
one we would recognise today. His commentary on the relations between 
negroes and mulattos in Haiti c*ompletely reflects the comments of Squier 
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cited on page 51; 
"In fact, the coloured element, which is the 
civilising element in Hayti, is daily becoming 
of less importance: internal party strife has in- 
juied their political standing, and constant inter- 
marriage is causing the race to b: reed back to the more 
numerous type, and in a few years the mulatto section 
will have made disastrous approaches to the negro. 11 
(18890 P. ix) 
This reflected his far from complimentary attitude towards 'the Black 
race', who evidently occupied a low place in his order of civilisation; 
"I know what the black man is, and I have no hesitation 
in declaring that he is incapable of the art of government 
what the negro may become after centuries of civilised 
education I cannot tell, but what I know in that he is not 
iit to govern now. " (op. cit., p. xi). 
Presumablyp St. John felt that his benevolence was evidenced by his 
respectful account of Toussaint L"Ouverturev but this is Somewhat 
marred by his belief that the man's intelligence could only be ex- 
plicable in terms of* an undue proportion of 'European blood' (pp 47-48)- 
Whatever he might have found to admire in the Indian population of Peru, 
in terms oi. lookso he found them even less acceptable than the Haytian 
negros; 
" ...... the Indiansq who still remain by millions 
in North and South America, are as a race the most 
ill-favoured natives I have seen in any portion of 
the globe. " (p 29). 
These judgements are clearly reflected in his view of Peru as a nationt 
as re shall see below, and the comments of Bond-holdeTS and other 
politicians clearly indicate the extent to which the anthropologists 
prism refracted the outside world in a way that was typical of 
Britain's 
governing classesl as our account of* Sir Horace Rumbold in Appendix A 
will demonstTate. 
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It would be a conceptual error to set up, on the basis of' this 
analysisýa Causal hypothesis which attributed British behaviour 
during the Pacif ic War to racist attitudes and nothing else; the 
import of the quotation from Miles above is that we should look for 
the material problems of production, and these were plentiful enough. 
Neyerthless, it is evident that it would have been hard for people 
with these attitudes to have adopted an unbiassed approach to the 
question,. -. of, interest that arose (just how difficult we shall see 
below in our account of' the War). 
(ii) Internal differentiation in the Peruvian social formation. 
Contemporary accounts of Peru at the time of the Pacific War stress 
the unusual degree of internal differentiation among the population 
(a phenomenon generally acknowledged as being shared with Bolivia, 
see Klein, 1971, p. 6. ). This differentiation was characterised by 
multi-lateral expressions of contempt and hatredg which were to erupt 
in savage violence during the Pacific War (q. v. Chapter. 10), but 
which had been noted by many earlier observers, such as our two 
anthropologists. 
Forbes spent seven years in Southern Peru and Bolivia and concluded 
that; 
"There can be no doubt, however, that the Aymara 
Indians cherish the most deep-rooted and inveterate 
hatred towards their white oppxessorsq and console 
themselves with the hope that sooner or later they 
will be enabled to iepossess themselves of the country 
of their ancestors. 11 (1870* P. 7) 
Throughout his work, he continues to comment on this hatred of whites, 
and "still deeper hatred of the Negro"(op. cit. P. 35)v and refeis 
to the "well known" fact that; 
11 after the battles in the eternal civil wars Of 
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Peru and Bolivia, a large portion of arms 
disappear, having been carried off' by the Indians, 
and concealed by them, no doubt with a view to their 
ultima. te employment against'. -Ueir oppressorB. "'(ibid. ) 
loýbes also noted, with evident amusement, the lburlesquing' of white 
fashions by the Indians during their fiestas (a custom which persists 
in many parades and masked processionals in Latin America). men and 
women wearing crinolines so huge that they could hardly move (op. cit., 
p 42). 
As we noted above# Bollaert had a preoccupation with the degrees of 
skin-colour variation resulting from inter-marriage, and this is reflect- 
ed in his account of inter-group hostilities; 
"Despite the republican constitutiont there prevails 
throughout Peru a strong pride of caste, which shows 
itself at every opportunity. By all varieties the 
white skin is envied. The Indian looks with abhorrence 
on the Negro; the latter, with scorn upon the Indian. 
The Mulatto fancies himself next to the Europeang and 
thinks that the little tinge of' black in his skin does 
not justify his being ranked lower than the mestizo, who, 
after all, is only an 'Indio-brutol; so called by the 
white Limenor.. " (1865, p. 96) 
He reinforces this account of' white skin being the great desideratum 
among 'half-castes' by stating that. "when a man of mixed blood marries 
a woman darker than himselfv and his children thereby become further 
removed from the white tint, it is said to be fun paso atras' " 
(Op. cit., 
p. 94). This I caste-like I structure is well documented over a 
long 
historical period; Humboldt had indentified the same phenomenon 
during 
the late vice-royalty-. 
"In Spain it is a sort of title of nobility to descend 
neither from Jews nor Moors; in America. skin, more or 
less white, indicates a man's rank in society. " 
(1607). 
The major theoretical problem is in the interpretation 
of these undoubted 
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hostilities and their effects; do they warrant an analytical category 
other than that ot, class, does their origin lie outside the sphere of 
production, and did they provide a barrier to the development of' 
capitalist production? Pex quotes Oppenheimer's analysis of' the origins 
of inter-group conflict as evidence against a Marxist analysis; 
"Contrary to the Marxist view that social differentiation 
is primarily to be explained in terms of the development 
ot' the social relations of' production within a society, 
which is thought of as producing class conflict ....... 
(according to Oppenheimer's view) "intergroup relations 
have the form they do because the two groups involved 
were not originally one, but have been brought together 
into a single political framework as a result of' the conquest 
by one of the other. " (Rex, 1970, P-11) 
Whilst this poses something of a false dichotomy g since Marx saw the 
transition from'one mode of production to another as being effected by 
conquest in specific historical instances (see p 18 above), this argument 
doe+elp to sharpen our focus on the relative autonomy of the social 
institutions and practices which SUT-round the 'articulation of modes 
oi production'. 
Initiallyt there may seem to be considerable evidence in the Instance 
of Latin America to support Oppenheimer's thesis. In the initial stages 
of the colonial era in Latin America, the distinction between races was 
institutionalised in two separate republics (Pereyral 1972# V01- UP P 
125). This structuxe was subsequently substituted by what Chevalier 
(197p, pp n4-166) describes as af orm of' corporatism, where the Indian 
'communidades' were "iegarded as separate social or -racial groups having 
their own peculiar organisation and legislation, subject to tributes and 
protected as minors under the tutelage of the Church and Crown. " (ibid. 
) 
This was largely the response of Spain to the crisis in tribpte revenues 
rezýulting from the de-population of New Spain (Keenjin his Introduction 
to zoiita, 1965, p 12ff). While the status brought some benefits (for 
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example the inalienability of their property), it seems that the 
institution was more honoured in the breech than the observance, as 
the commentary of the Ulloas in the 18th Century demonstrates; the early 
colonial institution of the *encomienda, being substituted by the authority 
0- the 'corregidorlp whose corruption and links with the extractive 
industries were also documented by the Ulloas in 1746. Though the 
encomienda'was banned under the Viceroyaltyl debt-bondage was widespread 
(Spalding 1975a). Whilst it is often commented thatj under this formal 
protectiont the Indians were better off than the various Icastaslo the 
point does not bear too much examination. 
However, the abolition of protected status at Independence had serious 
consequences for the Indian population; by transferring property to 
individuals rather, than communities; 
"it was not difficult to despoil the Indians of their 
propertyp especially after economic development and the 
commercialisation of agriculture had made the possession 
of land still more desirable. of' this equality of condition 
Proclaimed by the law only a part of the mestizo population 
'Was able to take advantage,, and for Indians the effect was 
the inverse of what was intended. " (Chevalier, 1970, P- 165) 
The crucial theoretical point is whethert in the light of this continued 
exploitation and oppression, the Indian population is applopiiately 
dilferentiated in terms either of class or ethnicity. Wolf comments on 
the disengagement of' the Indian from the new social order; "the new 
society could command their labour, but it could not command their 
loyalty. " (1959) quintanilla, cited in Frank (19719 P. 157) Points 
to 
the differential consciousness of Indians working respectively 
in 
'communidades'and'haciendas', xeminding us of the importance of the social 
relations o. production. It appears certain that the divide 
in Peru can 
sly 
not be seen purely in terms of customs and culture 
(as is exroneou 
supposed by van den Berghe, 1974 pp 16-17) or even language. 
The very 
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existence'and persistence of various forms of Indian cultureg and their 
monolingualismo an impassable barrier to any potential social mobility, 
was predicated upon the dominant position of the white elite, and their 
attitude the Indians (itself partly conditioned by their own role as 
conquerors). There is little evidence that the dominant groups in 
colonial and post-colonial society were sufficiently sophisticated to 
make, properly speaking, ethnic distinctions between groups. It would 
be mistaken, therefore to over-emphasise the influence of culture' at 
the expense of social relations by talking in terms of' ethnicity. 
Were these inter-group, relations, though, class relations in essences 
or more properly characterised as 'race' relations? The view held by 
the Peruvian elite of the Indian population was determined by a mixture 
of fear of the revolutionary potential (particularly after the Tupac 
Amaru revolt), and by specific class -relations entered into with groups 
of expropriated and servile Indians. Several of the institutionalised 
forms of labour and tribute relations necessarily implied contempt for 
the oppressed population in the same way that slavery did. The exprop- 
riation of their- lands (SPaldingo 1975)t the development of quasi-servile 
relations of: Vroduction (Piel, 1970)o the abolition of thelcuracasland 
their absorption into the 'mestizo' population (Van den Berghe and Primovt 
1977) were rendered acceptable by post-hoc rationalisations oi the 
Inaturel of' the Indian population, which were, howevert able to draw 
on a tradition of p: rejudice. The merchants of the 'consuladd of Mexico 
expressed the view of, the ruling colonial caste in a letter to the Spanish 
Coites in 1811; 
"The condition" (of Spaniards in America) "as conquerors 
of a conquered land makes them the fiTBt inhabitantse the 
pTeferred and privileged of all America ......... 
the 
wretched Indian ... was! ' 
(at the time of the Conquest) 
"like af ilthy animal, wallowing in the., trough of the 
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most shameless sensuality, unending drunkeness, 
and the most apathetic slovenliness.... a mad dog 
savouring human flesh..... Neither the hiStOTY 01' 
ancient times, nor tradition has transmitted to Our 
day the memory of so degenerate# wretched and unhaPPY 
a people ..... this is... the true portrait of the 
Indian today". (quoted in Stein and 6teint 1974P PP 
-56-57). 
While this was written about the Nahuatls of Colonial New Spaing Norberto 
Padilla, a government official who completed a report on the central 
highlands in 1674t blamed the backward state of the agriculture in Peru 
on the "abject state and bad ways" and the traditional customs of 
the "aboriginal race" (cited In Robertso 1976, p. 145). Ten years 
earlier, Jose Vicente Adorado had written a pamphletv recommending 
among other cures to the economic crisis in Bolivia; 
"To take these lands of' ignorant and backward 
Indians without the meanst capacity or desire to 
cultivate., and to convert them to the enterprising 
active and intelligent white racet avid for property 
and fortune, full of ambitions and needst is definitely 
the healthiest change in the social and economic order 
of' Bolivia. To realise it from the dead hands of the 
Indian is to return it to its useful and productive 
condition, beneficial to all humanity. 11(cited in 
Rodriguez 0., 1980t pp 62-63). 
Mariategui was convinced that racism was a function of capitalism'S 
"inability, in Latin America, to construct an economy free of Te al 
weeds" (1975, P. 2-5, my translation)p but he also construed it as a 
barrier to a bouigeois nationalist movementl and a factor 'Which tended 
to fivour imperialist penetration, since the bourgeoisie and the 
feudal 
oligarchy shaxed the imperialists' contempt f or the Indians p 
the negros 
and the Mulattos; 
"Entre el senor o el burgues criolio y sus peones 
de color, no hay nada de comun. La solidaridad 
de 
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clase , se suma a la soliclaridad de raza o de 
prejuicio, para hacer de las burguesias nacionales 
instrumentos dociles del imperialismo yanqui 0 
britanico. Y este sentimiento se extiende a gran 
parte de las clases medias, que imitan a la aristo- 
cracia ya la burguesia en el desden por la plebe de 
color, aunque su proprio mestizaje sea demasiado 
evidente. ll (1975, p. 27) 
Mariategui is directing us towaids two important perspectives here. 
Firstly9 he indicates that the racism developed and expressed by British 
and American 'imperialists" acted like an epidiascope to the internal 
divisions which already existed in Peru; reflecting and projecting and 
magnifying hostility and contempt which the society then proceeded to 
internalise, (Kiernan's extended treatment of this theme is particularly 
interesting, 1972, indicating in the history of Sarmiento the other 
course of response to European racism, namely nationalism). 
Secondly, he points to the ambiguous status of these relations. Racism 
existed initially as a legitimation of exploitative relations of produc- 
tiong but partially determined these relations as a particularly crystal- 
lised form of refeudalisation. The rigidity of these relations can be 
over-stressed; it is a mistake to view Indian communities as entirely 
closed, since they were both obliged to respond to varying demands on 
their labour power, and also to the growth of market forces 
(Smith, op. 
cit, Spalding, 1975, Favre, 1977)- Moreover, several authors have pointed 
out that racial categories did not represent an absolute barrier 
to. 
individual social mobility, given that Indians could be easily redefined 
as mestizo by a simple geographical relocation,, though 
it did represent 
a substantial barrier to class mobilty, and therefore rapid change 
in 
the social structure. This perspective is explored fýurther 
below 
(Chapters 5,7,10). 
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Summarv. 
These two chapters have sought to explore the conceptual terxain 
of Marxist analyses of the relations between capitalism and the 
world into which it expanded in the nineteenth century. There is 
an excessive rigidity embodied in some of the frameworks employed. 
in this analysis, and in some of the critiques of these frameworks. 
I have attempted to demonstrate, for example, how the utility of a 
strict structuralist reading of the 'mode of production' concept 
tends to disappear when it is applied to concrete situations, and 
hence how this rigidity is alien to what I perceive as Marx's own 
method. 
In this work I have continued to use the concept of the *mode of 
production! to identify areas of the Peruvian social formation which 
are not autonomous in their dynamics, but which exhibit characteristics, 
particularly in the sphere of relations of production, which are 
foreign to those of advanced capitalism, whilst recognising that this 
renders the term descriptive as well as analytic. Hence the under- 
standing of the term feudalism" as applied to Spanish absolutism, 
and the modified form of commodity feudalism (as in the "second serf- 
dom) to which it gave rise in Peru. This usage must largely be justi- 
fied by the detailed historical account which followsg and 'Which 
explores the concrete realisation of the concepts of race and class# 
overdetermination, the State and the 'articulation of modes of pro- 
duction,. 
I 
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CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL FORMS - STATE AND CHURCH 
A. Introduction - 
Situating the institutional forms of social relations within a 
Marxist discourse presents similar difficulties to those encountered 
when addressing problems of consciousness, for identical reasons. 
Whilst Marx made it quite clear that these levels of analysis formed 
part of his total project, he rarely came close to a detailed 
conceptualisation. of them. His general statements appear unambiguous; 
"In the social production of their life, men enter into 
definite relations that axe indispensable and independent 
of their will, relations of production correspond in a 
definite stage of development of their material productive 
forces. The sum total of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation on which rises a legal and political superstructure 
and to which correspond definite forms of socia. 1 consciousness". 
(1968, p. 181) 
This famous passage from the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy is followed by an indication of the direction in 
which determination takes place - "it is .... their social being that 
determines their consciousness" (ibid) - but it becomes evident from 
much of Marx's other writing that attempts to apply what was really 
no more than a broad analytical scheme were difficult. Where Marx 
directly addresses the inter-relationships of the axeas, it is 
normally in the form of a list of headings for a future project, or 
alternatively an 'off-the-cuff' remark in another contextq and in 
some instances he appears puzzled himself (see the final section of 
the Grundrisse's Introduction, where Marx admits the difficulty of 
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even analysing the development of property relations as legal 
relations, 19739 P-109). 
Cutler et al. feel that, "this absence of systematic argamentation 
in relation to what are frequently presented as among the fundamental 
concepts of Marxist theory poses a serious problem for Marxists" 
(1977, Vol-It P-179). Whilst they axe right to point to the dangers 
of specious exegesis for formalating theory, they are perhaps rather 
premature in using the difficulties of defining relations of 
correspondence and determination to reject the whole conceptual 
apparatus as internally inconsistent, (particulaxly since they appear 
to reconstitute Marx's project under their own aegis; op. cit. p 
pp. 230-231)- In particular, the gibes directed at the 'slogan' of 
'relative autonomy' (op-cit., P-178) axe mis-directedi. It is made 
to appear in their work as a dodge to explain the transpaxent non- 
correspondence of forms. If however, we consider the quotation from 
The Preface given above in the same light as Volume I of Capital, as 
an ana1vtical scheme which identifies rather than describes the social 
and juridicial relations which accompany systems of production, we 
will be correspondingly more prepared to accept the conceptual 
apparatus necessary to apprehend real historical change. As Henfrey 
has pointed out (1981, p. 29) Marx's political writings exemplify the 
purguit of these problems in his contemporary history with a subtlety 
which appears to elude some of his latter-day idealist critics. An 
indication of the relative primacy of, for example, forces and 
relations of production, does not necessarily imply either a logical 
or chronological sequence. 
1. Although I am unhappy about its applicability to the early 
republican state in Peru. 
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Consequently, the section which follows will explore conceptualis- 
ations of State and Church in an historical context. The extreme 
paucity of material on the Church obliges me to undertake only a brief 
exploration of its role -as an agent of legitimations and the other 
major institutional form, the A=V, will be examined in its 
historical context in the second section (but for a very thorough and 
excellent treatment, see Beruf, 1978)- 
B. The State 
Ma=t s polemical view of the concept of the state was as a coercive 
. instrument of the ruling class; this position is most clearly 
expressed in his famous remaxk in the Communist Manifesto: 
"The executive of the modern state is but a committee for 
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie". 
(1970&, P. 33) 
Both Marx and Engels did, however, also introduce the notion of the 
possibility of state autonomy under exceptiona. 1 circumstances. For 
instance, in this extract from a letter to C. Schmidt, Engels appears 
to be attributing a role of negative determination to the state: 
"Society gives rise to certain common functions which it 
cannot dispense with. The persons appointed for this 
purpose form a new branch of the division of labour within 
sociely. This gives them particular interests, distinct 
took from the interests of those who empowered them. They 
make themselves independent of the latter and - the state is 
in being. .... the new independent powerl reacts in its turn, 
by virtue of its inherent relative independence .... upon the 
conditions and course of production ..... On the whole the 
economic movement gets its way .... 11 
(27th October 1890 in Marx and Engels, 1968, pp. 685-686) 
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It would appear, however, that the state can be relatively autonomous 
for only a limited period: 
"The reaction of state power upon economic development can 
be of three kinds: it can nm in the same directiono and 
then development is more rapid; it can oppose the line of 
development in which case nowadays it will go to pieces in 
the long ran .... 11 
(ibid. 
9 P. 686; my emphasis) 
It is evident from the highly qualified way in which the concept of 
autonomy is discussed, that neither Marx nor Engels were in fact 
entirely happy with it. However they cleaxlyýjo express a doubt as to 
the existence of a direct correspondence between mode of production 
and superstructure; for instance, in the case of the seculaxised, 
bouFgeois state, where political enfranchisement of the working class 
may mask the fact of its continuing subjection through property 
relations into which is is assumed to have freely entered. Since in 
the (developed) capitalist state oppression is disguised, it may 
sometimes appeax to exercise genuine impartiality. 
Marx and Engels also considered that a state might enjoy autonomy 
when there was a balance of power between classes. Engels takes as 
his example of such a situation the Absolutist Stateg which, as a 
0 
transitional form, mediated between two modes of production. State 
autonomy in this sense is considered of especial relevance to the 
'underdeveloped' state due to the non-generality of capitalist 
relations in peripheral formations; it is of aspecial interest for 
Peru since, as I hope to show below, the traditions of Spanish 
Absolutism persisted throughout the 19th century: 
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"By way of exceptiong howeverg periods occur in which the 
warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state 
power, as ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a 
certain degree of independence of both. Such was the 
absolute monarchy of the 17th and 18th centuries, which 
held the balance between the nobility and class of 
burghers". 
(Bagels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and 
the State, in Marx and Engels, 1968, P-578; my emphasis) 
However it is noticeable that this observation is hedged around with 
considerable qualifications, and the state position as mediator 
referred to as ostensible. Parthermore, not all absolute monarchies 
could be said to have 'held a balances; Spanish absolutism was in fact 
clearly aligned with the feudal countryside against the towns 
(cf. Anderson, 1979, p. 61; also see Chapter 4 )- 
Another recurring theme wh-Ich appears to qontradict the idea of 
. 
direct correspondence between the mode of production and state form 
concerns the definition of a state's role by its geographical 
boundaries': 
"Present-day society is capitalist society, which exists 
in all civilized countries, more or less free from medieval 
admixture, more or less modified by the particulax historical 
development of each country, more or less developed .... 
the 'present-day statet changes with a country's frontier .... 
'The present-day state' is, therefore, a fiction". 
(Maxxj Critique of the Gotha Programmel May 1875P in Marx 
and Engels, 1968, P-327; my emphasis) 
1. Whilst agreeing with the importance of the role of the historical 
legacy of a society in its state formation, it should also be 
emphasised that a common feature of dependent states is their 
linternationalisation' and consequent fragmentation. which makes 
it difficult to "perceive the political process in terms of a 
struggle between the Nation and the anti-nation .... the anti- 
nation will be inside the nation so to speak, among the local 
people ****" (Caxdoso, 1972, P-93). 
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The importance of the historical inheritance in the formation and 
character of a state should emerge from this study; on the whole, 
however, the notion of relative autonomy is a comparatively weak 
concept in the context of the Peruvian social formation. It is, on 
the other hand, a theme which has been elaborated in the writings of 
many subsequent theorists. Unfortunately much of this work is rather 
unhelpful due to the tendency of contemporary Marxist analysts to take 
their analysis from the developed form of the Capitalist State as 
exhibited in metropolitan society - this applies equally to the 
'state derivationt theorists (c. f. J. Holloway & S. Picciotto, 1978). 
and to Miliband (1969,1970P 1973) and Poulantzas (1969,1976a). This 
is because current concerns with the state concentrate on its role as 
an ideological and economic stabiliser. 
*There has correspondingly been less attention paid to the state in 
its less developed, or less fully functionalist forms. Furthermore 
the variations in pre-capitalist and dependent social formations axe 
such that it is difficult to use much of the theory that has been 
developed, since it is frequently only applicable at a very generalised 
level to the specific social formation under study. The state in 
post-colonial societies is particularly historically specific - the 
problems in its analysis are analagous to those problems of 
periodization dealt with earlier; as the institutional form of a 
particularly complex set of undeveloped, nasQent and developed class 
relations, it embodies an acute set of contradictions corresponding 
to the variety of historical temporalities which it encompasses. The 
state "as an organic product and a necessary structural element (for 
the economic and social reproduction of society) in the society, is the 
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oxprou: 3ion of tho dominant contradictory cocial rolationoll (Ziumann 
and Lanzendorfer . 19779 P-157). A further complicating factor is 
that the form of the state, along with the econcmic structure of 
peripheral societies, tends to be largely derivative rather than 
original in character (c. f. Therborn, 1979) , and, in turn interlocks 
with the metropolitan relations of production and, to some extent, its 
state form. Thus, the institutional form in the periphery does not 
necessaxily transform itself to mirror changed economic or social 
circumstances; on the contrary, it may through-the process of over- 
determination, inhibit change or development in social or economic 
spheres. (Although it may also be used to implement change and 
'hasten .... transformations" 
(Marx, 1974, P-703M States are, after 
all, social a=angements made by, and constituting of social beings with 
expeptations which may have been reproduced from an anterior social 
order. I shall argue that this certainly tends to be the case in 
19th century Peru. 
Hamza Alavi (1972) has propounded that argument that three classes 
may in fact share state power in post-colonial societiesp and, 
although he, refers to Pakistan, this idea seems relevant to 19th 
century Pera. Even when a national bourgeoisie developsv and gains 
access to state power, its freedom of action is very much constrained 
by reactionary factions of the oligarchy and the power of foreign 
capitalists; this situation of class equilibrium generally produces 
'caudillismo'or Bonapartism. Continuing this theme, Charles Anderson 
(1967) has described Latin America as a living maseum - although new 
classes or fractions may become dominant they do not succeed'in 
completely ousting earlier actors from the political arena; thus the 
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peripheral state reflects the non-generality of the capitalist mode of 
production. It too must comprise a contradictory variety of political 
forms and functions. 
However, this preamble confronts us with the problems of how we 
define the state. Since for Althusser (1969) the state may be defined 
as that which ensures the continued domination of the class that 
controls the state, all institutions which contribute to the 
reproduction of a social formation could be characterised as parts of 
the apparatus. This seems far too broad a definition to be of much 
use, especially when considering the state in undeveloped societies, 
where, as noted above, it was/is frequently not under the complete 
control of any one class, or fraction 
1. Moreover, for much of the 
19th century, the state in Peru might be chaxacterised by its lack of 
permanent institutions; its elusive substance reflecting the 
fragmentation of the Peruvian economy and society. Are we to focus on 
the constitution, on national or local politicst or on the persistence/ 
re-emergence of pre-capitalist political forms such as clientelism, 
compradazgoand I caudillismd? For example, despite the persistence in 
19th century Brazil of a centralised state apparatus which ensured 
politcal stability, Peter Flynn (1974stPP-315-333) has noted the 
weakness of this apparatus and considers that state power might really 
have been located at the regional level - the liberal, democratic 
1. In this sense peripheral states have frequently been viewed as 
enjoying an exceptional degree of autonomy. However, we mast distinguish between states whose relative autonomy simply lay in the disorganisedg fragmented and ineffectual nature of their institutions, reflecting anaxchic social conditions and the political 
predominance of'caudillos: and those states which were largely 
staffed and controlled by the petty-bourgeoisiel due to some industrial development and the consequent emergence of an urban 
middle class. 
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constitution is seen as a facade, and central authority severely 
limited, its main functions being largely ideological - simply to hold 
the regions tbgether. 
I 
Alternatively should we foe-as on the centres on new democratic 
governments, and on the ideological debates between 'conservatives' 
and 'liberals'? It is obviously essential for our purposes to define 
our terms and to locate the state in any given instance, historicallyq 
in order to determine its origin, the extent to which it has outgrown 
I 
functions, or to which new circumstances have transmated both 
functions and form. 
Theorists who have analysed the state in underdeveloped societies 
have tended to concentrate on the contemporary state, and its tendency 
towaxds militaxy and populist forms of goverment. Castells (1972) 
chaxacterises it as being strong and relatively autonomous of the 
dominant, pro-imperialist bourgeoisie (whose interests itt neverthelesst 
tends to represent or favour). It is perceived that only a 'strong 
goverment' can modernise the productive infrastructure of the country, 
nationalise the agricultural sector to facilitate surplus extraction 
and make the public administration structure more efficient and 
'national'. Moreover, only such a government can unite contradictory 
social groupings and be seen/appeax to act in the interests of all 
1 
classes, that is the nation-state, and yet accomodate foreign capital 
This is also the role of the state as described by Marxq in the 
transitional. phase of pre-capitalist forms to capitalism - the 
state acting as a 'midwife' and weapon of capital. (1974P pp. 258t 
271t 341P 703).. However, in th case'the state is cleaxly not 
autonomous or external to society, but an instrument of capital; 
its impartiality is deceptive, it is acting in the collective 
interests of capital as a mediator between different social classes. 
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Contemporary Brazil mIL4A be conuidorud to be a parudigill or Lho nuw 
'strong, impartial state' -a totalitarian version of the limpaxtiall 
populism that preceded it and certainly the military leaders have 
attempted to present themselves in the role of arbiters of national 
interest. For Alavi (1972) tod. the state appaxatus in the post- 
colonial society has acquired a relatively autonomous economic role, 
directly appropriating a laxge paxt of the 'economic surplus', which 
it then deploys bureaucratically to initiate economic development. 
Hamilton's work on post-revolutionaxy Mexico continues this theme: 
"Paxtly as a consequence of its role in capital accumulation 
and investment, the state may enjoy a certain amount of 
temporary autonomy vis-a-vis class interests - particularly 
at critical periods as immediately following independencev 
revolutionary or other social upheavalsq and a sharp break- 
or change in dependency relations. In Mexico this occurred 
in the 19303 
(1975s P-75) 
Other students of Mexican history agree with this analysis; for 
Hodges and Gandy (1979) state autonomy is so maxked that they speak in 
terms of a new class, the bureaucratic class. Debray (1973) too 
discusses the development of the petty-bo-argeoisie into an 'autonomous 
state bureaucracy' who may be relatively independent of other social 
classes. Ziemann and Lanzendorfer (1977), howevert have perhaps 
prod-aced the most comprehensive and convincing exposition of this theory 
of relative autonomy. They view peripheral societies, as the social 
formations of the 'relatively stagnating transition' from pre- 
capitalist social formations to capitalism, elements of which synthesize 
with the exogenous conditions of development. Such social formations 
are therefore composed of dynamic and stagnatory elements and these 
two aspects 'constitute the contradictory unity of peripheral 
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development' (c. f. Althusser, 1969, pp. 96-97). This accentuates the 
structural heterogeneity which chaxacterised the latin'American 
colonies from the moment of their incorporation into the international 
system. Stemming from the fragmented structure of the peripheral social 
formations there axe, consequently, along with the role of mediating 
political difference among the class and fractions of domestic classes, 
several other political functions of the state. Firstly, "acting as 
intermediary in political differences between the synthesized national 
interests with the interests of the external bourgeoisie and their 
states see"; secondly, "guaranteeing the cohesion of the social 
structure, which is continually threatened by its own dynamic", and 
lastly, "acting as intermediary in political differences between the 
growing state bureaucracy and other classes and fractions of classes. " 
(19779 p. 162) The first two functions are useful in attempting to come 
to an understanding of the nature of the state in 19th century Peru. 
However, the applicability of the notion of 'relative autonomy' to the 
i 
19th century Peruvian experienceg implied by the last pointr is most 
debatable. Ziemaxm and Lanzendorfer elaborate on this last function: 
"The demands on the state which stem from the whole complex 
of social reproduction, and their functional reflections, 
assume concrete form in the relative autonomy of the state. 
The marks of this relative autonomy are to be seen in the 
unity and simultaneous existence of logically not separate 
aspects of statehood, such as 'weakness', instability, 
restricted legitmacy, 'strength', permanent intervention 
(ibid., p. 162) 
I shall return to these aspects below. 
F. S. Weaver (1976 and 1980) pursnes the idea of state autonomy and 
locates it specifica. 11y in the Peruvian experience during the Guano 
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Age. He, like Levin (1960), describes the Guano industry as having had 
an enclave character, with therefore "little direct impact on the 
Peruvian economy", and notes the general failure to use the guano 
revenue to establish self-generating sources of capital accumulation. 
I 
From this he draws the conclusion that: 
"the major impact of the guano exports was to create a powerful 
central state which rose above society and was fally capable of 
effecting policies explicitly contraxy to the interests of the 
planters of the Northern Coast (for example, abolishing 
slavery) and of the gamonales of the interior haciendas (for 
example, sharply curtailing their control over Indian labour)l 
The major impact of the guano boom then, was the creation of a 
powerful state more like that of colonial Peru than of Peru 
in the immediate post-independence decades. " (1976, p. 40) 
The concern here is to analyse the nature (changing) of the state in 
19th century Peru, prior to the development of the contemporary 
'strong' state, or the late 19th century trepublica axistocratical, 
and to consider the validity of the notion of an autonomous state 
apparatus in this context. Before situating the state in Peru within 
a detailed consideration of the empirical material, a task which will 
form part of the second section of this thesis, I should proceed to 
briefly outline how I shall define the state, and consider what 
constituted this structure in 19th century Pera. 
The state may be defined as a set of complementaryl interlocking 
superstructural institutions designed to ensure the reproduction of 
the social formation, and which, therefore, monopolise the meals of 
repression and exist as ideological symbols for the entire population. 
1. See my discussion of the-Indian peasantry in Chapters Taad, 10- 
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Thouo inutitutiono uro noL, howovar, oiniply mochuniotic rofluctiona of 
the social formations, but can be key instruments though which the 
conditions necessary for capitalist development may be created or 
inhibited. This superstructural expression of state power can be 
divided into different categories according to the main functions of 
the state; Ziemann and Lanzendorfer's remarks on these functions may 
provide a useful basis here. 
However, to return to the developedl capitalist form of the state, 
it is possible to outline three main functionsl which may be used to 
break down the state structure into firstly, the "administrative 
technical" (civil service), secondly the 'coercive' (judiciaryp army 
and police) and, lastly, the 'consensua. 1-mediativel (democratic, 
educational and welfaxe institutions). The colonial Peruvian statel or I 
administration, did not, as a pre-capitalist social formationg embody 
all-these functions but merely those required in its role as a colonial 
outpost of mercantili4m- eared to European needs - namely il--7,. -0-4ý 9 
the first two functions, Obviously republican Peru initially inherited 
many of these institutions, whilst economic domination by metropolitan 
capitalism increased; this brings us to a consideration of the nature 
of the colonial state in Peru. However, clearlyo the colonial 
administration was largely a reflection of Spanish absolutism; one of 
its major functions was to co-ordinate the disparate elements of the 
Peruvian economy, mediate between them and geax them to Spanish 
interests. Purthermore, the state bureaucracy, certainly at the 
higher levels, was made up of'peninsulares: the elite's orientationg 
both economic and social, was towaxds Euxope, andv finallyl*the 
majority of Indian peasants had no consciousness of Peru, as an 
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entity, at all. The Peruvian colonial heritage was in fact 
chaxacterised by its axtificialitY and structural heterogeneity as a 
social unit, and by its extreme dependence on Europe. More than other 
areas of Latin America (apart from Mexico) it was systematically 'used' 
by Spain, its natural resources sucked dry and its commerce monopolised 
by peninsulares for the benefit of the metropolis. It therefore 
presents a contradictory image as one of the most tightly and 
efficiently administered units of the Empire, where the state order 
appeared totally predominant; whilst in fact, the form of politics 
was derivative, the elite wholly divided and the social structure 
extremely fragile. To understand this more fully it is necessary to 
consider the nature of the Spanish Absolutist state, for the Peruvian 
state, as*Mariategai observed (1976, P-53) imbibed the ideology of the 
Counter-Reformation and the attributes of centralizedp repressive 
Absolutism to a marked degree 
1. 
For Perry Anderson (1979)v the absolutist state of Spain represented 
that form of state par excellence; moreover .. 
"no other major Absolutist state in Western Europe was to be 
so finally noble in chaxacter, or so inimica. 1 to bourgeois 
development. Ironically, the wealth provided by Peru is seen 
to be a major factor in facilitating its resistance to reform 
and modernization .... instead it bore down with a massive 
weight on the most active commerical centres of the continentp 
, even while threatening every other landed aristocracy in a 
1. This is, of course, not to deny the specificity of the Peruvian 
social formation, due to the integration of certain elements of 
pre-Columbian society into that formation; as I have already 
indicated above, it is a distortion of reality to consider 
peripheral societies as corresponding to European ideal-types. 
Nevertheless, Peru, under Spanish colonial rulet formed the 
centre of a substructure of European mercantile absolutism. 
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cycle of inter-aristocratic wars that lasted for a hundred-- 
and fifty years. " (Anderson, 1979, p. 61) 
The II unproductive consumption by Spain of colonial gold in a series of 
wars is remarkably similar to the use of the guano revenues by the 
Peruvian state for most of the guano era. It should also be remarked 
that, just as the plunder of Latin America represented a moment in 
the process of the primitive accumulation of capital for Europe, so 
for Latin America it represented 
I 
primitive disaccumulation 01 
Anderson's description of Spanish Absolutism identifies a state , 
"fOunded on the social supremacy of the aristocracy and confined 
by the imperatives of landed property. Army, bureaucracy, 
diplomacy and dynasty remained a hardened feudal complex which 
governed the whole state machine and guided its destinies. " 
(ibidq P-42) 
This interpretation of absolutism sees it as an essentially reactionary 
form, a reinforcement of rule by the traditional feudal classp developed 
in response to the crisis of feudalism, which has, however, a super- 
fioial modernity inherent in the establishment of an elaboratel 
centralised state. Furthermore, this apparatus may be appropriate to 
the development of capitalism if itrests on an alliance between the 
monarchy and mercantile capital, against the feudal power of the 
barons. The absolutist state can, therefore, be a transitional formp 
developing in an epoch of which mercantilism is the ruling doctrine, 
and overcoming localised forms of power; and it was in the mercantilist 
Although, as with the Guano Boom, whilst European economic 
domination was detrimental to the Peruvian national economyq it 
clearly did not preclude the enrichment of a small minority - 
thus exacerbating pre-existing divisions within the elite* 
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spirit that the Latin American colonies were discovered and organised. 
However, in Peru, as in Spain, there was a generally harmonious fusion 
between merchant capital and feudal rentier property, and while 
merchant capital in the foudal modo mr-ay have a I'diEsoolvent" effect it 
is, as Marx pointed out, "incapable by itself of promoting or 
explaining the transition from one mode of production to another" 
(Capital, 1972, Vol-3P P-327). It cannot be a source of permanent, 
self producing accumulation; its role is merely preparatory. Indeed$ 
because of these limitations, it may wello especially in alliance 
1 with landed property, be a reactionary force . As Merrington has 
observed of Russia o. 
"the growth of the world market led to the subordination 
of the urban bourgeoisie within a seigneurial export 
economy based on corvee labour" (1978, P-185) 
Similax limitations were placed on the development of both a Spanish 
and a Peruvian manufacturing bourgeoisie. 
The main functions of the Peruvian colonial administration wereo 
consequently, to maintain the status quo, to integrate the 
Iparcellized sovereignty' inherent in the seigneurial economy, ensure 
the smooth articulation of the export cells with the LVropean market, 
and support the towns, established as military outposts and centres 
for the collection of tribute. The colonial Peruvian administration 
was essentially a vast rent-collecting machine and source of patronage, 
with an exceptionally top-heavy coercive apparatust designed to subdue 
1. Marx wrote: ".. wherever merchant's capital still predominates 
we find backward conditions .. " 
WaDital, Vol-3P 19729 P-327)- Capitalism in Peral throughout the period under studyq took the form of mercantile capital. 
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the Indiana, and represent the empire. 
Independence did not revolutionise this situation; the Republican 
State that emerged was a wholly axtificial creationt in no sense an 
organic development arising out of the internal contradictions of 
Peru, but a result of the events in Europe. Consequently, despite the 
imported form of modern government that was established, Independence 
resulted in a regression towards feudal paxochialism, clientelism, 
I caudillismo'- the features of feudal politics prior to the centralisation 
and institutionalisation of the system of power which absolutism had 
established. According to Beruf, Independence resulted im'. 
"an accentuaiion-of-the centrifugal tendencies*inherent-in 
the fragmented social structu: re. Political power tended 
to shift away from the urban centreso which had played an 
intermediary role during the Spanish Empirep towards the 
feudal countryside" (1978p'p. 20). I .... 
The absence of central authorityl and the fragile and fractured 
nature of the elite gave rise to local Praetorian politics expressed 
thrgugh'caudillismo', and for several decades after Independence no 
one sector was able to attain dominance within the powerý bloc. Unlike 
in Chile, there was a failure to establish a balanced and institutionalised 
form of intra-elite conflicto and%caudillismdcontinued to be a major 
feature of Peruvian politics up until the end of the 19th century 
and the imposition of the liberal oligarchic state. The state, with 
its remnant of a revenue-collecting body, was one of the few sources 
of wealth in Peru during the early part of the 19th century, and 
therefore became a focus of struggle amongst the caudillos, a source 
of income/employmqnt for the 'middle sectors' - 'mestizo' soldiersp 1! awyp'r"s'v, 
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traders, etc. - and of capital accumulation for some members of the 
elite who regained their former wealth through making loans to the 
government, acquisition of contracts, grants9 and so on. Itl however, 
carried out no productive role in the realisation of capital 
accumulated within the national boundaries of the republic, but should 
be seen as merely consisting of vestigial elements of a state whose 
prime function had beent and was to remain, the provision of raw 
materials for mercantile capitalism. 
With the discovery of guano, and Peru's subsequent re-incorporation 
into the world market, the framework of a state appaxatus appropriate 
for the regulaxisation of raw material transactions and accommodation 
of foreign capital are re-established. Concomitant with this 
development, some institutionalisation of the political process took, 
place once more. The coastal fraction of the oligarchy clearly used 
the atuto under Echonique 
1 to obtain a largo amount Of 'UIO PuUnO 
revenues which they then used to re-establish their economic base of 
agro-extractive exports and through which they were able to achieve 
a degree of predominance. The other main function of the state during 
this era continued to be that of a patronage machine. Both these 
features mimic the functions of the colonial state. Levin describes 
the performance of the state during the Guano era in the following way: 
"With seemingly unlimited guano funds passing into the 
government coffers, the bureaucratic traditions of Lima's 
Spanish colonial days came into fall flower and an 
Echenique explicity spoke of the need to use the state to 
establish new bases of capital accumulation (28th July, 1853 in P. O. 611136), but this did not augL= the beginning of the 
consistent use of the state to develop capitalism, but rather the momentary capture of the apparatus by an aristocrat and his consequent use of it to enrich his clients. 
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lempleomanial seemed to grip the city. The swollen arWj 
bureaucracy and pension lists created a class whose financial 
support was of increasing importance for the political 
stability and the economic stability of the small exchange 
sector. Politically, the life of the gove rnm ent rested 
to a great extent on the continued welfare of this militaxy 
and civilian group .... 11 
(1960, P-114) 
Moreover, this 'swollen army' of 'bureaucracy' was not a stable sector, 
its personnel tending to change with each new I caudillo'. This is 
cleaxly clientelistic, pre-capitalist politics at work -a state run 
on personalist lines, despite the chaxade of the imported liberal, 
democratic parliamentary institutions. W. M. Mathew has commented on 
the way in which the gaano business was organised in its early 
stages: 
"The relationship between the contractors and government 
appears to have been highly personal, and the government 
itself acting as a medley of self-interested individuals. 
To talk of a contract between a goverment and a company 
is to imply a perhaps unreal degree of formality and 
legalism". (1972, p. 608) 
Moreover, throughout the period under study, no sources of autonomous 
capital accumalation- were established: instead the speculative nature 
of the Peravian economy was increasingly accentuated by its world- 
market dependence, the banking boom and by the use of the government 
apparatus as a source of income. This in turn inhibited attempts at 
modernisation of the appaxatus as the tins' and touts' struggled over 
control of the framework, whilst political instability was increased 
by the extreme vulnerability of the entire economic structure to 
international cycles. As Ziemann and Lanzendorfer have observed: 
"The contradictory and incoherent societal reproduction of 
the periphery does not lead to a permanent reproduction of 
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its own postulates and conditions .... it produces on the one 
hand a permanent economic crisis in the shape of an unbalanced 
economy, and on the other, a permanent political crisis in 
the shape of a political imbalance. " (1977, p. 164) 
However, the Peruvian state, up until the establishment of the 
oliGarchic republic in TB95, -cannot be simply characterised as vestigal. 
It was not a static entity, but was also gradually undergoing the 
transformation into an all-embracing functional nation-state: a 
peripheral, dependent capitalist state, which is itself characterised 
by a quasi-permanent fragility and transitional quality. It must 
therefore be seen as both, vestigial and transitional for most of the 
19th century, reflecting the extreme structural heterogeneity and 
hybrid nature of the social formation and the consequent failure of any 
one class to achieve complete hegemony, or institutionalise a system of 
cooperative conflict. Under Pierola, following the trauma of the war, 
institutionalisation of the political processes finally takes placeg a 
national, bureaucratic army is created 
1, 
and the state begins to function 
as a unifying force, reflecting the greater elite consensus which had 
been achieved, and as a mediator between national and foreign capi 
2 
The ideological debates between 'liberals' and 'conservatives', the 
strugglesibetween dynamic and stagnating elements of the oligarcýyq 
1. Beruf's study (1978) highlights the crucial importance, in the 
centralisation and organisation of the state that took place after 
1895, of the creation of a national army, controlled by the state. 
This in turn reflects the coercive role of the Peruvian states as 
opposed to its unifying or ideological functions. 
2. One of the major roles of the post-1895 state concerned the 
provision of labour, for instance, in 1895 Bolivar's decree 
concerning the illegality of communal land was re-enacted. 
This policy underlined the need of a state army. 
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I between the sierra and the coast, which preceded the modernisation of 
the state apparatus and for which the state acted as a foxmm, should 
be seen as representing part of this transitionj stages in the 
'incomplete b-aurgeois revolutiont. Incomplete, because the state 
continued to act as a cratch for pre-capitalist relations, because the 
backward sectors of the oligarchy were not ousted, but were, on the 
contrary, strengthened; and incomplete because it is questionable, even 
after the War of the Pacific, or by 1895, whether one may consider Peru 
traly as a nation-state. 
A crucial ideological component of the bourgeois capitalist state is 
the way in which national boundaries were erected'between classes and 
reinforced by the administrative apparatus. This historically specific 
development, which formed a vital part of the bourgeois revolutions of 
Western Europeq serves partly the purpose of defining capital 
accumulation within geographical boundaries for specific social classes 
and partly the way in which the capitalist class consolidates its power. 
In this way the bourgeois nation-state is an ideologicallentity as well 
as an actual entity composed of boundaries, institutions and so forth. 
However, in Peru, throughout the 19th century there is little or no 
conception of the nation-state 
1- 
capital is reproduced outside national 
1. Nationalism is a bourgeois phenomenon, even though capitalism is 
internationally mobilev' in contrast, since land is the basis of 
power for a feudal ruling class national boundaries are an 
obstacle - territory may be owned anywhere: "The ideological 
conceptions of Inationalismt as such were foreign to the inmost 
nature of Absolutisd' (Anderson, 1979, P-38)- Similaxly the 
phenomenon of nationalism was extremely slow to emerge in most 
Latin American statesq despite rhetoric to the contrary (cefe 
Ja, guaribe, 1969). The success of the Chilean state here was 
exceptional and stood in sharp contrast to Peru, where in the 
sierra, for exanple, landowners and Indians identified more with 
their'altiplano'countexparts in Ecuador or Bolivia than with 
coasta. 1 Peruvians (c*fo Bonillal 1978). 
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boundaries; as Weaver (1976) points out, the major export concerns have an 
enclave character; foreign and national capitalists' interests and 
even personal relations are intertwined; the state - far from enjoying 
autonomy - is, for most of the 19th century, quite unable to create a 
unifying focus for the disparate elements of the social formation - 
nor can it act with iudependence vis-a-vis British capital. On the 
contrary, it has a client-patron relationship with foreig n capitalq and 
may be described as a semi-colonial state. The Pacific War, paxtly 
arising out of the clientelistic style of politics pursued in Peru, 
woefully reflected the incoherent nature of the Peruvian upper classesp 
and I consequently 
the backward nature of the Peruvian state. It 
highlighted the total inability of the state to control the various 
parts of the country, and sectors of society, and its dependence on 
foreign capital. The war is the culmination of the political and 
economic instability inherent in the fragile and fragmented nature of 
the Peruvian social formation.. As a piggy-bank for the oligarchy and 
source of patronage for the 'swollen army' of civil servants, Peru was 
endowed with an army totally unequipped to fight Chile (Chile had 5 
generals, Peru -26 (Beraf, 1978, p. 28)). Contemporaries commented on 
the Peruvian preoccupations, even during the war, with infighting; 
and members of the elite sought the protection of the Chilean army 
against the oppressed classes, and/or put forward various schemes 
whereby Peru might be made into a North American protectorate (see , 
Chapter 10 By contrasto in Chile the landowning class had early 
on achieved a substantial degree of integration and national autonomy$ 
due in part to its differing colonial heritage, and this had led to 
the early institutionalioation of political processes and establishment 
of a strong and centralised state apparatus, controlled by the oligarchy, 
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in alliance with foreign capital. Chile had quickly developed as a 
"reliable", if independent, economic partneri. For Chile, therefore, 
the Pacific Wax may be seen as an example of positive action undertaken 
by the state in its accumulative stage; it represented not only a 
significant moment in its capital accumulation, but also a further 
progression towards national integration. Defeat for Peru represented 
not only capital disaccumulation,, but fL=ther disintegration of the 
social structure and weakening of the formal institutions of the 
state. The bourgeois-liberal, modernising reforms of Paxdo were 
therefore initially lost and we see a temporary return to'caudillismo! 
It was in partnership with foreign capitall via the Grace Contract, 
that the Civilistas eventually managed to recover economically and 
effect a degree of modernisation of the state apparatus in the form of 
the liberal-oligarchic statep in co-operation with more backwaxd 
sectors of the possessing classes. 'La republica aristocratical was 
therefore still based on an alliance between mercantile and rentier 
capital, but took Earopean liberalism as its form, and finally expressed 
intra-elite unity 
2 through this exclusivist democratic constitutionalism 
(c. f. Therboni, 1979, P-72) 
Duffield, writing just before the Pacific War, commented on the gap 
between 'form' and reality in Peruvian politics: 
Chilean 'reliability' and trespectabilityt was a major reason for 
British (unofficial) support for it, especially in the Pacific 
Wax. In the judgement of American historian Evans, after the 
Pacific Wax: "The promise of better business conditions in the 
nitrate fields when the progressive Chileans extended their 
administration there was not lost on the British investor. " 
(19279 P-135). 
2. However, it is clear that beneath the surface the structure of the 
Peruvian formation and politics was still archaic: Miller (1982) 
comments on the continuing importance of factional struggles and 
personal followings after the wax. 
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"Peru is a republic in name, "governed", or rather farmed by 
groups or families of despots, who frequently quaxel. 1 among 
themselves. " (18779 P-133) 
From the moment of Independence, of course, European bourgeois 
representative institutions had been adopted as the form of government 
and new, radical constitutions continued to be drawn up and implemented 
in Peru. Many of the liberal reforms do represent an attempt to carry 
out a bourgeois revolution and a few individuals did hope to establish 
an autonomous manufacturing base (c. f. Copello y Petriconi, 1876; 
Gootenberg, 1982); however, they axe also a function of ideological 
rhetoric and the result of mimicry of a model which was assumed to be 
better than indigenous forms. But since the reforms did not 
correspond to Peruvian realityq they either remained ineffective, 
generated further intra-elite friction, were transformed to suit the 
needs of the Peruvian oligarchyq orl finally, facilitated economic 
domination by metropolitan capital. In the event, institutions were 
generally modified to conform more closely to Peruvian reality; for 
example, the liberal-oligarchic republic at the end of the 19th 
century endowed the President with almost vice-regal powers, suffrage 
remained limited to about 3/16 of the population, and the chambers had 
little independence. What was eventually taken fully on board, howeverg 
was European economic liberalism. This united British and Peruvian 
capital and was the basis for the recovery of the export oligarchyt 
but undermined the possibilities of self-sustaining capitalist 
development on British lines. As Mariano Otero, writing in the 1840S 
about Mexico, observed: 
"When it'has been said to us very seriously that we have an 
aristocracy, when we have been exhorted to bring it up to 
date and we have been told of the European nobility and feudal 
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clergy, no one has known what he was talking about; words 
have miserably been mistaken for things, and an error in 
language has brought about one in politics .... the Mexican 
axistocracy was not at all similax to the European; it was 
**@* a parody .... and the individuals that composed it .... 
lived indolently upon capital enjoying their profits. " 
(in Cockcroft, 1974, p. 247) 
Moreover, the moden-dsing sector of this aristocracy perceived its 
interests as complementary to those of Western industry. - For 
Candamo, at the end of the 19th century, this was to be the role of 
the oligarchic state - to facilitate the export of raw materia. Is 
(in 
Yepes, 19729 p. 191)-and those like Copello, Petriconi and Pardo who 
had hoped to use guano wealth as a source of primitive accumulation to 
make Peru more independent, but had based their ideas largely on the 
philosophy of Chevalier or Comte, were doomed to failure. As the 
Mexican statesman Ponciano, Arriaga,, speaking in 1857, waxned: 
"Upon decreeing freedom of trade, industry and other 
franchises, great concessions are made to foreigners, scarcely 
reflecting upon the impossibility of our industry and crafts 
competing with the foreigners, given three centuries of delay, 
monopolyland servitude. " 
(in Cockcroft, 1974, p. 247', my emphasis) 
Marx observed in the 18th Brimaire: 
"Men make their own historyg but they do not make it just as 
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen 
by'themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all 
the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains 
of the living. " 
(1968, p. 96) 
Consequently, the form of state order that eventually came to be 
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institutionalised in Peru in the 1890s and the concomitant 
configaration of organised intra-elite conflict was still chaxacterised 
by earlier, archaic features. It represented an uneasy interlocking 
and coexistence of different historical temporalities, a compromise 
between the local historical time of the predominantly non-capitalist 
sierra with that of the dominant 'modern' sector, as the nascent 
capitalist order established a fuentional relationship with the feuda. 1 
hacendados; at the expense of the Indian communities. - It finally 
expressed the (marginal) victory of one backwaxd sector of the elite 
over an even more backward sector. Morse has discussed this victory 
and the preceding years of-political infighting in terms of the North 
American Civil War, which, howeverv in Latin America was won by the 
'South" (Morse, 1974, pp-416-447). However, what the 'South' subdued 
was not a 'Northern' industrialising sectorg but agriculture based on 
seigneurial relations and primitive technology. Purthermore,. in Peru, 
this sector was incorporated into the state structure, which consequently 
remained overloaded with contradictions and conflicts. 
In summaxy, the correct characterisation of the republican Peruvian 
state, prior to the establishment of the liberal oligarchic republicl 
must be that of aweak and vestigial structure, which largely consisted 
of'transitory elements, a bare framework for collecting revenue 
(thFough tax-faxming and monopolies), and carrying out repression. 
Central power contended for these functions with the localised client 
systems that predominated for most of the periodq and with the Indian 
1. The 'South' representing export-oriented, technologically modern 
plantation agriculture based on non-capitalist labour forms and 
dependent on foreign capital; even in this 'capitalist' sector 
of agriculture, therefore, the formal subsunption of labour to 
capital did not occur. 
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communities. It cannot, therefore be considered to have enjoyed 
autonomy in the sense of pursuing a coherent, independent policy, or 
mediating between classes, since there was no permanent independent 
bareaucracy (either civilian or military (Beraf, 1978)) to carry out 
I 
such policies. On the contraxy, Peravian politics was characterised 
by violent fluctuations, reflecting the capture of the apparatus by 
different clasd fractions. The republican statet during the period 
under study, may be said to have been a 'shadow' of its former, 
absolutist self. Moreover, it was a disorganised $shadow' lacking in 
national sovereignty. Its central determinant was the non-integrated 
incorporation of the Peruvian social formation into the, international 
economic system, which reacted with the internal factors delineated 
above to generate constant conflict and further social and structural 
heterogeneity. In this sense it may have been external to Peruvian 
society, but not in the sense of being autonomous, rather in the sense 
1 
of having little relevance to it Interestingly, as Peruvian politics 
I 
became more systematised, following Castilla and the beginning of the 
Guano Age, the archaic functions of the state were actually accentuated. 
We may even compare it to the Tsarist state at the end of the 19th 
I 
century; Althussers comments here axe resonant of features of the 
Peruvian state, especially as coastal agriculture began to modernise 
ind the state became stronger. The feature 'Of the Tearist state was: 
the accumulation and exacerbation of all the historical 
contradictions then possible in a single state. Contradictions 
of a regime of feudal exploitation at the dawn of the 20th 
I centuryp attempting ever more ferociously amidst mounting 
This generalisation is obviously applicable to the sierra, and 
particulaxly to the Indian peasantry, far more than it is to 
the coast. 
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threats to rule, with the aid of a deceitful priesthood 
over an enormous mass of ignorant peasants .... 
Contradictions of .... capitalist exploitation and 
imperialist exploitation in the major cities and 
their suburbs ... A gigantic contradiction between the 
stage of development of capitalist methods of production 
.... and the medieval state of the countryside 
(1969, PP-95-6) 
The Guano Age, whilst it produced certain liberal reforms, also led to 
the accentuation of certain of the medieval characteristics of the 
state - notably the enormous outlay on the military. Anderson 
writes that: 
"The virtual permanence of international armed conflict is 
one of the hallmarks of the whole climate of Absolutism 
(197ýt P-33)j 
furthermore, within a country toot armed struggle was commonplace, for: 
"wax was possibly the most rational and rapid single mode 
of expansion of surplus extractions available for any given 
ruling class under feudalism .... 
(ibid. 
9 P-31) 
In this sense the Pacific War, and the internal conflicts it 
generated, was the logical outcome of the structural continuity of the 
feudal character of the Peruvian state, whilst for Chile it was a 
war of local 'Imperialism'. Equally, the Peruvian statep lackingint- 
national cohesion and &national a=yO was inevitably defeatedg not only 
from without, but also from within, as the crisis producedl as it did 
for 20th pentury Tsarism: 
"The exacerbation of class struggles throughout the 
country, not only between exploiter and exploitedq but-even 
within the ruling classes themselves .... 11 
(Althusser, 1969, p. 96) (see Chapter 10) 
1. See following section. 
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The pre-Wax Peruvian state did not enjoy autonomy, so much as lack 
cohesion and validity and even substance 
1, 
expressing the contradictory 
nature of the social formation discussed above. As such it was a 
further obstacle to change, and ultimately inhibited good relations 
with foreign capital. Its reconstruction and regenerationg however, 
was accomplished via a semi-colonial relationship with metropolitan 
capital (enshrined in the Grace Contract). In this way, even as a 
fully organised state apparatus it; still continued to exhibit 
characteristics of absolutism, and fulfilled an intermediary role 
similar to that during the colonial era. 
C. Religion in Peru: instrument of control and expression of 
dioucrit 
Whilst religion was central to Hegelian thought, Marx clearly 
considered it of little concern. His most detailed discussion of 
it is to be found in "Introduction to a Critique of llegells 
Philosophy of Law": 
"The struggle against religion is therefore indirectly 
the struggle againstf that world whose spiritual aroma 
is religion. Religious suffering is the expression of 
real suffering and at the same time the protest against 
real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed 
creaturet the heart of a heartless worldq as it is the 
spirit of spiritless conditions. The criticism of religion 
Cotler writes: 'Towards the end of the. 19th century, Peru 
continued to be ruled by Igamonales, and Icaudillos' who were 
linked to the divergent interests of different regional landowning. 
! and commercia. 1 groups, which in turn dominated the Indian 
population. In this sense, the social and political system was 
of a colonial character. No sector of the dominant class was 
capable of forming a national state and providing a national 
identity for Peruvian society. ' (1979, -p. 273) 
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is thus in embryo a criticism of the vale of tears whose 
halo is religion". 
' 
(cited in McLellan, 1972, pp. 186-47) 
In his later writings, religion is generally ignored as an out-of- 
date and 'false conception', serving to mask real social relations 
and increasingly irrelevant to bourgeois society. His few comments 
on it. clearly link it with pre-capitalist formations; 
"the parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord". 
(Manifesto of the Compinist Manifesto in Marx and Engels, 
ig6eq P-55) 
Engels devotes more attention to the subject, and his observations 
provide a useful framework for discussion of the role of religion in 
the Peruvian social brmation. He makes a clear distinction between 
'Primitive' beliefs, arising from "erroneous, primitive conceptions 
of men about their own nature and external nature surrounding them" 
(Peuerbach and the ad of Classical German Philosophy in Marx and 
Engels, 1968, p. 618), and the more sophisticated ideologies/ 
religions which emerged with the development of the state, complementing 
the needs of that state. The simple folk religion of the Indian masses, 
centering on worship of the Earth Goddess, PachaTnama, clearly falls 
into the first category, whilst the extremely elitist and oppressive 
character of the Inca belief-system places it firmly within the 
1. Mioau ronuricu noutly oxproaa tho contradictions ourrounding tho 
Indian4*Yeligion in Peru. On the one hand Roman Catholicism, 
like the Inca state religion before it, was the state ideology 
used to conquer and oppress him/her. On the other hand, 
Christianity held out the promise of equality of humankind after 
death and consequently, in combination with earlier priýitive 
superstitions, became the vehicle and expression of Indian 
resistance to the inequalities of white rule (cf. Pike, 1978). 
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category of state ideologies' (cf. Mariategui, 1976, pp. 164-5). 
Engels then proceeds to discuss the nature of religion under 
feudalism: 
"In the Middle Ages, in the same measure as feudalism 
developed, Christianity grew into the religious counterpart 
to it, with u corrouponding foudal hioru=hy.... Thu 
Middle Ages had attached to theology all the other forms 
of ideology .... and made them subdivisions of theology. 
It thereby constrained every social and political 
movement to take a theological form. The sentiments-of 
the masses were fed with religion to the exclusion of all 
else; it was therefore necessary to put forward their own 
interests in a religious guise. 0,. " 
2 
(op. cit., p. 619) 
Medieval Spain was to prove the most ultranontane of all Western 
Absolutist states (cf. Anderson# 1979, p. 61). The long Reconquest/ 
Crusade against the Moors had produced a relationship between Church 
and State that was perhaps the closest and most harmonious in 
1. Pike describes the sophisticated and intellectual nature of Inca 
, religion, Xhich rendered it opaque-and unsatisfactory to the 
peasants, who therefore also maintained their old deities. Central 
to the Inca religion was an emphasis on the lapartness' of the 
elite from the masses, who even in death would go to an 
Underworld of torment and toil, separate from the resting place of 
the Inca Caste which was a paradise of Chicha, coca and women 
(1978, p. 240). The depressing prospect of this eternal immitability 
of status helps to explain the ease with which the mass of Indian 
peasants were converted to Christianity. It was also due to the 
fact that Inca theology, was a state ideology of the kind identified 
by Engels and, consequentlyp the Inca Gods "could continue to 
exist .... only as long as the nation existed .... they fell with 
its fall". (op. cit., p. 618) 
2. The continuing relevance of these observations to Peru even in the 
19th century, especially with regard to the need of the Indian 
peasantry to express their revolutionary aspirations through 
messianic movements (cf. Cohn, 1970, Chapter 10). provides an 
example of the medieval quality of Peruvian life. 
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Christendom (Mecham, 1966); and Just as the Conquest of Latin America 
was an integral part of the development of Absolutism in Spain, andt 
as such, a response to the crisis of feudal profitability', it may 
also be seen as the last Crusade (Mariategui, 1976, p. 169). 
2 
]Furthermore, the interdependence of Church and State was to be even 
closer in Latin America than in Spain, emphasising and contributing 
to the intensely traditional nature of the society created there. 
In Mecham's words: 
"Never before or since did a sovereign with the consent of 
the pope so completely control the Catholic Church within 
hie dominions .... 
(but) 
.... However exceptional were the 
powers of the Crown in ecclesiastical matters, there is 
little doubt that the royal aid and supervision was of 
inestimable advantage to the Church in America..... 
The King was amply compensated for the obligations and 
responsibilities he assumed with reference to the Church. 
Since Catholicism was indissolubly 
, 
linked with royal 
authorityv the Church was quite as effective an instrument 
in the conquest and domination of the Indies as was the 
army. It was one of the i3rincipal agents of the civil power 
in America for over three centuries ..... 
Undoubtedly the blind obedience and almost fanatical 
reverence of the colonials for their "most Catholic 
Sovereigns" were largely the result of clerical promptings". 
(1966, PP-36-7; my emphasis) 
Thin reactionary aXance was perhaps nowhere more successful and 
necessary than in Peru (cf. Klaiber, 1977, p. 8; Anna, 1975; 
1. Anderson describes Absolutism as "a redeployed and recharged 
app-aratus. of feudal domination". whilat Vilar characterised 
the Conquest as the highest stage of feudalism (1971). 
2-- Initially much of the religious education was delegated to the 
Oencomenderos, themselves, facilitating political control of the 
Indians (Wood, 1980) 
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mecham, 1966, p. 161). where Christianity remained the ideological 
garb of the upper classes through into the 20th centuryl, encountering 
no serious resistance 
2 
until the emergence of Gonzalez Prada, and his 
circle. As Mariategui observes: 
"La Revolucion de la, Independenciag del mismo modo que no 
toco los privilegios feudales, tampoco toco los privilegios 
eclesiasticos". 
(1976, pp. 185-6) 
Contemporary sources make it clear too that the church continued 
as an active and powerful political force in Peruvian society after 
Independence. For instance in 1868 the North American Minister in 
Peru wrote to the secretary of State that 11.... the Church Party 
.... controls no small part of the political power in Peru .... 
(Foreign Relations of the United States, Hovey to Seward, 
14th January 1868)o Whilst Pardo's relatively mild anti-clerical 
measuresq which largely consisted of an attempt to place state 
education under secular controlq provoked violent resistance throughout 
Peru, in particular from Arequipa and the rest, of the sierra (Foreign 
Relimtions of the United Stateaq Thomas to Fish, 22nd August 1874). 
In 1875 a pamphlet entitled 'Starcross' remarked (unprophetically): 
"The Jesuits being already banished from the Republic3, and 
the dissatisfied Priests having lost all their money and a 
great deal of their prestige in the late ridiculous attempt 
1. Even today "religion and politics-are so deeply intertwined in 
Peru that government officials automatically seek the support 
of the Church .... without which their political influence would be seriously limited". (Klaiber, 1977P P-xi) 
2. Certain attacks on the clergy were made; for instance in 1856 the 
ecclesiastical Ifuerol was abolished. However, in comparison with 
Mux1co, unti-cluricalium wau non-oxiotent. 
3. Their expulsion was carried out before Independence, in 1767 
(Mecham, 19669 P-40). 
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at revolution will now be compelled .... to remain quietly 
in their confessional boxes .... a lesson that will 
effea tually put a stop to the ultramontane views of 
such state peculators as Pierola. and his infamous 
partido .... 
(8th Febnxary 1875) 
The continuing importance and strength of Catholicism in 
nineteenth century Peru is intimately connected to the position of 
the Indian peasantry and their lack of allegiance to the concept of 
a nation state. Stemming from this are two major issues which should 
be briefly considered. Firstly the implications of the specific form 
of Christianity adopted by the Indians, and secondly religion as a 
major source of institutional control of the peasants (Pesce, 
19729 PP-75-6)1. 
The Christianity practised by the Indians has been described as a 
"syncretic fusion of animism, mother-earth worshipq and 16th century 
Spanish Catholicism! ' (Klaiber, 19779 P-4)- Pike (1978) notes that 
in fact the Catholic Church encouraged such a popularisation 
(which also helps to account for the easy conversion and consequent 
subjugation of the Indians). Since the European peasantry too 
combined pagan beliefs with official Catholicismq in the late Middle 
Ages the Catholic Church had begun to incorporate the popular legenas 
of saints into. official dogma (cf- Cohn, 
. 
1970) 2 In this way a 
1. In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Marx and Engels, 
1968, P-174) Marx specifically acknowledges the importance of the 
Church as an arm of the state: "Another idee napolecaienne is the 
domination of the priests as an instrument of government". Howevex 
the oppression and poverty of the peasantry meant that they could 
easily "become irreligious". 
2. Corresponding to the development of Absolutism and thus 
representing the ideological response to the crisis of feudalism. 
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synthesis of polyv- and monotheism was achieved (cf. Guinness, 1909) 
which greatly facilitated both control of the nominally Christian 
peasantry and conversion of the heathen (for instance the peasants I 
in Moorish Spain). Particular use was made of the Virgin in order 
to appeal to the ancient Rarth Mother cults. Pike writes that: 
"The symbolism associated with the Virgin served both to 
establish religious ties between the upper and lower 
classes and also to strengthen the bonds of domination 
and dependence ass=ed to be providentially ordained 
1. 
Me Spanish rulers of'Pera and their post-Independence 
successors would make telling use of it (symbolism), 
nourishing to the best of their abilities the cult of 
the Virgin known as Marianismoll. 
(op. cit., pp. 241-2) 
However, whilst this synthesis of primitive beliefs with 
Catholicism was successful in its appeal to the peasants, it also 
transformed Christianity into an Indian 'subculture', a potential 
ideological framework for future uprisings. Forbes has pointed 
out how encouragement of the Indians in their pre-Christian rites 
was also beneficial financially to the church: 
"The priests were .... only too glad to encourage the 
Ind-Lana in their tastes .... for they soon found out 
that the weak side of the Indian was his attachment to 
his feastso for which alone he can be induced to part 
1. These ties were of supreme importance since Catholicism was the 
sole unifying factor in the Peruvian social formation; in all 
other respects the state had failed to achieve national integration (see above). This was acknowledged in Bolivia after the Pacific 
War when the church was called upon to: "use its influence with 
the Indians in order to inspire them with patriotic feelings" (F. O. 61/348, St. John to Granville, 13th December 1883). 
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with his money.... Ehcouraged by the priests, the Indians 
of many districts are urged on to a rivalry in getting up 
feasts .... all of which naturally puts money into the 
pockets of the priest himself"'. 
(1870, P-41) 
But the conjunction of the realities of the superexploitation practised 
on the peasantry by the white elite, including the Church, with the 
potentially subversive mixture of Christian egalitarianism 
2 
and pre- 
Conquest cults9 could be a revolutionary force. lurthermore, since 
white society deliberately excluded the Indians and generally dealt 
with them through the mediation of. the Indian 'caciques' (as well as 
the 'mestizo' priests), there was scope for these to act as shamals/ 
populist leaders who both held the key to 'pure', uncorrupted 
Christianity and had knowledge of the Indian Gods (Pike, 1978, p. 244). 
There is a clear relationship between the servitude of the Indians 
and their degree of independence of the religious authorities in an 
area. A situation in which dependence was placEd On a local cacique, 
rather than the priest, as the broker. with 'Spanish' society, was 
Obviously this was not the only way in which surplus was 
extracted from the peasantry by the Church. Numerous devices, 
common to all feudal societies, were used. Guinness, discussing 
the abuses perpetrated by the landlords and merchants on the 
Indians (specifically the forced sale of wool by the method of 
Ireparto forzosol), goes on to enumerate the extortionate 
devices adopted by the priests: 
"A curacy is the monopoly of the fees of the district for 
marriages, baptisms, and other ceremonies, and the priests 
extort from their flooks exorbitant sums. Heavy burdens are 
put upon the faithful in. the form of tithes .... The men 
are ruined by their term of forced service for the priest, 
being obliged to purchase themselves everything which he 
demands during that time.... The forced service of the women 
to the priest is known as the Imittal .... 11 
(19099 pp. 201-2) 
These mechanisms, generally enshrined in law, were clearly part of the general policy forcing the Indian to participate in the wider 
market (cf. Pesce, 1972t PP-79-80)- 
2. This was one reason for the prohibition of access to the bible by 
Catholic autboritioa throughout Latin Amorica, and tho violont 
reactions to protestant evangelism. 
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e 
also one which facilitated both his emergence as a shaman and the 
development of (Indian) nationalistic/millenarian movements 
(cf; 
- Yu Zubritski, 1979). Obviously such movements were most common 
at times of greater pressure on the Indian communities, due to the 
penetration of market forces - for instance the Tupac Amaru revolt 
in the 1780s, and the uprisings during the Pacific War (cf. Chapter 10). 
Ironically, when such uprisings occurred, the Church, although it had 
contributed to the oppression which had generated such revolts, 
always played as great a role in the pacification and defeat of the 
Indian, as did the army (Klaiber, 1977). In a sense then the Church 
could be said to be more of a national state than the republican state 
itself', and generally represented both an effective mechanism of 
exploitation and means of control over the Indians. On the other 
hand the fact that the State's functions were thus visibly divided 
2 
both exemplified the divisions within and weakness of the upper 
classes, who were unable to unite in combining negotiation with 
foreign capital and control of the peasantry. 
In summary, both the central importance of religion and the close 
relationship between Church and State in 19th century Peru, illustrates 
the continuing vitality of its pre-capitalist characteristics, whilat 
also determining the nature of class struggles. In turng these 
Guinness writes that up until the 20th century', "legislation 
in Peru has been subservient to the requirements of Canon Law" 
'(19099 p. 245). 
2. This was clearly demonstrated during the 19th century by the 
inability of central state power to extend into the highlands. 
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factors constituted formidable obstacles to any liberalisation 
it 
or 
even integration of the Peruvian social structure, since the folk 
religion of the Indians had become a subculture based on their own 
traditions, to the exclusion of the rest of society, whilst 'official' 
Catholicism specifically aimed to maintain their subordination and 
IsepFateness'. 
1. For instance Prado's gove=ent was defeated in 1867 partly 
because the new constitution which it promulgated embraced a 
large number of liberal ideas, some of which specifically 
infringed the Church monopoly of education. These provoked 
a revolution (Maiguaschea, 19679 p. 160). 
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CHAPTER 4 : THI--. ' CRIGINS OF COLONIAL PFRU 
ItArcAuction 
This chapter and the two that follow it comprise a section that 
will present a synthesis of the historical processes involved in 
development of the Feruvian social formation; both charting the 
chronological topography of the War of the Pacific and also 
analysing some crucial aspects of the interface between the 
external and internal influences on the Peruvian economic and 
social structure. Consequently, part of this discussion must 
focus on both the pre-Columbian and medieval Spanish social 
formation, and the nature of their fusion in the colonial era. 
Also central to the analysis is the changing nature of Peruvian 
relationships with foreign powers - both metropolitan nations 
and, other Latin American states. r-art of the section (Chapter 6) 
will therefore deal with the balkanisation of the Latin American 
economy that took place after Independenceg as intra-regional 
commerce and links dissolved before imperial capital. Out of 
the newq neo-colonial relationships there developed a system 
of intra-oligarchic politicsq dominated, on the West Coast, by 
a Chilean-Peruvian rivalry which was focussed principally on 
Bolivian territory. The relationship between the Chilean an& 
Peruvian elites will therefore form a part of the discussiont 
since it not only serves to highlight the dialectic of unity and 
diversity underlying South American balkanisation, but also 
provides an insight into the nature of state and class formation 
in 19th Century republican Peru, together with the nature of the 
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requirements of British capital; it was also, of course, the 
immediate cause of the Pacific War. 
In this way these chapters, while partially based on primary 
researcht principally employ secondary material and will form 
a bridge between the preceding theoretical prospectus, and the 
main empirical work on the War of the Pacific. They will focus 
on analysis of the actual mechanisms, both internal and external, 
which underpin the relations of dependence and underdevelopment. 
A methodological note; for convenience, I will be using a 
number of 'middle-order' terms and categories such as 'patron- 
client' relationships, but these should be addressed within the 
Marxint rruawwork I havo oijUlned above, r-ather thall t1w runntionalint 
framework in which they are often used. 
Marx alwayn asserted thatt in order to understand a given social 
structure, it was imperative to analyse the preceding relations of 
Productiong since they not only shaped the forms of the new social 
relations, but would also linger on, within the new mode of production. 
Thin meant that each society undergoing change would inevitably pass 
through a transitional period when neither mode of production 
predominated. Spanish policy was designed to deliberately retain 
elements of the Inca social organisation, whilst in the 19th Century 
aspects of the capitalist mode of production were established and 
co-existed with pre-capitalist social relations. This 'scission' 
(Yepes 1974)9 which characterised the entire Peruvian social 
1. For instance, see Grundrisse# 1973, pp. 100-107 
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formation, was actually reinforced during the 19th Century by 
II. etropolitan capital, and rendered the process of change and 
modernisation especially difficult and uneven. Writing at the 
beginning of the 20th Century, Mariategui observed that Peruvian 
society continued to exhibit features of the influences which had 
shaped it, appearing to express the idea of a long-standing 
transitional social formation. His view, as expressed below, 
approximate very closely to the concept of an articulation of different 
I 
modes of production: 
"en el Peru actual co-existen elementos de tres economias 
diferentes. Bajo el regimen de economia feudal nacio 
de la Conquista subsisten en la sierra a1gunos residuos. 
vivos todavia de la economia comunista indigena. En la 
Costa, sobre un suelo feudal crece una economia burgesa 
que por lo menos en su desarollo mentalq do, la impresion 
de una economia retardada. " (Mariategui, 1976, p. 28) 
But since these non-capitalist and capitalist forms appeared to 
be so entrenchedq intertwined and interdependent, he attributed 
to the resultant social formation a degree of permanency; the 
contradictions within Peruvian society could not be resolved, due 
to the tenacious links between the 'bourgeoisie' and servile 
I 
relations of production. Indeedl he denied the emergence, in 
the 19th Centuryt of a true bourgeois class: 
'ten el Peru no hemos tenido en 100 anos de republica, 
una verdadera clase burgesat una verdadera clase capitalista. 
La antigua clase feudal - camuflada o diBfrazada de burguesia 
republicana - ha conservado sus posiciones. 911 
(1976, po5l) 
Other PeruviarirU(Basadre 19699 Bravo Bresani 1970, Bonilla, 1970) 
also appear, to subscribe to this viewpoint, whilst Bollinger (1977) 
appears over zealous in his discovery of a bourgeois revolution in 
-lo4- 
early 19th Century Peru. The problem is extremely complex# since 
the logic of a denial of the existence of a bourgeoisie in 19th 
Latin America (cf. Dale Johnson, 1972) could lead to the positing 
of the existence of a new mode of production, - the colonial or 
I neo-colonial mode of production. ksee Hamza Alavi, 1975 and 
Roxborough, 1979). But whilst the clear evidence of survivals 
in Peru of previous social relations and cultural forms have 
helped determine its structural evolutiong and must therefore be 
analysed, they cannot be seen to represent, a new mode of productiong 
since in fact they have not created new, autonomous class forms. 
However, the hybrid colonial structure that was created by the 
Ppanish can be shown, as a comlýination of different social relations, 
to represent a particularly lengthy, complex and eclectic form of 
transition or historical trajectory. Bartra (1982) and Yepes 
(1974) provide a particularly useful starting point here in their 
discussion of the 'determined' nature of capitalist development 
in Latin America, which requires the constant Irefunctionalisation' 
of the preceding non-capitalist forms. 
examine the origins of colonial Peru. 
I 
B. The pre-Columbian mode ofproduction 
In this light, let us now 
There is clear evidence that, despite official Inca claims to 
have established 'civilization' in the Andean areat the Peruvian- 
Bolivian-Ecuadorean regions had in fact produced several groups that 
had achieved sufficient surplus to permit the emergence of a 
specialised division of labour, and a state structure 
1. Indeed 
For instanceg Moche societyp the Tiahuanaco culture, and the 
Chimu state. 
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the specialisation and cultural achievements of preceding Indian 
i 
groups made possible the establishment of the Inca Empire (Lanning, 
1967), many features of which closely resembled earlier systems. 
It would appear that the Inca achievement was principally the 
unification, by conquest, of the diverse groups in the area, 
followed by their organisation into an integrated and highly 
controlled sYstemv which in turn permitted the intensification 
of previous forces and relations of production. (Dietericho 
19829 PP-114-116). In fact, the Inca and the Aztec and Maya 
civilisations, all represented the culmination of an increasingly 
unified historical progress within Latin Americal the continuity 
of whicli was broken by conquest. 
The fundamental unit of social organisation and production of the 
region, which long pre-dated the Incas, was the layllul, which 
was based on communal usufruct of the means of production. The 
layllus' were settlements based on kinship relations, being 
CoIIIj)o: ICd 01, Ileveral I'allillion 
1 
1111 ()1' WhOIII VIILd, or clainwd to 
haveg descended from a common ancester - sometimes an animal. 
The kinship networks formed the pervasive basis of social 
relations, essential to both the 'economic constraints of agrarian 
activities' and reproduction of the productive unit (Meillassoux, 
19789 p. 160). The whole fabric of this social structure achieved 
integrity through religious symbolism 
29 
the 'huacal (monument) 
to the legendary ancester was generally venerated at the centre of the 
1. Carmen Deere's work has demonstrated that there were variations 
to this pattern; in Cajamarcal nuclear families formed the basic 
social and productive unit, and the dominant tenancy pattern 
was that of individualised smallholdings. (19779 P-51) 
2. Melotti identifies this pre-eminent role of religion as being 
a key feature of what he describes as the Asiatic tradition. (1977v PP-70-71). 
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village - thus reinforcing the community's social cohesion. The 
rather closed and self-sufficient nature 
1 
of the layllul was 
further accentuated by the widespread practice of endogamyt in 
itself an expression of the communal Dwnership of land and the 
necessity of co-operative relations of production. Castro 
Pozo wrote: 
"The layllul consisted of several monogamous families who 
were descended from a common ancestor and who continued to 
practice endogramy as an ancestral law. " (19639 P-484). 
The lack of private property and the reciprocal nature of social 
relations led many later observers to idealise the Andean layllul; 
intqllectuals such as Campanella and Marmontel described it as the 
'Perfect society' (in Guidoni and Magni, 19779 P-105). Por 
Mariategui, too, it represented an ideal of agrarian communism 
which, in its 20th Century formg could be viewed as a progressive 
force for national social and economic development (1976, PP-559 
80-2); Marx, however, saw the classlessness of the community as 
2 
endowing it with a backward and static nature (1964, P-75) 
However, class relations could be said to have existed within the 
layllul. Extra-economic coercion and methods of domination were 
concealed within kinship relations, which also centred on the use 
of women as counters to form alliances. Such relations of authority 
were based on a division of labour according to age and sex; women 
were always of inferior status in such communities and used as 
1. Their self-sufficient character was facilitated by ayllu control 
of different ecological zones, since Andean topography. and therefore 
climate varies to such an extent within a small area. (Murrat J. 
"An Aymara Kingdom" Fthnohist=, 15, no. 2., 1966, p. 121) 
2. Although his correspondence later in life with Zasulich reveals 
a charil. r. 0 of oj)lnion. (in Marx arid Engoin, 1961), n) 
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objects of exchange - although not as Levi-Strauss (1972, p. 61) has 
maintained, - as a natural, biological law arising out of the exchange 
of languagebit as afunction of the relations of production, (Young 
and Harris, 1976). This is not however to deny the generally 
static nature of such socio-economic units. 
The politico-religious administration of the village was carried 
out through a hierarchy of offices (S. Brush, 1977, pp. 63-68 and 
B. Mishkin, 1963t P-441) headed by the council of male elders, 
led by the Icuracal. This stratification arose from the actual 
process of cultivation which, while demanding co-operation, was 
also dominated by the older males of the work-team, who had been 
involved in the work processes longest and therefore possessed 
valuable knowledge. This differentiation was expressed in and 
legitimised by the system of offices which males held from boyhood, 
each office bringng new knowledge of ritual (Father Pablo Jose 
de Arriagal 1621, in Romero and Urteaga, 19209 Vol. I). 
As productivity had risen in the Andean areaq economic contacts 
and cultural interchanges between 'ayllus' increased, eventually 
giving rise to the establishment of p , roupings of villaRes based on 
a theocratic systeml whichq in turng evolved into regional-state 
St7cturesq Meillassoux (1978)v in his discussion of peasant 
organisations, observes that when the amalgamation or domination 
of such communities occurred, social and economic relations 
continued to be expressed in terms of kinship: 
"The sovereign is assimilated to a senior .... or the-father. 
He is entitled to '-eat' his subjects as his own children, 
that is to receive part of their labour or the product of 
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their labour. Conversely he is expected to protect them. 
Such relations are often supported by an ideology which 
relates people to a mythical single ancestor and to a 
common descent group. " (1978, pp. 166-167). 
Whent as was the case with the Inca Empire, it was one group 
sI ubjugating anotherg or others, it would be possible to talk 
in terms of a class system and a state. Furthermorej in such 
a situation: 
"Kinship is transformed ... into an ideology whoso Iraison 
d'etrel is not so much to express the relationships generated 
from the growth and organisation of the society as to justify 
and even support a domination imposed from outside .... 
When kinship reaches a religious dimensiont it may gain 
enough strength to be considered as the basic justification 
for domination and exploitation. " (ibid. p. 167) 
By the 14th Century the Inca tribe had succeeded in producing a 
large enough surplus to support a more sophisticated and stratified 
society dominated by a strong military and religious superstructuret 
which appeared as a state bureaucracy. The Inca military superiority 
enabled them to appropriate the agricultural surplus of surrounding 
areas and so, gradually, to subdue their principal rivals, such as 
the Chimu State, and establish an empire. This empire, Tahuantinsuyaq 
contrived to use as Its basic unit the cotiunutial 'Llylltl', IPUL 111od1flu'd 
its social structure. The Icuracal now had to be acceptable to 
the Inca authorities, since he had to enforce the new economic 
demands on the village. Part of the village's communal lands 
was expropriated and transferred to the Inca state or priesthood. 
(Hildebrando Castro Pozo, 19639 P-483). The lands they retained 
now no longer belonged to the village but to the Inca, although 
usufruct rights remained the same. Surplus labour was extracted 
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by forced labour, (the Imital) on the state and religious lands, and 
on the p-reat public workn of the empire. Furthermore, villapern 
had to also work the lands of the Icuracal, thus formalizing the 
class barrier. (R. Larco Hoyle, 1971 and V. W. Von Hagen, 1977). 
A further form of surplus appropriation and method of domination 
was to be found in the practice of Imitimaes' (forced migrations), 
whereby whole populations were transferred from one region to 
another. This was sometimes carried out in punishment for 
rebellion, but often simply in order to effect major construction 
projectsl or the colonisation of new areas. It appears too, that 
an important element of the social structure of Tahuantinsuya was 
composed of slave labour - criminals and prisoners of war known 
as 'Yanacunas' (Yu Zubritski, 1979, P-54). 
The surplus produced by these various exploitative mechanisms 
was sufficient to allow for the construction of monumental public 
works, which generally served the purpose, directly or indirectly, 
of reinforcing the power of the ruling caste. Marx perceived 
one of the fundamental aspects of the Asiatic mode of production 
as being the necessity of carrying out sophisticated technological 
projects in order for increases in productivity to occur. (1964, 
P-72). However, since the organisation of such major economic 
projects could not be undertaken by individual communities, forms 
of centralised power ("oriental despotism", Marx, 19649 P-70) 
would appear that could organise such public works. The 
consequently dominant role of the state and the dominant class in 
production further strengthened the state, which in turn bblstered 
its power by the erection of stupendous religious monuments. 
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bastales que aprendan los oficios de sus padres. " 
: While Inca Pachutee proclaimed that: 
"Los gobernadores deben advertir y mirar .... cosas con 
mucha atencion .... La primera, que, ellosq y sus subditos 
guarden y cumplan perfectamente las leyes de sus Reyes... " 
(de la Vega, Vol. 11,19599 PP-99-100) 
Ideological oppression was mitigated by care taken for reproduction 
of the labour force. Part of the surplus food product wan stored 
in granaries for times of hardshipq and to support, the poor, the 
old and the sick. Such policies, together with the efficient 
organisation of the empire, were further reasons for the admiration 
expressed by many Peruvianists. (Valcarcell 19439 Mariategui, 1976, 
Castro Pozo, 1963) for Tahuantinsuya. However it is clear that the 
Inca Empire was a class society, not only within the layllut , but 
in terms of its overall structure. 
1 It was based on a complex 
division of labour and specialisationg and dominated by a tribal 
aristocracy/bureaucracy -a caste of priestst warriors and 
administratorsq whose independent class nature was disguised by 
their bureaucratic and religious functionsq (Mandelq 19719 PP-30-54)9 
but who were exempted from all work and who had the right to 
extract tribute and mandatory work from those over whom they 
exercised power. 
2 (Godelierg 1978)- This 'aristocracy' was 
Dietrich writes: ".. the Incas inherited ... a system of 
patrilineally organised exogenous clans in the process of 
transformation toward private property as well an a strongly 
centralised political force. This naturally signifies the 
existence of an incipient class system. ooso 
Both developmental tendencies were systematized and essentially 
modified during the period of Inca domination. "(19829p. 116). 
2. Other privileges differentiated the elite from the massess such as 
the wearing of special clothingg and, above all, access to women. 
The Inca, however# was especially raised above all other mortals by 
a variety of mechanisms which included the right to marry his Own 
sister and the burning of his clothes after each wearing. (Zarate, 
1968, P-51). 
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composed of members of the Incaayllu' and heads of other tribes - 
ttle scuL-acatif - now 1jiLugratod itito Lho TnotL olito (Citril. r, r) Pozn, 
19639 P-483)- The relationship to production of this elite 
therefore resembled that of feudal lords. 
1 All were entitled 
to tribute (which could be paid in the form of labour servicesi 
food or craft goods)j senior Incas, prominent military men, noble 
officeholders and chiefs also held individual rights over land, 
which they governed. (L. Ran4allq 1977, P-10). Consequently, 
it would appear thatq while kinship relations continued to be 
crucial and to be used ideologically to express Inca hegemonyp 
they in fact played a secondary or'complementary role, as formal 
structures, specifically the state and its dependent bureaucracy, 
emerged as the dominant social forces of Tahuantinsuya. Castro 
Pozo noted that: 
"Under the Incas the old obligatory services came to be 
thoroughly regulated by the State Government. " (19639 P-486). 
The dominance of state and bureaucracy in turn ref3ected the progress 
of the productive forces represented by Tahuantinsuyaq which had, 
while being built on primitive communal forms of productiong 
resulted in increased complexity of the superstructure'. (Bankes, 
1977, pp. 110-112). However such a complex superstructure tended 
to reinforce the static aspects of Peruvian society. 
When Pizarro and his expedition arrived in Peru in 1532 they 
There were important differences, though, such as the absence 
of a contractual relationship between peasant and lord, and 
the lord's lack of autonomous sovereignity, which m4de 
Tahuantinsuya more resistant to further evolution. 
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found a highly centralised and efficiently administered 
1 
society. 
Despite the lack of writing, the wheel or money the Incas had 
constructed an integrated economic' system and had achieved a 
'superb craft tradition'. (Bankes, 1977, p. 196). It would 
appeart however, that in comparison with 16th Century Spain, or 
Aztec Mexico* Tahuantinsuya was not really an urban civilisation, 
but rather exhibited what Marx called that 'unity of agriculture 
and craft manufacture.... 1 (19649 P-83). As a result of this 
and the crucial lack of money, trade was far less than in 
contemporary Mexico or Spain, 
2 despite the considerable degree 
of specialisation of labour that had been attained. Castro Pozo 
observed that : 
there wuB no money and needs were satifiried thrOLIJI'll 
barter or exchange. " (19639 P-485)- 
and it appeared that the majority of the population barely lived 
above the subsistence level. (L. Randall, 1977, p. 16). Production 
was therefore in general not aimed at the market, but was directed 
towards satisfaction of the community's needs and to fulfillment 
I 
of tribute requirements. In this sense, even the economy of the 
empire as a whole, and certainly that of the individual community 
remained predominantly natural in character. The emergence of the 
1. Tahuantinsuya was organized on a decimal pyramidal pattern, at 
the base of which was the male worker; ten workers were then 
controlled by one foreman; ten foremen were in turn supervised 
by an official, and so onj the hierarchy continuing to the 
chief of the tribe (10,900 workers), to the governor of the 
province, and to the ruler of one of the four quarters of the Inca 
lempires and finally to the Sapa Inca himself. (Yu Zubritski, 
1979). This centralised organisation exemplifies one of the 
major differences between the pre-Columbian and medieval Spanish 
social formations and enabled the Incas to produce a siieable 
surplus, despite the low level of technological development 
and poor labour productivity. 
2. Nevertheless, Lanning writes: "There was an interchange of 
goods and ideas across the central Andes such as had never 
been seen before... " (1967, p. 127). 
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Inca state and the consequent exploitation of the communities had 
not fundamentally altered either the character of property relations, 
the nature of the economy or the forms of extra-economic coercion 
employed to appropriate surplus, despite the sophistication of 
the administration. Lenin, in his discussion of empires such an 
the Inca and the Aztec, concluded that the genesis of the development 
of capitalism was not likely to be found in such tribute societies. 
(Lenin, 1917, pp-97-8). Economic dynamism seems likely to have 
been stifled by the persistence of communal property and relations 
of production, by the unity of manufacture and agricultureq by the 
relative lack of trade and urban lifeg by the absence of money and 
by the apparently low level of class consciousness due to the 
hidden nature of class forms. Furthermore the centralised 
political organisation of the society not only absorbed all the 
surplusq leaving few opportunities for private primitive accumulation, 
it also reinforced the staticq ordered nature of the social 
organisation. 
C. Medieval Spain 
Interestinglyq some aspects of 15th and 16th Century Spanish 
society, seem to have resembled certain of the features of 
Tahuantinsuya described above, quite apart from the cultural and 
social heritage of the Muslim colonization, the structure of which 
clearly resembled the Inca social formation. (see Ervand Abrahamiang 
1975). It would appear that in some parts of the Hispano-Christian 
world(notably Asturias) various forms of commun'al landholding and 
associative relations of production predominated. According to 
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Payne: 
"The need for co-operation and division of responsibility 
for defense and the civil order was generally accepted ... 
Most land was held in a kind of condominiumq part of the 
usufruct going to the overlord - whether aristocrat, 
church or crown - and part to tfiotio who workod on 1 1. or 
otherwise 'owned' it ..... Associative arrangements functioned 
not only between members of hierarchic relationships but on 
the co-operative level of peasant village communes and 
pastoral associations as well.... " (19739 P-45. ) 
Furthermorel 
11 ... the medieval Hispano-Christian family was also 
organised along communal and associative lines. " (ibid, 
P-45) 
The above passage describes a social organisation clearly similar 
to that of the layllul, and Payne stresses the persistence of such 
traditions, even after their formal abolition. Moreover Christian 
Spain, like Inca Peru, was a rigid class society based on the 
expToitation of immobile peasant labour. The social basis of 
both societies was kinship relationsg ties of personal dependence 
andq above allj religion. The eight centuries of reconquest had 
accentuated the role of religion and the military ethic in Hispano- 
Christian society to a far greater degree than in otherg contemporary 
West European feudal formations, bringing it closer to the essentially 
I 
religious/military character of Tahuantinsuya. Purthermoreq by 
the time of the Conquest of Perug Spanish political organination 
had assumed the form of a centralised absolutist state, - the first 
Absolutist State of Western Furope. 
2 This state, like the Inca 
1. J. H. Elliot writes 11 ... it was a society held together by ties 
of kinship, clientage and obligation; a society in which the 
community had precedence over the individual... " (19739P. 113)- 
2. Perry Anderson, 1979, pp. 60-84; also, Elliott, 1973- 
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state, did not rule over a homogenous society, but one known as 
'. The Spains' - differentiated by a variety of political and 
religious e2periencess divided by formidable geographical barrierol 
and by linguistic differences. Againg like Tahuantinsuya, the 
Hispano-Christian state was held together by religion: 
"To be Spanish was to be Catholic .... Catholicism became 
and remained the prime agency of political socialisation. 11 
(E. Ramon Arango, 1978, P-10) 
Spain, at the time of the conquest of Peru, was consequently not 
a classicly West European feudal society, and was certainly not 
capitalist, or even, despite the transitory, economic dynamism 
of certain regions, in the process of becoming capitalist., 
It may perhaps be characterised as a hybrid and eclectic social 
formation, and this was reflected in the form of society which 
it created in Peru. Highlighting the disparities in, and 
oetsLr1fugLt1 naLuru ofg Lhu Spun1uh tiocial vLrucLuru utid JUt 
inevitable impact on South American colonizationg Oviedo y Valdes 
commented: 
11... although those who came to America were vassals of 
the kings of Spain, who could produce unity between a 
Biscayan and a Catalan who came from such different 
provinces and languages? How can an Andalusian get along 
with a Valencian, a man ýrom Perpignan with a Cordoban, an 
Aragonese with a Guipuzcoan, a Gallician with a Castilian, 
an Asturian with a Navarrese. " (in Stein and Stein, 1974, p. 12) 
Luis Vitale's (1971) assertions concerning the capitalist 
a character of medieval Spain appear as misguided as Franks 
similar observations on 16th and 17th Century Iatin America. (19719 1972, etc. ). 
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D. 16th Century Spain and the colonization 
The different historical experience of the Iberian peninsula may 
be traced to early on in West European history. Andernon notes 
that: 
"Spain and Gaul remained the Roman provinces most deeply 
marked by slavery down to the final end of the Empire. " 
(19789 pp. 63/4). 
and that this feature persisted with the Visigothic invasions: 
"In the Mediterranean west, rural slavery continued to be 
a major economic phenomenon. Visigothic Spaing in particulars 
seems to have contained exceptionally large numbers of slaves. " 
(19789 P-119). 
furthermore slavery continued to exist throughout the conquest, 
as Muslim captives were enslaved. 
Clearly the Muslim invasion and colonisation in the early 8th 
Century formed another radical break with the mainstream of West 
European development. Moreover, the effect of the invasion was 
not only to introduce an oriental aspect to Spanish civilization, 
but it also broke the Romano-Visigothic framework of the state. 
This produced a resurgence, in the unconquered regions (Asturias) 
of the former primitive civilizationsl which had been based upon 
communal principles, known as Iforall democracy, (E. de la Souclýere, 
19629 P-35o)o The survival of the Ifueros', (customary laws)9 right 
up until the 18th Century in certain areas of Spainjundermined 
the sovere1pnity of the ntate and the unity of Hinpano-Chrintilin 
society. As the Reconquest of Spain had proceededg frontier 
castles and settlements were established which became self 
governing under the Ifueros'. As a result these 'laws' came 
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to express not only rights that had emerged organically through 
custom, but also established contractual guarantees of self 
government, Furthermorev as they therefore played a significant 
part in the Christian recolonization of Spain, they became a part 
of the political tradition in most of the peninsulaq (de Moxo, 1978, 
p. 18). with the notable exception of Andalusia. The original 
egalitarian riaLure o17 foral democracy wa8 however larguly 
undermined also as part of the Reconquest, since freemen tended 
to seek the protection of powerful lords, and consequently much 
of the Spanish social structure came to resemble a 'loose' version 
of West European feudalism. 
1 As a result, after the Reconquest, 
, 
the persistence of the IfuerosIq largely in the hands of the local 
nobility, came to be a weaponagainst the centralising pressure 
of the king. The Reconquest had necessitated unity and the 
acceptance of one overlordt which had resulted in Spain establishing 
itself as the first European nation-state. But the very process 
of the Reconquest had also caused the spontaneous development of 
a variety of feudal relationst and determined their form. Feudalism 
therefore had spontaneDusly developed in Spain out of the crusade 
I 
against the Moors, rather than as a result of the fusion of 
barbarian and imperial societiesg and such a development naturally 
vitiated against a concentration of sovereignity in the person of 
the monarch. The unification of Spain was therefore in many ways 
a paradoxical and premature development; indeedg an unnatural 
development prompted by exogenous factors rather than internal 
evolution. Payne has observed interesting similarities between 
Payne notes the development in the Agturias, by the 10th Centuryl 
of a "semi-feudal political structure. " (19739 P-36). 
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thý Spanish Empire of the 16th Century and the 10th Century Iberian 
Caliphate,, both of which were, in his view: 
"launched before their respective societies had reached 
their fullest cultural development. Both emphasised 
imperial expansion and foreign issues to the detriment 
of internal problems. Neither achieved a fully integrated 
civic entity. " (Payne, 19739 P-30)- 
And, since the formation of the Spanish nation-state was premature, 
and achieved through, and because of, a religious-military crusade, 
the continued pursuance of such foreign issues was, of course, 
vital for the existence of that state. 
1 In Ramon Arango's words: 
"modern Spanish history is an account of unsuccessful 
attempts to sustain a viable nation-state. It begins in 
1492 ..... 11 
(19789 P. M. 
Marx also observed the paradoxical nature of Spanish history: 
11 ** . how are we to account for the singular phenomenon 
that, after nearly three centuries of a Habsburg dynasty, 
followed by a Bourbon dynasty - either of them quite 
sufficient tocrush a people - the municipal liberties 
o. r 2pain, wore or leon ourvivu? That in tho vory 
country where of all feudal states absolute monarchy 
first arose in its most unmitigated formg centralisation 
has never succeeded in taking root? " (Marx and Engels, 
1939, pp. 24-5, in Anderson, 19799 footnote 69-70). 
The fundamental weakness of the Catholic kings was demonstrated 
by certain crucial failuresq which would be significant factors 
in the failure to evolve a modern state; specifically, their 
Again, this represents an interesting parallel with Tahuantinsuyat 
which was not a homogenous state, but one cemented by religiont 
military expeditions and ideoloeyg and at the time of conquest 
was torn by civil war. (Zaratet 1968, PP-56-61, Prescottt 
19379 pp. 202-214). 
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inability to attack the bases of the noble class, which had thoroughly 
consolidated itself in the 14th and 15th Centuries throughout most 
of Spain. The general pattern in Western Europe was the establishment 
of the nation state involving the subjugation by the monarchy of 
the aristocracy, and the destruction of the parcellised sovereignity 
inherent in the feudal structure. 
1 This was generally accomplished 
partially through an alliance with other classes - usually the 
burghers and/or lesser nobility. However, in Spain, a reactionary 
alliance was forged between the higher nobility and the sovereign, 
which ultimately undermined central state powerg since it enabled 
the nobility to control the towns. This development was bound up 
with the final years of the Reconquest and the colonisation of 
the South. Arango notes that in the South, the traditions of 
the Ifueros' were, naturally, extremely weakv andl moreover, that 
as the area was conquered the: 
11 kings gave vast tracts of land not to pioneers but 
to the Church, to the nobility and to the military orders 
(19789 P-15) 
Certainly the agrarian order which emerged in these regions was 
characterised by far more repressive seigneurial relations than in 
the North, and little peasant or 'comunerol freedom, and the 
extremely powerful nobility that established itself subsequently 
came to dominate the Spanish polity. (S. de Moxo, 1978, pp. 20-27). 
Anderson has described how the process of colonisation of Andalusia 
"The long period of the successful and multiform 
exploitation ended, at any rate in most West European countriest 
between the middle and the end of the 14th Century ... 11, thus 
greatly weakening the power of the landowners. (R. Hilton, 1978, 
pa*t). 
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set the pattern for many parts of Spaing as their oppression of 
Moslem peasants depopulated the land, causing an acute labour 
shortage, which was then met by the reduction of the rural labour 
force to serfdom: 
"The new Southern pattern now reacted back on Castile: 
to prevent a drainage of labour from their estates by the 
wealthier Andalusian aristocracyq the Northern hidalgo 
class fastened increasing ties of dependence on its 
peasantry, until by the 14th Century an increasingly 
similar villein class had emerged throughout most of 
Spain. " (Andersonj 1976, P-170)- 
But, although clearly such a development was both a retrograde 
step, and threatening to the kings of Spain: 
"The Castilian and Aragonese monarchies, neither of them 
yet wholly consolidated institutions, nevertheless reaped 
substantial benefits from this feudalization of their 
warrior aristocracies. The traditions of military 
fealty to the royal commander were reinforced, a 
powerful yet loyal nobility was created, and a servile 
peasant class stabilized on the land. " (1978, PP-170-171) 
On their side, the feudal ruling classes were able to use the 
mechanisms of central state power to facilitate the extraction 
of surplus from the peasantry and maintain them in a position of 
subordination, (C. Hillj 19789 p. 121). Payne too (19739 P-151) 
ha I commented on the fact that in Castile, which became the 
principal base of the monarchyq and as overlord of which Isabella 
claimed South America as a personal fief, no progressive union of 
the lower nobility and "upper middle classes" took place. Instead 
in the first decades of the 15th Centuryq the nobility and 
Church effectively achieved immunity to most taxation, and- 
domination in the Cortes, while the towns had been defeated 
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in the comunero rebellion (1520-1). This early suppression of 
bourgeois freedoms distinguished the Spanish monarchy from its 
West European counterparts, 
Other aspects of the predominance of a noble culture continued 
to be influential. Instead of an economic or intellectual, 
bourgeoisification taking place, the psychological traits which 
had evolved out of the Reconquestq such as extreme religious 
fanaticism, obsessive concern with Ilimpieza de sangrel and 
white skin, and glorification of the military 'hidalgo', 
became mythologised and entrenched as a defence against change. 
Just as feudal relations and ideology were being dismantledg or 
at least adapted/subordinated to the needs of petty commodity 
production and mercantilism, in previously more orthodox feudal 
formations in 16th Century Spaing the creation of the state 
and the conquest of the Americas breathed new life into such 
structures and attitudes. Elena de la SoucAre (19629 P-45) 
notes the fantastic expansion of the 'hidalgo' class that took 
place immediately after the Reconquest (and as a result of it); 
nignificat)tly, Lho canto of IhIcIalgo, rorbridn to Itn mpmbor-n till 
manual work or even commercial enterprise. 
2 (J. Read, 1974, p. 238). 
At the same time, a further consequence of the Reconquest was the 
expulsion from Spain of the Muslims and Jews, among the most 
progressive and dynamic commercial elements of the Spanish population. 
Bloch has commented on the difference between countries in which 
feudalism was imposed and those wheres as in Spain, it emerged 
spontaneously. In the latter ... "the feudal regime was never 
able to attain the systematic character that hardly belongs to 
any but institutions formed fully accoutred and tliereby 
unembarassed with survival. " (1963, Vol. 6, p. 208). 
2. Lima, as the affluent viceregal centre, inherited thir, 
aristocratic culture with all its prejudices. (cf. Mnner 1978). 
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The above discusnion of characteristica of the 16th Century 
Spanish social formation is part of an attempt to understand the 
nature of the society which was developed in colonial Peru. The 
conclusions are confusing and often appear contradictory. We have 
noted parallels, some stemming from ancient traditions of Spanish 
society, with aspects of Inca society. However, in other respects 
Catholic Spain and Tahuantinsuya were clearly extremely dissimilar, 
andl therefore, the Spanish colonization was to represent a break 
in the potential trajectory of the pre-Columbian mode of production. 
But equally, because of the curious nature of the Spanish social 
formation, the historical evolution followed by West European 
feudalism appeared closed to Spain, and especially so to colonial 
Peru, composed as it was of the most reactionary elements of both 
socirties, and dependent for its reproduction on Western Europe. 
In V. G. Kiernan's view, 16th Century Spain: 
11... in spite of ... purging and purifying, still looked 
half Eastern in manners and temperament. " (1972, p. 9). 
while Anderson has observed that: 
"the matrix of Spanish medieval society was always a 
unique one. " (19789 p. 168) 
It was a society made up of a mosaic of repressive labour systems9 
whilst retainingg in some parts, communal freedoms; pluralistic, 
yet held together by-royal absolutism and Catholicism. 
These different types of social and economic organisation were 
transplanted to South America, with some modifications and orientated 
to export markets, along with the rigid, centralised system of 
administration. Payne writes: 
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"The uniq ue achievement of colonial Hispanic society 
was the development of an original hybrid society, but 
it was not a dynamic society. It was rather a kind 
of colonial feudalism which recreated, often in more 
extreme forms, many of the problems of the peninsular 
expansion$ and grew only more severe afterwards.... 
the worst aspects of aristocratic dominium in the 
peninsula were reproduced socially and psychologically 
in Hispanic America. " (Payne, 1973, p. 204) 
this verdict applied particularly to Perul as the centre of the 
Spanish American empire. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE CONQUEST AND FORMATION OF COLONIAL PERU 
A. Early Colonial Peru 
The Hispano-Christian Reconquest imbued Spanish society with 
a temporary exuberance and dynamism whichq in fact, far from 
I 
ushering in a Golden Age, was to be very shortlivedq but which 
resulted in the discovery and colonisation of South America. 
This period of exploration expressed the expansion of petty commodity 
production and the dominance of mercantilism and represented for 
most of Western Europe, the beginning of the transition to capitalism; 
I 
indeed, by making possible the primary accumulation of capitalt 
it was a prime factor in that transition. In Spaing however# 
the wealth, generated primarily by Peru and Mexicot disappeared 
in the pursuit of the classic feudal preoccupation of endless 
warfare; and permitted the accentuation of the reactionary features 
in the Spanish formation noted above# with similarly stultifying 
consequences for Latin America. Despite the existence in 15th 
Century and 16th Century Spain of dynamic centres of simple commodity 
production and mercantile activity (notably in Catalunia)t these 
centres increasingly decayed, andq by 1600, Spain was dependent 
on the economies Of Englandt France and Holland. Anderson has 
writ Lon: 
"Conducted and organised within still notably seigneurial 
structuresq the plunder of the Americas was nevertheless 
at the sarne time the most spectacular single act in the 
primitive 40cumulation of European capital during the 
Renaissaric, e . Spanish Absolutism thus drew strength both 
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from the inheritances of feudal aggrandisement at home 
and the booty of extractive capital overseas. There was 
never, of courseq any question as to the social and economic 
interests to which the political apparatus of the Spanish 
monarchy principally and permanently answered. No other 
major Absolutist State was to be so finally noble in 
character, or so inimical to bourgeois development. 
The very fortune of its early control of the mines of 
America .... disinclined it to promote the growth of 
manufacturing or foster the spread of mercantile enterprise 
within its European empire. " (1979t p. 61. ) (my emphasis) 
Not surprisinglyg thereforet although the conquest by Spain and 
Portugal of South America incorporated and integrated Peru into 
the European mercantile systems the motivation behind Iberian 
expansion was not primarily that of dynamic burgeoning mercantile 
economies. The voyages of discovery and conquest were carried 
out by rootless individuals - military adventurers displaced by 
the final cessation of the long wars against the Moors. These 
men sought new crusades and fresh sources of personal booty. 
-Prescott comments on the mixture of motives driving the crusader: 
"Gold was the incentive and the recompenset and in the 
pursuit of it his inflexible nature rarely hesitated as 
to the means. His courage was sullied with cruelty, 
the cruelty that flowed equally from his avarice and his 
religion, .... the religion of the Crusader ........ 
(19379 
P-117). 
and he contrasts the nature of the Iberian colonisationg carried 
out in: 
11 .... the most uncompromising spirit of intolerance - the 
spirit of the Inquisitor at home and of the Crusader abroad... " 
with that of the settlement of North Americaq which was motivated 
by the desire for: 
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11 ... independence religious and political. " 
(19379 P-117)- 
Mackay, too, emphasises the similarities between the Conquest and 
the Reconquest: 
"The lust for gold was as strong as it had ever beeng and 
the conquistadores continued to invoke the help of Santiago.... 
(the warcry of the crusaders. against the Moore) ..... in battle 
***ell 
(19779 p. 211). 
The expedition to South America must therefore be viewed as 
forming a logical continuation to those of the individual crusaders 
seeking adventure and wealth in a feudal relationship with the 
Crown against the Moorsq and the personal relationship with the 
monarch was long retained. This is, of course, not to deny the 
drive within Spain to discover new trade routes and new sources 
of wealth, or to present a picture of Spanish society untouched by 
commercial impulses. Clearly merchant capital had developed 
within Spaing however, as noted earlierv merchant capital is 
linked to feudal productive relations and need not be a revolutionary 
force. In order for it to lead to a progressive transformation 
of Pre-capitalist relationst there must exist many preconditions - 
such as an alliance between burghers and small gentry. 
1 As 
Merrington has argued, there is not necessarily an antithesis 
between feudalism and trade, town and country (19789 P-185), and this 
was most clearly borne out by the Peruvian colonial social formation. 
Mercantile capital in Spain, was, on the whole, a reactionary 
force which became increasingly based on specualtive rather 
than innovative and productive activities; the generally 
Or fundamental cracks in the base and superstructure of 
feudal society should occur - such as the Reformation. 
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harmonius co-existence between Spanish mercantilism and feudalism 
was to be expressed in the Conquest and colonization. Commercial 
impulses behind the expansion were inextricably linked to desires 
to strike again at Islam, even to find a new Christian ally to 
combat the Infidel (Kiernang 1972, p. 9. )t whilst the personal 
ambitions of the conquistadores themselves were to carve out their 
own feudal domainsg or acquire treasure. In the words of Bernal 
Diaz delCastillo, the Spanish went to the Americas: 
"to serve God and his Majestyq to give light to those 
in darknessq and also to get rich. (1904, V019II9 P-485) 
Fiýrthermore, as Columbus acted in the capacity of vassal of 
Isabella, South America became the personal fiefdom of the most 
reactionary areas of Spain - for instance Andalucia and Castile, 
while Catalunia and the Basque provinces were excluded. 
The process, of colonization of Peru revealed the confusion of 
motivations and interests involved in the expansion. It can 
be divided into two phases: the first# lasting approximately 
40 years, sees relatively little structural change, (Dewl 19699 
pp. 20-21), and is dominated by private venturesq formalized by 
the'capitulaciones'granted by the king. 2 During the secondq 
When the merchant guild of Sevilla was set up to control trade 
with the Americas, only Castilians were allowed to participate (Stein & Stein, 19749 P-47). 
Ots Capdequi characterises the process as follows: 
11 ... the task of the discovery, conquest and colonization of 
America was not in the strict sense, in its origins, a state 
enterprise .... If we analyze the whole of the capitulaciones (grants) 
... we clearly find the evident and absorbing predominance 
of private interest, of private initiative in the organination 
and tho maintmianov or J, 11o owpo(JILIon or diticovory. IL wall 110r111131 
that these expeditions were financed by great merchants.. The new 
law that arose in these countries ... had a fundamentally pact 
like characterg a contractual character... These capitulaciones, 
these contractsp became truly juridLcialand negotiable instruments 
see" 
(1946, pp. 6-11). 
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while the link between the state and private enterprise never 
disappearedl the Crown gradually imposed more direct control. 
The first period was dominated by both warfare against the Indians 
and struggle between the original conquistadoresq who virtually 
wiped themselves out. (Steward and Faron, 19599 PP-155-156). 
It was so devestating a period for the Indians that it is estimated 
that at least half, possibly two-thirds, of the indigenous population 
had been exterminated by the late 16th Century (Rowe, Kubler, 
1963). Contomporary o1niorvorn - cortain royal offirialn and 
monks 
1 
were alarmed, and partly as a result of their detailed 
reports9 combined with the growing determination to control the 
evidently abundant minerals, the state began to intervene and 
attempt to direct cilonization. During this first phase the 
conquistadores either murderedt subdued or inter-married and 
allied themselves with the Inca hierarchy and the 'curacas'. 
By the 1540s they were generally able to organise methods of 
government and exploitationt frequently retaining elements 
of the Inca social structure. So, for instance, Long and Roberts 
note that in the Mantaro area: 
"the curacas exercised political and administrative 
control within the towns and continued to be the principal 
individual landowners. They shared power with the Spanish 
settlers, some of whome married into their families.... " 
(19789 p. 27). 
The Laws of Burgos, 1512-13p enshrined the first royal attempts 
Por instance see Jose de Acosta, HiRtarfal Nat'l Tnnral 
de las Indias. (Seville 1950)9 translated by C. R. Markham# 
Hakluyt Society, 18809 ser. 1,60-1). 
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to protect the Indians, alsof however setting down the obligation 
of Indian men to work nine months a year for Spaniardsq (Hemming 
19729 p. 129); despite these codesq little restraint was shown by 
I 
the Spaniards, or, frequentlyq even the Indian'curacas. ' Exploitation 
increased as the Inca Treasuresdisappearedv were melted down and 
distributedt and the only remaining source of wealth centred, on 
Indian labour, to be used either on the land or in the mines. BY 
the 1540S Spain had already established settlements in other parts 
of the Americas and had created as a basic socio-economic unit 
the'repartimiento'(allotment) of Indians to the'encomienda, 
(protection) of a Spaniard. The'encomendero'was then formally 
entrusted with the moral care-and religious instruction of his 
Indians, who, in returng would pay tribute to him and the Crown. 
(Part of which would be used to finance the administration of the 
colonies). In this wayg frequently layllus' were left intact 
along with the exploitative mechanisms of the Imital and tributel 
but placed under the legal jurisdiction of the Crown and conquistadores 
rather than the Inca. By this system the Crown hoped to limit the 
independence that conquistadores had achieved and ensure that they 
did tjoL - au in 10pain - develop their own reirional powor banen, but 
would occupy an intermediate, dependent position between the Indians 
and the royal officials (torregidores). 
1 In other wordsq the 
Spanish monarchy wanted to achieve the central control and 
sovereignity that they had failed to establish in Spain. They 
therefore tried to create a system whereby the Spanish overlord 
acted an an intermediary for, the Crown and the royal officials 
Direct control of the disposition of Indian labour was officially I the responsibility of the bureaucracy rather than the'encomenderos. 
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usually based in Lima, and lived in the local town, leaving the 
surrounding countryside largely to Ltic Ireduced' indigCnoutj 
population. With regard to the second part of the plan they 
generally succeeded and consequently South America was: 
"from the firstp a world of cities, almost indeed city 
states. Already before the 16th Century closed most 
of what are today the capital cities of Spanish Americap 
and many others also, dotted the map, outposts of empireq 
centres of civilisation in the wilderness.... Separated 
by vast distances and empty spaces, they wereq they still 
are, the outward and visible sign of Spain in America. " 
(R. A. Humphreysp 1969, PP- 3-4)- 
Royal policy was reinforced by other factors - the small 
numbers of Spanish colonisers whowere, in any case, in Mariateguils 
I words, not pioneers, but: 
11 ... virreyes, cortesanosq aventurerosq clerigos, doctores 
y soldados.... " (1976, P-14)9 
and the nature of the-Spanish social formation which was certainly 
incapable of releasing large numbers of peasant smallholders of 
family farmers for large scale colonisation# and couldq thereforel 
only annex Peru as another province 
1 
and source of labourg to 
be rather administered than settled. (cf. Yepes 1974)- 
Priction between the Spanish Crown and conquistadores increased 
as reports of the continuing decline in the Indian population 
reached the king, and corruption and disloyalty on the part of 
A process which further splintered mainland Spaing-wbere ... 
"orthodox provinces were substituted by autarchic patrimonies" 
(P. Anderson, 1979v P-71), and inhibited the successful 
Hispanicisation of Peru. 
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the'encomenderos'and bureaucracy was revealed. On the other hand, 
the obviqus wealth of the mines 
1 
determined the monarchy to gain 
a firm hold over the empireq and shape its economic orientation. 
Consequently, in 1569 the viceroy Francisco de Toledo was sent out 
to Lima in order to organize the pattern of Spanish colonialism- 
(Dew, 1969, p. 21). The advent of the new viceroy 
2 
and the 
decision this represented on the part of the Spanish Crown to 
assert its control over the development of Peru therefore marks 
the predication of the embryonic social formation upon the demands 
of the metropolisq and resulted in the creation of an 'intermediate' 
social formationg which acted as a conduit for the passage of 
surplus to Spain. 
The basis of the colonial social formation was the establishment 
of the indigenous peasant population as an internal colony 
(Gonzalez Casanova, 1969, PP-118-39) - the previous pretence that 
the Indians were free and equal citizens was now dismissed. This 
policy stemmed from the pressing need to protect Indian labour, 
without which the mines could not be workedl or the colony fed. 
The method chosen was the 'reduction' of the Indians and their 
villages into larger groupingsq located in more accessible areas 
to ensure tighter control and protection from the 'corregidoreslo 
and effective religious indoctrination and 'civilization' by the 
Jesuits (Winder, 1978, p. 211). Usually two or three layllus' 
would be amalgamated and removed from their communal landsq a 
1. The mines were owned by the Crowng but could be worked by 
private individuals as royal vassals. 
2. Toledo in fact came from a feudal landed family and, ironically 
for the monarchy, but logically enoughl hoped to create a 
seigneurial landed aristocracy in each Peruvian town. (He=ing, 
19729 P-399 j cf. Roberts 19789 PP-40-42). 
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process which generally not only lost the Indians their traditional 
Arrigation systems and their best land, but could also destroy the 
system of exploitation of the different climatic-zones, and led 
to the general deterioration of agriculture in Peru. As a result 
the 'reducciones' provoked fierce Indian resistance, which must 
itself be taken into account as a further reason for the very 
survival of the communal lands. 
1 Kubler speaks of tbe: 
11 ... vital persistence of the Inca concept of the State. " 
(1963# P-343)- 
and Castro Pozo observed that: 
11 ... in the sierraq the ayllus .... were defended tenaciously 
by the Indian women. " (1963, P-496). 
These re-patterned Indian communities were established around 
new communal lands and a church; they were granted legal charters 
and rights of self-goverrinent and policing, (carried outq as under 
the Incas, by the village elders and headed by the'curaca, who was 
responsible for collection of taxes and enforcement of the Imital). 
In many ways, thereforep the indigenous population had achieved 
a nominal autonomy, and was able to retain elements of the pre- 
Columbian forms of social organisation and culture. It is clearg 
for instance, that even when converted to Catholicism, the Indians 
continued to hold to earlier beliefs, a fact which the Spanish 
correctly viewed with apprehension; but despite numerous aggresive 
campalgrui tho old bolinfa could not bo eradicated, and Juan Melendez 
bitterly remarked that: 
Although, as mentioned earlierg communal usufruct had long been 
practised in parts of Spain; the new 'communidades" therefore 
combined elements of both the Spanish and Columbian systems. 
(Winder, 1978, p. 211). 
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"they return like dogs to the vomit of their ancient 
idolatries ... 11 
(in Hemming, 1972, P-398)9 
While Ulloa, discussing the reasons behind the policy of preservation 
I 
of, and self rule for, the communitiesp wrote: 
"Even after so many years .... it is impossible to make 
this nation set aside-its old customs and usages, and if we 
were to try to do so it would be even worse, because if 
Lhe people hare were forbidden to hold tliuir jUntu InutAirigu 
publicly they would meet at night in secluded places where 
it would be impossible to control what was being said. " 
(Antonio de Ulloa, in Guidoni and Magni, 1977, p. 121). 
However, the policy of self government also relieved the colonial 
bureaucracy of the expense of direct administration of the communities. 
Whilst placing them out of reach of the 'hacendados' but accessible 
to royal needs, it also disguised the nature of their oppression. 
Furthermore, the process by which Indian communities were established 
as separate, but still amenable to exploitation, exemplifies the 
argument propounded in the preceding theoretical discussion, that 
forms of apparent cleavage between different ethnic or economic 
groupings are not necessarily inimical to their participation in 
the economic systems; indeed such cleavages may be highly functional 
for dominant classes. Consequently, affirmation of the separate 
cultural identity of the indigenous population was positively 
encouraged (for instance, as noted aboveg in terms of dress)9 andq 
instead of being forced to learn Spanish, missionaries learned the 
Indian languages in order to disseminate Christianity. Wolf 
writes of the Mexican communidad: 
"Thus equipped to function in terms of their own resourcest 
these communities became in the centuries after-the-Conquest 
veritable redoubts of cultural homeostasis. Communal 
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jurisdiction over landq obligations to expend surplus funds 
in religious ceremoniest negative attitudes toward personal 
displays of wealth and self-assertiont strong defenses against 
deviant behaviour, all served to emphasise social and cultural 
homogeneity and to reduce tendencies toward the development 
of internal class differences and heterogeneity in 
behaviour and interests. The taboos on sale of land to 
outsiders and the tendency toward endogamy made it difficult 
for out , siders to gain footholds in the villages. " (E. R. Wolf 
in T. Shanin, 19719 P-54). 
Whilstthis viewpoint is challenged by other researchq on both the 
Mexican and Peruvian Indian economies 
1, 
which tends to reveal a 
far greater degree of differentiation and openess to market forces 
, 
2. 
within the'communidad, other writers, notably Puenzalida (196B, 
PP-155-187), have demonstrated the vitality and persistence of 
distinct cultural patterns and communal relations. Frequentlyq 
as closer integration into the wider economy took place$ sometimes 
generating greater wealth within the village, this wealth was 
consumed in more elaborate ritualq or by a co6perative project; 
and within the community itself non-capitalist forms of productiong 
generally based on reciprocityq remained pervasive. Clearly, 
therefore, the retention of the Indian'comunidad'by the Spanish 
crown was extremely significant for the future evolution of the 
Peruvian social formationsl and formed one barrier to the 
development of industrial capitalism in Peru. Furthermoreq the 
structure of the rest of colonial society was not necessarily 
incompatible with the peasant units; agents of change in other 
1. For instance . see H. Tschopikq 
(1947) and R. Schaedel (1959) 
2. - Skinner (1964), however, has argued that degrees of openness of 
peasant communities are simply oscillations on a continuum of 
change in response to external factorsq in particular changes 
in the strength/policy of the state (cf. Spalding 1975aq and 
Chapter 7). 
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societies havel for instancet been the state and its demands for 
surplus. In Peru, howevers the colonial administration both made 
demands on the a comunidades 
4 
and preserved them. (Bushnell, 1956v 
i 
P*138). Alternativelyt a producing and trading' town may introduce 
external pressures or new social patterns into a community and 
undermine its unity. But the function of Peruvian towns as 
mestizo or white centres created to oppress the Indian communities, 
(C. T. Smith, 1971, pp. 276-277)9 meant that they could fulfill no 
such dyjnamic role. 
1 Vargas Ugarte writes that: 
"In 1780 a viceroy described Peruln lands as unfarmeds 
its roads in ruinsg and all but two towns outside Lima 
losing population. A decade later a successor complained 
that Lima and all of Peru's towns were plagued by parasitic 
functionaries. " (1966-719 Vol-V-,, p. 106). 
One major reason for the royal policy of preservation-of the 
communities lay in an attempt to ensure that the settlers in Peru 
did not establish themselves as powerful, independent baronst but 
became dependents of the Crown; however in this they largely failed, 
for a variety of reasons. Royal control was inhibited by the 
distance of Peru from Spain and by the great extent of unpopulated 
landsq which the Spanish Crown in fact wished to be inhabited and 
thus protected against European encroachment. Furthermore the 
establishment of large 'haciendas' was encouraged by the needs of 
the mines and the towns, which the Indiancomunidades'could not 
entirely supply. The Creoles were in any case able to expand 
their original Irepartimientos' (land grants) through alliance 
This is again resonant of the functiong or non-function# of 
urban centres in pre-Columbian Peru. 
-137- 
with corrupt local officials, the royal 'corregidores' whose function 
was partly to control creole'hacendados'(Rowe, 1963)- Finally, 
the extreme exploitation and maltreatment of the Indians in the 
minesq ýrovoked widespread resistance to the royal Imital and 
flight to the protection of the local 'hacendado'. In this way 
the creole, sierran landowner gained a subject Indian workforce 
under a variety of informal contractual arrangements. (Pielp 1970# 
p. 294). He thus established a realtively independent local 
power baseq whilst exercising no formal political power. (Dewq 
1969, p. 21). 
By the middle of the 17th Century the colonists had thus either 
succeeded in appropriating large amounts of land and/or establishing 
perpetual right to an origfnal Irepartimientol. 
1 The first lands 
to be usurped were in the coastal zone and fertileg inter-mountain 
valleys9 areas which had been quickly evacuated byg or cleared of, 
the indigenous population early on in the colonization process. 
I 
(Castro Pozo, 1963t P-488). Here large latifundias were establishedo 
which tended to concentrate on export crop agriculture - notably 
sugar (Alberto 19769 p. 2) - using a variety of servile labour forms 
29 
including imported African slaves, from the early 17th Century 
onwards. (C. T. Smith, 1971, p. 278). In the sierrat the creation 
1. lAlthough title to land remained insecureq and colonial law managed 
to limit the social and political power of the creole class by 
placing restrictions on their legal political and udicial 
authority over their workers. (Weaver, 1980, p. 62J * 2. Indigenous communities did survive on the coast up until the 
expansion of the cash crop'haciendas'in the late 19th Centuryl 
and provided the"latifundialwith labour. For instanceg in the 
Northq around Cajamarca; but they were to be found in far fewer 
numbers than in the mountains, (Deere, 1977). 
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II 
of haciendas was less extensive; the Spaniards were apprehensive 
of. the Andean region and Hemming notes that there the Indian 
population levels declined far less dramatically than on the coast. 
(19729 P-349). Furthermore, the pattern of settlement appears 
to have varied according to the relationships originally established 
I 
between the Spanish and the indigenous leaders. For instanceg 
in the Mantaro Valley relatively few'haciendas'were established# 
and this has been attributed to the alliance concluded between 
the conquistadores and the'curacas; during the Conquestq against 
the Incas. (Long and Robertst 19789 p. 27)- 
The sierran'hacienda'was characterised by a dislocation between 
production and market conditions (Yepes, 1974, p. 66); it was 
similar in socio-economic form to the European demesne# (C. Kay, 
19749 pp. 69-98)t and generally operated its own unofficial police 
and judicial system. It was also characterised by the use of 
extremely archaic technology and the consequently heavy consumption 
of land and labour. Apart from utilizing its position as a refuge 
for escaped Imitayos', it also obtained much of its labour not 
through the lencomiendalt 1 but through debt peonage. Endebted 
either by tribute obligations, (Gongora, 19759 PP-152-154)9 Or 
by purchano of goodnq tho Indian might bo forcod to neek tho 
'shelter' of the'hacienda'q where he would normally pay labour 
I 
services in return for a parcel of land and protection 
2, (Keen, 
1. This institution was abandoned early on due to its misuse by the 
settlers. (C. Kayt 19749 p. 81). 
2. The'hacendadols'role as protector formed a vital part'of local 
kinship and clientelistic politics, by which control over the 
Indians was maintained --!, Sometimes against central authority9 
and sometimes against other'hacendados'or Indians. 
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1965P P-16). Or the Indian labourer might continue as resident 
of a. nearby community that had, however# lost its land (frequently 
to thelhacendado'(Castro Pozo, 19639 P-48a))t and was therefore 
forced to wurk for the'hacendado' in exubarige for a uutioluLt-11ce 
plot of land (Winderg 1978, p. 211). Alternatively, peasants 
from a community with land might also perform seasonal labour 
on the'hacienda'lands, in order to be able to earn extra goods 
or money to enable them to maintain traditional customs, such as 
fiestas, (Wolf, 19539 p. 161) or meet tribute requirements. It 
ýs apparent$ therefore, that'a degree of mutality of interest 
could exist between the traditional sierran hacendado 
I and Indiang 
against central authorityt in the form of a reactionary allianceg 
and this was to become apparent when attempts to modernize Peru 
were made in the 19th Century. (Wolf, 19"ils P-54. ). 
In times of recession, the'hacienda'could and generally would 
retreat into a recluse economy - as did all such units established 
throughout South America (for instance the sugar'hacienda6 of 
the Brazilian North East). But, like the Brazilian 'engenhos 
de aqucarIq many such farms were orýginally established in order 
to raise crops or livestock for market, in the Peruvian case, 
generally food and livestock for the mines and townsq and wool 
for theobrajesq or for exportq demonstrating the scission 
remarked upon by Yepes, (19749 p. 66). Howeverg they were nott 
on the whole, a dynamic force in the mountain economy - Long 
and Roberts write that: 
"large highland landholdings had little economic dynamism 
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throughout the colonial and contemporary periods, and 
capital accumulation, outside of the mining enclave and a 
few large livestock haciendasq was mainly based on the 
internal differentiation and exploitation of the peasant 
economy. " (1978, p. 21). - 
Frank (1971) quotes Jose Miranda's discussion of the economic 
ambitions of the 'encomenderos' in order to support his contention 
that this sector of the economy was dynamic and may be characterised 
as capitalist. ' The passage is of interest for several reasons. 
It highlights the importance of the market to many'hacendados. ' 
clearly exposes the interlinked interests of the Spanish settlers, 
and also provides an interesting description of clientelistic 
politics and absentee ownership: 
"Although the continental lencomenderol has much of the 
feudal lord, European style... he seems to have no real 
interest in his feudal style position or function. No: 
the oncomendoro In above all a mnn of hin time, mnvf, (i 
by desire for profit and pursuing the goal of wealth. 
Among his contemporaries, the encomendero is the man 
of action in whom the ideas and anxieties of a new world 
take strongest root.... Por this reasong he does not, like 
the feudal lord, limit himself to the mere enjoyment of 
tribute and servicet but he converts the one like the 
other into the principal base of several business enterprises. 
He will do the same as any entrepreneur from that. time till 
now: use his own and others' resources and the work of others 
in the pursuit of hiw own wealth and well being ..... 
The businesses which the encomendero established to take 
economic advantage of the encomienda are, therefore, of 
three kinds, minin-g, livestock and agricultural ...... 
We often see the encomendero caught up in a complicated 
net of economic and legal relationships: he participates 
1L1_ 
in various mining companies.... he is owner of a herd of 
swine or sheep, which he grazes on the range of another 
encomendero - with whom he has entered into an economic 
contract for the purpose'- and which are under the care of 
a Spaniard whose services he has obtained through some 
contract or payment; and all this after having conferred 
general powers to some relativet friendt or employee to 
administer his encomiendas and after having conferred 
special powers to other people so'that they might administer 
his haciendas or livestock ranches, his shops or sugar millsq 
or to take care of his interest wherever it may be necessary ..... 
(Miranda, 19479 PP-423-49 4279446 in Frank, 1971t PP-152-3)- 
It seems unnecessary to outline once more the many arguments 
(for, example Laclau, 1971, Genovese$ 1969, Yepes, 1974). that have 
demonstrated the falseness of the proposition that capitalism could 
develop in South America when Spain and Portugal were still clearly 
seigneurial statesl and indeed continued to contain residues of 
servile relations in the 20th Century. Frank's approach ignores 
the compatibility, mentioned earlier, and perfectly expressed 
by the Peruvian colonial economy, of mercantile enterprises with 
feudal or servile forms of production (see Chapter 1, pp. 9 and 10). 
The mixed nature of the I haciendý is one aspect of the hybrid 
social formation created in colonial Peru - one clearly designed 
to serve external needs, and able to utilize a variety of non- 
capitalist relations of production in order to do this. The 
following description of the treatment of labour on the'hacienda' 
wan mado in tho 10th Contury: 
it is the custom for all owners of haciendasq workshopso 
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estancias and drovers to sell their workers along with 
their establishments. What? Are these Indian labourers 
free or slaves? lio matter. They belong to the 
hacienda and must serve on it. This Indian is my master's 
property ... 11 
(Jeronimo de Mendietag Historia eclesiastica 
Indiana, 1995-lq96, In Stein and Stein, 1974, P-31). 
The logic behind the social formation described above lay in 
the extraction of specie, which was clearly the central economic 
activity of the colonial period. The income from this source 
allowed Spain to resist such attacks on the feudal order 
as the Reformation and later the Enlightenment. The major 
I 
preoccupationt thereforeq of the Spanish Crown was always with the 
Peruvian (and Mexican) mines. The need to control what became it6 
principal source of income, together with its economic backwardnessq 
led the Spanish state to impose an extremely restrictive form of 
mercantilism based on the port of Sevilla (and after 1717, Cadiz)! 
In Seville the trade was controlled by the merchant guild, (bonsulad6) 
and I Board of Trade (casa de contrataciori), and linked to similar 
'consulados'in Lima, which manipulated prices to the disadvantage of 
American producers. It is clear that this monopolistic policy 
The reason behind the policy of monopolistic regulations "lay 
in its influence to create enhanced opportunities of profit 
for industrial capital by raising the price level of individual 
products and depressing the price-level of agricultural (or 
mineral)products, within the controlled economy of metropolis 
and colony: an influence to which the achievement of an export 
surplus from the metropolis might contribute by draining the 
colonial economy of gold and increasing the flow of gold into 
the metropolis"(Dobbl 19709 p. 209). Not only was surplus 
appropriation, but also surplus realizationg consequently 
inhibited and restricted by Spanish policy, together wi. th the 
possibilities for dynamic economic development. 
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therefore inhibited capital accumulation both in Spain and Perug 
11 
encouraged an intensely conservative approach to economic change, 
2 
and generated deep resentment of Spain on the part of the creoles. 
Stein and Stein write: 
"It is not surprising ... that oonsulados in colonial trade 
at Sevilla, Mexico City and Lima - groups often formed 
by interest, by regional origins, and by kinship and 
I 
alliance - constantly resisted the modernisation of the 
Spanish commercial system. They opposed innovationB such 
as the joint-stock companyq .... restricted memberships 
controlled undersupply of a captive marketq secrecy of 
operations..... " (19749 pp-49-50) 
This stifling mercantile system remained virtually unchanged 
until Independence, the Bourbon reforms simply modifying the 
basic structure; furthermore other possible economic activity 
was extremely limited, as all industrial entrepreneurship was 
either specifically banned or discouraged. 
The colonial administration created to oversee and unite the 
divernf? - nlopiontn or thn Peruvinn economy wnii a olour r(ifl(veLlon 
of the narrow aims of the metropolis and the contradictions within 
the colonial social formation. Veliz writes that: 
1. Gongora notes the reactionary nature of the South American 
merchants: "Throughout the Americas, these merchants .... were 
passionately interested in acquiring titles of nobility... 
The 'bourgeois' life style was still alien to their collective 
consciousness. At the most ... they displayed the purely 
mercantile element of bourgeois consciousnesst and thus had 
no effect on the overall structure of society which still 
maintained as far as its internal market was concerned a 
predominantly 'natural' economy ..... 11 Gongora, 19759 p. 164- 2. Who, however benefitted from the system far more than those 
in less important parts of the empire. 
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what the Spanish conquerors imposed on their new 
dominions was a highly centralized version of the authoritarian 
Renaissance state; there were no regional sites of political 
power in the new countries; the little power possessed by 
local landowners and military leaders was derived directly 
and exclusively from the good-will of the captain-generalg 
viceroy or king ... 11 
(Veliz9l9709 P-13)- 
This description, in facto approximates more closely to what the 
Crown tried to create, the ideal form rather than the reality of 
the colonial state. 
1 The structural heterogeneity and disharmony 
of the base could not be expressed in a uniform, centralised state 
apparatus, 
2 
and while it is true that, as in Spain, the monarchy 
and the church were unifying forces that held together colonial 
society, the conditions that resulted in national disintegration 
after Independence were created in the 16th Century. Side by 
side with an extremely elaborate and bureaucratic state machine, 
modelled on the Spanish apparatus, existed both the self-governing 
Indian communities 
3 
and the semi-autonomous large estates. 
Similarlyq beneath, and even within, the formal channels of 
4 
government, operated the politics of clientelism and kinship. 
I, ', ffoctiv(, ly tho rolo oF tho oolonlrO ntato within thin sorirLl 
structure was that of both a synthesizer and mediatorg and also 
I 
an oppressor and educator. The'hacendados'were both intermediaries 
R. A. Humphreys writest "The empire was built on paternalist 
and absolutist lines. It could not, in point of fact, be quite 
so centralised as theory might imply. The Royal will was always 
limited by circumstances ... 11 
(1969, p. 82). 
2. Furthermore effective centralisation would have required a 
comprehensive system of transport and communications, which the 
Spanish failed to establish. 
3. Both aspects demonstrating, once again, a degree of continuity 
and similarity between the pre-and post-colonial structures. 
(see Kossok, 19739 P-18-) 
4- The Peruvian colonial apparatus never completely lost its 
characteristic mixture of state and private interests. 
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themselvesl informal agents (vassals) of the Crown, ultimately 
dependent on and in alliance with the administration against the 
colonized indigenous population, and yet alRo independent actors 
embodying their own informal state power within their region, 
against that of the central authority. 
Other sectors of the ruling class, who had no feudal baseq such 
as the merchantsl occupied a purely intermediary position . 
with their economic base in the sphere of circulation, andt as 
peninsulares, generally opposed to the creole elite. The entire 
social formation and state structure expressed this intermediate 
function and contradictory composition (Morseq 1974)9 which was 
embodied in the major function of the state - the administration 
of specie export to Spain - while its atructure was predominantly 
military and ecclesiastical. The Peruvian colonial administration 
was, therefore, as discussed in the theoretical section, similar 
to that of the Spanish absolutist state, yet differentiated by 
its inclusion of local pre-Columbian forms of government and its 
colonial functions of coercion and the collection of tribute. 
Similar in that it was a source of employmentq corruption and 
patronage, 
1 
yet different in that the elite was fractured into 
creoles and peninsulares, and it contained no traditional democratic 
checks and balances. 
When discussing the development of state power, and its contribution 
Pike writes: 11 ... the motherlandq in an effort to supervise its treasure house effectively, inflicted upon Peru the largesto 
most powerful and prestigious, and the best paid bureaucracy 
to be found in all of South America. " (19679 pp. 24-5). 
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to the genesis of industrial capitalismt Marx wrote: 
"(The) power of the state, the concentrated and organised 
force of society ... hasten(s), hot-house fashion, the 
process of transformation of the feudal mode of production 
into the capitalist mode, and ... shorten(s) the transition. 
Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a 
new one. It is itself an economic power.. " (CaritaIJ9 
19749 P-703. ). 
Both the Spanish state, howeverg and the Peruvian colonial administration 
were constructed around the need to Preserve the feudal orderg 
products of a stagmatingrather than a progressive transition, 
and this was clearly expressed in their structures and policies, 
1 
B. 18th Century Peru and the end of the Empire 
The changes that occurred in the colonial Peruvian structure 
from its establishment to independence were generally brought 
about by developments in Europe; however these then generated an 
I 
internal dynamic within the Empire, and led to an economic 
expansion in certain regions., The net result for Peru, however# 
was to accentuate the general impoverishment and decay which had 
set in as demand for foodstuffs began to exceed that for the 
already abating supply of bullion. (Purtadog 1976). Consequentlyt 
part of the j3ourbon reforms programme was aimed at stimulating the 
neglected agricultural areas of the empire, for instance, Buenos 
Newton describes the state in Spain and its dependencies as 
follows: "The relationships between sovereignity and corps 
intermediaries was in effect frozen in mid passage from the 
forms of late medieval Christendom to those of the burgeoning 
royal absolutism that elsewhere in Europe was to erect the 
institutional scaffolding of the Modern Nation State" (19709 
pp. 22-23) (my emphasis). This captures the notion of a 
stagnating transition so clearly expressed by the Peruvian 
and Spanish social formations. 
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Aires and Chile. Integral to this policy was the creation of 
La. Plata Viceroyalty which brought about dislocation of trade and 
ended a major source of income for many sectors of the Peruvian 
elite. It also represented the beginning of a shift in the 
balance of power between Peru and Chile. As the Chilean economy 
began to expando and its elite started to assert its independenceg 
Peru relapsed into the stagnation and economic parochialism 
19 
(Pike, 1967, p. 65) which had previously been masked by the advantages 
it had derived as the centre of the Empire. 
An antagonism had long existed between the elites, of Chile and 
2 Peru ; as Victor Tapie has written: 
"Par le Chilien, le Peruvien eftait un gros mulatre lippu 
et sensuel; pour le Peruvien, le Chilien un Irotol, inculte 
et cruel. " (19459 P-199) 
and the Limenos felt a strong sense of superiority towards the people 
of Santiago who wereq in any case, their subordinates in the imperial 
bureaucratic chain. The Chilean colonial heritage may be differentiated 
from that of Peru in many other ways; most importantlyg as a barren 
outpost with a relatively small Indian population that could not be quite 
easily transformed into a subservient labour force (Kossokg 19739 
p. 19), CW. Ioln colonitiation proccUll bOCLro porhapi more retiornblance 
3 to the North American experience than to the Peruvian. Furthermore, 
Piel notes the pre-eminence of decayed rural grandeur at this 
time: "Les 'traditions peruviennes' fixe's au l71ýme siecle 
quand se stabilise le pouvoir fonciýttde l1aristocratie 
colonialeg atteignent leur apogee dans le Peru du Vice-Roi 
I 
Amat et de la Pericholeg vers 177611, (1970; L. p. 294)- 
2. This was to increase during the first half of the 19th Century 
as will be shown in subsequent chapters; in the 1870's the 
city of Lima was represented in the main street of Santiago 
by the statue of a coquette. (Pinillos, 19479 P-143)- 
3- cf. Robert Baldwin's comparative study of two hypothetical 
colonies. (1956). 
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rather than existing solely as an appendage to the European systemt 
the Chilean elite developed an economy based on exports, with other 
parts of the Empireq centring on the trade in tallow, livestock 
(Roxborough, O'Brien and Roddickq 19779 P-5), and later wheat and 
even copper (Purser, 1971, P-53) with Peru. This predominantly 
agricultural prosperity in turn led to the consolidation of power 
by interests based on the large landed estatesq mainly those located 
I in the central areas of the country, (Rumbold 19039 Monteon, 19B2). 
I 
The dynamism and success of its farming elite, together with its 
spatial isolation from Europe, permitted Chile to attain a far 
greater degree of independence 
1. both political and economic 
(Frank, 19-719 P-61)s than that enjoyed by Perug andq from an early 
stage in its colonial historyl fostered a sense of national identity 
amonpt the upper classes. 
2 The Spanish settlers had formed an 
immediately more homogenous group, and had produced: 
11 ... a fairly complete and unusually successful amalgam 
of Indian and Spanish. " (Kiernan, 1972, p. 288). 
Furthermore they were less divided by the multiple interest groupst 
and the constant influx of peninsulares that Perug as the bureaucratic 
and trading centre of a vast empire, was naturally subject to. (Yepes 1974) 
Other factorsq such as the country's topographyl may be put forward 
as contributing to the emergence of a state bearing greater 
resemblance, in structural and cultural terms, to parts of Europe 
than to Peru, whilst the very austerity of Chile, in sharp contrast 
1. Sergio Villalobos traces the growing independence of Chi , 
lean 
merchants and commerce from Peruvian control throughout the 
18th Century. (19689 PP-11-3l)- 
2. This was also due to the prolonged struggle against the 
Araucanian Indians which demanded 'social and political stability# 
and unity. (Kinsbruner, 19739 P-10). 
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to the luxury, of aristocratic Viceregal societyq tended to attract 
the pioneer farmer rather than the parasites identified by Mariategui., 
(1976, P-14) It is of course clear that the Chilean colonial social 
formation exhibited many of the same reactionary elitistg feudal 
and dependant features that charcaterised Peruvian structure, 
(Blakemore, 1971o PP-495-497). But the differences already 
mentioned, in particular the unity of the upper classesq and the 
absence of Indiancommunitiesg were to have important consequences* 
The colonization of Peru had broken the organic unity of the pre- 
Columbian social and economic structure, and replaced it by a 
fragmented society, which was further divided by the exaggerated 
I 
pre-eminence of the coastal strip and Lima* in the words of El 
Banco Italiano: 
durante el coloniaje toda la vida estaba reconcentrada 
en Lima, en donde afluia la plata. 11 (19419' P-34). 
1 
By contrast, the colonial Chilean elite had created a more integrated 
and geographically balanced society, which was to enable it, after 
1 Independence, to achieve economic and political predominance 
over Peru. 
The 18th Century was a period of disasters for Peruvian society. 
The mining industry had formed an integrative focus for the entire 
colonial economy, and had, to a degree, counterbalanced the ' 
predominance of the coast. The boom periodt howeverg had come to 
an end by the middle of the 17th Centuryq and the industry remained 
I 
Morse writes that "Lima is the classic example for thq Spanish 
mercantile era of an outpost of foreign politico-economic control 
which in turn dominated. 9 exploited and depressed its own 
nation. " (19749 P-427). 
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stagnant until the latter half of the 18th Century (Purser, 1971, 
P-59). However, the continued demands made on the Indian population 
by the mines and 
I 
obrajes 
%1 
, together with pressure from the 
I hacendados' 
and heavy tribute requirements provoked not only flight to inaccessible 
mountain regions, but also massive population decline. 
2 In 
Bollinger's wordsq so many demands were being made on Indian labour 
that it: 
"was consumed faster than it could reproduce itselý. 11 
(19779 p. 21). 
These structural problems were exacerbated by a series of natural 
disasters in the 18th Century - earthquakes, epidemics - combined 
with a decline in coastal plantation agricultureg as the price 
of African slave labour increased (Cespedes del Castillop G. 19479 
PP-53-6) 
3 Furthermore# the Bourbon reforms represented an attempt 
4 to extract an even higher surplus from the indigenous population. 
This combination of conditions created together a crisis, and 
accelerated the disintegration of Peruvian'society. 
Perhaps the first outward sign of this process of disintegration 
1. Hemming comments on the severe disruption to Indian life caused 
by the'mitaýq especially in the Southern sierra: "By the middle 
of the 17th Century the population of the 16 affected provinces 
was reduced by over three-quarters. The Indians who remained 
behind had to furnish the same contingents of 'mitayos, 'as their 
forbears had under Toledo, and tlie daily wage of it'mlLayo' at 
Potosi remained unchanged for 200 years... agriculture suffered 
irreparably in these areas.... (1972, P-409). 
2. The Indian population declined to its lowest point of 350sOOO 
in the 18th Century. (Morseq 19749 P-419) 
3. In 1777 Viceroy Guiror declared 11 ... este Reyno se queda 
cadaverico.. " (in Chavarria, 19789 P-77). 
4. They also established the right of'criolloslto purchase. 
government offices. (Weaverg 1980, p. 63)- 
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was the Tupac Amaru II revoltq the culmination of a series of 
In#an uprisings during the 18th Century, (Bushnell, 1956, P-136)# 
prominent in which were Indians displaced by service in the mines 
und 
'D b VLtjt, - &I' - 
4Y 
It 11110011M I' LLI Id' I t1d tO [I I't-tran L orors. Thirs itimirrontion 
was both indicative of the fact that the straitjacket of Spanish 
domination, and the feudal order could no longer contain the 
contradictions withing and increased sophistication and 
differentiation of, Peruvian societyq and was also provocative 
, of further change. Its suppression was extremely costly in 
lives and money, destructive of agriculture and machinery, and 
intimidated the creoles and the Spanishq driving them: 
"to the safety of the large citiesq or the coast". 
(Morse, 1974v P-420). 
It also underlined creole adherence to Spain. Despite the fact 
that among Tupac Amaruls stated aims were many that most creoles 
would sympathise with, effectively the abolition of restrictive 
I mercantilismq (Humphreys and Lynchq 19659 P-17)9 the clear 
antagonism towards all white oppressors, creole or peninsularg 
undermined an already relatively weak drive towards independence, 
whilst exacerbating the poverty and instability within Peru. 
In other parts of the empireq the conflict between the primitive 
nature of the Spanish economy and the needs and aspirations of the 
Creoles led to the growth of Independence movements. This conflict 
had in fact been intensified by the ineffective Bourbon policy of 
trade liberalisation, which had simply highlighted the inadequacies 
of the Spanish economy. Creole dissatisfaction was further 
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increased, after 17789 by the open humiliation 
1 
of Spain, and 
the subsequent, direct penetration of the colonial economies by 
British and French goods. Furthermore the industrialization 
of Britain was increasing the demand for raw materials, and marketsq 
and: 
"therefore from the 1760s and 1770s on, export-oriented 
production grew rapidly. " 
But I 
"this was true in varying degrees within the colonies, as 
shown by the differences between the Captaingeneralship of 
Chile and the central districts of the Viceroyalty of Peru. " 
(Kossok, 1973, pp. 20-1). 
Consequently, 
"everywhere in South America 9 except in the old Viceroyalty 
of Peru ... the years between 1808 and 1812 saw the beginnings 
or tho trantiltion from tho cloilod, to tho oppn door. " 
(Humphreysq 1969, p. 110) (my emphasis) 
In Peru the struggle for independence was weakq protracted and 
ambiguousq characterised by distinct movements from within both the 
I Republica de los Espanoles, and the'Republica de los Indios'. The 
I 
Perry Anderson has made the following remarks on the failure 
of the Bourbon reforms, and the nature of Spanish society on 
the eve of South American Independence, which are also extremely 
resonant of 18th and early 19th Century Peru: 
"It was now too late for a development comparable to that of 
France or England.... The state administration *** remained 
rife with empleomania ... Vast latifundia worked by gang 
labour in the South provided the fortunes of a stagnant grandee 
nobilityl parked in the provincial capitals.... By the end 
of the century, the Bourbon court was itself in a full decadence 
reminiscent of its predecessor... even after the Caroline reformst 
the authority of the Absolutist State stopped at municipal 
level over vast areas of the country. Down to the invAsion 
of Napoleon$ more than half the towns in Spain were not under 
monarchicalt but under seigneurial or clerical jurisdiction. 
The regime of senoriosq a medieval relic ... assured.... 
(the 
nobles),,, not only of profits, but also of judicial-and 
administrative power... " (1979t PP-83-4)- 
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I 
Spaniards were determined to lose neither battle, and bled the 
colony dry in the effort to retain it. 
1 (Fisher, 1976, p. 23). 
While Spanish control had become unnecessary and undesirable to 
virtually the entire Chilean elite 
2. in Peru t. he creoles were 
too divided and nervous of the indigenous population to carry out 
an effective struggle; furthermore it would appear that the 
majority of the white population was content to remain under 
Spanish administration (Anna, 1975). Essentially, thereforeq 
independence was gained for the Peruvian creolesq as late as 
1824, by other South Americans - Bolivar's forces from the Northg 
3 
and those of Cochrane and San Martin in the South. Whereas 
Independence in Chile must be viewed as a watershed, and the 
beginning of the development of a nation, Riva Aguero asserted 
that Ayacucho meant/means nothing more to Peruvian consciousness 
than a "civil struggle between two bands, each assisted by foreign 
mercenaries. " (1955, pp. 110-121)9 especially since Bolivar 
agreed with the defeated Spanish armies that: 
"los privilegiost,. prebendas y situaccion social de estos 
enemigos de la Patria insurgenteg fueran mantenidos, con 
el efecto de que todos los procolonialistas de siempreg 
volvieran a sus antiguas posiciones de poder efectivo y 
de dominio. " (Roel, 19779 P-31)- 
There was therefore a considerable degree of continuity between 
The Spanish virtually exhausted all accessible seanns in the mines 
in an effort to increase their income in order to subsidise the 
wars against the rebel colonies and later within Peru, while 
capital exported from the colony between 1819 and 1824 has 
been estimated at 40 million pesos. (Chavarria, 19789 P-42). 
2. Chile had continued to experience demographic upturn and 
urban growth throughout the 18th Century. (Morse, 1974s P-422). 
3. Kiernan writes that when San Martin came from Chile to "liberate 
a hesitant Peru and his lieutenants recruited bands of Indians 
the wealthier citizens of Lima were highly apprehensive of these 
allies. " (1972, p. 291). 
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I 
the colonial and republican Peruvian structures. Par from being 
liquidated, the feudal social organisation, wasl if anythinr f_,, injected 
with new vitality, despite the clear signs of the growing differentiation 
and discontent within rural society. In Yepes' words, due to the 
weakness of the liberals and their fear of the Indians, the reactionary 
forceo were able to avoid modification of' the internal reluLioiis 
of domination and: 
11 ... on the contraryq the maintenance and reproduction 
of those relations was assured in the configuration of the 
new state... thus the basic scission of the colonial economy 
(production conditions and market conditions) was maintained. " 
(19749 pp. 67-8). N 
The resulting accentuation of the fragmentation of the Peruvian 
structure itself resulted in the failure, on the part of the 
Peruvian elitet by contrast with the Chilean upper classes, to 
construct an effective centralised state apparatus. The failure 
was not only a major contributory factor in the outbreak of the 
Pacific War, but also a reflection of both the decayed nature 
of the old orderg and yet its simultaneous ability to survive 
I 
and resist the evolution of capitalist relations of production 
11 
and political processes. These features of the republican 
social formation will be examined in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
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cHAPTER 6: INTRA-ELITE CONFLICT IN POST INDEPENDENCE PERU AND CHILE 
A. Independence and Republican Peru 
Republican Peru was initiated beset by a number of problems which 
greatly retarded the institutionalisation of political processes 
and the effective restructuring of social and economic life. 
The Wars of Independence, the culmination of decades of economic 
decay and social unrest all combined to shatter the outwardly 
monolithic political and administrative structure of Spanish 
colonialism in Perug andq in spite of Bolivar's attempt to 
recreate the colonial system in the form of the 'Republica 
Aristocratical, these factors provoked a regression to economic 
and political parochialism. (Pavre, 1969, p. 92). Contemporary 
observers comment on the total collapse of commercel andq 
consequently, also of the economic power of the state: 
I'during, Lblo Limu Lhut jay uourAry wutj tArugglIjig, wl L11 
little puccess, to win independence, I was called three 
times to fill the Office of Minister of Finance. The 
first two times, there were still some -ruins from which 
to repair the building. But now (1825) even the ruins 
have gone. " (Hipolito Unanue, 1914, Vol-II9 P-370). 
i and Rowcroft, (British Consul in Lima) reported to the P. O. 9 
on 6th Augustq 1824, that: 
"The Spanish restrictions have always much obstructed 
the progress and the circulation of trade; and the 
troubles of the country have impeded its extension of 
late. The removal of both these impediments will open 
foreign trade to the extent which the small number of 
peoplej and their slender means of exchange will permit ... 
The labour of the mines too is almost suspended. " (F. O. 61/2) 
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Purthermore, in a private letterl Rowcroft 
1 
expressed his ethno- 
centric doubts as to whether the problems facing Peru could ever, 
be-'overcome: 
"Can the mixed populations of these countries, in 
their defective condition of general information and 
ignorance of political principles, with their 
weakness in all means of combination ..... and open 
to the insidious deceptions of every class of imposters 
and every rank of demagogues .... in any forseeable 
time .... settle themselves into any stable, rationalq 
well secured order of government? " (F. O. 61/2,13th Junet 1824) 
In the event, despite the discovery of guano, and despite progress 
during the pre-War of the Pacific period towards an institutionalised 
state form and some integration and modernization of the Peruvian 
structure, intermittent civil warfare continued up to and during 
the War. The war itself was partly provoked by failure to create 
stable political institutions and eradicate the feudal cast of 
Feruvian society, and, in turnj also expressed the rationality 
I 
and function of war in a predominantly feudal social formation. 
There is a variety of interpretations of the period of civil 
warsl ranging from the variant of Latin American scholarship that 
tends to attribute them to inherent instability and individual 
personalities (for instanceg G. Pope Atkins, 1977 and W. Witherst 
1964) to works that attempt to make sense of them in political 
terms. Weaver (1980) and Bollinger (1977) are two writers 
He also enclosed a letter from an English traveller in Peru 
(dated 14th October, 1823) outlining the extreme poverty of 
the country: "Lima .... is now going to decay; perhaps the 
population, formerly 80#000t does not exceed 50sOO0 .... 
about a fifth of the city .... in deserted .... most of the 
rich Old L; panlardu are goile ... tuojiuy ... vury uu"Veu ee the Negroes are all dead or dispersed .... 11 
(F. O. 61/29 in 
Rowcroft to F-0-15th July, 1824) 
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who have both recently made a valuable contribution to the discussion; 
however, they also demonstrate the dangers of becoming overly 
deterministic. They both, quite correctly, underline the importance 
of viewing the period not in terms of 'flamboyant caudillismol but 
in,, 
"the light of the criollo elite's efforts to forge a class 
that would be sufficiently united to give political structure 
and geographical definition to the new nation states; 
the core of the disputes .... concerned the political forms 
most appropriate for class rule. " ' (Weaver, 1980, pp. 67-68) 
Weaver also implies that some of the instability in Perug Bolivia and 
Mexico had a logic of its own: 
"The possessing classes in these nations had neither the 
confidence in their control of the producing classes nor the 
unity to create a political alternative to military ruleg 
and the tensions and personal ambitions within the victorious 
armies led to frequent wars and rapid turnover of the generals 
at the top'. " (19BOp P-72) 
Bollinger's analysis emphasises the conscious attempt to carry out 
a bourgeois revolution to the virtual exclusion of all other factors. 
He is concerned to disprove studies that deny the existence of a 
capitalist class in early 19th Century Peru, although the main focus 
of his criticism is the dependency school. He makes the following 
juýgement on the disturbances of the 1830s: 
"Although the aspirations of an emergent national bourgeoisie 
were momentarily frustratedg the dominant features of the 
period were not an ahistorical reimposition of neo-colonial 
status 
1 
or the 'development of underdevelopment'. Rathert 
Since Bollinger later refers to the process-of refeudalisation 
that took place in the 19th Century, this assertion that to talk 
of an imposition of earlier relations is ahistorical appears 
illogical. 
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the Republican struggle was indeed liberal inspired and 
bourgeois-led. It was, despite its contradiction and 
weaknesses, the onset of Peru's bourgeois revolution. " 
(19779 p. 28) 
I 
He also asserts that: 
at the heart of these conflicts was a bitter struggle 
over protectionism. " (1977t p. 27) 
Whilst approaching the issue from different standpointsl both 
Weaver and Bollinger appear to agree too that by the mid 1850s/606 
it is possible to talk of a strong state structure in Peru. Bollinger 
sees this in terms of the successes of the bourgeois revolutiong 
as a result of guano, and discusses the state in the following 
terms: 
"The state 
, 
bureaucracy was expanded to over 33,000 (about 
1.6% of the total population) in part to assist capitalist 
development. " (19779 P-31) (my emphasis) 
Weaver speaks of the development of a strong, autonomous state 
to the detriment of the evolutiong or consolidationg of a 
capitalist class: 
"Thus the guano revenues created in Lima a large centralised 
state apparatus whiýh was remarkably immune from influence by 
even the most influential classes and which was capable of 
promulgating policies inimical to the interests of the most 
powerful of domestic groups., ' (19809 P-91) 
Clearlyýhe prolonged social conflict after the Wars of Independence 
; was concerned with the formation of the state, the direction of the 
economy# the reformulation or retention of relations of production; 
For a recent treatment of the struggles over protectionism versus 
free trade that took place in mid 19th Century Peru see Gootenbergq 
1982. 
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however, interpretations that exclude all other aspects of these 
clooloty uiid Lund 
to become teleological. Class analysis when crudely applied can 
become functionalist. Just as many writers# for instance, Beruf 
(1978), Singelmann (1975) and Flynn (1974) have shown how functionalist 
analysis of clientelism ignores the way in which class interests are 
, expressed through factional conflict 
1, in the same way, some class 
analysis, through ignoring primordial sentiments and the significance 
of clientelism and continual intragroup warfare, oversimplifies and 
distorts the picture. Peru's 19th Century experience may be 
differentiated from that of many other Latin American states by the 
extreme persistence of certain social structures and political 
processes stemming from its aristocratic colonial pastq and even 
from 15th Century Spain and pre-Columbian Tahuantinsuya. This 
I 
was especially clear during the first decades of Republican history 
when the political processes were dominated by kinship politics 
(Dourricaud, 1969, P-153), and when the state had lost almost all 
functions other than that of a rent-collecting machine - appearing 
as a deoayed and weakened absolutist state in the guise of 
European constitutionalism. However, this regression to clan 
politics was complicated by both the intensification of class 
conflictq and the establishment of the Peruvian nation-stateg 
together with the contaminant of metropolitan capital. Consequentlyp 
the civilwars following independence must be analysed on several 
levels, whilst also recognising that the various aspects of the 
Flynn comments on the ahistorical and static nature of this type 
of analysis which fails to appreciate how 11 ... clientelistic 
patterns may support certain social formations and class interests 
as expressed)at a particular stage of society's development. " 
(1974, P-145 
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conflicts overlapped and reinforced/affected each other. 
Bollinger writes: 
"The Wars of Independence constituted the first major political 
confrontation between the reactionary forces rooted in the 
tribute-communal mode and the emergent liberals aspiring 
to install a bourgeois order 11 (19779 p. 26) 
However, class formation and consciousness in Peru, especially among 
the upper classes, was, in the 1820s, still at a relatively primitive 
stage, having been effectively splintered not only by the coexistence 
of a variety of forms of production and patron-client ties and 
familial alliances, but also by the Spanish policy of divide and 
rule. In turn, this had been reinforced by other factors such as 
geographical problemsp poor comnunications and racial cleavages. 
1 
Whilst it may be possible to talk about Chilean Independence in 
terms of an emergent liberal groupq the evidence indicates that in 
Peru such a group was negligible, and those individuals that did 
hold liberal views were not an embryonic capitalist class, but 
were intellectuals, priests. Jose de la Riva Aguero writes: 
"Who were those that set up to govern the new born state? 
The poor, silly colonial nobility of Limag incapable of 
effort and destitute of ideas? Their ineffectiveness left 
a void which was filled by military caudillos... " (1955, pp 117-118) 
and a contemporary observer made two most significant allegations 
concerning support for Peruvian Independence - firstly that Lima 
alone was involvedg and that rural Peru unanimously rejected 
Colonial Peru had been a strictly hierarchical society composed 
of a number of racial categoriesq which even involved prejudice 
against creoles by the peninsulares. "The most miserable European" 
wrote Humboldt "without educationg and without intellectual 
cultivationg thinks himself superior to the whites born in the 
new continent. " (18119 11,2 in Humphreys, 1969, P-83) 
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#dependence; secondlyq that even in Lima it was brought about 
by a tiny group - not of aspiring liberals, but of: 
"ambitious and bitter petty lawyers, priests and professionals 
(who) forced it upon a desperate and starving capital whose 
citizens were intimidated by armed forceg threatened by 
imminent social chaos, and coerced by violence and fear. " 
(Pedro Angel de Tado, in Anna, 1975, p. 223) 
Annals detailed statistical analysis of the male. elite at the 
end of the 18th Century indicates its overwhelmingly reactionary 
character -, 41-7% were members of the regular or secular clergy, 
and of theset 28.6%, representing the largest single category. within 
the male elite, belonged to regular orders (Anna, 19759 p. 234). and 
consequently lived entirely unproductive lives isolated from the 
community. In fact the proportion involved in any kind of productive 
activities was extremely low - 26.3% (op. cit. 9 p. 237) -, and it was 
most unlikely that 18th Century Peru would have generated a sizeable 
creole bourgeoisie, given the monopoly by peninsulares of commercial 
life, and the conservative nature of viceregal society. On the 
contrary, it is clear that, as Tado asserted, independence was 
supported simply by peninsulares whose property and income was 
fixed in Perut and by creoles who wanted to supplant the peninsulares 
and assume their paranitic and unproductive functions. San Martin 
was well aware of thisq and utilised it to gain a following. 
According to Anna he made promises to all major sectors of Lima 
societyl telling the creole aristocracy, with accuracyt that they 
had been an "inert class without function in the midst of a society 
of soldiers and slaves', 19 (in Anna, 1975, p. 245) and that-he would 
place them at the head of society. However, he also made promises 
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of power, money and advancement-to the army (recognising them as the 
irue future posseBsors of political power), and thus contributed 
to the emergence of caudillismo. He pledged himself, toog to 
distribute dozens of bureaucratic positions, despite the fact that 
there was already a scarcity of government employment, and both the 
states' institutions and finances were in ruins. Empleomania and 
corruption had long been a feature of colonial Peru 
1. 
and in this 
way it was instituted as customary procedure at the birth of the 
Itupublic. IL Itt cluur, thorororn, that Indopondonce wan entablished 
by those motivated by individual self interest, and in such a way 
as to exacerbate the divisions already existing within Peruvian 
society. However, San Martin further increased the potentiality 
for conflict within the elite by granting considerable rewards 
to his own followers who thus infiltrated the eliteg and were 
not even Peruvians: I 
"The best positions and most desirable confiscated properties 
went first to Chileansq Argentinians, even Englishmeng before 
Peruvians. Well over half the administrative machinery of 
the young republic, even including the first congress was 
staffed by non-Peruvians. " (in Anna, 1975, p. 246) 
The sierran hacendados I represented another sector of Peruvian society 
that could be described as generally operating outside the framework 
of any formal ideological struggle, whilst making a contribution to' 
the state of political anarchy, especially as political power shifted 
to the countryside (Yepes, 1972). Wolf and Hansen (1966) have 
pointed out how the'hacienda'system inhibited the development of a 
cohesive political association of'hacienda'ownersq since dependence 
on primitive technology led to continual competition ov*er land and 
The sale of offices was a traditional means of raising revenue 
employed by the Absolutist , 
State (Andersonj 19799 P-34) and under 
Charles III the practice had been extended to creoles. 
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laboýr, and the consequent formation of kindred alliance/cli'entelistic 
politics. This competition, which set landowner against landowner 
and-'also against the nearby Indian communityq was obviously intensified, 
and the non-capitalist relations, on which they were based, stimulatedg 
as metropolitan demand for sierran products rose. 
1 During the 
colonial period, the state had largely succeeded in curbing the 
tendency towards factional conflict through its role as mediatorg 
and through its control of the army; but the political vacuum in 
19th Century Peru resulted in generalised conflict in the sierra 
29 
raising the question as to whether anarchy was in fact the natural 
condition 
3 
of the'hacienda'systems (Wolf and Hansen, 1966). Beruf 
writes that the factional mode of conflict requires: 
the existence of patron-client relationships in the 
countryside, a fragmentation of the dominant class on regionalt 
sectoral, or ideological grounds; and consequently, the absence 
of a strongg centralised political system. " (19789 p. 24) 
which is in fact a clear descr, iption of a feudal social organisation. 
But the parcellised sovereignity inherent in the'hacienda. which could 
only be controlled by a strong state, in turn militated against the 
imposition of effective central authority. Colonial Spain had 
imported feudal social structures, but had generally succeeded in 
controlling them; the power vacuum in 19th Century Perug itself 
largely a result of intense intra-elite conflict, enabled the 
I feudal lords to assert their own political and economic autonomy 
1. For instancel. wool from the Southern highlands-(Spaldingo 1975) 
The assault on the'comunidades'was justified in the name of progress 
and westernisation of the Indian. (Pikes 19789 p. 248) 
2. Newton writes: "The settlers foiled by the Crown in the 16th Century 
were finally triumphant ...... South America's political pociety 
reverted to its components the class, the tribes the haciendag 
the village. " (19709 P-30ý 
3- Salvador de Madariaga asserted that anarchy was "the national 
state of all Spaniards'19 a condition of Spanish society (19479 p. 283) 
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(Bourricaud, 19699'P-153)9 which was further enhanced by the demands 
of metropolitan capital. 
Consequently, part of the post-independence struggles must be viewed 
as being caused by the logic of class positions rather than occuring 
as a result of conscious class projects. 
1 The most prominent 
actors in these struggles, who were generally motivated by personal 
2 
gain, rather than political ideals were the'mestizos. By 
I definition the4mestizos'had occupied no clearly determined position 
in colonial Perug but were 'outsiders' (Wolf and Hansen 1966), they 
3 had represented a floatingg rootless population, frequently acting 
as mediators/brokers between the white elite and the Indians, 
sometimes as the landlords' armed retainers. After Independence 
thelmestizos'q in their capacity as1caudillos'q came to be mediators 
between different sectors of the upper classes too (Beruf 1978t p. 26). 
But the arming of the'mestizos'also enabled them to compete with the 
creoles, and build up their own client systems - as individuals, 
however, rather than as representatives of a class. Chavarria 
writes: 
"Una consecuencia importante de la Independencia... habia 
sido la perdida por parte de la aristocraeia colonial 
peruana de gran parte de su riqueza y poder. La aristocracial 
que habia basado su poderio en la posesion de minas y haeiendasq 
fue cediendo gradualmente ante. los eaudillos militares*db'" 
(19729 p. 124) 
1.11obs bawai Iu diticutision of lisiutiticLivu und conticloutt clutiti 
reaction' is useful here (1971). 
2. As late as 1875 U, S- Consul Gibbs commented to Fish that it was 
difficult to understand Peruvian politics - "there doesn't appear 
to be any particular principles at stake, nor .. party platforms but mer ly pýrsonal ambitions ... 11 
(Foreign Relations of the United 
States 
Wru 
, October 20th, 1875). 
3. Although clearly somemestizos'became artisans in the cities. 
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This competition increased localised struggles over land and labour, 
which had been given fuller impulse by the abolition of communal 
land (Castro Pozo, 19639 P-497), and the attempts to increase 
the subordination and exploitation of the Indian. The sierra. 
continued to form a vast, unofficial Indian reservation; 
Kubler writes: 
"The colonial status of the Indians did not cease with 
the creation of the Republic. On the contrary all the 
exploitative mechanisms of the colonial government 
continued ... Tribute .... although it changed its name 
continued to be levied .... The mita finally survived under 
a new name. " (19639 P-353) 
Furthermore, if the'mestizo caudillo'did not establish himself as 
ai hacendado; but continued as a military leader, he deperided partly 
on the Indian'communities to provide him with soldiers 
1. 
and, if 
he gained control of the stateg tribute. Consequentlyq like 
the colonial administration beforet the republican state could have 
an interest in maintaining the communities in opposition to the 
Is hacienda'- again, in imitation of the absolutist state and in 
I 
opposition to the bourgeois property reforms. It is therefore 
evident that many of the post-Independence wars were not only 
concerned with the economic. or political direction of the new 
republicl but were an extension of class/clientelist politics, 
their predictable functioning and interplay deranged by the 
broad diffusions of military power among large sections of the 
Marx commented. that the freed peasantry would normallys before 
being driven onto the 'narrow path' of the labour market ... "turn to beggingg vagabonding and robbery an its only source 
of income... " (1857-589 P-507)'Caudillismd and the generally 
unsettled condition of rival Peru for most of the 19th Century 
allowed a large proportion of landless Indians andmestizos' 
to avoid being turned into free labour. 
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male population, and the collapse of the absolutist state after the 
1111 
expulsion of Spain. This is of course not to imply that caudillismo 
was not used by certain sectors of the upper classes for their own 
political ends; Beruf's work demonstrates the ways in which the 
class interests of the creole elite were expressed through pertional 
conflict: 
".. the military would serve to provide leadership to the 
contending factions thus representing the interests of 
the segments of the propertied classes embodied in the 
different political factions ... 11 
(19789 p. 20) 
The dominance thus gained by thelcaudillos, however, and the 
failure of the elite to reach agreement on anything but the most 
general issues, meant that factional conflict developed its own 
momentum; it became, along with empleomania, a mode of existence, 
expressive of the predominance of feudal social relationsg which 
the coastal elite, despite attempts to institutionalise the political 
processes and professionalise the army, was unable to control until 
aI fter the Pacific war. It is consequently not truly possible to 
talk in terms of either an institutionalised state apparatus 
(Mathew, 19729 p. 608; Miller, 1982) army or bureaucracy until after 
1895. As a contemporary observer remarked: 
"Peru is not a republic ... and never has been .... Itý 
poliical constitution and its laws have nothing whatsoever 
to do with the people, nor have the people aught to do 
with them; and they care for them as they care for the 
1. 
-Whilst 
the imposition of a modified version of the colonial state 
after Independenceg which vested almost total power in the president 
added a further impetus to coups. By the simple overthrow of 
the president, who was the sole repository of state power# access 
to booty was easily gained; as poverty among the regional upper 
classes increasedl such a course of action became increasingly 
attractive. 
2. "This great number of officials who have been accustomed to 
live on the state is a standing menace against the prosperity 
and peace of the country. ", (Gibbs - Fish, 21st Augusto 1876, 
Foreign Relations of the United States. 
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theory of gravitation .. from which they may indeed derive 
some .. comfort in its application, but the application of 
which will probably never enlighten their souls. (Duffieldg 
1877, P-133) 
and in 1854 the British Minister in Lima, Sulivan, discussed 
Peruvian poliical processes in the following way: 
the small towns in the South seem to be as zealous in 
the cause of the Government, as they were some months ago 
in the cause of the revolution. In fact the Peruvian 
people, of whom both sides talk so much$ takes but 
little interest what party is in the ascendant, the 
revolution was got up by force of gold and the reaction 
which is now taking place owes its success to the same 
power. The leaders of the insurrection are already 
quarrelling among themselves for the spoils even before 
they have ensured success. *911 
(Sulivan-P. O., P. O. 61/147P 
21st Julyt 1854) 
and in 1855 Sulivan informed Clarendon, that following Echenique's 
doroat. sal Voriiln olvil rivrvantii woro bolnir dimidonod witiloill. pay 
or pension (January 1855, P. O. 61/145), This procedure continued 
to be normal practice throughout the 19th Century. 
It is apparentg therefore, thatq on one levelt the political 
I and economic anarchy subsequent to Independence was symptomatic 
I 
of the underdeveloped and disarayed nature of class formation, 
together with the persistence of pre-capitalist political processes. 
This aspect of the conflicts interacted with the ideological 
struggles that also began to take place, and militated against 
their satisfactory conclusion# and the establishment of effective 
central authority. Dew's research on altiplano politics _ 
demoýstrates the strong opposition to the centralised administration 
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that was formally created by Bolivar after Independence, and again 
Gamarra, after the defeat of Santa Cruz's attempt to establish a 
more federatedg regionalised structure. lie shows the relative 
exclusion from formal central power of most sierran landowners, 
but equally the powerlessness of central directives. (1969, p. 26) 
The vitality of such fragmentation and regionalism in turn inhibited 
the development of an economic organising axis (Wilson to F. O., 29th 
September, 1838, F. O. 61/53). which could have integrated the new 
Republic, and ensured that one of the principal debates for much 
I 
of the period, was centralism versus regionalismg rather than 
protectionism or labour policy. Howeverg a-further complicating 
factor was introduced by the fact that Independence had not simply 
splintered groups within one embryonic nation-state, butq partly 
because those nation states that were subsequently created fragmented 
groups stretching across frontiers also generated conflict of an 
intra-elite nature between countries. Once the integrative economic 
activity had decayed, as it had in Peru and Bolivia, along with 
the sharp decrease in intra-continental contacts, and the disappearance 
of the political organising axisq together with the simultaneous 
disruption of social values, there not only developed class conflict 
to derange the functioning of vertical linkages but also severe 
intra-class conflict. This intra-elite conflict occurred not only 
within the new national structures, but was also rationalised 
around the nation-state disputes that quickly arose. 
2 
These 
1. This was obviously especially true of Peru and Boliviag which 
Ittid Withit-Intilly boon unitod jind ith: irml it noinnint) Vill Lion. I-If, rl I 
even used the Bolivian currency until a monetary reform. was 
carried out in 1663- 
2. Between 1828 and 1866 Peru fought wars with Boliviag Colombial 
Chilel, Ecuadorq Argentina and Spain. 
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disputes were caused by a variety of factors and demonstrated different 
aspects of, and produced different results for, the various states. 
For instance, since, in Peru and Boliviag national consciousness 
could hardly be said to exist among either the Indians or the bulk 
of the upper classes, this conflict was clearly elite competition 
and was partly an expression of the social predominance of the 
military. 
1 It also appears to perfectly demonstrate Perry 
Anclt, nsonlii olmorvation Witt Llso w4tional nomiprLtion or it rouditi. 
class is warfare: 
"The nobility was a landowning class whose profession was 
war: its social vocation was not an external accretion 
but an intrinsic function of its economic position. " 
(1979v P-31) 
and similarly the Republican state devoted its income overwhelmingly 
to war. In 1860 Jerningham commented to Russell that the large, 
guano advances would be: 
frittered awayq after the old system, in keeping up 
a large force and .. in military expenditures, instead.. " 
(as in Chile) so*" of being employed in the development of 
the other resources of the country, on which to fall backq 
when the guano should have disappeared. " (P. O. 61/1939 
Jerningham to Russell, 13th October, 1660) 
Howeverg as mentioned earlier, the normal functioning of feudal 
In a report to the F. O., dated 18th Auguatt 1877, Consul, -Grabam discusses the Peruvian armyq observing that "as the army is a 
potent weapon in fomenting revolutions, great efforts are made 
to pay it with regularity and to feed it properly, and in this 
respect the government of the day are generally successful. " 
Furthermore, it was wel ,1 armed and 
"well dressed". The most 
striking fact of allq howeverg highlighting the importance of 
the military as a career for the middle classes and younger sons 
of provincial gentryq concerns the extreme imbalance of officers 
to meng in 1876 there were 2,629 officers to a mere 49000 
ordinary soldiers. (F. O. 177/149, Graham to F. O., 18th, Augusto 
1877). 
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politics was overdetermined _1by 
two new factors, due to their 
o9currence in an Industrial Age and to the demands of metropolitan 
capital. The necessity to reformulate relations with the metropolis, 
together with fierce intra-state (elite) competition for metropolitan 
markets, capital and new export products, fuelled such conflictst 
whilst the differing stages of political development and maturity 
of the various Lation American states also affected the issue. 
The varying levels of development of the new republics may be 
gauged by their susceptibility to bourgeois control through civilian 
politics. For Chile the Andean system of elite competition was not 
an expression of feudal preoccupation but a national Bismarckian 
venture to establish unity within and to contribute to the primitive 
accumulation of capital. But for Peru international wars were 
frequently extensions of civil wars and the feudal sector of the 
ruling class was essentially mobile and would collaborate with the 
Chilean elite as easily as with another s'ectore of the Peruvian 
elite. 
Thu dyiianduu of UoLh the Puruviaii uiid ChIluuti pollLicul oytiLtimus 
which were developing at this time, may therefore be said to have 
turned upon the interdependent nature of the Andean political systemo 
within which the Bolivian republic was little more than a catspawq 
a battleground and object of conflict. At this point, it is useful 
to compare the post-Independence development of the Chilean social 
f 
structure with that of Peru. 
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B. Post Independence Chile and rivalry with Peru 
Despite the high expectations entertained by British merchants 
of the potentiality of the Peruvian market, which, it was thought, 
would far exceed the Chilean, results were disappointing - Peru 
was quickly flooded with British goods (Humphreysg 1940, pp 93, n. 2j 
1 
117,124). By contrast, the Chilean economy and market offered 
more promise than had been expected; R. A. Humphreys comments: 
"Valparaiso, whose population multiplied five times in as 
many years, soon resembled ... a 'coast town' of Britain and 
its reputation as the most important port in the Pacific was 
already established by the middle of the twenties ... 11 
(1969, 
p. 122) 
Thp structure of the Chilean economy had remained relatively intactq 
despite some disruption caused by the Independence struggle and, on 
the whole control of labour and markets for exports were retained. 
On this basis the Chilean elite embarked upon'a series of strategies 
designed to expand and diversify the economy (Franko 19719 p. 82)9 
andq in addition to its prosperous export agricultural sector 
20 
copper was discoveredg early on in the Republican periodl in the 
North of Chile 
3. The rapid development in the exploitation 
(Ortega, 1982, p. 1) and export of minerals from the mid 1840s 
onwards (Joslin, 19639 P-7. ) not only stimulated the economy# but 
also led to diversification into the industrial sphere, (Kayq 19819 
P-4 89) 
4: 
While Perulfound itself drained of bullion in exchange for consumer 
goods and weapons of war'' (Ilumphreysq 1969, p. 128) (my emphasis)$ 
Chile had exports to offer in exchange. 
2. "Wheat exports increased fourfold between 1650 and 1675" (KaYt 1981, p. 41 
3- This discovery also contributed to the extension of Chilean influence 
Northwards into Atacama. 
4- These industrial developments enabled Chile to compete with Europe 
and North America in the processing of certain raw materials; 
Peruvian mt. -Lalo begun Lo bu tiuriL LO Chilvan jinitilLhip- worý11, (consular Reports Arica and Islay, P. P. 18789 LXXV9 31st Januaryl 
1878). ' 
-172- 
"In the second half of the last century, an important 
effort was made in the field of metallurgy. Numerous 
industries of this type were installed in the region of 
Santiago and Valparaiso, the majority of them directed by 
foreigners. The projects of these metallurgical industries 
were ambitious.. " Moreover, 11 ... the initiative developed 
in the metallurgical, industry showed its efficiency. by being 
able to provide the necessary arms and equipment for the 
army and navy during the War of the Pacific ... 
(Nolff, - 
19629 P-154 in Frank, 19719 P-85) 
Deliberate political and economic measures were taken to stimulate 
national capitalism 
1, 
such as the gradual acquisition of an indigenous 
merchant marine, the construction of modern port facilities in 
Valparaico, ý and the developmerit of ruilwayti, livelriiihif?. lit 165,9 
(Oppenheimerg 19829 P-53)- From 1841 - 61 the Chilean economy 
was enjoying a boom, which was of a more balanced and integrated 
nature than that generated by the Peruvian guano industryq and which 
produced substantial-backward linkages into Chilean society as a 
whole (Sepulveda, 19599 P-35). - Purthermoreq ref3ecting the early 
assumption by the state of a dynamic roleg:, 
"All this wealth was-re-invested in great public works. 
Roads were openedv railroads built, ... steamships travelled 
the extensive Pacific coasts ... The telegraph shortened 
communications ... Economic and technical progress transformed 
the standard of living ... mining expanded ... The deyelopment 
of railroads and the growth of commerce produced the enrichment 
of many families. (J. C. Jobetq cited in Pinto, 1969, p. 19) 
I 
It appears clear that post-Independence Chile# like Perut was 
characterised by predominantly non-capitalist relations of production. 
Ratcliff (1974) comments on the 'dynamism' and 'aggression' of 
Chilean capitalist development in the middle and late 19th 
Century. 
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However, significant differences enabled the Chilean elite to 
q, 4ickly establish an effective central state structure. There 
are several reasons behind this early successq which have already 
been mentioned, and which range from Chile's colonial heritage and 
favourable topography (Blakemoreq 1974) to a less reactionaryo' 
I 
aristocratic and ecclesiastical social climate. Furthermore$ 
widespread flight to Spain of_both capital and the educated and 
business classes did not take place after Independence (as occurred 
in Peru); and although Chile did experience a few years of intra- 
elite conflict9 internal unity was relatively quickly established. 
By 1833 a constitution had been adopted which created a strong 
state based on a centralised, authoritarian political system 
(Drakel 1978, p. 89), which excluded all landless and illiterate 
persons, but does appear to have been fully representative of the 
upper classes, (Pregger Ramon, 1979). Furthermore, it was not 
simply a reimposition of the colonial absolutist state, or a 
meaningless European-style constitutional charade. The state 
that was constructed was suitable for the transition to capitalism 
and was geared to bring about capital accumulation and establish 
suitable relations with metropolitan powers. Moreover the elite 
succeeded in converting the Chilean army into a professionalg 
bureaucratic force. This progress was observed and applauded 
by foreign capital, even though certain attempts at economic, 
nationalism brought Chile into conflict with H. M. G. Kiernan 
writes: 
"Its landowning oligarchyq controlling both economic and 
Unity was established both within the eliteg andl at a superficial 
levelq among the population as a whole which at least generally 
shared a common language.. and culture. I 
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political lifeg maintained an unusually stable system as 
well as a parliamentary facadet while its long coastline and 
commercial opportunities kept it from standing still ... 
Englishmen admired its solid governing class , *, o" 
(19720 P-304) 
clillo wati I'CSIL Lu tio 1"llfluot Pluctilicnats' - ulmotiL whi Lo, exisol 
consequently at a more advanced stage in its development than its 
neighbourat - and at the turn of the century, U. S. Consul, T. C. Dawson 
wrote: 
"like the Yno-lish aristocracy that of Chile is truly 
representativeg wielding its power with a keen sense of 
its responsibility to the nation. " (1904, Vol. 2, p. 229- 
my emphasis) 
Whilst reports of Peru's anarchy 
1 
and decadence 
2 
reached Britaing 
producing the comment in a private letter from Wilson (British 
Minister in Lima) that: 
"South American politics are per se disgusting .... South 
American faithlessness and ingratitude are proverbial... 
(F. O. 61/539 20th July, 1838) 
British merchants were beginning to establish a close and harmonius 
relationship with the Chilean elite. The American minister in 
Santiago, wrote to Clay of: 
the English interest in Chileg created by mining 
companiesg commercial relations and intermarrying with the 
natives. " (Heman Allen to Clay, 5th hovember, 1825, in 
Manning, 1925, 'Vol-ii, p. 1106) 
1. British F. O. documents reveal a deep preoccupation with the state 
of anarchy frequently referred to as prevailing in Peru, and 
disrupting trade. On the 14th Aprilt 1839# Wilson wrote to 
the F. O. of the "enthronement of a military anarchy in Peru and 
the practical restorations of the old Peruvian system of stock- 
Jobbing, monopoly, contraband and fiscal derangement 
(Wilson to P. O., P. O. 61/58# 14th Aprill 1839)- 
2. Darwin's observations on Lima were most unfavourableg describing 
it as filthy, while concerning Peruvian society as a whole he 
wrote: "No state in South America, since the decade of Independencet 
has suffered more from anarchy than Peru. " (1840t p. 266) 
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In 1834 Wilson reflected on the unreasonableness of the Peruvian 
. *government in comparison with Chile: 
"Valparaiso has become the deposit port of the Pacific 
because it is the first port after Cape Horn and ... tends 
to supply the West Coast of South America ... The comparatively 
liberal commercial policy of Chile, and the insanely antiliberal 
commercial system of Peru have both tended to secure to 
Valparaiso this preference from which she derives such 
immense advantages .... so deep-rooted and inveterate are 
prejudices against foreigners in Peru, so blindly ignorant 
is the country generally of the advantages to be derived 
from extensive and unfettered commercial intercourse thatl 
I almost despair of seeing even an attempt made to raise 
Peru from the degraded commercial position into which she 
has been sunk by the selfish ignorance of ... her rulers. " 
(Wilson to F. O., F. O. 61/269 19th Januaryq 1834) 
and the special relationship established between the British and 
ChIlo wau rulluutod in Iduological ot&1111ort - thromh Uio British 
press and even in practical support by individuals in its 
wars. 
Howeverv the major factor in the success of the Chilean states 
and economyq relative to Pqru, was the aggresive 'Real - Politik' 
foreign policy that it adopted. Having concluded a successful 
marriage of 'iron and rye', the Chilean elite attempted to develop 
national capitalism through a combination of appropriate domestic 
policies and aggressive adventurism abroad. Its Northern imperialismp 
For instance on the 8th August, 1638, Wilson reported to the 
P. O. that in its wars against the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation 
several British vessels had been observed in the Chilean fleet. 
(P. O. 61/55, Wilson to P. O., 8th Augustq 1838)- 
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I economic prosperity and partnership with/dependence on British 
lb 
capitalism became therefore inextricably linked and focussed on 
the Bolivian coast. 
The rivalry between the Peruvian and Chilean elites did not 
evaporate with Independence and# furthermorej Chile's subsequent 
development inevitably brought it into direct conflict with Peru. 
Robert Burr (1974, p. 18) has discussed the importance of foreign 
adventures in the consolidation of the Chilean capitalist state 
and has highlighted the influence of the statesman Andres Bello, 
a student of European power politicag on foreign policy decisions 
from the 1830S onwards. Bello's policies were largely directed 
against Perut because the former predominance of the Peruvian upper 
classes in South America led the Chilean elite to view Peru as the 
only Pacific state that really constituted a serious threat to Chile. 
At first the rivalry simply expressed itself in commercial strifet 
but in 1830 it first erupted into warg bringing the competition 
between the merchants of Valparaiso and Callao to a head. In 
1832, Portales, the architect of the ideology of Chilean supremacy 
and of the Chilean authoritarian state (Drake, 1978) launched an 
offensive against Peru. As with later offensives, he was also 
motivated by the need to unite opposing factions at home and thus 
overcome domestic difficulties. Then in 1635 a liberal commercial 
treaty which was highly advantageous to Chile and which had been 
forced upon Peru at an earlier date, was denied by Peruvian leader 
Orbegoso. Thiki eventq toguLhor wILIiLIm compl I vaL I iiK I'tintnr nf it 
However Burr failes to recognise the class nature of these 
apparent nation-state conflicts. 
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loan contracted by Peru in Chile a few years previously (Veliz, 19779 
PP-3-20) and the formation of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederationg 
led to a minor war. Chilean participation and later victory was 
also brought about by a Peruvian civil war, and an alliance between 
the Peruvian revolutionaries and the Chilean elite. The Confederation 
was violently opposed by many sectors of the conservative Lima elite, 
who, led by Camarraq turned to Chile for help. Furthermore the 
Confederation was felt to seriously endaneer the West Coast balance 
of power and Chilean commercial ambitionspand therefore on 10th 
September, 1836, President Portales ordered Manuel Blanco Fncalada 
to lead a campaign to: 
achieve the second independence of Chile... The 
Confederation must forever 
' 
disappear from the Americas 
scene. By its geographical extent, by the combined 
wealth of Peru and Bolivia, until now scarcely touched; 
by the rule that the new organisation, taking it away from 
us would ... exercise in the Pacific, by Lima's larger. 
number of cultured white people closely connected with 
influential Spanish families; by the greater intelligencet 
if indeed inferior characterg of its public meng the 
Confederation would soon smother Chile We must forever 
rule in the Pacific... " (In de la Cruz, 1936-379 III9P-452) 
The successful conclusion of this war established a conservative 
faction in power in Limaq under the presidency of Gamarra and 
the influence of Chilet and led to further civil wars. For the 
Chilean upper classes it largely eradicated the feelings of 
inferiority expressed above. It also consolidated both the 
I 
Chilean state and Valparaiso's position of supremacy, and left 
the Chilean elite in an advantageous position from which to embark- 
on its policy of expansion. Finally, it had inaugurated a system of 
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Weft Coast power politics9 dominated by the Chilean elite. This 
system of power politicst from the 1842 exploratory expedition 
onwards, centred specifically on the Atacama Desert. The resulting 
dispute was primarily between Bolivia and Chile; howevert the economic 
nature of the dispute and the central importance of nitrates and 
guano, and the resultant involvement and intertwining of Chilean, 
Peruvian and European capitalism in the industries in the border 
areas, together with the traditional rivalry between Peru and Chile, 
necessarily led to the inclusion in the dispute of Peru and also, 
indirectly, of Britain, France and the U. S. A. Bolivia, however, 
although the scene of dispute, tended to remain a pawn in this 
struggle. The Chilean-Peruvian tension was heightened by the 
presence of numerous Chileans in Peru (P. O. 61/318). who were 
frequently discriminated against and therefore constituted a 
permanent issue of contention between the two countries. From 
the 1840s onwards the rivalry 
1 
was expressed in terms of naval 
competition as well as commercial strife. In March 1848, the 
Chli, f of Liu? Chilean Navy noted the extraordinary amount of the 
Peruvian state income devoted to the militaryg and insisted that: 
11 the steady enlargement of the Peruvian navy requires 
similar efforts on Chile's part ... to maintain between the 
two states the peace that is so greatly desired 
(in Luis Uribe Orrego, 1914, p. 202). 
And in 18526El Correo de Lima'reported a Chilean newspaper article 
I 
This rivalry and tension expressed itself in many ways. Before 
the war in 1866 against Spain, an earlier attempt to regain a 
foothold in South America had rallied the West Coast powers. 
In 1847 Peru convoked an American congress to discuss the problem 
raised by the Spanish puppets Floresq who was trying to gain 
power in Ecuador. However, an attempt in the subsequent treaty 
of 1848 to institutionalise a system of co-operative peacekeeping 
was strongly opposed by Chile as imposing a limitation on its 
sovereignity, 
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on guano and salitre which remarked: 
"Esas riquezas permiten al Peru hacer adquisiciones navales 
como el Amazonast con el cual sera dueno absoluto de los 
mares. " (26th May, 1852) 
The intense intra-elite rivalry remained a feature of West Coast 
politics right up until the Pacific Warg (with a brief break in 
the 1860s, when a temporary alliance was forged between all three 
groups in order to combat the menace posed by Spain's attempts to 
regain power in Peru). In Peru and Bolivia, the Chilean threat 
failed to unify the elite, but was, on the contrary, utilised 
by different sectors in their attempts to defeat a rival faction. 
I This occasionally was extremely detrimental not only to the potential 
coherence of the Bolivian or Peruvian elitesq but also to national 
control over economic assets, as is demonstrated by Melgarejols 
pro-Chilean attitude, Gamarra's policy in Tarapaca and Pierola's 
adventures. The Chilean elites however, achieved a great 
I er degree 
of unity'in the face of external threats and earned a reputation 
with metropolitan capital as an efficient and stable collaborator. 
(Blakemore, 19749 P-9)- In a letter to Palmerston on llth Marcho 
1B39, Wilson contemplated the likely future relationship between 
the three countries and foreign capital, following the defeat of 
Santa Cruz: 
"Commercially speakingg she (Bolivia) will be dependent 
upon Chile; a fate to which Perug a prey to continuous 
anarchy and illiberal and corrupt administrations must 
practically submit for many years to come. 
The commercial supremacy of Valparaiso and of the Chilean 
flag in the Pacific , ..... the destruction of direct 
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trade between the United Statesq Europe and Peru, the 
consequent retardation of the development of her industrial 
resources by withdrawal therefrom of British enterprise and 
capital ...... will be the necessary and immediate results of 
the Chilean invasion or restauration of Peru ....... " 
(P. O. 61/58) 
and speaking in 1884 to one of the fractions of the totally divided 
Peruvian elite at the Cajamarca Assembly, just prior to concluding 
a humiliating peace with the Chilean state, Iglesias summarised 
the situation, 
"Chileg pueblo unido, sensato y fuerte por los beneficios 
de una larga y no interrumpida paz interna, disciplinaba 
sus guardias nacionalesq economizaba sus tesoros, conservando 
su credito, adquiria poderosos elementas navales, y esperaba, 
disimulando, la ocasion propicia para imponerse. El Peru 
hondamente dividido por facciones personalesq prodigando 
locamente sus riquezast desangrando por una sucesion 
interminable de contiendas civiles, precipito locamente 
los acontecimientos, dando a Chile el pretexto que anhelaba. 
Signo una alianza sin adquirir los medios materiales que la 
hicieran eficaz y respetable, y sin armada, sin ejercitog sin 
recursos de ningun generog al decretar la expropiacion de 
las salitreras de Tarapacat devolviendo a Chile capital y 
brazos empleados en nuestro territoriot no solo le dio un 
motivo de rupturaq sino un aumento de medics decisivos de 
accion. " (12th January, 1684, in Ugartechej 1945, PP-154-155) 
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CHAPTER 7: FOREIGN CAPITAL AND THE EMERGENCE OP A PERUVIAN BOURGEOISIE 
A. The Early Years 
From the preceding chapters the importance that must be assigned 
to the persistence in Peru of pre-capitalist configurations of 
political, social and economic relationships should be evident. 
It is in this context that the emergence of a Peruvian bourgeoisie 
and the role of foreign capital should be viewed. However, it 
is important to attempt to advance L)jqt)jjd I)tilitilidomy Utuory lit Lit, " 
analytical endeavour, (ef Henfreyq 1981). The Dependency Schoolt 
while encompassing a broad spectrum of ideological viewpointst 
focusses specifically on the way in which Latin American States 
were inserted into the world economy as'the primary cause of 
underdevelopment. There is a, consensus therefore, within this 
theoretical approachq that the major obstacles to Latin American 
development should be situated in terms of phenomena such as the 
repatriation of profits, onerous loans and disadvantageous/declining 
terms of tradeq (for instance, Emmanuel, 1972) - that is to sayt the 
external appropriation of surplus. These factors must be acknowledged 
have inblited capital accumulation and, combined with the pressure 
eierted by H. M. G. on Latin American states to perform a dependent 
role within the international division of labourg were clearly 
contributory to the 'development of underdevelopment'. Howeverg 
since the unit of analysis employed should be that of class rather 
than that of the nation state (Weffort, 1571). the impact of foreign 
capital mustIbe understood in terms of the endogenous political and 
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social structure; in terms of the effects of the functioning of the 
capital accumulation process in the core economies on the internal 
dynamics of the peripheral society, (for instance see Chapter 19 
I 
P-13)- The neo-colonial relationship established between the 
Peruvian and British economies was largely due to cultural attitudes 
and the socio-economic base of the Peruvian elite; the dominantg 
export-oriented sectors of the Peruvian possessing classes utilised 
foreign loans to develop capitalism without revolutionizing domestic 
social conditions, whilst foreign capital, in turn, actively reinforced 
pre-capitalist social relations. 
The process whereby capitalism in Peru was established in its 
'crudest form' (Meillassoux, 1978, p. 168) was therefore a mutually 
reinforcing one whereby the reactionary and colonial nature of the 
Peruvian elite conformed to the needs of metropolitan capital and 
vice versat foreclosing the option of self sustaining and industrial 
capitalist developmentg-aimed primarily at a domestic marketý 
Similarly a bourgeois revolution of the Anglo-American variety 
could not occur. Let us now consider the ideological struggles 
that took place in the republican era prior to the Pacific War. 
The central debate that was 'carried out after Independence involved 
a tiny group of individuals whose socio-economic base and intellectual 
viewpoints were not, in factq wholly dissimilar. The debate was$ 
, moreover, conducted in terms of conceptions and. language which 
mimicked the West European vision of the ideal methods of political 
and social organisation, whilst both the symbolic machinery of the 
state and local political power was monopolised by the caudillos. ' 
lievertheless, these: 
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I'* refinadas Polemicas filosofico-legalit3ta 
(Yepest 1972p p. 96). 
did exercise a degree of influence over policies pursued by the 
successive military governmentsq and did express contemporary 
concerns. 
A feature of the creole elite had always been its exclusion from 
the formal political processes of the colony. As observed in 
Chapter 5 central political power had been exercised by the 
'peninsulares', while the creole elite had expressed its power 
through its socio-economic position. This factq combined with 
the poverty 
1 
and disunity of the possessing classes after 
Independence, resulted, as noted aboveg in political power being 
transferred to the larmy'q and the armed retainers of the'hacendados. 
However this also coincided with conservative political philosophy. 
For the principle conservative ideologues of the early republican 
One of the first British merchants to establish himself in Peru 
recorded in 1826; "the ruin of many rich familiess the emigration 
of others 
,, 
and the long suffering of the people .... 11 which 
had "occasioned so much poverty and ... desolation. " 
(Charles 
Milner Ricketts in Hanke, 1967, p. lB); whilst Echeniquet a 
member of the Peruvian aristocracy who became president of 
Peru, wrote in justification of his financial coup on behalf 
of a sector of the upper classes: 11 ... impoverished in the 
extreme by the Wars of Independence and by those of the Republic 
afterwards.... and deprived of still more capital which was 
taken away by rich Spaniards who went into exile, public wealth 
was reduced to nothingness and consequently rural properties 
were without hope ... and the urban ones in a state of utter 
ruin ..... Without capitalists ... and with a few speculators 
who charged as much as 2 or 391G per month for their money, it 
was impossible either to take advantage of their capital or 
to check usury and as a result poverty was great and widespread. " 
(Memorias of Echeniquet P-195 - in Maiguashcaq 19679 P-57). 
This widespread poverty not only reduced the power of the creole 
upper classes, but also diminished the attractivenesss Of 
government to themt which at the time, offered little financial 
reward. 
-ltY4- 
period, notably Jose Maria de Pandog Herrera and Pardo y Aliaga, 
the ideal state was simply a republican version of the colonial 
administration 
1; Pando - prophetically and realistically - 
envisaged a situation in which the military governed under the 
influence of an 'aristocracy of wisdom' (Pike, 19679 P-78). This 
Platonic viewpoint therefore required a centralised and authoritarian 
structure with an all powerful executive, backed up by a large 
bureaucracy and a powerful church. On the other hand the 
liberals, principally represented by priests Francisco Javier de 
Luna Pizarro, and the Mariategui brothers and Francisco Paulo 
Gonzalez Vigil, and, subsequently, Nieto, Castilla, Santa Cruz 
and Flias, tended to favour a federalist form of governmentg and 
a subordinated army and church. On the whole, and especially 
I 
after the defeat of Santa Cruz' federationg the conservative 
viewpoint effectively prevailed 
2 for much of the pre-Pacific 
war periodg (in social and political terms)q despite several 
I major periods of liberal reform and modernization; this was 
particularly notable with regard to the central position of 
the executive, the predominance of Lima, (Davalos y Lisson, 
1919, Vol. IV) and the strength of the church. It is also 
important to note that the lines within this ideological struggle 
were not clearly drawn. Individuals would change sides, and 
Frequently not even that modification was envisaged; many 
conservatives held monarchist (Pinillosq 19479 p. 29) and 
extreme ultramontane views. 
2. Although, to a degreeg the formal philosophies of the two 
. groups were reconciled in the 1860 constitution 
(Yepes, 
19729 P-97); the reality was howeverg as noted in Chapter 
3. a weak and vestigial state. 
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sometimes the 'conservatives' appeared as modernizers and nationalistsq 
whilst the 'liberals' were generally closely connected with foreign 
capital, but conservative in their social outlook. 
Bollinger (1977) discusses the ideological debates in terms of an 
incýpient national bourgeoisie in conflict with a comprador 
bourgeoisie; howevert Gootenberg's (1982) discussion of the 
struggle over protectionism reveals the complex and fluid nature of 
these conflicts. Whilst industrialization was never, given the 
predominantly racist and agrarian outlook of the Peruvian elite, 
of widespread concern, it did become a matter of discussion, in 
Lima, at the beginning of the Guano Era. Some capital began to 
be used to set up factoriest notably in glassware, cotton, paper 
and textiles, (Rippy, 1946, PP-147-8). Export merchant Juan 
Norberto Casanovat in particular, was an enthusiastic proponent 
of manufacturing who backed the calls of artisans for protection 
in order to establish native industry. Furthermoreq other prominent 
and wealthy merchants were also involved - for instance, Gonzalo 
Candamo invested in textile factories (Macera, 1974)- Ultimately, 
however, the consumer and mercantile interests of the elite led 
them to abandon the artisan campaign, (partly alienated by its 
simultaneously reactionary and Jacobin character). Wilson 
pinpoinLed the majov problein in hiu IU3'1 trade reportp in which 
he noted thatq despite the protection of tariffs: 
"The indigenous manufacture of the unbleached Tocuyos has 
been gradually decreasing, and will in all probability be 
entirely abandoned, the same description of this article 
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being produced at so much less cost in England, and the United 
States that even after paying import duties and all other 
charges the Poreign Manufacture can be offered 
, 
at half the price 
of the native production... " (P. O. 61/53 Wilson to P. O., 
: 191-11 111311; illy C7111phallslo). 
The debate over protectionism and free trade that took place in the 
late '40sq early '50s highlights the dominant groups in Lima society. 
It is clear that, as in colonial times, mercantile capital predominated, 
and that while it was prepared, briefly, to consider expanding into 
I 
manufacturingg its reactionary character led it ultimately, in the face 
of European competition, to prefer speculative and financial, or agrarian 
activities and withdraw its capital 
1 (Macera 19749 P-40). Consequently. 
the doctrine that support should only be given to industry that could 
freely compete was propounded, and, from 1852 onwards9 the Peruvian 
Government adopted a (relatively) consistent liberal economic policy. 
Without a strong state that was firmly committed to a degree of self- 
spstalining economic growthq factory production was consequently not 
feasible. Ultimately, Leguendo's solution to Peru's deteriorating 
economy, proposed as early as 1794, that: 
11 ... they should abridge their use of European manufactures 
and content themselves with those of their own production... 
(P. O. 61/2s Roweroft to P. O., 16th Augustq 1824)- 
was appealing only to the artisans who were, in fact9 motivated 
largely by reactionary sentiments and who: 
"had always relied on and endorsed the European habits, of 
an elite consumer class. " (Gootenberg, 19829 P-351). 
Indeed, Gootenberg also observes that when the Lima artisans had 
enjoyed the protection of high tariffs, in the 1820s and 130s: 
This remained a persistent characteristic of the bourgeoisie. 
Chaplin, in his work on the development of industry in Peru 
comments that managers and owners were usually "more mercantilist 
than industrial in their actions and beliefs. " 19669 p. 18. 
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"No attempts were made to reorient production to match 
needs of poorer consumersq who (instead) relied on industrial 
imports when purchases were possible, " (ibidj P-342) 
despite the fact that, at this timej the elite markets had virtually 
disappeared. 'Furthermore consumer tastes in general favoured the 
European products so long denied the Peruvian customer. Even in 
the mid-20s, at a time of extreme poverty amongst all sectors of 
society$ Ricketts wrote: 
"The Peruvians have certainly acquired a taste for the 
commodities of Great Britain.... English mechanicsq carpenterss 
cabinet makers, blacksmiths, watchmakers ... meet with 
roady vinploymont.. off 0.000$ 
+his trend reflected, above all, the strong Anglophilia on the 
I 
part of the elite, especially amongst the coastal liberals: 
" ... the highest class of the community feel the importance 
of cementing the friendship and forming an extensive 
intercourse with Great Britain .... 
(op. cit., pp. 21/2); 
and W. B. Stevenson, writing in 18259 confirmed the existence of 
a veritable mania for English goods: 
"On entering a house in Lima, or in any other part of Peru 
almost every object reminded me of England.... even 
the kitchen utensils were English .... 
(1825t Vol- Ist 
pp-349-350). 
The issue of protectionism as against a free trade policy 
ýas obviously seen to be of'major importance. by the P. O., 
given that the early British industrial economy relied for its 
expansion chiefly on international trade. (Hobsbawmt' 1969# P-135). 
British anxiety td overthrow the Spanish monopoly of trade with 
South America, and its expectations of the potentiality of the 
-188- 
markets in the New World had long been apparent 
1. 
and were clearly 
expressed by the participation of British individuals in the liberation 
struggles and by attempts to expedite Spanish departure. In 1807, 
following the failure of two expeditions, one official and one 
I- 
unofficialt designed to annex Buenos Airesq Castlereagh announced 
to the Cabinet that: 
"the particular interest which we should be understood 
alone to propose to ourselves should be ... the opening ý 
to our manufacturers of the markets of that &eat continent. 00" 
howeverl he'cautioned that: 
".. in looking to any scheme for liberating South Americaq 
it seems indispensable that we should not present ourselves 
in any other light than as auxillaries and protectors. " 
(in Ferns, 1960, P-48). 
However during the early years of independenceg up until at least 
the mid 1850sp while the British control'over the economies of 
the hemisphere was still uncertain, and politics was in the hands 
of frequently anti-British'caudillos', the cruder tactics of threats 
and bullying were frequently resorted to. This included the 
questioning of the sovereignity of the new South American states 
when policy decisions conflicted with British interests. Thusq 
on 19th January, 1834, British Minister Wilson asked the P. O.: 
British economic intercourse with South America had really 
commenced at the beginning of the 18th Century through the 
contraband trade; consequently a strong relationship had 
developed between the elites and British merchants. This 
was especially true of Chileg where the British and the 
, 
upper classes were "bound together by trading ties and 
naval connections. ' Britain had played an important part 
in the manning of the first Chilean navy during the wars 
of Independence. " (Blakcemore, 19749 P-10)- 
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"Has the Government-of Peru a right to blockade one of its 
ports, thereby excluding foreign shipping from that port....? 
and the F. O. documents reveal that continual pressure was exerted 
on the new governments to implement the free trade policy which 
was finally achieved in 1852. It is also clear from these sources 
that the initial protectionist stance was prompted by the 
corrupt and traditional nature of Peruvian politics and the need to 
raise revenue (Platt, 1972, p. 80)pas much as by the adoption of a 
clear strategy for industrialization or the emergence of an 
industrial bourgeoisie: 
"The principal burdens upon commerce in Peru consist 
in absolute prohibitions, in the heavy amount of dutiest 
the tardiness of the customs employeesq and the innumerable 
petty embarassments in all the Customs Houses, following 
up the old Spanish system of frightening away-commerce 
instead of encouraging it... Hence a foreigner in Peru 
can never obtain justice in any case but through briberyq 
hence the wanton neglect of their interestsq and the 
barefaced manner in which they are cheated, both by the 
Government and by Private individuals; witness the shameless 
neglect of even an attempt to pay the dividends on the 
loan ... 11 
(Wilson's commercial reportj 19th January, 1834, 
P. O. 61/26). 
The above extract alludes to two of the crucial elements that 
were to cbaracterise the relationship between British capital 
and the republican governments prior to the Pacific war; firstlyt 
despitedissatisfaction with internal affairs, the establishment 
of a modus vivendi between Peruvian governments and British 
cf. contemporary British pressure on China (see M. Greenbergo 
1973, and Chesneaux et al., 1977). 
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merchants largely based on corruption - contracts in exchange 
for hand-outs. In this way British policy aims were attained 
by reinforcing the pre-capitalist nature of the Peruvian political 
processes* In 1834 Wilscndescribed one of the methods by which 
an alliance of Peruvian and foreign capitalists attempted to 
impose a policy of economic liberalism on the government: 
"A commission of foreign and native merchants is to be 
appointed for the purpose of preparing a Project of a 
Commercial Code for the approval of the Government .... 
The Government was induced to adopt this liberal course 
under the following circumstances. The foreign merchants 
were called upon to advance money to the government by 
way of a loan. After consulting amongst themselves, 
a sum amounting to about 0379000 or E7,400 sterling 
Wall 111111florlbod, IIII(I Orrol-od Lo Lho GovurtunuIlL ati LI, 
loan on the express condition that the decree just 
before alluded to should be issued ... 
(P. O. 61/26, 
Wilson to F. O. 9 20th March, 1834)- 
Gootenberg discusses the emergence of a Peruvian merchant 
groupq due to Government legislation in the 1820s and '30s 
restricting the foreign merchant's activities (although 
it was not consistent in either its enactment or application). 
However this exclusionism, was discarded in favour of collaboration 
once the Peruvians were firmly established: "Native and foreign 
merchants worked closely to secure military supply contractst 
infuriating local artisans. Peruvians possessed the political 
connections while foreigners arranged the overseas deals. A 
relatively reducedt prosperous and politically crucial group of 
native merchants thus merged with liberal foreign interests. 
This change was forseeable... Once secureq their politics were 
bound to changel since they were essentially an 'intermediary 
class'l dependent on foreigners for goods and credits.. " This 
liberal export alliance restricted control of and benefits from 
the Peruvian economy to a tiny group, and effectively precluded 
the development of a manufacturing base: it also gave foreign 
merchants an effective lever to exert influence not only over 
trade and economic policyq but also therefore over Peruvian 
internal politics; "By the 1650s foreigners dominated the 
'consuladol" (Gobtenberg, 19829 PP-3369 337). It was this 
group - hardly a reforming, national body - that would later on 
form the nucleus of the Civilista Party. 
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The second major strand in the British-Peruvian relationship 
concerned the importance of government loansv not only from merchantst 
but also those placed in Londong and the resultant diplomatic 
wrangles over the Bondholders' rights. Official government 
policy towards the Bondholders' grievances varied, according to 
the influence wielded by those heading the Bondholders' committees 
an4 to the importance to the British economy of overseas investments 
(rather than to changes in F. O. personnel- see Blakemore, 1975); 
in the 1850s it brought the two countries to the brink of war 
(see P. O. 61/170, January, 1857, "Our case for going to war with 
Peru") - 
The Peruvian republican government had begun life not simply 
bankruptq but in debt (Humphreys, 1969, p. 124), and consequently 
Independence was marked by the flotation of a loan on the London 
Money Parket. By 1825 Peru was already in default, as were 
most other Latin American states. However, loans continued to 
play a prominent part in the British-Peruvian relationship during 
the next 50 years. The expansion of British capitalism that took 
place during the 19th Century was inextricably linked to the 
extension of capital investment abroad, This was to serve not 
only to relieve the pressure of capital at home and provide high 
profits, but also to draw these newly emergent economies into 
a dependent relationship with British industrial capital, whilst 
financing the development of an infrastructure suitable for foreign 
transactions, (cf Luxembourg - 19729 p. 60 and Cardoso y Faletto, 
1969, P-43). Within this relationship both Peruvian and Iýritish 
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merchants were intermediaries - agents of industrial capital who 
negotiated with the governments and pre-capitalist export groups. 
Loans served to finance the purchase of British manufactures, 
handled by the merchant houses 
1, 
and to revive the indigenous 
raw nuiterial export Induntrien; they forced participation in the 
world economy. Defence of British investments, both those of the 
Bondholders and the merchantsq was an integral part of British 
policy, and was, in both the opening and middle decades of the 
19th Century, conducted vigorouslyq along with the campaigns to, 
open up the markets to British goods. In response to the general 
Latin American default in 1825P H. M. G. instructed its diplomatic 
staff to become agents for the Bondholders in South America, to 
hold funds for their accounts and to participate in their collection 
by the management of monopolies and customs (F. O. 61/5, official 
memo to Ricketts) - thus making a clear commitment to an interventionist 
policy in defence of all sectors of British capitalism. 
I 
It was the theme of free tradeq however, that dominated British 
policy during the early years of South American Independence; in 
1841 Palmerston announced to Auckland: 
"It is the business of government to open and secure 
"2 roads for merchants . 
(January 22nd, le4l, in Plattl 19689 
P-85). 
1, At first the purchasing power of the Peruvians was most 
disappointing, after the initial spending spree; Platt 
notes that for some time the approximately forty foreign 
merchant houses in Peru were probably the largest consumers, 
of their own imports (Platt, 19729 P-50). 
2.7ne following yearg 
4842), Mariano Otero noted the consequences 
of economic liberalism in Mexico; ... trade was no more than the 
passive instrument of foreign industry and commerce... and today 
these cabinets, in everything submissive to the mercantile spirito 
are profoundly interested in keeping us in a state of misery or 
backwardness from which foreign commerce draws all the advantages. " 
(in J. Cockroft# 19749 p. 244). 
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In the pursuance of this goal, the P. O. frequently did consider overt 
involvement in South American internal politics. The late 
'30s and early '40s were years of extreme depression for the 
British economy and were characterised by general social unrest; 
consequently manufacturers and merchants lobbied H. M. G. to achieve 
the opening up of South America, which because of protectionist 
policies, had only partially occurred on Independence. The 
solution to the 'Hungry Forties' was to be partly found in the 
South American economies. Consequently the P. O. welcomed the 
liberal government of Santa Cruz, which concluded a free trade 
Treaty with the U. K. and abolished the interior Custom Houses of 
the republic (F. O. 61/589 Wilson to Palmerston, 19th April, 1839). 
However, even with the lenlightenedl, 'pro-British Santa Cruz it 
wan ner-essary to be alert for potential plann to build iip Intra- 
regional trade. In 1839, the P. O. issued Wilson with the following 
instructions concerning a Congress in Mexico City that was to 
discuss the possibility of concluding Treaties between South 
American states, which would place their commerce on a: 
more favourable footing than that of European countries 
with those states.... I 
If the Government of Peru-Bolivia should entertain the notion,, 
of appointing Ministers to attend a Congress of this descriptiong 
For instance, in 1839 it was suggested that a 'competent naval 
force' might be dispatched to Peru to ensure the observance 
of a beneficial commercial treaty (P. O. 61/58) and in 1842 
an P. O. memo on British trade proposed an intervention in the 
River Plate area in order to defend free trade and navigation- 
rightsq since this was a matter of self preservation: . "Self preservation, as it regards Great Britain, can scarcely 
be said to consist in only maintaining political power, in' 
the simplest acceptance of the term, in as much as the commercial 
interests of Great Britain are so mixed up with her political 
strength# that it becomes necessary to support the one in order 
to maintain the other. " (J. Murray memo on British Tradet 31st 
December, 1841, F. O. 97/284). 
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I have to instruct you to take every opportunity that 
may present itself, to dissuade General Santa Cruz from 
giving his consent to the principles of establishing differential 
duties in favour of the states of South America. " 
(P. O. to Wilson, F. O. 61/579 27th May, 1839). 
In fact civil war had already broken out in Peru and had resulted in 
the resignation of Santa Cruz by the time the above message was 
written,, and the British Minister, in an attempt to retain the 
improved trading position for British capital, had become involved 
I 
in the struggle. These efforts were not successful. Wilson wrote 
to Walpole: 
"My hopes of being able to contribute to bring about a 
Peace between Chile and the Peruvain-Bolivian Confederation 
by means of a negotiation havev for the present atleastq 
been entirely fruotratedl but I am .... unwilling to abandon 
all hope of Her Majesty's Mediation being eventually 
instrumental in bringing about an event now become more 
than ever desirable to the interests of the two belligerent 
co6tries and of Great Britain..... " (F. O. 61/58, lst 
February, 1839). 
Furthermore the intervention aroused deep hostility towards the 
British among certain sectors of the Peruvian population, 
1 
according 
to Wilson this was because: 
11 Jealousy and hatred of foreigners are undoubtedly the 
two most powerful and characteristic passions of the Peruvian 
nation ... 
(11th March, 18399 Wilson to Palmerston, FD. 
61/58)- 
However it might rather be interpreted as a further indication of 
Llit; l&uavyl&atjtjt,, j $4tiolitod by tho P. O. and thp Lhrvat thýat 
This hostility remained a feature of Peruvian society*and 
was a factor in the failure of the Anglophile group to succeed 
in establishing a 'satisfactory' government policy towards 
II. M. G. and British capital. (P. O. 6Y1939 10th Decemberp 
1660, no-75)- 
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British imports represented to certain sectors of Peruvian society. 
For instance Wilson reported that the reaction to the Trade Treaty 
concluded between Britain and Peru in 1838 had been extremely strong: 
11 the Treaty has driven Orbegoso and all North Peruvians 
to a state of phrenzy ... they exclaim the country has been 
sold to the 'Ingleses'; that they are now mere colonists 
or Creat. 11ritain, and like stiirr.. - (20th Jifly. 18AH, 
private letter from Wilson, P. O. 61/53). 
1 
The defeat of Santa Cruz and victory of Gnmqrra inaugurated a 
period of conservative 'rule' under the influence of Pardo y 
Aliaga, which was generally anti-British and protectionint. 
1 
It was also extremely centralized and repressive (Pike 1967, 
P-87). and consequently provokedg in 1844, a 'constitutionalist' 
reactiont based in Arequipa and led by Castilla, Nieto and the 
Southern capitalistt Domingo Elias. Castilla's victory and the 
discovery of guano (1842) mark a clear watershed in Peruvian 
republican history. 
2 Prior to the discovery of guano it is 
hardly possible to talk in terms of central political institutions 
(bee Chapter 3), and, after the initial commercial contacts with 
3 Britain, trade was virtually at a standstill, The situation 
1. Representin ar versal of earlier conservative policies. 
2. Maiguashca, 1967). in particular, views the Guano age as the 
beginning of a new age of modernisation and reconstruction, - 
in which governments began to show "a deep concern for national 
interests. " k1ariategui describes it (1976) as marking a 
decisive break, but recognises the contradictions that also 
emerged, (22/23)- 
3. Since the Peruvian export economy had been destroyed by the 
wars, the elite had virtually no goods to offer in return for 
the British imports9 and consequently was drained of bullion 
by 1826. (Humphreys9 1969, p. 128). 
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was characterised by political anarchyq economic stagnation and poor 
relations with Britain. The guano age was an integral part of the 
general expansion of British capitalism and led to the full integration 
of the Peruvian economy into the international system (its duration 
also corresponded almost exactly to the British boom). An important 
element of this was the establishment of the Pacific Steam Navigation 
Company 1, itself a result of innovations in freight, whichl'together 
with the gradually decreasing production costs, had halved the prices 
of European exports since the beginning of the 19th Century. (Imlah, 
19509 P-163)- Guano wealth not only enabled the Peruvian elite 
to participate in this boom both as consumers 
2. 
and producers of- 
raw materials, but it also allowed the military'caudillos'to purchase 
a degree of elite unity through a wider distribution of patronage, 
(at the cost, however, of fiscal equilibrium). Thist in turn# 
permitted a superficial modernization, centralization and a degree 
of institutionalization of the political processes, on the basis 
or UsIss micismy i7famproint gist, to takc, plitno. 
1. The Americans saw it as a crucial weapon in British predominance: 
"England has a most powerful link that binds all of those 
establishments in one commercial chain,... I refer to the Pacific 
Steam Navigation Company ... which today commands commercially 
the whole South American coast ... 
(Foreign Relations of 
the U. S. A. 9 Gibbs to Evarts, 6th Augustq 1877). Indeed, it 
was seen to give British capital undue influence in the internal 
affairs of West Coast powers. 
2. The combination of guano wealth and improved sea communications 
even led to a reliance on food imports. Also most noticeable 
was the massive influx of luxury imports which both further 
divided the elite, and impoverished sectors excluded from 
the guano boom, as'inflation soared. In 1865 Barton informed 
Russell that Perug " ... thanks to guano, can and does consume 
from abroad equal to three times more than what it naturally 
produceag the Peruvian Government, on the other hand, can 
and does spend four times more than its domestic income. " 
(13th December, 1865, in P. O. 61/227; 1 La Revista de Lima') 
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B. - The Guano Are 
Castilla's government of 1845 was particularly notable for the 
introduction of some order to the national finances, through the 
inauguration of a system of biennial budgets (McQueen, 1926, P. M. 
However, due to the need for British technology, capital goods 
and loans, in order to establish sources of capital accumulation, 
combined with the demands of the Peruvian elite, the state was 
also forced into relatively unfavourable guano contracts and the 
contraction of costly loansq with the consignees: a process which, 
1 
once begung was difficult to halt. The Peruvian Foreign Ministerg 
Gomez Sanchez, outlined the exigencies of the pressing financial 
situation at the beginning of the Guano Ageq even though profits 
from the fertilizer were then at their height, in a letter to 
the F. O. in 1854: 
"The importance of Huano having been discovered in foreign 
countries at a time when Peru was involved in a national 
wart the government was forced to enter into a contract 
with the propogators of that manure to advance funds to 
meet the urgencies of that situation. The first step 
havinp. been taken, the increasing necessities of the 
country obliged it to proceed without stopping in this 
new and untried line and to contract on each occasion 
fresh obligationsg and although it is true that in the 
course of fourteen years, the revenue of this country 
has considerably improvedq the method employed up to the 
present day has taken such deep root, and the obligations 
of the government with each one of the consignees are so 
complicated and so important that if they were to attempt 
to make a change in this respect the entire nation would' 
be placed in a crisis which perhaps it could not overcomeq 
although it might exercise all its energy. 11 (w. u. 
10th Octoberq 1854)- 
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These observations summarised the circular position in which 
administrations found themselves, and which not only led to the 
bitter conflict with the consignees, the impoverishment of the 
treasury and many sectors of the elite, but also resulted in 
the contraction of huge international debts. Effectively only 
Vin tnlaiio noralintimni sind 14 ntnall nirolt, of* oxtlortnri3, till) 1-oh-rin Ln 
and planters, really benefitted from the guano in Perug and 
loans to the state formed one of the most profitable sources of 
income. 1 Marx explained the way in which such transactions 
then led to further speculative activityq giving the appearance 
of a fantastic economic boom: 
"The state creditors actually give nothing away, for 
the sum lent is transformed into public bonds, easily 
negotiable, which go on functioning in their hands 
just as so much hard cash would ... apart from the class 
of lazy annuitants thus createdg and from the impoverished 
wealth of the financiersq middlemen between the government 
and the nation - as also apart from the tax farmersq 
merchants, private manufacturers to whom a good part 
of every national loan renders the service of a capital 
fallen from heaven - the national debt has given rise to 
joint stock companies; to dealings in negotiable effects 
of all kinds and ... to stock exchanges, gambling and 
to the modern bankocracy... (Capita , Vol. 1., 1974, 
P-706). 
Since the large advances made by the consignees could not 
satisfy all the many demands made on the Peruvian Exchequerg as 
In 1864 'El Tiempol commented on the advance that was-being 
negotiated with guano merchants,, Oyague and Sancho Davilaq 
and which carried, 11... la monstruosa usura de 251/u, amen de 
5% de interes ... 11 
(19th September,, 1864). 
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inflation soared and the demands of the clientele system increased, 
the. state also turned to the London Money market: - 
"National debts, that is the alienation of the state 
marked with its stamp the capitalist era. The only 
part of the so-called national wealth that actually enters 
into the collective possession of the modern people is 
their national debt. Hence... the modern doctrine that 
a nation becomes the richer the more deeply it is in 
debt. Public credit becomes the credo of capital... 
(Marxt 1974, P-706). 
Peruvian statesmeng with supposedly_inexhaustible reserves of 
guano to use as collateralg tended to imbibe this philosophy 
unquestioningly - especially Pierola, who, noting the size of 
the British national debt (Pinillos, 1947, p. 63. )9 enthusiastically 
negotiated a huge loan, Contraction of such loans represented 
an ideal source of capitalq while payment would be the problem 
of future governments, (Astiz, 1969; Bertram, 1974)- To 
establish alternative sources of income would be highly unpopular, 
in fact dangerous, as U. S. Minister flovey poirlted out wilvil 
discussing Pardo's attempts to modernize the state: 
11 the abolitiong of pensions ... was a severe blow to 
the aristocracy of the country. The families of the 
'old hidalgos' actually monopolised the revenues and , 
offices of the nationg and there was nothing left with 
which to support the government.. " consequently his 
efforts to introduce a ".. system of capitation taxation... 
proved a "complete failure ... 11 
(Foreign Relations of the 
U. S. A. 9 Hovey to Fisht 22nd August, 1870). 
In a senseq therefore the modernisation of the Peruvian structure 
that took place during the Guano Age was largely superficial 
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and in factq in many waysq guano resulted in an accentuation of certain 
features of colonial Peru. The considerable amount of guano income 
that was retained in Peru (Shane Hunt, 1973) was both used in a 
fundamentally pre-capitalist way, and maintained a pre-capitalist 
configuration of state and class. Pierolaq writing in 1866, 
described Peru as: 
un feudo militar: economicamente una propiedad privadL. 
No hay clase dirigente ni, clase media organizaba. Hay un 
grupo de senores codiciosas y un grupo de generales ambiciosas. 
Absolutamente nada mas.... " (in Pinillos, 19479 P-52). 
land the failure of even superficial bourgeois reforms was clearly 
illuminated in the national disintegration that took place during the 
Pacific War. 
ývbilst the distribution of guano income to the elite in the form 
of jobs, credit, pensions and bribes brought about a diminuition of 
intra-elite conflictq this did not cease altogether. The state 
finances could not support the entire upper class and integration 
with the international economy increased the structural and social 
diversity and disunity of the republic, as modernisation occurred 
on the coast and the sierra decayed. Furthermore, internal peace 
was dependent on patronage. Jn fact the fractures with the 
possessing-classes were in many ways, intensified by guano 
(Mariategui, 1976, p. 23), which failed to generate centripetal 
economic development that would simplify the Peruvian class 
structure along modern lines. Instead, the deepseated conflicts 
between the coAst and the sierra, and specifically Lima and the 
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rest of the countryq were exacerbated Wilson writes: 
"Spatial development during the English domination was 
largely an accentuation of colonial trends: continued 
growth of the cities and coastal axis, reinforced by the 
rapid expansion of the state bureaucracy in Lima .... 
the growing urban domination of the country by extracting 
surplus through taxes, commercial intermediation and land 
rent, just as during colonial times... " (1975, P-32).. 
if anythingg intra-class and regional struggles over poscession 
or tho nf. Rlp we-rf- NrIIFfI by Itn anepsn to wPRI. th. ronsproifnLly 
the earlier political practices of open conflict were, on the 
whole, not modified and regularised, despite the formal 
constitutional structure of government. The true form of 
government continued to correspond to dissarayed clan politics; 
as a result elections were a violent farce: 
"En todos los puntos de, la Republica cuando se aproximan 
los dias de elecciones de diputados y de presidente, se 
difunden en las masas pacificas un inesplicable terrorg 
With regard to the principal expression of guano wealth, 
(consumption of imports) in 1859 Lima, representing approximately 
9% of the Peruvian population, took 6 7% of the national imports. 
(-Davalos y Lisson, 1919, Vol. IVt p. 1-21ý. However despite the 
dominance achieved during this period by the Furophile Lima 
elite, it was unable to assert complete hegemony over the whole 
country. In Mariateguils words: I'M Peru costeno, heredero 
de Espana y de la conquista, domina desde Lima al Peru 
serrano; pero no es demograficaý y espiritualamente asaz 
fuerte para absorberlo. La unidad peruana esta por hacer... 
no hay aqui que resolver una pluralidad de tradiciones 
locales o regionales sino una dualidad de raza, de lengua y 
de sentimiento, nacida de la invasion y conquista del Peru 
autoctono por una raza extranjera que no ha conseguido 
funcionarse con la raza indigena ni eliminarla ni absorberla 
(my emphasis) (1976t p. 206). The persistence of this apparently 
'dualist' feature of the Peruvian structure represented one 
of the principal differences with the Chilean social formationg 
and was the major cause of continuing conflict durinp-rthe 
Guano Age. 
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una extrana inquietudg solo comparable con el pavor 
que suelen inspirar ciertos presagios siniestros 
1 que anuncian la proxima calamidad. Y*en efecto, que 
cosa han sido, casi siempre, entre nosotros# las 
epocas eleccionariasq sino momentos de angustia, 
de desorden y de escandolo ? oooo. oo ll 
(Laso, 
18639 P. 98). 
and U. S. Minister Gibbs commented: 
"To an American ..... the electionsare apparently 
decided more by force than by suffrage ....... 
(Foreign Relations of the U. S. A. 20th Octoberl 1875 
Gibbs to Fish). 
One of the principal reforms carried out by Castilla as a 
result of the new found wealth was the abolition, in 1854, 
of the Indian poll tax/colonial tribute, which, as noted earlierg 
represented nothing more than Icentralised feudal rent'. 
However no modern tax structure was put in its place (until 
Pardo's failed attempt) andq furthermore, the Indian tribute 
was revived on several occasions, (for instance in 1866, by a 
liberal government (McQueen, 1926, P-40) and in 1872, (P. O. 
61/2729 27th September, 1872, no. 39)), due to the poverty 
of the administration. A primary function of the republican 
government therefore continued to be that of a (feudal) rent 
collecting machine, andg whilst it was theoretically in favour 
of the abolition of communal propertyl. this was not necessarily 
a wholly progressive position, and it in fact presided over the 
extension of pre-capitalist relations from the 1850s and'60s 
On the whole, however, the republican state was unable to exercise 
authority in the sierra; instead for most of the 19th century the 
highlands were the scene of a strug -bourgeoisie . gle 
between petty 
(rich Indian farmer and'mestizo'trader) and'hacendado'(cf. Ch. 10). 
Conflict between these groups increased as demand for wool rosep 
increasing both the internal differentiation within the Indian 
community and competition for pre-capitalist forms of labour at 
'below subsistence remuneration' (Spalding 1975a, p. 116; cf. Banajil 
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p. 26) 
1 
Ollwal-da 
. 
Yu Zu1jvIWk1 writeu thaL Ili votipuinju Lu murhuL ftivuati: 
,. 
"In all of the Andean countrieng throughout the second 
half of the 19th century and during the first decades 
of the 20th Centuryq numerous forms of feudal and 
semi-feudal exploitation were imposed on the Quechua 
peasants. " (1979, p. 122; my translation)g(cf. Chapter 10 
This contradictory policy towards the Indian population 
illustrates tlie fundamental paradox of the Peruvian state during 
the Guano Age. In part a reconstruction of the colonial Absolutist 
state, it is nevertheless clear that its structure remained vestigial 
and weak (see Chapter 3); the institutionalised. form of a malfunctioning 
clientelistic political system, in transition to a more modern 
structure. Yet, due to the vast sums of money generated by the 
Guano industry, the Peruvian state, after the 1850s, assumed a 
prominent)indeed dominant position in society. In Echenique's 
words: 
The Ambivalent attitude of the coa. 9tal elite towardo the peasanto 
during the Ouano Age sprang from several factors; it not only 
reflected the strength of the feudal sierraq and their frequent 
connections with it (Bourricaud, 1970, Burga and Galindot 1979)9 
but also stemmed from the vitality of the Indian communet 
especially in the South - Spalding,, 1975), and the fact that 
this social unit made a contribution to social stability (cf. 
Gerschenkron on the Russian1mir: 1965, pp. 211-213). This was 
of especial importance during the early republican period 
which was a time of intense class conflict - in particular 
during the 1850s and 1860s which saw Indian and Chinese uprisings. 
Furthermore the Indian communes before the War of the Pacific 
tended to be dynamic economic structuresl frequently involved 
in trade with British merchants (Lorgand Robertst 1978; Pielq 
1970). However, in this context, it is important to emphasise 
that Indian participation in the market was generally motivated 
by a desire to maintain their cultural practices. As Mutch (19BO) has observed of North American peasant farmers, p-roduction 
was primarily aimed at subsistence rather than tradeq and what 
was produced was a sur lus rather than a commodity. Ultimately 
this 'household' mode of pI roduction was antithetical to capitalismt 
however it continued to be functional to both Peruvian mercantile 
capitalism and the social structure as a whole. By contrasto its 
rivalg the'haciendaýq was frequently wholly concerned to produce 
., 
h a re a commodity, but throup -imposition or serniom. 
-204- 
for the moment nothing of importance can be done 
in our country by private enterprise, and therefore 
everything will remain stationary until the Government 
intervenes with its initiative and its revenue. " 
(Presidential message, 28th July, 1653, in F. o. 61/136, 
in justification of his conversion of the internal debt). 
Moreover it continued to fulfill a central role in the economyp 
notably in the hands of Balta and Pierola, and subsequently 
Pardo. In this sense its behaviour is reminiscent of the truly 
'liberal' state. in its transitional stage as a mainspring of capital 
accumulation (Wolfe, 1977). However it also consistently abdicated 
other functions normally assumed by the modernising state, specifically 
that of taxation, and control and emisoion of the mottey tiuliply, 
and enforcement of a common culture and language. Vegotiations 
for loans were generally carried out for the state by private 
individualsq sometimes foreign merchants - for instance Gibbs and 
Dreyfus, who were also thus able to influence the course of Peruvian 
politics (Foreign Relations, of the U. S. A, Settle to Fish, 22nd 
September, 1871). It was not characterised by a permanent 
bureaucracy despite the size of the 'civil service1v the personnel 
of which was generally changed with each new president 
(Sulivan to 
Clarendon, P. O. 61/145, January 1855). It was frequently unable 
to enforce central power in many of the more distant regions and 
continued to co-exist with the local informal power structures 
I represented by church, hacienda and Indian community, since its- 
extremely centralised form both masked and increased regional 
differences and animosities. 
1 Dew writes of this period: 
The weakness of central state power in the sierra was exacerbated 
by the increasing structural heterogeneity of the republic , 
as guano wealth generated a massive import boom, even of 
foodstuffs 
(Copello and PetrIconi, 1676); Maiguaschca writes: "By the end of 
the 1850s, from an economic point of view at leastq the highlands 
had practically ceased to form a part of the Peruvian nation. 
" (1967 
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"Most frequently money was doled out from Lima not to 
aid the development of the provincesq but to entrench in 
power supporters of the political machine that was at the 
moment in control of the capital... " (1969, PP-112/113) 
Furthermore, until the construction of railways, 
1 the guano 
w4alth was expended in greater quantities by the government to 
fulfill pre-capitalist preoccupations, than on public works that 
would generate economic growth (Macera, 19749 p. 16). McQueen 
estimated that at least one third of government revenues were 
devoted to the army and navy for most of the Guano Age (McQueent 
1926, p. 10), and Hovey discussed Peruvian political processes in 
1868, in the following way; 
"The finances of the country are exhausted and wasted by 
these civil dissensions and the people look to the government 
for their daily bread... the mongrel negrog mulatto, cholo 
and Indian population care not who rules so that they can 
have a little money and a little excitement ... to hope 
for republican institutions being sustained .... is to 
hope in vain. Add to this the interest of the church 
here, which is to destroy all civil power and erect in 
its stead a reign of intolerance and bigotry and you have 
a fair prospect of the future... There are many men strugpling 
for progress and liberty, but as yet their efforts have been 
unavailing... " (U. S. Minister Hovey to Seward, 14th January, 
1868, Foreign Relations of the United States). 
A-bovt. - ail tile Puruviull (44aiio ý; WL, apimaru au rd-t2l, v, kiLh 
with regard'to the internal structure of Peru, and in its 'tributary', 
I 
neo-colonial relationship with Britain. The central determination 
of the Peruvian state formation during this period was represented 
Even Balta's railway programme was not implemented simply to 
i 
invigorate the economy;, it was connected tothe need to control 
the sierra, whilst also representing a bid for popularity through 
the extension of a variety of corrupt deals to favourites (Lima to P. O. 27th September, 1872, (P. O. 61/272) and Clarke, 
1877; Yepes 19729 p. 90) 
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by the demands and constraints of the international system. 
While metropolitan capital required a modern state structureq not 
only wan thin impeded by nuch endopenour, factorn an I. opopraphic-9 
demographic and racial conditions, it was also inhibited by the 
workings of the international system itself. This both undermined 
the sovereignity of the Peruvian state, accentuated servile relations 
andq combined with internal factorsq produced a 'determined' type 
of capitalist development (Bartra, 1981; Albert4Henderson 1981; 
Yepes 1974). which during the Guano Age, tended to fix the 
embryonic Peruvian bourgeoisie in an intermediaryg mercantilet or 
semi-capitalist role. Moreover the very economic base of this 
new quasi-capitdýist group was further undermined by its ultimate 
dependence on foreign capital (and ideology)t and by its pre- 
capitalist and mercantile preoccupations, which led profits to 
be generally applied to conspicuous consumptions 
2 financial 
I 
speculation or primary export production characterised. by non- 
3 
capitalist labour processm, In a report written in 1876 on 
1. On 13th July, 1868, 'El Nacional I remarked on the dependence of the 
Peruvian economy: I'La alza obaja de los efectos publicosq es, 
en Europa$ el barometro mas infalible para demonstrar la mayor 
o meno, r entabilidad y confianza que inspiran nuestros gobiernos 
" and Charles Jones in his discussion of British banking in"South America writes: "The flotations followed a pattern 
dictated rather more by conditions in the British economy than 
by events in Latin America... " (in Platt, 1977, p. 20). 
2. According to Claverog even the modern sugar developmentq generally 
seen as representing the most productive aspect of the Guano Ageq 
was characterised as much by the construction of palaces as by 
modern machinery. The ýlantation -. -was not "un centro de 
comercio sino un paraiso. 11 (1896, P42). (cf. Morsels(1974) 
comparison of the 'modern' Latin American sector with the 
Southern states of North America. ) 
3. Geoffrey Kay (1975) has argued that a major reason for the 
contradictory and reactionary nature of capitalism as it evolved 
in South America is that capital arrived them in the forms Of 
mercantile capital which, since it derives its profit from the 
sphere of exchange has no drive towards the elimination of pre- 
capitalistic forms. (cf. Marx - Capital, Vol-3 (1972)rp-327- 
329). 
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0 
the economic problems confronting Peruvian coastal agriculture (the 
'. modern sector), U. S. Minister Gibbs remarked that if the elite were 
to: 
't*e* encourage labour by other means, than cruelty and 
let these large and unproductive capitals now employed 
in the construction of sumptuous palaces be applied to 
better the conditions of the labourersq then better -ý 
colonists, real workmen, will be obtained... " (Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Gibbs to Fishl 12th August, 
1876). 
As a consequence the wealth of both the state and the capitalist 
elite, like their power base, was insubstantial and somewhat 
illusory, dependent as it was on relations with metropolitan capita 
both were alsog thereforeq incapable of generating a progressive 
capitalist transformation of the Peruvian structures or eveng as 
in Chile, of creating a unified oligarchic state. A contemporary 
view of the Guano Age was expressed in 1874 by the Pacific Times: 
"It seemed as if the golden age had revived. The question 
where the money has gone to would be-a difficult one to answer* 
The receipts from the guano .... would have been sufficient 
to construct more canals, railways, bridges.. and roads than 
are actually necessary. But .... when military government 
was predominant, and the financial stat 
'e 
of the republic was 
a secondary consideration, loans were made at a ruinous rate 
of interestq projects were taken up and cast aside, subsidies 
were granted which could have no other object than the 
protection of some, private interests, without producing 
In fact the practices of both the elite and the state led to 
capital'tliýsýc;, at-f-iimiilri-tinn for instanceg an extreme. example of 
the lack of national or economic consciousness of Peruvian 
governments was afforded by their growing poverty which, in 
1865, led to serious consideration of a proposal put forward 
by the capitalist Hegan to buy or rent the Chincha guano islands$ 
since this would ... " secure payment of interest and redemption (about C8009000) per annum for which the guano is mortgaged.. " 
(P. O. 61/2309,11th Novemberl 1865)- The scheme was abandoned 
until Pierola oancluded a similar type of arrangement with 
Drey 
i 
fus in 1669. 
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any benefit to the nation and every kind of extravagance was 
indulged in. Soldiering became the order of the day.... this 
is the reason why we have such an extensive list of half pay 
officers.... " (14th June, 1874). 
The above analysis does not represent a return to the dualist state 
model of l9th Century Perug but subsequent approaches, in my opinion, 
have frequently ignored the backward, patrimonial and disorganised 
nature of the state during the Guano Age and the correspondingly 
archaic forms of class domination, in favour'of a search for forms 
that would correspond to the West European/North American experience, 
and specifically the national bourgeoi*Sie and the autonomous or 
progressive nation states. This theme will form part of the 
following section which examines certain aspects of British capital 
during this era, together with its relationship with the Civilistas. 
C. British Policy in Peru 
Throughout the Guano Age Peru was of considerable importance in 
international capital and commodity exchanges; for instance Yathew 
(1981) estimates that in the decade 1655-1865 Britain received 
Peruvian Guano to the value of E209000,000 - the highest sum 
exchanged for any Latin American commodity (p. 252)9 while the 
Peruvian external debt in the 1870s was the largest in South America. 
At the end of 1880 British capital'in Peru amounted to C3691779070 
sterling, (Peruvian Bondholders' Papersq 1679) and it was the very 
substantial size of this investment which was an important determinant 
Of H. M. G. ýolicy towards Peru just before and during the'Pacific 
War, and which subsequently led to Peruvian bankruptcy and loss 
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of autonomy. This capital investment may be divided into three main 
categories - firstly, loans to the Peruvian Government, secondly, 
capital invested by joint stock companies operating in Peru, and, 
lastly, private loans made to both the Peruvian Government and elite 
by British merchants resident in Peru. Of the E76,177,0709 
C72 million was held in Govprnment. bonds and 1,3,5('0, (-()0 invested 
in various economic enterprises. By comparison, only E7,765,104 
was held in Chilean Government bonds, and 001,417 in economic 
enterprises, (RiPPY, 195-19 p. 25). The differential does not 
represent a greater faith in the Peruvian statet but the fantastic 
reputation gained by guano on which the Government loans were 
hypothecated. By the mid'1870s, once the bubble had burst, 
contemporaries began to express amazement that the Peruvian state 
had ever succeeded in attracting such a large amount of investment: 
the population is under 3s4OOtOOO and their revenue 
for 1871 to 1872 was 95,900,000. How so small a country, 
with so small a revenue could place so larpe a loan on 
our market is surprising ... (Money Market Review; 7th 
March, 1874). 
Generally such observations implied that indeed the whole operation 
must have been a Peruvian plot, reversing the situation whereby in 
fact oversubscription had occurred largely due to conditions in 
Europe. David Landes (1969) has described howq with the end of the- 
British railway boom in the 1840s, pressure for investment opportunities 
t 
mounted and there developed new financial institutions - especially 
attracted to overseas speculation (Joslin 1963, Jones 1977) - 
which were able to obtain large sums of money from the ever-increasing 
I 
groups of investors. Competition to handle these loans was fierce 
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since, as Joslin has pointed out: 
... profits were not confined to the issue of the loan but 
extended to the remittances to pay interest for years to 
come. " (19639 P-8)- 
Perp, as the owner of guano, 'undoubtedly did provide an attraotivo 
i 
market offering high interest rates andq after the mid 150s, had 
a good record of repayment. Moreover, as British industrial 
supremacy began to yield: 
"the international position of the British economy.... 
became increasingly dependent on the British inclination 
to invest or lend their accumulated surpluses abroad. " 
(Hobsbawm, 1969, P-146). 
Consequently pressure to protect the interests of the British investor 
mounted and the huge size of the Peruvian default clearly prejudiced 
both H. M. G. and individual British capitalists against Peru in 
the late 1870s. 
The (Wrat, Ion o I' IJ io Gimno A go I i(or, r-mi p, I I, I v, I rei IvIy 1114) 1ywILI 
the great expansion of British capitalism from the 1850s onwards. 
It in fact began and ended at a time of depression for world 
capitalism; consequently, while both economies were booming and 
apparently complementaryg and British industrial leadership assuredg 
the policy of H. M. G. towards Peru was relatively aloof. Dowever 
I in the early 1850s and 70s the British approach was more heavy 
handed. In the 1850s the main issues of contention concerned 
the outstanding foreign debtq the price of guano and injury to 
British citizens in Peru resulting from the unsatisfactory internal 
state of the country, whilBt in the 1870s the major preoccbpation 
was with the Bondholders' interests. An illustration of the approach 
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was afforded by a letter from the P. O. to the Peruvian Minister of 
Finance in 1852, de Riverog concerning the unsatisfactory handling 
by the Peruvian Government of the Guano Trade. The threat is 
barely concealed: 
11 ... anxiety is felt to obtain an ample supply of ... 
(guano).. at a fair and reasonable price without the 
purchases being subjected to the exorbitant expenses entailed 
upon them by the present system of agency for the sale of 
puano on the British market. 
H. M. G. have been overwhelmed with petitions on this subject 
from the landed proprietors, from the tenant farmerst and 
I from the merchants of Great Britain. 
It must without doubt have been satisfactory to the Peruvian 
Government to have learnt the course taken by H. M. G. upon 
the question of the Lobos Islands. H. M. G. have acknowledged 
that Peru has a prima facie claim to the possession of these 
islands; but I cannot conceal from myself the danger that 
the prognure of Public opinion may force H. M. G. to sift and 
examine more closely this Peruvian claim: a claim which persons 
much versed in international law have not been inclined 
'unanimouslyto allow... *sit 
Consequently Peru was urged to consider a change of policy and a 
new method of shipping and marketing the fertilizer is suggested: 
"I request you, Sirg to bring this important matter under 
the consideration of the Government of Peru and to urge 
them to adopt this plan, or some other which will 
have the effect of relieving the agriculturalists of the 
U. K. from what is in point of fact an oppressive monoPolY---" 
(P. O. 61/136, Lord Malmesbury to M. de Riverop 8th July, 
1852, (my emphasis)). 
The strong wording of this communication indicates the importance 
to the British economy of Peruvian fertilizers, and the consequent 
interest taken in the affairs uf tile RePublic; Ilububaw"I '"'Leo 
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that from the 1850s onwards British agriculture was no longer able 
to supply enough food to feed the population (1969, P-135). 
On the wholeg howeverg more subtle and refined mechanisms of control 
could be exercised, and were penerally preferred. Feru was not 
another Fgypt; Britain had no strategin interests in the areal and in 
the final analysis H. M. G. was rarely tempted, therefore, to undertake 
the military intervention, (which was sometimes, however, threatened). 
Furthermore$ since the European origins and aspirations of the elite 
led sectors of them to ape European habits of consumption (Noboat 
1861), forms of government and politico-economic ideologies 
they generally wereq as Europeans felt they should be: 
"content to see their hemisphere as an outpost or dependency 
of the Old World. " (Kiernan, 1972, p. 295). 
As Hobsbawm has pointed out, until the 1870S when Britain began to 
lose its industrial lead, it was usually beneficial for the South 
kmerican agrarian elites to collaborate with British capitalism; 
at first many states had virtually no other customers (Hobsbawml 
1969, p. 1378). Moreover the status of the new republics as quas i- 
European, (almost) white 'democracies', that Britain had helped to 
create, not only provided British capital with a collaborationist 
claps, or factiong but also inhibited ideas of direct intervention. 
But the informal mechanisms of pressure from the stock exchanget 
and the British press, and of diplomatic bullying backed up by the 
omnipresent British navy, continued to be employed when necessary. 
So. in 1854, the following criticism was levied at the activities 
1. For instance Pardo's adherence to the economic philosophy of Chevalier. 
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of the Bondholders: 
"It is scarcely necessary to notice the unbecoming abuse 
which is introduced into the "Reporter"l still less to 
combat the unauthorised meddling with the internal politics 
of Peru; the object of the Bondholder is to improve the 
position of his security; depressed at presentg not as' the 
"Reporter" says, by the acts of Perug but'by the mischeivous 
writing, talking and agitation, on the part of a few, to 
the detriment of the greater number of the interestedl who 
aro oither indifferent to the quotation, so long an their 
dividends are paid regularlyl or averse to unnecessary 
publicity.. " (Mr. Rudolfo to Lord Wodehouse, 29th June, 
18549 P. O. 61/161). 
As a clear indication of the return to the frequent use of such 
tactics in the mid-70sq Salisbury wrote: 
"I don It quite understand the principle of absolute 
abstinence from interference 9-**11 
(which had tended to 
predominate in the late '50 and 160s) "... if any 
government commits a wrong towards a single British subject 
we always interfere: why are we not to interfere when the 
wrong is done to hundreds? Fry impression is that a remonstrancet 
forcibly but carefully expressed might do good to the 
Bondholders. " (F. O. 61/323, Autumn 1B78). 
And the position adopted by Palmerston, in 1848, towards the 
outstanding Per uvian debt 
I 
was thoroughly re-examined and considered 
as a possible model for the government approach to the vexed problem 
of the Bondholders in the lB70s., Duffieldq reflecting on the nature 
of the British-Peruvian relationship in 1877 made the following 
observations: 
This approach advocated ... "the active intervention of 
the 
British Government" in order to secure satisfaction. ' However 
a solution had been reached by the exploitation of the divisions 
within the Peruvian elite. (F. O. 61/3239 Maclean to Adams 
16th May, 1848), before such action became necessary. 
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"it should be borne in mind that the Peruvians have suffered the 
rrPaLvni. 401F. -OtIvn nt Clip bandfi nr riijonpnnivp IIH1,10i Cnvnrt)mr10. P. 
Claims for money of the most vexatious, frivolous and irritating 
nature have been pressed upon Peru with an arrogance equal only 
to their ridiculous extravagance. " (18779 P-32). 
Howeverg still more important in shaping the direction of the Peruvian 
social formation was the economic impact of British capitalism, and 
perhaps, the ideological influence of economic liberalism and positivism 
over the Anglophile sector of the elite. But whereas in Chile this had 
led to the evolution of a 'successful' working partnership between 
British and Chilean capitalq its relatively smooth functioning ensured 
by civilian control of the state, in. Peru the Civilistas failed to gain 
political control, due to the internal structure discussed abovegand 
the character and identification of this group. 
D. The Civilistas and Pierola 
The ýiany reasons for the failure of the Peruvian elite, prior 
to the Pacific War, to achieve coherence and establish an oligarchic 
republic, have already been touched upon. In part stemming from I 
the relative weakness of the more progressive, coastal fraction# 
it also sprang from a contempt for both Peruvian politics, and 
the Indian population andq consequently, for the notion of a Peruvian 
state at all. 
1 This manifested itself in both its economic and social 
practices. Kiernan, noting that in the 1870s European actors were 
giving "applauded performances of Shakespeare at Lima'19 writes that 
such wholescale adoption of European culture, along with European 
The Civilistas always saw the solution to Peru's problems not only 
in attracting European capital (Pardo 1661, P-185/7), but also in 
immigration; in 1894 Javier Prado y Ugarteche referred to the pernicious 
influence which the 'inferior' races had exercised in Peru throughout 
its history. Prado called for the coming of the superior races to Peru 
especially from North Europe (in Klaibers 19779 P-48)- 
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furniture and dress were: "fopperies that could only make an isolated 
upper class still more alien to its own fellow countrymen.... " (19729 
p. 298). Whilst in Favre's opinion: 
'Ila oligarquia peruana aparece cada vez mas desconectada de 
una sociedad en la que no esta sino artificialamente enquistada 
sobre la que ejerce un poder que .... no es por eso menos 
lejano y difuso. Por eso nunca ha sentido la necesidad o la 
tentacion de legitimarse. " (1969, p. 116, my emphasis). 
Other writers concur that it is largely inaccurate to speak at this 
time of a national bourgeoisie; Yepes clearly contradicts Bollinger's 
interpretation (1977) and states: 
"Lejos de constituir un bourgeoisia nacionalg al reemplazar 
a los comerciantes extranjeron en la connignacion del abonn 
de islasq en lo sustantivo mantienen vigente el proceso de 
descapitalizacion del pais. Sus ingentes beneficios no se 
orienten a la base productiva (19729 P-76, my emphasis)q 
and Basadre even denies the existence during the Guano Age of capitalism 
at all (let alone of national capitalism), in all but a mere handful 
i 
of Peruvian merchants (1969, Vol. VI, p. 65). 
Such viewpoints are supported by clear evidence that, firstlyl what 
could be considered to be an(embryonic) bourgeoisie was composed of 
foreigners as well as Peruvians, 
1 
who invested abroad as much as in 
Perug and realized and frequently consumed their profits outside of 
the republic; secondly, that this group was either mercantilist in 
2 
nature, and/or engaged in export agriculture employing pre-capitalist 
Bravo Bresani writes of: "los grupos progresistas y burguesast 
cuya major parte esta formada por extranjeros .... if 
(1.9709P. 95)- 
2. Mariategui commented on the similarity in the roles played by the 
fertilisers in the early republican period to that played by precious 
metals during the colonial era (1976, p. 20) highlighting the concomitant 
parallels between the old Spanish mercantile class and the 19th 
Century guano group and Isalitreros'; (of. Gootenberg, 1982)- 
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labour 1. A contemporary observerg Duffieldq makes explicit the 
dependent and comprador character of the Peruvian oligarchyt and the 
resultant lack of national autonomy: 
11 ... it may truly be said that what the Moors were to... 
Southern Spain, Europeans and Asiatics have been to Peru; 
supplying it not only with literature and science, but 
industry also. All the great estates of Peru are tilled 
by foreigners; so are its gardens. All the steamships-on 
its coast are driven by foreigners; foreigners surveyed 
and built their railwaysq their one pier, gave them gas ... 
There is nothing of importance in the whole country that 
does not owe its existence to foreign capital and foreign 
thoughts,... " (16771 PPo36/7)s 
Quiroz' research (1980) reveals that Echenique's notorious 
certificates of consolidation, along. with those of the external 
debt# circulated also among a very small group of people, and 
finished in the possession of a few merchant firms with strong 
foreign connections, among them actual foreign houses. And while 
Burga (1976) has demonstrated that the subsequent guano boom did 
lead to the formation of productive capital in coastal agriculture, 
Hovey's report to Seward (Foreip gn Relations of the United Statesq 
28th January, 1668) commented on the large numbers of these modern 
farms that were owned by foreigners specifically by North Americanst 
1. In an article (11th February, 1876) on Peru's Asiatic colonyt 'El Nacional' described 'coolie labour19 employed on the guano 
islands and coastal plantations, as slavery in all but name. 
However. when merchant capital was invested productivelyg it was in this sphere of the economy rather than in manufacturing (see above). Albert writes that by the mid '70s, in the Lima 
valleyn, 11 ... there were.... multiple holdings .... and ...... 
a 
considerable number of 'hacendados' were leading figrures in finance and commercel e. g. Althausq J. M. Sancho Davila, Meiggst Lembeckt Goyeneche, and Bryce ...... 
(1976, P. 56a), thus demonstrating the traditional identity of interests between the merchants and landed aristocracy (cf. Congora, 19759 p. 164). As Bronner has 
remarkedg for the merchant: "conspicuous consumption transmuted 
wealth into status. " (1978, p. 24)- 
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Britonsq Columbiansq Chileans and Venezuelans. 
1 Purthemore, as 
has already been mantioned9such plantations were modern only in 
terms of their capital equipment and production techniques employed. 
2 
Vloially, IL to olcmj- lji; aL Uip Pxkirnil orintiOtionf, or oop plitf, 
(highlighted by Gootenberg's study (1982)), was increased both by 
the numerous marriage alliances that were concluded between foreign 
and Peruvian merchants (for instance between John Bryce and Pablo 
Vivero's daughter,, and between Heeren and Pardols'sister-in-law) and 
by their attachment to European culture, and practice of educating 
their sons abroad (Belmont Parker,. 1919). 
3 Hovey wrote to Fish 
that the Peruvian upper classes were 11 ... mainly educated in the 
1. His report also remarked upon the extensive damage inflicted on 
these plantations by Balta's armyt illustrating the extreme 
hostility between sierra and coast. 
2. The Chilean economy and dominant class was similarly contradictory 
during this period. Petras writes: "the Chilean ruling class was 
at the same time bourgeois and traditional. " (1970t p. 20); whilnt 
according to Kay the 11 ... landlords did not constitute a bourgeoisie 
as the agricultural surplus was not primarily extracted through 
capitalist relations of productiong even though production was 
market-oriented. Both through the form of exercising domination 
and of extracting the surplus, landlords could be characterised as 
an oligarchy during this period. " (19819 P-489) (cf. Marx: 
this mode of production is tot yet determined by capital, but 
rather found on hand by it ." 
(Grundrisse, P-586). 
3- Certain members of the Peruvian oligarchy not only had stron. ties 
with Europe, but also with Chile - for instance the Aspillaga 
family bad lived in Chile for 30 or 40 years before the War of the 
Pacific, whilst Leguia (born 1863) was educated there (telmont 
Parker, 1919). On the other hand the sierran elite tended to 
have affinal or economic ties with or feelings of loyalty too 
Bolivia. This divergence was highlighted by the differing 
responses of members of the upper classes to the war (see 
Chapter 10); Ilayne anticipated-this early in 1879 when he 
predicted that Pierola would want to support Boliviat whereas: 
"Prado, who no doubt looks forward to retiring to Chile after 
his term expires, or before if necessaryg would hesitate very 
much before he acquiesced in any open act of hostility towards 
Chile... " (Gibbs, M. S. 11,120; Hayne to B8hlj 16th Februaryt 
1879). 
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U. S. A. or Europe 
1. 
and implied that this was a major reason 
behind the relative (political) weakneria of the obantal elite, 
which consequently had few roots in Peruvian society; instead: 
all power is virtually in the hands of the priesthood. The 
army is the second greatest power. " (Hovey to Fish, Foreign 
Relations of the"United States, 22nd August, 1870)- 
It is evident that the coastal fraction, whilst it largely 
monopolised capital wealth in the republic, was not by any means 
wholly predominant. Its small size, the fact that, with the 
exception of the planters, it lacked a productive base and 
instead functioned primarily as an intermediary groupt together 
with its alienation from the sierra, all combined to impede the 
construction by this coantal group of a state order. On the 
whole it did not participate in the formal political life of the 
republic. Davalos and Lisson attributed this to its contempt 
for Peruvian political life; it would have felt it a dishonour 
I'vincularse a la Administracion", (19191, Vol. IV, 
p. 296). Instead it exercised its influence over incumbent 
presidents through control of republican sources of incomegand 
I 
through its monopoly of social prestige, via such informal 
mechanismTas the Club Nacionall the Tribunal del Consulado, and 
Once againg an indication both of their racist attitudes 
Perug and their slavish Europhilia. 
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the Bolsa Nacional. 1 This disinclination to become directly involved 
in Peruvian politics was lamented by some contemporary observers, who 
also noted the inherent dangers in the reliance on its economic 
predominance and on the snobbery and subservience of the'caudillos' 
and middle class and provincial career politicians: 
"Si los Zaracondeguisq Barredosg Sancho Davilas, Osmasq 
Vijiles, Viveros, Cossiosg quisieran moverse un poco, 
perdiendo un tanto de la gravedad perjudicial al pais 
toda la juventud decente los seguiria, todo hombre honrado 
seria un deber de acompanarlos: el mismo populacho, al 
que se mira de mal lado estaria al flanco de la gente de 
prestigio. Entonces todo seria orden y las elecciones 
serian mejores de lo que fueren ... 
(Laso, 18639 PP-104- 
6). 
However the continuing strength of other sectors of Peruvian society 
and the form ihat the political processes took, 
2 
militated against 
The Bolsa Nacional, was founded in 1840 In Lima by Peruls handful of 
capitalists - Francisco Quiroz, Domingo Elias, Nicolas Borras, Joaquin 
Osma, Manuel Oyague, Clemente Villate, Jose Manuel Palaciosq Juan de 
Dios Calderong Jose Maria Varelo and Jose Maria Sotomayor. The Club 
Nacional was established in 1855, following the economic reinvigoration 
of sectors of the elite due to Echenique's conversion of the debt, 
the emancipation of the slaves and the guano. The club was theoreticall-, 
open only to descendants of the colonial aristocracyg but it did also 
welcome some of the new merchants. Whilst the most important offices 
of the Club were dominated by the old aristocracy (for instance the 
first President was Gaspar de la Fuenley querejazu, a direct 
descendant of the "Oidores y Caballeros de la Orden de Santiago") 
it in fact formed a unifying power base for the new pseudo-aristocracy. (I am indebted to Herminio Parra Rivera for showing me some*of his 
research notes on the Peruvian elite on which most of the rest of this 
chapter is based (interview May 1976). Bronner's verdict on the 
colonial upper classes remained applicable: "The fraudulent pedigreest 
the trumped up habitosq the would-be 'grandees' are all of a piece. 
Within the corporative (but not quite impermeable) racial 'Spanishness' 
see@ the elite kept changing all the time. And tho more it chanped Lhe woru It j)rtAendt: d to ramain we uunu. " (19't1s9p. ý-(, ). buUL-gucolu consciousness could not be said to exist in l9th Century Peru-- 
even amongst the bourgeois group. 
2. Ample evidence of the persistent vitality of reactionary forces in Peru 
is offered in contemporary sources. In 1868 Hovey discussed the 
reasons behind the defeat of the modernizing I caudillo'g Prado: "The 
Church partyl aided by the women, who control no small part of the 
political power in Peru* determined to destroy him.. " (Foreign Relations 
of the United Statesl Hovey to Seward, 14th January, 1868). 
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elite participationt except in the form of a few individuals who 
chose to act as Ministers or members of Congresse 
K. H. Stephens writes: 
"The big landowners are lords but there is no overlord like 
the medieval king. The national government in Peru 
never succeeded in reuniting the authority that became 
dirilsorsicLI wIL14 (19'11, 
The relative weakness of the export elite, economically via a via 
foreign capital, and politically via a via the sierra, were important 
factors inhibiting the construction of an effective national state 
structure (cf. Cotler, 1979). According to Spalding: 
"With the disintegration of the-colonial state from at 
least 18109 the central government was not in a position 
to maintain its authority over the rural areas, particularly 
the highlands.... The constitution of the new nation of 
Peru left the highland oligarchy in virtually total control 
of its own affairs, with representations in congress far in 
excess of the actual proportion of the voting population 
located in the highlands, " 1 (1975a, p. 119) 
This political predominance of the highland landowners was a decisive 
factor in the accentuation of the fissures within Peruvian society 
I 
and the dispersal of state power whiditook place after Independence. 
Inherent in the 'hacienda' institution was the abrogation of state 
functions (cf. Dobb's definition of serfdom as exploitation of the 
producer through direct politico-legal compulsion; 19789 P-57) in 
order to facilitate the landlord's control of his peonsl and his 
struggle against the nearby communities. However, central state 
As a result reforms that were put forward to liberalise -the economys 
and modernize and extend the power of the state (generally based 
on the ideas of the 'Revista de Lima! ) were usually easily defeated 
in congress. 
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powpr could only be re-established in the outlying regions through 
tbq. building up of regional power bases. These either had to utilise 
the local bosses (1patrones') attached to, or at least sympathetic 
to, the president, or alternative political brokerage monopolies 
which could challenge some of the traditional large landowners' power 
over the Icampesinos'. Given this configurationg despite the general 
economic, and social marginalisation of the massesl both repional 
'campesino'and artisan followings could become highly important 
power resources for both local and national politicians. 
1 In 
return, presidents might be forced into the adoption of nome radical 
policies 
2_ for instance Castilla's abolition of Indian poll-tax 
3 
endowing Peruvian politics with a tinge of early Populism. This 
in particularly evident when examining Pierola's-political behaviour 
(see over). Consequently it was somewhat difficult for the coastal 
group, who generally lacked such a regional baseq or Icampesinol clients# 
to predominate politically. Instead, as was common during this period 
1 1n fact the result of an election was trenerally decided UY Lhou "tollia 
de la mesa", that is in favour of whoever could rally the largest 
band of supporters (Manuel Vicente Villaran in 'El Mercurio Peruanol, 
July 1918). 
2. Yepes writes thatq apart from localised uprisings in the sierraq there 
is clear evidence of popular participation in the coup of 1854 
against the presidency of the aristocratic Echenique, and again in 
1865, against Pezet (1972, p. 81). 
3. This measure was also, however, in part an'indication of the shift 
in the focus of the economy to the coast which, together with 
the income generated by guano, meant that the state no longer 
had an overriding need to force the Indian to participate in 
the national economy. The republican state, unlike the colonial 
state, did not have to collaborate with the sierran 'hacendadol 
to force the Indian to sell their labour to Spaniards; on the 
other hand the measure was also an acknowledgement of the limited 
nature of, central state power in the sierra, and effectively 
further increased the autonomy of the'hacendados. (Cf. 
Spalding 1975 a). 
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in many parts of Latin Americaq power was shared in an uneasy compromise 
between the'caudillos, the impoverished rural (highland) aristocracy, 
who dominated most of sierran society including (to a degree - see 
112 Chapter 10) the 'campesinos, and the middle class intelligentsia 
whose adherence to the status quo was acquired through their employment 
I in government positions. Bourricaud writes that as, in the face of 
the elimination of the Bolivian 'febleIq rising inflation and food 
imports: 
I 
i 
"titled families found themselves in increasing distress... 
The former masters of the land ... took refuge in administrative 
jobs, which, minor as they were, could be accepted without 
loss of face and without compromising rank and dignity. " 
(1970, P-57)9 
and Cossio del Pomar describes the general decay of the regional 
aristocracy during the 1660s, and their search for compensation in 
administrative positions (1961, p. 22). But the fragile compromise 
that had been concluded between the coastal liberals and sierran 
conservatives through the 1860 constitution, and which was expressed 
in this sharing of political power by the groups largely excluded 
from direct participation in the guano boomq was undermined as the 
1- Singelmann (1975, P-390) has described the way in which 'micro- 
sociallrelations integrated with and were reinforced by the Imacro- 
structural' patterns, which conceded the'hacendadosllcontrol over 
the sierran Indians, not just on their'haciendas'but in the area 
as a whole, via their control of the courts, church, 'armed forces', 
markets, and so on. However in reality the hegemony of the white 
elite in the highlands was not assured until after the Pacific 
war (see Chapter 10); moreover, as noted above, this intra-elite , bargain' did not function smoothly except at the most general level, since individual presidents attempted to raise to 
Prominence their own supporters. In general, though, it is 
evident that control of the sierran economy and Indian population 
remained the prerogative of the highland'hacendado. s', despite the 
need for labour on the coast. This is one aspect of the 
a*rticulation of different forms of production which resulted , 
not 
2. 
only in economic imbalances, but also political and social deformitieE Lawyers in particular played a leading part in Peruvian politics; 
according to Garcia Calderont prior to the Pacific War; "Les 
avocats exercent le pouvoir avec les chefs de l1armee: ii ya 
une dynastie de lettres... " (19079p. 24)- 
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Peruvian economy began to enter a crisis (McQueen i: dentifies this 
as. beginning as early as 1861, although its full effects were not 
felt until the 1870s; 1926, p. 6). Blanchard (1975) notes the 
emergence of defensive artisan organisation as early as the 1850s, 
and in 1868 the widespread dissatisfaction with the economic 
stranglehold exercised by the guano group came to a head with 
Pierola's contract with Dreyfus. The Pierolista. attack on the 
economic base of the coastal fraction finally prompted this group 
to orpanize their own political maohine, throuph which they also 
hoped to construct a liberal, oligarchic state. Let us now 
examine the nature of Pierola's politics a little more closely. 
Blanchard (1977) has ob'served that populism is usually seen as 
emerging in Latin America in the 1930'st (cf. Niekerk, 1974)9 but 
he seeks to antedate its appearance to the first decade of the 20th 
Century with Billinghurst's presidency Considering populism 
from a rather different perspective, Pike (1976) seeks its origin 
in the messianic/nationalistic movements of the Indians, beginning 
as early as Santos Atahualpa and Tupac Amaru in the 18th Century 
(cf. Yu Zubritskit 1979 and Chapter 10). But as noted above, the 
Pierolista 'party' can also be interpreted as populist. 
2 
PoPuliSM may be identified as a movement based on a multi-class 
YePes also places the birth of Peruvian populism in 1912 (19729 p. 234)- 2. Pierola was in fact Billin hurst's friend and mentor: furthermore Yepes, citing Jose Martin 
Z1963) 
notes that Billinghurst adopted 
all Pierola's conservative economic and religious tendencies (ibid. 
p. 236). Pierola came from an ultramontane, conservative Arequipa family connected with the regional aristocracy that had been excluded from the guano boom; ".. por educacion y por situacion Pierola 
es conservador. " (Pinillost 1947, p. 29). Billinghurst 
also originated from the provinces. 
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alliance of underpriviliged sectorst whichv howeverg does not derive from 
the auLO1101J1ULIkI ovLfaiiitiaLiun ul' imsy wit. ulutai I, t4L Iti dI roul-vil by t2 
charismatic leader who is frequently a member of a discontented fraction 
of the upper or middle classes (cf. Torcuato di Tella 1969). The derogatory 
significance assigned to the term fundamentally stems from the irrational 
nature of populist ideology which, as Chekhov observedq may be characterised 
, as ".. a disorderly, incoherent potpourri of old but still unfinished songs., 
(Hard No. 6, in Wortman, 1967, 'p. 61). Richard Pipes, in a discussion of 
Russian populism, stresses the attitudional nature of its ideologyq which 
is generally devoid of any specific programmatic content (1964)- Characteril 
of all populLt: movements is an intensely conservative nationalism, a 
stresss on instinct and emotion rather than on intellect, and a nostalgic 
idealization of the past and of traditional (generally aprarian) values. 
However, the emotionall quasi-relip , ious psychological appeal may sometimes 
e combined with elements of radicalism. Pierola! s anti-civilista 
campaign and his programme and stance during the War of the Pacific 
exhibited most of these features. Intensely religious and a staunch 
advocate of the 'old values' (Pinillos 1947), his defence of the traditional 
sierra against the influence of coastal liberlaism and foreign ideas 
also contained radical elements, of which his self-appointed role as 
'Protector de la Raza Indigenal 1 and his contract with Dreyfus were 
In Gibbs' words: "Pierola is popular with the lower orders in Peru 
and this factor together with his extreme xenophobia made 
him correspondingly unpopular with the foreign and Peruvian mercantile 
. community. 
(M-S. 11,470/3, Gibbs Valparaiso to London, 24th Februarys 
1B79). However the conditions which produced Pierola, also penerated 
a far more genuinely radical form of populism in the form of Indian 
nationalism and millenarianism. As Pike (1978) has pointed outs 
. 
the combination of the promises of material improvement and equality 
held out by Christianity with the reality of the attack on Indian 
standards of living and cultural values gave new impetus to peasant 
uprisinf. -,., - from the mid. l9th Century onwards. F`urthermore localiBed 
peasant discontent frequently found a leader from among-st the small 
farmer/trader class that was also under attack from the expanding 'hacienda's and these leaders generally assumed the stance of a S)haman 
with supernatural powers to redeem the oppressed (e. g. Pedro Pablo 
Atusparia; cf. Klaiber, 1974). This theme is examined in more detail 
in Chapter 10). 
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the most striking examples. 
Purthermore the first political movement to be characterised as 
populist emerged as a response to a situation bearing a striking, if 
superficial similarity to Peru in the 186Cs and '70S. The beginnings 
of the penetration of capitalism together with bourgeois ideas into 
Russia was already having a disruptive effect on society and the state 
structure by, the mid 19th Century. The advent of industrial capitalism 
and the introduction of market forces into the immensev feudal 
countryside was to produceg by the end of the century a composite 
social formation dominated by the capitalist mode of productiong but 
feudal in its political processes (Anderson, 19799 PP-354-56 ). 
Furthermoreq in the backward countryside mercantile capitalism and 
feudal relations continued to predominate. 
1 This combined and 
uneven development was, as in Perut largely the result of the 
industrialization of Western Europe rather than the product of any 
internal dynamic. This not only led to West European economic 
domination and cultural influence, but also produced the first 
military humiliation for Tsarist Absolutism with defeat in the Crimea. 
As a result a superficial modernization of the Russian social structure 
was inaugurated 
2 
which beg an the 'ruin of the peasantry' (Lenin, 
1956, p. 19) and their differentiationg and initiated the secularisation 
of Russian society. Intellectually this produced in the 1860s and 
In Lenin's words the "capitalist economy could not emerg' at onceq 0 
pd the c0rv4e economy could not disappear at once. The only possible 
system of economy was accordingly, a transitional one... " (19569P. 194)- 
2. The -programme is similar in content to the reforms initiated in Peru in the 1860s and by the Civilintas under Pardo. On the * one 
hand the 
State remained centralised and feudal in form, whilst in the countryside 
,,.. a labyrinth of traditional forms of extra-economic surplus 
extractiong embodied in customary rights and duess contined to prevail 
on Russian estates. " (Anderson, op. cit-9 P-340- On the other hand 
changes that would facilitate participation in the world capitalist 
system were carried out. 
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'70s two opposing trends; those who wished to thoroughly modernize 
Russia on Western lines (cf. Copello and Petriconi), and those who 
dreaded the advance of industrial capitalism and the disruption of 
traditional agrarian society, and concomitant devaluation of old 
fashioned Russian values. Whilst the Narodniks were more radical in 
both their programme and tactics than Pierola, being wholly committed 
to thp defence of the Imirl (Wortman, 1967). the conditions that 
produced themg their Anglophobia and their concern with Russia's moral 
regeneration (cf. ILa, Revista de Lima' 1859, Is pp. 18-19) are clearly 
I 
resonant of Pierola's nationalism and radical pose. 
In some ways the response of the coastal elite to Pierola's policies, 
and in particular to his contract with Dreyfus, may actually be seen as 
another facet of the phenomenon of elite disunity and weaknessp which 
was one cause of Pierolals-populist stance. -The Civilistas 
1, 
were 
also forced to enlist multi-class support and pose as a radical, national 
group. Consequently Gibbs described them in the followinp. way: 
"Up to July 1872, Peru had been governed by military men or 
parties9 frequent revolutions were the results9 the barracks 
being the focus of the different transformations in the changes 
of military power. 
But the people becoming more enlightened by education and a 
better system that had deleloped itself in the country ... 1, 
attempted to elect a civilian President, Pardo was chosen and: 
".. the mass ofthe educated and thinking part of the community 
joined, andhe was elected .... this was the formation of the 
party called civilists.... consisting of the intelligence of the 
countryg being very liberal in all questions affecting the 
The Civilista party was, as befitting an oligarchic organizationt 
organized from the'Club de la Union which was founded in 1868 and 
which represented foreign commerceg the old coastal Icasta oligarquial 
and-some of the ideologues concerned to thoroughly modernize 
Peruvian society, associated with the 'Revista de Lima"* 
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welfare of the nation..... " (Gibbs to Fish, 21st August, 18769 
Foreign Relations of the United States). 
This picture of national unity in search of a democratic civilian state 
isq however, belied by the persistence of bitter civil warfareq from 
1872 onwards. Moreover, despite mobillsation of artisan and middle- 
class support in Lima, it is clear that the real force behind the 
new electoral alliance was the guano group; and this group was not 
only concerned to forge a new state structure, but also, above all, 
to regain and safeguard its economic base (cf. Karno, 1970). In a 
pamphlet published in support of the Civilistas, Alejandro Revoredo 
spoke in glowing, terms of: 
11 ... la patriotica sinceridad de sus propositos y la verdad 
que los Civilistas jamas le han mentido al reru... " (19-A, 99 
P-139). 
Furthemoreq the, new party was characterised by: 
"*so el sentido de justicia y equidad de su obra politica. - 
El eivilismo jamas padria haber gobernado para una sola clase. 
Y es que el eivilismo nunca fue elevado a Palaciog solo por 
una fraccion de la nacionalidad... No fue el Partido Civilt 
agrupacion sectaria. No fue el vocero de los anhelos de 
una sola elase soeial. Si a alpmn seetarismo se inclino, 
fue al de la defensa de los intereses populares... " (ibidv 
pp. 146-147). 
In realitys however, the state order that the Civilistas attempted 
to construct was designed to suit the narrow class interests of the 
coastal elite (Chavarria, 1972). These interests, howeverg were 
essentially contradictory. They were concerned firstlyq with the 
re-establishment Of the civilista economic baseq and secondlyq with 
modernization of the Peruvian state structure to the extent that it 
would ensure. the smooth functioning of the relationship between ý 
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British and Peruvian capital. Unfortunately, due to the general 
ec. onomic depression, sources of capital accumulation had been severely 
dimished and consequently competition over resources and industries 
intensified. As a result, achievement of the first aim involved 
I 
the alienation of important sectors of British capitalg while the 
approaching bankruptcy of the entire Peruvian economyq over which the 
Civilistas presidedg antagonised other important British elements. 
This scenario will be examined in more detail below. 
Apart from the two goals outlined above, it could be said that, as 
an intermediary gro-upq neither the coastal elite, nor their political 
expression, the Civilistas, had a coherent class project- one of 
the main reasons for their earlier failure to enter politics. Despite 
the participation of certain reformers, including Pardo himself, who 
were part of the 'New Generation' and had been strongly influenced by 
m- Invulvott Iii, Lho 11(ovIoW do 1,1mal , T*mids-moon Lally Lho VortivIon 
coastal capitalists were concerned to maintain the status quo 
1 but 
under its controlq rather than that of thelcaudillos'. 
The main thrust of Civilista policy therefore focussed not on the 
, emancipation of 
Indian labour or eradication of the feudal residues 
from society (Piel, 1970), but'on reforms which would ensure its 
future dominance. Por instance, Pardo's decentralizing laws were 
partly economic measures, and partly attempts to conciliate the 
provincial aristocracy by further weakening central state authority 
in the regions. Apart from efforts to conclude an arrangement with 
international capitalf linked to the formation of a new (Pe'ruvian) 
Despite Levin's emphasis on the 'newness' of this groupq and his 
assertion that its commerical and financial interests were 
antithetical to those of old aristocracy (1960). 
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guano company (Karno, 1970), and the establishment of the lestancolt 
the principal policy preoccupation was with the subordination of the 
1 
army (see Beruf 1978)v and reform of the church - two major threats 
I 
to Civilista rule. In the event this first period of Civilian 
administration was almost a complete failure; in part, as Yepes 
observedg because it had arrived too late, (19729 P-107) and was 
extremely handicapped by the economic situation and the resultant 
social unrest. In any case it is mistaken to view the Civilistas 
as a dynamicq new radical force dedicated to the capitalist transformation 
of tIe Peruvian social formation 
2 (see Chapter 1), 
An examination of Civilista Party leadership (Revoredo, 19399 PP- 
409 2789 3309 332) demonstrates that it did not correspond exactly 
to the socio-economic elite that had emerged in Peru during the 
Guano Age. Obviously, many prominent civilistas were closely tied i 
to guano wealthq either directly through the consignees (Manuel Pardo 
and Manuel Amunategui were involved in the industry) or through the 
activities generated by guano wealth - for instance, banks, railroadst 
sugar and cotton , However, the party also included several prominent 
military men: for instance Jose Miguel Medina, Isidro Frisanchog Manuel 
Martinez-de Aparicio, Lizardo Montero and Anrelio Garcia y Garcia. 
Most of these operated from the Club ýilitar Dos de Mayo, an 
institution established on the lst Octoberq 1871 for the express 
3 purpose of establishing Pardo as president. In this sense then 
1. Yet even these measures were not particularly radical or successful; 
for inntance religious tolerance was not established until the 20th 
CatjLuvy atid Mauhaiat jiuLats LbuL Its Vvvus "Llin riyuLum ul' 
of State and Church is one of the most comprehensive and absolute 
in Latin America. " (1966, p. 160, see Chapter3)- 
2. Caceres (n. d.: 46) writes that the Civilista party was ".. hondamente 
tradicional, ranciamente ultramontaneg esencialmente derechista ... Pue 
por eso una reaccion plutocratico-aristocratico con ci6rta aureola de 
popularidadl pero de una popularidad condicionada, superflua ... " A 
description which is equally appropriate to Pierola''s populism. 
3- Its president was General of Division Martinez de Aparicio (Miro 
Quesada Laos, 1961, P-39)- 
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civilista politics was not markedly different from previous alliances 
of elite and military interests on regional lines. In fact the same 
class fractions identified above in piýevious power-sharing arrangements 
are to be found - neýmelyq representatives of the middle class/liberal 
professions, the military, and a component from the financier/mercantile/ 
planter group (the latter in larger than usual numbers. ) 
Among the military men involved in the new party we find two freneraInt 
and two rear-admirals. Both generals were of the same generation. 
General Medina (1604-1884) participated with Santa Cruz in several 
independence battles. He also took part in General Salaverry's 
government (1836). and then in 1844 pronounced against the Dictatorship 
of General Vivanco and for Castilla. A year later Medina was elected 
as deputy to Congress and for the next 6 years represented Ayacucho in 
I 
the Senate (Ayarza, 1921, p. 125)- 
Prom 1851 to 1866 he held a variety of posts - for instanceg president 
of the Consejo de Estado in 1852, and Prefect of Callao (1865-66), 
whilst also acting, as Chief of Staff of theArmy and General of Brigade 
(Taurog 19669 119 P-335)- Under Pardo he received his most important 
posit on as Minister of War, 1672-73- His careerg as briefly outlined 
aboveg does reveal a degree of consistency in vaguely liberal tendencies 
and support for modernizing administrations. However, he was apparently 
also tied to the coastal group through financial interests; Camprubi 
(19579 Vol- It P-38) names him as one of the founding members of the 
Banco de la-Providencia. As a member of the banking eliteg he was 
therefore interested in instititionalising the political procesbes of 
the country and consequently subordinating the armed factions . 
General Isidro Frisancho's political career demonstrates rather more 
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contradictory tendencies. Despite early affiliation to 'liberal' 
capses andcaudillos'(Castilla and Nieto) and the generoun reward af 
thr prefactures of Ancash, Junin, Cuzco and the Amazonas (Cortes, 
18759 P-188)9 in 1852 he joined Echenique's faction as Minister of 
Warg and later defended the unpopular and conservative Pezet government 
against Prado's revolt in 1865 (Tauro, 19669 Vol. I., PP-553-554)- 
His renewed support for the more progressive elements in Peruvian 
politics was, therefore unlikely to have been prompted by any 
ideological sympathy, but was perhaps in return for promised office. 
Rear-admiral Lizardo Montero's political history is also characterised 
by the inconsistencies and personal attachments which were so marked 
a feature of Peruvian political life. In 1857 he supported VivancoOs 
revolutionary attacks on the Peruvian coastq and on the conservative 
leader's defeat fled to Spain. However on his return in 1862, he was 
made a captain, and in 1865 participated in Prado's 'liberal' revolt. 
He continued as an active politician in the service of Pradot after 
the Civilista defeat in 1876, with clear political ambitions of his 
own. These had received an initial setback after his defeat by 
Prado in the succession contest in 1876, but were realized in IUU-L 
when he became Garcia Calderon's Vice-President. 
Such support was obviously crucial to the guano group, since these 
military men were not only able to mobilise a mass following but were 
I also in a better position to carry out reforms of the armed forces. I 
Important too was the middle c. lass/liberai professional group who 
tended to form the career politicians and contribute the ideological 
apparatus of the party. This element may be briefly examined by 
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considerinp, the interents of Jose Simeon Tejedaq and Manuel Marcos 
Sal azar. 
Tejeda (1825-73) was the archetype of the public servant/legislator. 
An Arequipa lawyer, he was involved in a variety of commissions to 
reform civil codes made a doctor in 18499 he was later awarded the 
professorship of law of the University of Arequipa. However his 
I 
subsequent life is clearly that of a career politican, (although he 
does appear to have held a relatively consistent philosophy and was 
respected as a major civilista political thinker having been a 
contributor to the 'Revista de Lima'). In the Convencion Nacional 
of 1855-57, Tejeda was elected Isecretario suplentel; in 1869 he 
was a member of the Junta de Notables of Lima, as well as being 
prelident of the Circulo Literacio and of the Consejo Superior de 
Instruccion Publica (Varela Orbegoso, 19169 P-144)- Under the 
Civilistas he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies, where he 
became president of the House (Echegaray Correa, 1965v PP-440-4449457). 
However, despite Teieda's reputation as a liberalq and his apparent 
political inteýrity (Cortes: 18759 P-485), he had also had connections 
with the Pierolista/Balta group, and was named by Balta as Peru's 
lawyer on the Peru-United States Commission (Cortes: 187S9 P-486). 
Furthermore he was linked to international commerce, and in 1863 
became the lawyer for the Banco de Londres, Mejico y SudAmerica. 
Presumably the latter connection wan the more importantq and must 
have introduced him to the prominent Lima merchants of the day. 
Manuel Marcos Salazar may be taken as the second representative 
of the middle class element in the Civilista party. Apparently 
unconnected with either banking or guanot his support for Pardo 
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appears to havip been inspired by genuine liberalism. Originally a 
teacher at the Colegio de Guadalupe, in the '70s he left to teach 
at San Carlos, and, shortly afterwards, to become the senatorfbr 
Junin. He was particularly involved in Pardo, s educational reform 
programmeg and he was a member of various education commissions. 
(Buenaventura G. Seoane, 1901, pp. 206-209). 
Jose de la Riva. Aguero (1827-1881) and Aurelio Denegri may be seen 
as fairly typical examples of the bourgeois/oligarchic fraction which 
formed the central core of the'Civilista party. The former is a 
representative of an old viceregal aristocratic family that had 
supported independence (Anna, 1974), and had subsequently combined the 
tradition of government 
I 
with financial activities. Itiva Aguero 
was the first panager of the Banco de Credito Hipotecario (on the 
31st January, 16669 in Comprubi, 19579 P-59). In addition, he was 
on a commission which two years later drew up the regulations for the 
Caja de Ahorros of the Lima Beneficiencia Publica (ibid. 9 p. 82). 
'Typically cosmopolitan, he had studied at Louvain, and, as a 
I 
young man, had acted as secretary to the Peruvian Legations in 
Washington and Madrid. He participated iný the Extraordinary Congress 
of 1858-9, as'suplentelfor Huarochiri (Echegaray Correa, 1965t P-572), 
and later served as Minister of Finance during the brief interim 
administration of Colonel Mariano Herencia Zevallos- 
2, then in 
186B, he participated in the founding of the new aristocratic club, 
the Club Nacional. Under Pardo's presidency Riva Aguero served as 
1. The family had originally been 'conservative', and strong supporters 
of free trade and a traditional raw material export role for Peru. 
2. Himself from an old aristocratic familyq turned'caudillol(Parra 
Rivera, 1976). 
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I 
Minister of Foreign Relations (1872-75)9 arranging the fateful 'Secret' 
Treaty with Bolivia in 1873, and proposing the convocation of an American 
Congress to decide on help to achieve the independence of Cuba. 
Aurelio Denegri, was one of Peru's wealthiest and most innovative 
capitalists. A member of the Junta Departmental de Lima of the 
Civ4ista Party, he was also involved in government banking policiesq 
due to his substantial financial experience. In 1872 he became 
'director proprietario'of the Banco Garantizadorq a position he 
retained up until the War of the Pacific (Camprubit 19579 PP-1039337)9 
and in 1679, he was appointed to a three man commission created to 
k 1 investigate the affairs of the Banco Nacional del Peru The 
Denegri family was also involved in sugar cultivation in Icaq (Macera, 
1974, p. 166) and owned a business house in Lima 2. Confirmation of 
Denegri's status in Lima's financial/commercial community may be found 
in the fact that twice in 1879, and then in 1884, he was elected Prior 
of the Tribunal de Comercio (Paz Soldan, 1917, p. 250)- 
Finally, a prominent and crucial part in the civilista machine was 
Played by the press. Aramburuls 'La Opinion Nacionall - which 
described the Civilista party as containing I'los hombres y las ideas 
de hoyl, (In Porras Barrencheaq, 1970, p. 111) - as well as the two 
maJor newspapers in Peru, T1 Comercio, 39 and 'El Nacionall, were, all 
f irm Partisans of Manuel Pardo. 
1 Tri August 1879 the, bank had its third crisisq and a result the' 
Commission was appointed. The other members were Felipe Masias 
29 arid Juan Federico Lembecke 
(Camprubi, op. cit. v P-395). - Pike describes Aurelio Denegri as having made a fortune in business 
3- and mining activities (1967). Financially, he survived the war. 'R1 Comerciol was directed by wealthy guano capitalistq Amunategui and, by 1875, edited by Panamanian-born businessman Jose Antonio ýIi`ro Quesada. Quesada was also secretary of the municipality of CaLIlao in 1868, and commander of one of the regiments of the National Guard established by Pardo. (Belmont Parker, 1919). 
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The above brief breakdown hejps us to see, in the light of the earlier 
discussion, that essentially the Civilistas did not represent a new, 
national force. Rather they wereq like Pierola's followers, a broad 
alliance of familial, personal and business groupings from amongst 
the elitp, which however had to call on suPT)ort from othor "Vetors 
of coastal society to oppose Pierola and his clients. Furthermoreq 
whilst Pardo declared his government's task to be the removal of 
"obstaculos del pasadoll (28th July, 1874, in Ugarteche y San Cristoval, 
19459 P-54), the Civilista party was in fact composed of many reactionary 
elements. It could not possibly sustain a policy of capitalisation 
and of increasing the productivity of agriculture or construct a new 
state order, that was truly national in characterg or baned on more 
modern forms of class dominationg because of the mixed nature of its 
membership, its limited control of the economy, and essentially 
conservative aims. Moreoverg the way it attempted to bring about 
the recuperation of the economic base of the elite both intensified 
the polarisation within Peruvian society and alienated its European 
allýes, who represented its major claim to progressivism and solirce 
of strength. This programme of economic recuperation (an aspect 
of which will be examined in detail in the following chapter) also 
failedq partly because of the weakness of the Civilistasq but larp. ely 
because of the international monetary crisisq and in particular the 
extremely vulnerable and indebted situation of the Peruvian economy. 
Cotler (1979) contrasts the Chilean and Peruvian regimesq and. 
attributes the national hegemony achieved by the export oligarchy 
in the former largely to its direct control and organisation of 
economic production (clearly stemming from its colonial settlement 
hintory of relative independence and economic vitality); in 
comparison the 'enclave' character of economic development in 
Perug together with the control exercised by foreign capital is 
seen to have inhibited the development of one dominant group 
committed to national integration. Obviously, other factors (discussed throughout this work) must also be considered in, order 
to fully understand the difference. 
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E. The Crisis of the External Debt and the Role of the British Press 
Th !e importance of loans to both the British and Peruvian economies (cf. 
Joslin, 1963t P-8)9 the large size of the Peruvian external debt and the 
unhappy relationship between Peru and Britain have already been touched 
upon, Having settled its first debts in the 1850s (under extreme pressure 
from H. M. G. ). a new cycle of foreign borrowing was initiated in the 1860s. 
Voreign loans served to bring in a degree of internal peace through 
government patronage and mask the stagnation of the economy whilst in 
fact exacerbating its underlying unbalancedt underproductiveldependent 
nature. Pierola's attempt to use the guano wealth for more productive 
purposes (as well as to benefit other sectors of the upper classes) 
involved the contraction of fresh loans 
1; 
owing to the bullish state 
of the Stock Exchange, these were heavily oversubscribed (see F. O. 61/331 
for full details of the Bondholders' claims, loans etc. ). Huge profits 
(calculated by McQueen, 1926, to even exceed the total Yeruvian revenue 
from guano) were made from the operations connected with the Dreyfus 
Contract and the, 1872 loan (Bonilla, 19709 P-339). The Peruvian 
Government itselfq however, did not even derive much ready cash from 
these transactiont, and it is clear that continuation of the extremely 
expensive public works' project would necessitate further loans. 
2 
To the delight of Dreyfus and'his associates. Earlier Premsel had 
expressed fears that the original arrangementg whereby Dreyfun would 
supply the Peruvian Government with a regular income, would overcome 
the need for credit, thus eliminating a source of large profits: "En 
donnant au Tresor 194009000 soles par mois vous assurez a tout jamais 
son service, et vous le mettez a l1abri des besoins, systeme qui est 
contraire a nos interets9 car il ferait cesser les emprunts temporaines. 
qui ont leurs petits charmes pour nous. " (cited in Bonilla, 19709 
P-325. - Premsel to Dreyfusq 15th November, 1869). 
2. In 1873 'The Railway News 'comnented on the desperate need of the Peruvian Government for liquid capital which forced it to agree in 1869 to ".. 
borrow at a usurious rate of interest a sum of rather less than half a 
milliong giving, as security for the advanceg the right to sell 2509000 
tonnes of guano at C6 per ton, a concession equal in value to six times 
týe amount of the loan"(20th December, 1873 ). 'The Timespointed out 
that the Bondholders too derived few financial benefits: "Contracts with 
such governments .. only enriched a few financial leeches and a clique 
of more or less corrupt officials. " Ord Marchq 1877)- 
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I 
Pardo was committed to such a policy for several reasons. Firstly, 
because of the clear need for railroadsq secondly because so much 
public money had already been expended on themq and also because of 
the unprecedented degree of labour agitations connected to the huge 
numbers of unemployed (The Pacific Mail'. lst Novemberg 1873 ; Yepesq 
19749 PP-75/6), many of whom had supported the Civilistass and whose 
ranks would be further swelled if the public works were abandoned. 
However the economic depressiong rumours of the approaching exhaustion 
of the guano beds and the hostility expressed by the Bondholders towards 
the relationship between the Peruvian Government and Dreyfusq all 
coAined to produce the failure of the 1873 loan. Essentially this 
was also a major factor in the failure of Civilismog since lack of 
money meant that large sectors of the armed forces and of the elite 
(as well as the railways) could no lonper be financed. It also 
forced ýardo to abandon economic liberalism, the fundamental tenet 
of Civilismo, and intervene in the economy through the 'Estancol and 
banking legislation. 
The Peruvian Government did not actually default on its external 
debtq howeverl until 1876, and efforts contined to be made up until 
the outbreak of the Pacific War to retrieve the situation and placate 
the Bondholders. The problem overshadowed both Pardo's presidency 
and that of his successor, and neatly reveal the dependent nature 
, 
of the Peruvian economy and the power of the British press and 
foreign capital. 
Althoilph the larpe n17, P of the Peruvlan external dplit. mn(]P' It ' 
extremely likely that problems with repayment would arise, especially 
given the small proportion of the loan that the government actually 
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received and the high cost of interestg the imme "diate cause of the 
crisis originated outside of Peruvian control. The buoyant atmosphere 
in the London money market in the late 1860s and early '70s was already 
beginning to recede in 1872, and this was expressed in a gradual loss 
of confidence in Peruvian paperg (which was also provoked by the 
complicated nature of Peruvian hypothecationsq due to the Dreyfus 
a greement). An editorial in 'The Economist' written in March 1872 
discussed the 1672 loan in the following way: 
"wn aro fold vrilmno I)rinvfi 1" 1'4 million s ypill'. mid will 
be especially pledged; that one railway bringing in C72,000 
a year, and other railways .... will also be pledged; so with 
the customsq which bring in about El million, but there is 
nothing to show how much of the above is really freeg or at 
the disposal of the Peruvian Governmentq or how long the 
guano is likely to yield to 94 million a year, if it really 
does so now. As the charge of the debt will be E1,840,000 
for annual interest and Z736,000 for the sinking fund ... it 
is plain that a statement of the'free revenue without guano, 
and an estimate of the probable duration of the guano are both 
essential points ... The state revenueg exclusive of customs 
and the guano, ... is only about E500,000 and the expendituret 
excluding the interest on the debt is C2 million, showing a 
deficit of E195009000... wtich must be made good out of the 
resources now especially assigned before this can be made 
available to the creditors ... it is ... quite clear ... that 
the pledge of any revenue but the customs and the guano is 
purely illusory. If the guano especially does not yield at 
least E3 million the creditors*will not be paid... " (23rd 
March, 1872, my emphasis). 
1 
14 Despite thiag as already mentionad, the 1872 loan was moot 'successful' 
and the 'Standard' reassured the public that: "althouirh the amount 
.... seems large .... there is little apprehension of loss. " 
(20th 
March, 1872). Furthermore aspersions cast on Peru's financial 
state were contradicted by the numerous subscriptions received for 
the new Dreyfus bank (Banco Nacional del Peru) amounting to 32 
million soles, (cf. 'Panama Star and Herald', 6th May, 1672). 
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The explicit doubt caat here on the volume of guano otill remaining 
in Peru marked the beginning of a dialogue, largely conducted in the 
London Pressq over the quality and quantity of the fertilizer, the 
trusiworthiness of the Peruvian government and the consequent reliability 
of Peruvian credit. This became a self fulfilling prophecy, and 
produced humiliating infringements of Peruvian sovereipnity, as the 
1 inevitable results of speculation were blamed on Peru Despite 
varioun Poientific inventigationo of the guano islandn, condliGtod 
under British aýispices as well as Peruvianj reporting that stocks 
remained plentiful (cf. Duffield, 18779 P-77), rumours to the contrary 
still circulated and both sales of guano and Peru's credit rating 
continued to fall. In vain 'The Pacific 1ýaill pointed out: 
"A good deal of controversy has lately arisen on this subject 
from the circumstance of the Peruvian Government beinp somewhat 
at variance with their financial agents ... otherwise there is 
For instance in 1878 'The Man of the World' noted that throughout 
the world there was due to the: "British holders of foreign Bonds 
in default a sum equal to half the National Debt of England. " 
However this situation could in no way be blamed on the Bondholder 
or on the configuration of International finance: "Many of these 
defaulting States are enjoying a degree of internal prosperity, 
the inhabitants ... basking in the sunshine of every kind of 
personal indulgence... " The fault lay entirely with the luilLruaLwurLity Ulid tt ruLucti Lo Palmot-oLuillail 
bullying was called fort as the only tactics that would be. understood: 
"These foreign states not only refuse to pay either the interest 
or principal of their debts, but they confiscate the special hypothecations given *., and fatten perpetually upon the plunder 
of these Bondholders ... and insult the British Government to its very beard... (Peru has) been living upon the plunder of 
Englishmen for many years, They borrowed of us in 1870 and 1872 
f319000tOOO, they gave us a mortgage upon their guano deposits 
as security, and yet they sell it and pocket the proceedst leaving us without principal or interest since July 1875. There is now due for arrears some , 
C6,000,000. All attempts of the Bondholders to stop this spoliation and obtain some measure 
of justice has hitherto been fruitless..... " (Pist Septembert 
1878). 
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nothinp wha, tever in the actual position of (its flnancpn) to 
warrant any unfavourable conclusions as regards the securities 
of the republic. On the contraryl the more of the resources 
the country are looked into, the greater they will be found ... 
the greatest possible economy is being exercised in the 
national expenditure... " (16th Decembers 1873)- 
ý In reality, howeverg Peru's financial condition was continually 
deteriorating. In November 1873 problems with Dreyfus arose as 
the latter, alarmed by the slump and fall in the quality of and 
demand for guanop refused to maintain the debt service. In response 
the Peruvian Government suspended the permit to ship guano and 
promulgated two decrees declaring that holders of the 1870 and 1872 
bonds had preferential hypothecation over all Peruvian guanog and that 
legal proceedings would be instituted against Dreyfusq should lie fail 
to meet the interest and sinking fund payments on the next date due. 
This tactic proved effective and resulted in a new contract, which 
committed Dreyfus to continuing to service of the debt until July# 
18759 by which time Pardo hoped to have gained a new source of 
revenue through the 'Estancol. 'The Times' acknowledged that the 
t 
government had done its best for the Bondholdersq but commented that 
"its power to do that best has been very limited ... 11, due to the 
situation in which the government found itself. "... from having become 
a party to contracts under which monopolists have had all the power 
and the Government none.. " (25th Decemberg 1874), and it later 
became apparent that, in its dealing with Dreyfus# the Government 
owing to its vulnerable and desperate positiont had fared extremely badly., 
1. In an examination of the Bondholders' Affairsq Clarket a leading member 
of Croyle's committeeq asserted that in their dealings with DreyfLug 
both Peru and the Stock Exchange had been deceived.... O.. the Peruvian 
Government did not get what they ought to have got.. " (P. P. Monetary 
Policy General 11,1877). 
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Events were clearly moving the Peruvian economy swiftly into 
bankruptcy; the failure (and unpopularity) of the 'Estancol did noting 
to alleviate affairs, whilst continued speculation in Peruvian stock, 
and unfavourable newspapers reports further exacerbated the situation. 
At the end of 1874 the 'Money Market Review' discussed Peruvian attempts 
to solve the problems of the External Debt in the following way: 
11 ... the expediency of reducing either the interent or the 
capital of the Foreign Debt is openly. discussed in the Congress. 
In other words, it would appear that, since Peru begins to find 
that her liabilities are more than she can manageg her 
1,111-04,00 Jr LIJ L110 UJOY I'OOk1U1'UV U11011, LkO 
the advisability of a blank repudiation of her solemn obligations 
to-the foreign creditor. " (12th December,, 1874)- 
'The Bullionist' laid the blame rather at the door of Dreyfun: 
"The necessities of the Peruvian Government have compelled it, 
to raise money through the contractors who dispose of the guano, 
and the Bondholders wish to know to what extent the contractors 
lies over the supplies they have in their own keeping interferes 
with their prior right of, property in. it. The guano may be 
abundantly sufficient to secure them against loss in the event 
of anything happening; but it is obvious its value for their 
purposes would be greatly deteriorated if it-were also held as 
security by the contractors for their advances. What is the - 
precise arrangement of the Governmentwith the contractors? 
... Peru deserves to be treated with all fairness and respect 
by its creditors .... but... the country in in an unsettled 
stateg political divisions interfere with its stability... " 
(2nd January, 1675)- 
Other reports on Peru at the beginning of 1875 also discussed the 
collapse. of businesses and internal dissensions and warned the Bondholders 
to be alert, in case more hypothecations of their property be made 
i (cf. 'Daily Telegraph, ' 24th January, and 2nd February, 1875) Not 
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surprisinglyt thereforeq the Peruvian Government's attempts to obtain 
credit from fresh sourcesp or negotiate new agreementaq were unsuccessful# 
and at the beginning of IB76 it declared itself bankrupt. On the llth 
January . Juan Ignacio Elgiiera, the Minister of Financel made a detailed 
statement on the subject of the Debt and outlined the efforts that 
were being made to settle the Bondholders' claims. Ile emphasised the 
barriers to such a settlement, arising from the press: 
"The passionate hostility of some of the English and French 
Journals which have been attao'king Peru for come time Pact 
to the evident damage of native and foreign interests involved 
in the credit of the country, ... have all tended to create a 
situation in which the arrangement of a suitable contract in the 
exterior is as difficult asIt would be disagreeable to the 
Government to solicit it... " (in F. O. 61/323)- 
H. M. G., however, supported the argument that it was Peru's involvement 
with Dreyfus which was the main cause of the dispute: 
in 1874 the Peruvian Government made a private contract with 
Messrs Dreyfus ... whereby, in consideration of large advances to 
the Governmentg the firm obtained the exclusive right to sell 
guano in the European market till the lst November, 1876, and 
were relieved of the obligation of providing for the Bondholders' 
claims. 
The, win, thtit in Jnviiinry, 1(1'16 Mir, 11nii-H'I'dolm-61 
ceased to receive any interest on their Bonds. 
The Peruvian Governmentl independently of their contracts 
with ... Dreyfus... have been selling a large quantity of 
guano on their own account... and they. have appropriated 
the entire proceeds of these sales for their own purposes, 
leaving the interest due ... unpaid. " 
(P. O. 61/3239 
Confidential Hlemo, 2nd Januaryl 1879. ). 
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Despite these problems new negotiations were entered into between the 
Peruvian Government and the Bondholdersq resulting in June 1876, in 
the Raphael contract. Raphael formed a company under the name of 
the Peruvian Guano Company, which was made up of many former consignees 
(thus regaining for them their former economic base, cf. Karno, 1970). 
In return for an annual income*of C700,000, the Peruvian Government 
consigned to the Peruvian Guano Companyq 199000000 tons of euanot the 
proceeds of which would be used to pay the governments income and the 
i 
Bondholders. However the latter agreed not only to forego cash payments 
of interest until the beginning of 18799 but also to a reduction of the 
future rate of interest. These concessions were made largely 
because of the grant to the company of the exclusive monopoly of the 
sale of the fertilizer in the European market 
1, (for full details 
see P. O. 61/3239 ibid). 
However the Peruvian Governments' complicated dealings with Dreyfus 
led it to transgress this agreement by assigning more guano to the 
French House. The resultant competition meantq by the outbreak of 
the Pacific War, that the Bondholders had gained virtually no benefits 
from the c'ontract. 
2 As a resultq not only the British presso 
Bondholders and stock Exchange viewed Peru with hostilitY9 but II. M. G. 
too had decided it was time to intervene: 
11 H. M. G. have come to the conclusion that the time has 
arrived when they can no longer i' ' *- ^ 
abstain from officially representing to the Peruvian Government 
the complaints of the British holders of these Bonds ... 11 
(F. O. 
61/323sibid). 
1- This contract was concluded with the committee headed by Russellq 
and was violently opposed by Croyle and his supporters* 2. Nor had it solved the problems of Peru's finances and credit rating. 
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P. Summary 
It should be evident from the preceding discussion that an attempt 
to characterise Peruvian politics in the period ýnder study needs to 
take into account not only issues such as the diverse relations of 
production and forms of domination, the colonialq political and 
cultural heritagel andthe influence of Western thought9 but that 
a central determinant may be seen as the export orientation of the 
elite together with its predication on the world economy. It is 
clear that the class relations emerging from relations between foreign 
capital and Peru are highly complex, and as such belie simplistic 
impositions of class schema derived from the realm of theory, and 
similarly affect the character of the political processes. On the 
Ulle hand 1ý)Lh CutiLuL-y Puruviafl 1juliLluo, app, irwiLly domutwLi-ciLbit-, 
the emergence of a national bourgeoisieg were largely expressed by 
and mediated through West European institutional forms; on the other 
hand the embryonic forms of capitalist relations that were beginning 
to emerge in Peruvian agriculture wereq both on the coast and in the 
sierral manifested through an intensification of archaicq 'aristocratic' 
forms of exploitation$ in political contradiction to a modern, 
bourgeois, centralized state form. Furthermore the 'liberal'/eemi 
capitalist sector of the oligarchy (together with more progressive 
elements of Peruvian society) whilst in favour of modernising and 
extending central state power, was inhibited in this task both by 
its subordinate relationship with British capital and by the nature of 
its economic base. In Chile similar problems were overcome because 
of the comparatively cohesive character of the feudal landowoing 
class (stemming from its different colonial history) which enabled 
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it to construct an effective central state structure and exercise more 
I 
control over the national economy In the admiring words of 
Briti sh Diplomat, Horace Rumbold: 
"There exist in Chile the elements of a society in some ways 
essentially superior to any to be found in other South American 
republics. The landowning classest who practically govern the 
country, do so by reason of their territorial possessions and 
their pure Spanish descent.... The hacendados... are necessarily 
preponderant in the state and constitute in effect a powerful 
oligarchy. " (1902,, Vol. Iq p. 26). 
By contrast, Peruvian politicsq whilst derived in form from British 
practices* did not provoke the same admiration. 1"urthermore the 
methods employed by the Civilistas in their attempt to establish 
hegemony over oiher segments of the upper classes and the popular 
sector, on the lines of the Chilean state, involved the alienation 
of important sectors of British capitalt and played a part in bringing 
about the Pacific War. On the other hand the Civilistas were too 
weak vis a vis foreign capital and in the face of the world depression 
to succeed in their aims. The following chapter will examine, in detail 
a major aspect of Civilista economic policy, in the context of its 
interaction with British capital. 
Monteon writes of the pre-Pacific War period in Chile: "A few 
dozen aristocratic families owned the richest estates, ran the 
state administration and held the high offices in the Church. " (19829P-3)- Cotler points out that direct control of the national 
, emony of 
the Chilean resources at this time further increased the hep 
OxIl"I'L ('14eurollY tivt1v oLhar ijoLativs, or oootaty 
(1979, 
,.. "r, 7). 
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-CH=R'8-: ITHE IESTANCOI AND BRITISH CAPITAL 
The interests of foreign capital and the embryonic' Peruvian 
bourgeoisie coalesced in'two major export enclaves, both of which 
were of crucial significance for the entire Peruvian economy - 
guano wid nitrate8. As . 4as buen wean iii the preoadillg CliapLarj 
tha 
guano industry led to the insertion of the Peruvian economy into the 
capitalist world market and raised the state to an exage'ratedly 
prominent position in Peruvian society. On other other hand, the 
imbalance and distortion produced by the guano industry accentuated 
the fragmentation of Peruvian soeiety and did not enable the state 
to achieve national sovereignty; its purchase as Peruvian society 
remained imperfect. Similarly the financial basis of the Peruvian 
bourgeoisieg established via the guano industry, was fragilej-- 
speculative and dependent, ý; These problems came to a head 'at the 
beginning of the 1870B and provoked intervention by the Civilista- 
government in the nitrate industry. 
I 
This chapter is concerned with Britishq Peruvian and Chilean 
capital and the'lestancol, and deals withýsome issues, already discussed 
by Greenhill and Xiller (1973). However; whilst their account of the 
government monopoly is most thorough, they fail to draw the obvious 
conclusions from their evidenoe4 The general tenor of-their arg=Ont 
is to exculpate British capitalism by a detailed examination of general 
motivations; this episode is of interest, howeverp'because-it presentst 
in microcosm a picture of the articulation of metropolitan capital 
with West Coast mercantile activity, and demonstrates the orientation 
of the Peruvian economy to metropolitan demands. It also highlights 
-2-47- 
I 
the nature of the interaction of-the Peruvian state both with foreign 
capital and with H. M. G. It is an important, episodeg too, because 
foreign opposition was axoused by the lestancol policy and contributed 
to its failure, and, as such, the monopoly policy was an important 
component in the complex of causes leading up to the War of the 
Pacific. 
The involvement of both Britain and Chile in the nitrate industry 
dates from the very beginning of the exploitation of the fertilizer. 
Nitrate extraction began in the 1830s, largely stimulatedq as in the 
case of guano, by the demand*generated by British agriculture, and 
also by its importance in the manufacture of explosives. British 
merchant houses were active in the industry from an early. stage, 
although the majority of the 'paxadas' were, until the 1860s-boom, 
relatively basicl unmechanised operations, owned by smaller Peruvian 
and Chilean entrepeneurs, The first importantion of the fertilizer 
J-11tO &451LUILI WhO . 111 IU!! ý#p 1jy, tho juuvuheutL Juriciph llodwl 
1, 
Cula alvva4y 
by 1833# H, M. Consul Wilson was describing the trade to Palmerston in 
the following way: 
"The export of saltpetre from the Peruvian port of Iquique 
is yeaxly becoming of increasing importance to the commerce 
of Great Britain ... it is perculiarly important to the trade 
of this countryo supplying vessels with a return cargo and 
thus diminishing the amount of hitherto more unprofitable 
mode of payment for British manufacturers in-silver or bullion.. " 
(10th March 1833t P. O. 61/23) 
In an article dated 1st February 1875P the'Pacific Mail'reported 
that 34 bags of nitrate of soda were brought into England by 
Ilegan and sold to the Liverpool brokert James Atherton. 
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The policy adopted by the Peruvian Goverment towaxds nitrates was 
strikingly different from the controlling influence it exercised over 
guano, and this approach was initiated by Gamarra partly because hot 
according to J. M. Rodrigaez, 
I 
creyo favorecer a Taxapaca, su pais natal, con la 
liberacion del salitxe .. 119 
but a. Iso because this policy suited the Chileans to whom, 
"tan obligado estaba el P=esidente de la Republica .. 
ya quien le ligaban simpatias .. 11, 
for the Chileans formed a major market for the productq as well as 
being involved in its extraction, 
"exportandolo como producto propio de Chile 
(1916, vol. xq P-319) 
In Rodriguez' view it was therefore largely because of Chilean 
involvement in Taxapaca, and their influence over certain Peraviansp 
that nitrate was not used as a source of government income until the 
late 1860si. Moreover, since, until the 1860s and 1870st the 
Chileans tended to dominate the industry, they came to view the 
nitrate as properly belonging to them, a factor which made 
Taxapaca an, 
11 ". objeto de codicia paxa Chile 
(Rodrigaez; 1916, Vol-Xt P-320) 
It would appear that other people were also confused with regard to 
2 the ownership of the fertilizer . As late as 1874 the Corporation 
Offering an important example of the effect of Chilean influence 
on Peravian politics. 
2. In 1872 Peruvian fiscal Commissioner Daniel Ruzo reported on the 
threat represented by Chilean warships to Taxapaca, the nitrate 
of which ".. hasta aqui se ha explotado casi exclusivamente en 
beneficio de Chile, y aun presentandonele en los mercadon 
europeos como, producto chileno .. " 
(in'La Prema; 4th October 18'12) 
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of Foreign Bondholders noted thatp 
,. 
"Hitherto-, by an inexplicable anomalyq Peruvian Saltpetre 
has been regarded and designated on all the European 
ets as Chilean. .. It is important that the public 
be .. informed that all the Saltpetre exported by the 
Merchants of Chili is extracted from Peru 
(corporation of Foreign Bond Holders, I, 19th March 1872 to 
21st December 1874, P-ii) 
However, British capital, through the dominance exercised by the laxge 
merchant houses over the whole West Coast commerceg increasingly 
infiltrated the induntry. These merchant houses held away, over the 
whole Peruvian economy, and were dominated by Europeans. Dancuaxt 
(1906, Vol. IV, p. 12), using Peruvian tax records, has shown that 
among the top seven merchant houses in Lima, four were foreign owned 
and heavily involved in guano by the 1840s. Among the next twenty" 
four biggest import-export houses, theývast majority were also 
foreign owned. These Icasas fuertes' were inextricably involved in 
a multiplicity of axeas of Peruvian commercial life, from exporting 
guano, supplying ships, giving credit, handling wool exportst 
importing, everything from luxury, goods to sugar mill machinery and 
acting as agents for the Peruvian Government abroad. Capelo, writing 
in the 1890s, described these houses in the following way: 
"Few in numberg but with strong influence in all centres of 
national life, they constitute a vigorous nucleus which can 
cause laws to be made or unmade without anyone knowing. They 
do-or imdo whatever is in their own interestsp with no other 
motive than the concentration in their own hands of all the 
national wealth .. " 
(Capelo; 18951 Vol-IIIP'*P-137) 
It was thereforcinevitable that the Europeansq prima ily Britisho 
would eventually take a greater interest in nitrates toot especially 
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as its importance rose, and as Peruvian mercants began to take over 
the handling of giiano. Moreover European merchants tended to invest 
indiscriminately in Chilean, Bolivian and Peruvian areas, and might 
be based in either Lima or Valpaxaiso or both. In the 1850s 
Duncan Fox began to discuss the possibility of entering the businessp 
and in 1851 Stephen Williamson founded the firm of S. Williamson & Co. 
specifically to develop the nitrate trade (Lima-Timest "Scots in 
Fezu'll 19th December 1975), in 1055 seymo=, Peacock & Go, (London) 
wrote to Clarendon requesting that a British Consulate be established 
at Iquique, in view of the considerable amount of British involvement 
there: a 
"The undersigned merchants of the City of Londong being 
largely interested in the importation to this kingdom of 
nitrate of soda from Iquique .. take the liberty of pointing 
out to Your Lordship that this valuable article of commerce is 
yearly increasing in consumption for agricultural and domestic 
purposes, employing a vast amount of British capital both in 
its manufacture in Peru and in the tonnage required for 
bringing it to this country, that during the last six months 
of this yeax upwaxds of 10,000 tons of nitrate of soda were 
shipped to the United Kingdom alone, in British bottoms 
being nearly equal to the entire quantity shipped to all other 
44"Ll"44, so I-I"L L"UPUMVI W41 VPjj-VPS3P44LIIIjS 14 IIIwt4Q. Y'V; %IIIr' t4jr 
nearly C200,000 .. " 
(P. O., 61/1589 15th November 1855) 
This request was granted - in itself an indication of the importance 
of the province of British capital. In January 1859, John Ravenscroft 
noted the soaring profitability of the nitrate provincesý but decided 
to delay involvement for a while: 
"Nitrate of soda is selling at 1616 but until-we see some 
system adopted, by which quality can be made sure, we will. ' 
not be inclined to order on our account. The immense 
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quantity on the way, we should think, will over-stock the 
market, but the consumption is undoubtedly very great and 
far beyond anything we knew before .. " 
(Short History of Duncan, Fox & Co. -Ltd 9 
1843-1956, P-32) 
In the event, the maxket was not flood6d and the British shaxe in the 
industry increased'quite dramatically in the 1860s, especially after 
the 1868 boom, when consumption in'Britain, from'1868-73, doubled 
(Annual Statements of the Trade of the U. K. with Foreign Countries 
and British Possessions, in Parliamentary Papersj 1868-1873)- 
Unlike the guano industry, nitrate extraction increasingly required 
laxge amounts of capital and technological expertisel since a 
complicated and expensive manufacturing process was needed to remove 
the impurities from the substance (Greenhill and Miller, 1973v P-111)- 
So, as European demand for the fertilizer rocketedg and the impetus 
to raise productivity increased, steam was introduced into its 
I 
manufacture, and larger, modern and predominantly British concerns 
took over more and more of the industryp replacing manY of'the more 
primit - ive sparadas'. In 1873 the 'Pacific Maillo in an article on 
the Peruvian economy, wrote of the industry: 
"There axe numerous small manufactoriorij but the chief ones 
I axe those of Messers Hainsworth & Co. at San Antonio, and 
Messers Gibbs 1 Co. at La Noria. ll 
(lst November 1873) 
Chilean and especially Peruvian capitalists undoubtedly suffered 
as a result of this expansiont and by the 18700 much of Chilean 
nitrate capital was to be found in the famous Cia. de Salitres y 
Ferrocaxilles de Antofagasta in Bolivia. By the early 1870s a laxge 
proportion of the industry used stean driven machinery (which could 
reducecosts to C5 from E8 per ton) and over twenty firms manufactured 
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between 5lOQQ and 1OjQQQ tong per mnum (Greenhill & Miller, 19731 A111)9s 
in 1872 2,176,239 quintals, with a value of C1,604-0409 (out of a total 
of approximately 5 million quintals) were exported to the U. K. alone 
(P. P. 1874, LXVIII, Accounts and Papers; Commercial Report No. 10). 
The early 1870s were the peak years, and in 1872 many new nitrate 
companies were organized in Lima, a number of banks opened in 
Taxapaca, and major port facilities developed, extending Southwaxds 
from Pisagua in Taxapaca to Taltal in the Bolivian littoral. Iquique, 
however, remained the most important outlet, the terminus of the 
nitrate railways, which served isolated loficinas', and the entrepot 
for all the local ports. In contrast to this prosperity in the 
South, the economic situation in Peru continued to deteriorate. As 
articles hostile to Peru, asserting that the guano had ran out, began 
to appear in the British press with increasing regularity, and as the 
Peruvian oligarchy began to suffer from the depressiont the Peruvian 
Gove rnm ent turned to Taxapaca nitrates as the source of new income 
which would avert social unrest, national bankruptcy and total loss 
of credit. (Gibbs Ms-10v 703/2v 12th July 1877) 
Iýrom 1848 to 1868 Gamarral a policy had been followed and the nitrate 
industry had remained untaxed. In response to the boom in salesq 
which began in the late 1860s, a light export duty of 10/- per 1001b 
(4 centavos per quintal) was imposed by the Peruvian Government in 
1868. Then, in 1872, along with an increase in customs duties and 
pro f osals for administrative decentralisationg two plans were put 
forwaxd; one to establish a government monopoly of the industryl and 
the other involving profit-shaxing and higher export duty of 
25 centavos per ton. This proposed change in policy with regard to 
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nitrate was partly a result of the, by now, huge externa. 1debt of 
Peru. which required almost C2 million a year to merely service it - 
a sum which had begun to absorb almost all the gove=ment's revenues 
(McQueen, 1926, P-7)1. Pardo was also inspiried by the hope that by 
controlling the export of nitrate, gaano'sales'would rise again, as 
nitrate was viewed as a major competitor to the goverment 
controlled fertilizer. It was feltq too, that the present nitrate 
industry had: 
".. privado a la republica de usa de sus grandes fuentes de 
riqueza permanente, tan grande que podria sustituir con 
ventaja la guano y ser desde ahora el primero de los recursos 
fiscales .. " 
("Loque so ve y loque no so voll in La Opinion Naöionäl, 
Lima, 1874. ) '- 
The 'Estancol scheme was most attractive; it would, through the 
collaboration between the banks and the governmento enable Peruvian 
capital to regain a strong position in the industry, whilst also 
allowing a new set of foreign capitalists to become involved. This 
perhaps explains the later claims of Charles R. Flint, an 
international arms broker based in New York, who attributed the plan 
to a group of international bankers 'and financiers (who were indeed 
involved in Peruvian banking business). As with the guano state 
1. Pardo's message to Congress, August 1872, contained fall details 
U-r Ulu auopa-VaLo sAaLo Ur JIa. VUV. LLUI r. LIILuIUqZI 11TIto Opoulal 
circumstances connected with the exportation of saltpetre show an 
incontestable right on the part of the country to look to this as 
a means to replenish the Treasury, and we believe without any 
hurt to the industry .. we look to this rich portion of our territoxy to replenish our exhausted coffersl we .. call attention 
of the people to the monopoly which Peru enjoys in the worldt in 
the production of nitrate of Tarapacal proving that in the last 
few years the production has been annually increased and how nearly 
doubled the price during the'last 8 years, " (Diario de Debates, 
Camara de Diputados (Lima), Vol. II) 
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monopoly, the Peruvian Goverment was to receive a regulax monthly 
salary from the proceeds - thus solving its budgetary problems. 
According to Chaxles Flint: 
"My firm were the agents of this monopoly in the United 
States, and we secured the European Agency for Baring Brothers. 
The result of this organisation was detrimental to the nitrate 
producers and merchants of Chile, a fact which led up to a wax 
of conquest .. " 
(in W. J. Dennis, 1931, pp-74/75) 
On the 18th January 1873 the nitrate state monopoly scheme was made 
lawe to oomp Into olmration two monthq IRterl however, In flip event, 
implementation of the project was further delayed. Such a scheme 
ran directly counter to the laissez-faire policies of Pardo and the 
Civilistas; b-at, the main reason for the postporment is to be found 
in the violent opposition the lestancof axoused in Peru - both from 
, 
the Pierolista group and from the nitrate concerns - and in Europe. 
The 18th January 1873 law entitledthe state to buy nitrate at 
2-4 soles per quintal; if the nitrate was then sold above 31 soles 
the producers and the Treasury would share the profits between them. 
Production quotas were to be assiged to loficinas' on the basis of 
existing output and capacity. Unworked nitrate was to become state 
property and Isalitreros' were prohibited from any further extension 
of their holdings. The a dministration of the whole projeot was to be 
undertaken by the banks - The Nacional, Providencia, Peru and Lima. 
The policy thus represented an attempt by the civilista capitalists 
to regain their economic base - fýrom which they had been dislodged 
by Pierola - through control of nitrateel and the PierolisU presS 
was swift to denounce them. 
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To the F. O. the project was a further example of the Peruvian 
predeliction for restrictive, mercantilist practices, which it had 
vigoro-usly opposed since Independence. In 1839 Mr- Wilson had been 
instruoted in the following manner, when the possibility of a brandy 
monopoly arose: 
".. whatever may be the pretense under which the Government 
may propose to establish a monopoly, it will be your duty at 
all times to use your best endeavours to dissuade that 
government from entertaining or encouraging any such. projeot.. " 
(F. O. 61/579 3rd Februaxy 1839, F-0. to Mr. Wilson) 
Mr. Wilson was successful in discouraging the scheme. The guano 
trade had been described as 'an oppressive monopolylp and strenuous 
efforts made to persuade the Peruvian Gove rnm ent to change its policy, 
and the 'illiberal' and Ibackwaxd1 nature of Peruvian commerce was 
frequently commented on, and often compaxed unfavourably to Chilean 
practices. In 1860 Jerningham wrote to Russell: 
"In obedience to the instructions .. in Your Lordship's 
dispatch .. to communicate to the Peruvian Government a 
copy of 4 paper which had been drawn up by the Boaxd of 
Trade showing the results of the Policy of Free Trade 
which had been adopted in England and to point out to the 
Peruvian Government the advantages which have been derived 
from the introduction of a more liberal system and which 
H. M. G. axe convinced would equally follow the introduction 
of such a system in other, countries 
(P. O. 61/193, Gth June 1860) 
Inevitably then, the nitrate project, on ideological and practical 
grounds, aroused H. M. G. opposition and Jerningham described it as 
having:. 
".. caused great conplaints in the districts of Peru fiom 
whence .. (it is) exported, and a deputation arrived the other 
day in Lima from Iquique to remonstrate with His Excellency 
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the President against what they considered a haxdship and 
a measure detrimental to the interests of the producers 
(F. O. 61/272, Jerningham-Graxiville, 28th January 1872) 
I 
and an official protest was registered. 
I 
By the 1870s Tarapaca might have been described as a paradigm Of an 
enclave economy. The nitrate tradet centred in Iquiquev created very 
few forward or backward linkages into the Peruvian economy. 
Geographically isolated, like Guano, in the fax South of Peru, the 
industry probably generated more feedbacks into the Chilean economy 
than the Peruvian. The shipping, marketing and general administration 
of the fertilizer was handled from the headquarters of merchant housesp 
like Gibbs, which were frequently based in Valpaxaisop and usually 
these houses had interests in Chilean/Bolivian nitrates too. 
Increasingly these same companiQu were also either direotly involved 
in the manufacture of nitrate, or provided loans for machinery, 
equipment and such items, most of which also came through Valparaisop 
from abroad. Even food tended to be imported from Chileg labour was 
largely provided by Chilean nationals 
1, 
and the bulk of the profits 
from the industry went overseas. March reported on the composition 
of the industry, and its reaction to the goverment proposals, in 
the following way: 
"In the establishment of chemical works at Taxapaca and 
Iquique on modern principles for the recrystallisation of 
crude nitrate in order to manufacture nitrate of soda of 
commerce, mach British capital had been invested. many of the 
Ul Comaroio, 10th Ootobor 1873, entimatod that 90yo of 
Iquique Ia population was foreign. 
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scientific employees also axe British subjects and any 
restrictive legislative enactments which may jeopardise 
the existence of this enterprise would be attended with 
disastrous results to a sector of the community. This 
question is therefore r*egaxded with much apprehension by 
these materially interested. " 
(P. O. 61/285, Maxch-P. O. 126th October 1874) - 
and 'The Times', in an axticle on the proposed monopolyt noted: 
Lord Granville has instructed Mr. Jerningham to represent 
to the Peruvian Government the impoijoy of a course so likely 
to check consumption in this country. The Foreign Office will, 
it is believedg likewise institute inquiries in other quaxters 
where nitrate of soda may be expected to be found 
(lot February 1873) 
The nitrate capitalists had been long accustomed to complete 
freedom of action and therefore themselves took vigorous'actiong 
both in Peru and London, against the threatened intervention. 
According to Civilista paper 'La Opinion Nacionalt: 
11.. lejos de contribuir al sostenimiento del gobiernop 
la la industria salitrera la atacabag menoseabando su renta, 
y amenazaba herirlo mortalmente en sus mayores angustiasq 
con perjuicio de las otras industrias nacionales ye de la 
sociedad entera, .. la libertad de una sola industria .. 
nos estaba haciendo mal a todos en el orden industrial .. " 
I 
("Lo que se ve y loque no se vell, Lima 1874) 
Moreover, the resistence offered was primarily the work of: 
lt.. los industrioaes y comerciantes chilenos -- 
(y) han 
teniclo lugax grandes perturbaciones en la industria 
salitrera y se han retirado de ella algunos capitales 
extranjeros .. 11 
(op. cit., Lima 1874) 
The large Tarapaca Nitrate Company, another Gibbs' subsidiaryg was 
especially vocal, and by Autumn 1873 the measure had been shelved 
in favour of higher export duties (to 15 centavos per quintal) 
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(McQueen, 1926, P-40). Neverthelessl a company was established, 
in July 1873, the Cia. Administradora del Estanco del Salitrej to 
collect the export duties. This company was set up by the bankst 
who obviously considered the measure to have been merely postponed, 
and their case was strengthened by the poor results of the higher 
duties, which brought in a mere 697,542 soles in 1874. As the 
'Now York Herald' reported on 4th Auguat 1874, 
"The benefits expected from the law of the lestancoll or 
limitation of the exportation of nitrateg have only been 
ý'realized in small measure, for the reason that it has not 
been possible to establish the estanco itselfv in spite 
of all the arguments used in its favour. Public opinion 
not only in the Provice of Tarapaca, in the republic 
generally, appears to be decidedly in'opposition to the 
measure, an obstacle difficult to overcome .., and much 
more so in a matter whose successful result required the 
assistance of all". 
By the end of 1874 both British and U. S. consular reports began to 
dwell more and more on the worsening financial situation in Peru. 
In October 1874 March wrote to Derby that the, "urgency of financial 
stability in Peru can only be established by the raising of funds 
abroad from guano sales.. " (P. O., 61/285)- However, March notedt 
the competition provided by nitrates to guano was diminishing both 
the market for and profitability of the government owned fertilizer: 
"It is assmed that nitrate of soda in addition to its ' 
consumption for. chemical purposes and separate application 
to the soil, enters largely into the composition of 
artificial manures used by Britain and other agricultures 
and therefore it is said to'compete with and lessen the 
demand for guano. This circumstance caused a tax to b9 
levied on the-exportation of nitrate of soda from Iquique 
giving rise'to much discontent. .. A heavier impost is now 
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advocated by some, while others call for the suppression 
of the Nitrate works 
(P. O. 61/285P March to Derby, 26th October 1874) 
Such measures wouldq however, still, March notedq give rise to strong 
protests due to the amount of British capital tied up in the area. 
The 'South Pacific Timeslo on the other hand, considered that the 
government should remove ".. the established rights of the few to 
protect, the interests of the many .. " 
(in Greenhill & Miller, 19739 
p. 116). The situation was made all the more urgent due to the collapse 
of Peru's credit rating. Despite a brief revival in the country's 
reputation following the favourable, reports in April 1874 on the 
extent of the guano stocks (Foreign Times, 11th July 1873; 
New York Hearald, 'Financier'3rd September 1874)(reports 6th May 
- 
1874; 
I 
demanded by the Bondholders and the London Press)t and the new Dreyfus 
agreement, the tide had almost immediately turned again. As outlined 
in the preceding chapter, hostile reports on Peru began to appear in 
London newspapers from the middle of the year (Mney Market Review: 
12th December 18741'South Pacific Times: 28th December 1874); most 
damaging of all was an unfavourable report-by 'Stock Exchange Review',, 
which may be said to have effectively sentenced Peru to bankruptcy 
(Maiguaschca, 1967, pp. 299-300). There was considerable pressure 
on the Peruvian Government from within the-country tooi The world 
depression was affecting most aspects, of the export economy, severely 
reducing the sources of income available to the oligarchy, and 1874 
saw the failure of several Peruvian businesses, amongst them the 
prominent merchant houses Ugaxte & Co. and the Zaxacondegui House 
The Times'. 30th June 1874, reported that the failure of * 
Zaxacondegai, ".. one of the foremost and wealthiest merchants 
(of Lima) .. had thrown .. Lima into considerable confusiony 
many families having deposited upwards of 2,000,000 soles with 
him .. A few days after this another failure, that of Mr. Ugaxte, 
waa armounoed .. " 
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On the 10th December 1874 'La Patrial wrote: 
"The paralisation. of business has increased up to a point 
which we may call almost desperate - no new engagements 
are entered into. The banks have hermetically sealed their 
coffers, and if they open them it is not with the intention 
of leading, but with the hope of receiving. Money cannot 
be obtained at any interest, nor on any security, however 
satisfactory. " k 
However, the government was also desperate for money 
1 
and the Peruvian 
banks now represented virtually the only possible source of income. 
It is at this point that the symbiotic relationship between the 
Government and the coastal oligarchy is perhaps most cleaxly 
illuminated. Nitrate was practically the only remining profitable 
industry, and, 'as was customaxy in 19th century Peru, the state was 
to use Peruvian natural resources for the benefit of the oligaxchy - 
both the Peruvian Isalitreroal and the bankers. On the 27th December 1876, 
in his letter to Huth in London, Rowe noted that, "The nitrate 
expropriation scheme is all the banks have to look for 
ý'(IMS-107039 1-2). Roel, too, views the whole operation as little more 
than an exercise to benefit the old guano plutocracy 
2, 
now involved in 
banking, rather than the Peravian state, and Weaver's notion of the 
autonomy of the Peruvian state appears, at this stage, somewhat 
dubious. An extraordinary session of Congress was therefore called 
at the beginning of 1875 to once more discuss the question, raised 
1. IU. S. Consul Thomas, 16th February 1875, wrote to Washington of 
the ".. deeply emb=assed condition of Peruvian finances. " 
(Foreign Relations of the United States) 
2. Roel writes: I'La operacion no estaba dirigida a beneficiar al 
Estado sino, a la plutocracia guanerar convertida en banquera .. " (1977, p. 24) 
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late in 1874 by Finance Minister Juan Eiguera, that nitrate should 
become a government monopoly, and its price be raised (ýaily 
Tel egraph: 12th December 1874). By mid 1875 a scheme was finally 
developed and an expropriation decree passed on the 14th December 18751 
to ýecome law in the middle of 1876. By this law the state was 
authorized to buy up Isalitreros', who, because of the government'. s 
failure to raise a loan in Europe, would be compensated with 2 year 
certificates, bearing &/6 interest and a 49/6 sinking fund, in exchange 
for their properties, Capitalists could then work the loficinas' as 
tenants of the'government, but manufacture was to be carried out 
according to fixed quotas and price controls. The administration of 
this system was placed in the hands of the Peruvian Nitrate Corporation, 
made up of the 4 civilista banks, represented by the Cia. Administradora 
del Estanco del Salitre set up in 1873, British merchants Gibbst and 
the government as a silent partner (F. O. 6.1/351, November 1882). The 
directors of the company were all prominent public figures, several. 
members of congress, and all civilistas. Francisco Garcia Calderon 
was President, Carlos Elizalde Vice-President, and Luis B. Cisneros 
the Secretary. The company received from the state 36 plantsp fully 
equipped and valued-at just over 11 million soles; that is to sayl 
7C% of the industry (Foreign Relations of the United States (Peru)v 
Gibbs to Fish, 13th July 1876). The Providencia Bank took on the 
I 
concession to sell nitrate in Europe, and the House of Oliphant, 
represented by Juan Elmore, the concession for Canada and the 
United States. From this arrangement the banks also took 50/6 
commission on all nitrate sales; but this was not all. The deal also 
granted them control over a variety of other export items, but more 
important still, they were to be permitted to increase their note 
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issues from 9,100,000 soles to 15 million soles, and the return to 
specie payments was indefinitely postponed. This arrangement, 
together with the ParjudaBion given to xulgga ill -IU'j'j to rillwlou 111M 
railways by issue of his own paperp effectively eradicated au 
gove rnm ental control over the money supply and accelerated the already 
chronic inflation and capital flight. (Ms 10,703/1-2, Rowe to Huth, 
27th August 1877) In return, the Government received a bank loan of 
18 million soles 
1. Gibbs' part in the business was as consignee, under 
most favourable terms (Gibbs MS'11,41/3, London to Valparaisoq 
lot February 1876). One of its obligationsg howeverg was to lend money 
to the banks. The entire. negotiation exemplifies the way in which 
the government machinery was used in a quite remarkable way by the 
Civilistas, and other prominent capitalists, to revive their fortunes. 
Due to the world depression the industry was no longer quite so 
profitable as it had been in the early 187ps and, as a result, many 
of the Isalitreros' were more conciliatory in their reaction to the 
law. Indeed Miller and Greenhill(1973) tend to axgae'that they viewed 
19 Spencer Ste John informed the F*09 that "aftor'long negotiationg 
an agreement has at length been arrived at by which the banks 
lend the Government X18 million soles .. to enable the banks to lend this amount they are permitted to increase their circulation 
which is irredeemable .. The Goverment has given as security, 
a certain amount of goverment bonds of the public debt and the 
produce of the nitrate tax or nitrate works w1jen acquired (St. John to P. O., 16th August 1875, P-0- 177/149) 
Initially the goverment had hoped to, 
_rai 
se a million, loan, 
as partof the whole project, using the newly acquired loficinas, 
as security. C4 million of this was to have been employed as 
compensation for the Isalitrerost. In fact, Peru's (by now) 
poor financial reputationg together with the depressed state of the money market, made such a loan impossible. Consequently 
the certificates were issued instead, and the internal loan, 
obtained. 
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the goverment offer as a chance to escape from a nQn-profitable 
industry, while Gibbs' eventual collaboration in the project could be 
viewed as further evidence that the theory that the lestancol alienated 
important foreiga interests, including the Chileans, and was therefore 
a contributory factor in the outbreak of wax in 1879, is untenable. 
However, there were several reasons forý acceptance of the scheme 
. 
this time. As Miller and Greenhill themselves point out, many 
Isalitreros' may simply have felt that strenuous opposition was uselessl 
since the economic situation had deteriorated'to such an extent that 
intervention was inevitable. Having accepted gove = ent intervention 
in the industry, many then proceeded to forge ownership documents with 
the result that the government valuation of the amount of compensation 
due was extremely exaggerated. Spencer St. John observed: 
"The negotiations between the Peruvian Government and the 
nitrate land proprietors was tainted-with jobbery from the 
cormnencement, and prices in certificates were paid for 
nitrate factories fax in excess of their real value .. " 
(P. O. 61A48, Spencer St. John to Currie, 12th November 1883) 
The possibility of making laxge profits out of the goverment in this 
ioiay must certainly have made the, scheme more acceptable to many 
industrialistal especially those who owned the more primitive, 
labour intensive 'paxadas' - who'were mainly Peruvian,, However 
this does not necessarily indicate positive approval of expropriation 
1 by the large, usually Britishp nitrate capitalists . Moreoverg when, 
Indeed there is ample evidence indicating that the lestancol was 
still unpopular. St. John reported the policy in the following 
critical terms: "duties were to be raised to .. so high a figure las to destroy all private enterprise .. They have already 
obtained the session of the majority of the works, and n9w 
intend by a crushing export duty to force the few private 
manufacturers to sell their, property .. " moreover the scheme 
would ".. half ruin the maritime province of Tarapaca, and even the 
most favourable calculations show that no profit will accrue to 
r vernment to make up fol- the great loss to the nation .. " 
714,177/149, Spencer St. John to the PsO., 20th May 1876) 
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in 1878, the Peruvian Government was unable to pay off the former 
I 
IsalitrerosIv it acquired another group of enemiesl, some of whom were 
positively in favour of Chilean annexation of Taxapaca (Chairman of 
Peruvian Bondholders to Derby, 9th July and 11th December 1877, 
P. O. 61/323). There is consistent evidence too that British capital 
had long preferred to work under Chilean administration rather than 
Peruvian. In 1855, in a letter to the P. O., Seymour, Peacock & Co. 
compented on the "frequently distu=bed state of the country", as a 
result of which, "great inconvenience, loss and occasional insult 
has been inflicted on British subjects at this port (Iquique).. " 
(F. O. 61/1589 15th January 1855). As earlier chapters have made clear, 
Peruvian political life during the mid 19th century could be best 
described as violently anarchic, especially when compared to the 
peaceful predictability of Chilean constitutionalism. In the 1860s 
In addition to the Bondholders, whose resentment of the Peruvian 
Goverment's nitrate policy was frequently expressed. The 
issuance of the nitrate certificates was to complicate Peru's 
relationship with the Bondholders leven Aucther, since the 
goverment loans-had been hypothecated on all Peruvian resources. 
Charles Russell wrote to the P. O. in 1877 that ".. the memorandum 
of the Peruvian Government admits that the Bondholders have a 
claim on the nitrate .. ", consequently ".. it is not right of the Peruvian Gove = ent to deal with the Bondholder's property in 
the Nitrates on the plea that they axe covered by the guano .. 
we ask nothing more than a continuance of those rights over 
nitrates which have been pledged us by the Peruvian Goverment (F. O. 61/3239 11th December 1877 ). And in 1878, in a letter to 
Salisbury, Russell's rival Croyle dwelt at length on the value 
of the nitrate deposits ".. yet its proceeds axe being mortgaged 
for the construction of public works whilat the Bondholders. are 
left without any provision whatsoever. " 
(F. O. 61/3239 18th September 1878) 
. 
Orrlulul ouiXI. Vuu4LItJn Ur tho ult; luto o-C Lho 33sinahw1aarw w4 IIo4? 4VI9u4 
nitrate was given, when, at the end of 1879, in a letter to 
Pakenham in Chile on the subject of the Bondholderp, 
Lord Salisbury wrote: 
"the guano and nitrate of soda works now in the haxids of 
Chileans in Peru have already been hypothocated to the 
Bondholders (my emphasis) (Salisbury to Pakenham, 12th December 1879, P. O. 61/317) 
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1 
an employee of the merchant house Dancan Fox observed that there 
appeared to be "countless independent Peruvian armies which seemed 
to be on walking tours all over Perull. He noted that in comparison 
to Chile, Peru was far more 'exciting' (Short History of Duncan, 
Fox & Co. Ltd. - 1843-1956, nd*p P-39)- 
The factional conflict which bedevilled political life increased 
during the crisis yeaxs of the 18703 and this, together with the 
severe economic decline, made Peru an increasingly unattractive 
field of operations. Contemporary merchant houses report heavy 
losses, default on loans, and falling prices. Of course this was a 
feature of all Latin American economies in the 18708, to a lesser or 
greater extent. What distinguished Peru from Chile was the severity 
of the crisis, and consequent increased political and military strife, 
due to the collapse of the major export product - guano - and the size 
of the Peruvian foreign debt. Some merchants, began-to ran down their 
Peruvian operations, and in 1876 the Gibbs manager of the Arequipa 
office, Rayne, wrote to London regarding the wholesaling business in 
Arejuipa, which ".. has now dwindled down to a most insignificant 
extent .. " 
(Gibbs Ms-119470/1,2nd ]December 1876). The nitrate 
monopoly was one more factor in making Peru unpopular and unattractive 
to London 1. The author of 'The Times' editorial on the 30th May 1879, 
after the outbreak of ChilearVFeruvian hoptilitical considered that all 
foreign interests should favour Chile in the war, since the quarrel 
1. 'The commercial report from Arica, printed in. Parliamentary Papers 
at the end of 1876, after the imposition of the lestancolg clearly 
reports disturbance to commerce as a result of the new p9licy 
and a general dissatisfaction with the unsettled state of affairs 
in both Peru and Bolivia (P. P. LXXVI, Commerical ReportsjArica 
to Nugent, 31st December 1876) 
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I 
was a mercantile one, and since Chile stood for free, trade, whilst 
Pera represented restrictive and monopolistic practices and Greenhill 
writes of Chilean nitrate policy in 1880 in the following way: 
"It rejected the Peruvian state monopoly -- officials 
wiahed to preaerve Chilele intmational oredit and her 
attraction to overseas investors which goverment 
intervention in a predominantly foreign owned enterprise 
would endanger" 
(1977v p. 253) 
While Sir. E. J. Reed in a letter to the Foreign Office after the wax, 
in 1886, noted that Chile, as "A friend to the liberty of commerce, 
an enemy to State monopolies .. began by restoring to the 
expropriated owners the (nitrate) beds and factories in exchange for 
bonds of the first issue. " (P-0- 17V1889 22nd March 1886). 
It is improbable, anyway, that the antagonism felt in 1873 would have 
completely disappeared two years later, unless the market had 
completely collapsed. In fact# sales and prices had fallen, but the 
industry could not be described as unprofitable in 1876, and indeed 
Greenhill demonstrates that opposition did still exist when he refers 
to iodine, produced as a by-product-of nitrate manufacture, and an 
industry which involved the same capitalistal but which was not 
expropriated and remained, in private hands, "as an attractive sideline 
for salitreros who resented official interference in the nitrate 
trade .. " 
(19771 p. 269). Moreover, 30/16 of the industry chose to 
remain private and to pay-the extremely heavy export duty (fixed 
at 1.25. soles per quintal, or C4.18s 9d per ton in June 1876 - while 
nitrates in Bolivia remained quite free of tax). These Isalitreros' 
tended to be foreign, among them the large Fo1sch & Martin companyp 
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and the Cia Salitrera de Pisagua, whilst the smaller Peruvian concerns 
that had suffered badly from the recent slump in the industryg Lid 
tend, to welcome the measure, In factp a report on Industry made in 
1878 declared that trade was suffering because of the lestancol. 
(St. John to Salisbury, 23rd May 18789 F. O. 61/306) 
It would appear then that nitrate capitalists were harmed by the 
estanco; Yepes corroborates this viewpoint and writes of the monopoly 
as conflicting with the interests of the big producers, many of whom 
were foreigners (1972, P. 117). Support is lent to this position by 
contemporary press and consular reports which make it clear that 
resistance was offered. On the 3rd September 1874 'The Financier' 
wrote of the relatively light 1873 tax: 
-"It was believed that Congress would repeal the law relating 
to nitrate of soda, which is said to have very prejudicially 
affected the interests aid projects of Tarapaca 
(my emphasis) 
On the 13th July 1876 U. S. Minister Gibbs' letter to the Secretary of 
State, Fish, reported that an extraordinary meeting of Congress had 
been called: 
to force some of the owners of the nitrate of soda works 
in the South .. to come in under the expropriation decree 
These works axe very important and very productive, the 
export from these in 1875 amounting to over 3229745 tons, 
... the government argued that the immense exportation of 
nitrate interfered with the sales of guano .. 
(but) the export 
duty of 60 cents per 100lbs, as per decree referred to, did 
not stop the supply .. some 14 workq, valued at 4,170,000 soleaq 
had refused to enter into terms with the government ..,, 
(my emphasis) 
(Foreign Relations of the United States (Peru) , Gibbs to Fish) 
T14t 1-143-to a. V; Wt r: Vul; l tllg 14"ll, t1q, 10 to 
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it is cleax that the F. O. also disliked the scheme for two further 
reasons: partly because of British opposition to all government 
interference with trade, and also because it was felt thatg like the 
'oppressive guano mompoly', it would lead to higher prices and harm 
British agric-ultureý In a letter to the P. O. concerning nitrate the 
Board of Trade issued the following instructions: 
"As Nitrate of Soda comes to this country almost exclusively 
from Peru, and was imported into the U. K. chiefly for 
agricultural p-L=poses to the amount of nearly C. 1 million 
in 1871, and as any increase in the price following upon the 
establishment of a Goverment monopoly would be very 
disadvantageous to British farmers, I am, therefore, to 
request that you will suggest to Lord Granville whether 
it may not be expedient*to instruct Mr. Jerningham to take 
an opportunity of mentioning to the Peruvian Goverment .. 
that as the price of Nitrate of Soda is now high in this 
country as an agricultura. 1 manure, any increase in its cost 
would check its consumption .. " 
(C. Valpy-F. O., B. T. 12/10/3-1369.. 6th January 1873) 
Opposition also came once more from within Peru, from the 
Pierolistas, who described the project as: 
".. a useless, despotic act, destroying a large business 
and throwing out a great deal of capital that had accumalated 
at the nitrate fields; useless, because the fields of Bolivia 
were just as productiveg and the act would be very beneficial 
to that country .. in answer it was said that the fields of 
Bolivia had been formed to one persong Mr. Meiggs, for a 
stipulated sum per amum, and that this goverment would 
have control over these fields, and that it was-absolutely 
necessary for the Treasury to have-fall powers over all 
nitrate fields in Peru 
(Foreign 
I 
Relations of t he United States, Gibbs to Fish, 
13th July 1876) 
-269- 
The activities of Pierola and his supporters highlight the tension 
between Peru and Chile, which was accentuated by the monopoly, and 
which aggrieved British nitrate capitalists exploited. The 
effective application of the monopoly, through Meiggs, to much of the 
nitrates in Bolivia 
1, teAds to lend'support to the view that Chile 
felt threatened by the lestancol and believed it to be ultimately 
aimed at the Antofagasta Nitrate Company too. It is evident, 
therefore, that Peruvian action would have the effect of pushing the 
British and Chilean Isalitreros' even closer together, especially as 
some of the Tarapaca capitalists reactea to Peruvian Government 
I 
intervention by moving into Bolivian nitrates, where Chilean capital 
was dominant. In a letter from Charles Hall, a British capitalist 
operating in Bolivia, we find the following views: 
"Owing to the position taken by the Peruvian Government as 
regaxds the export of nitrate, and the levying of heavy 
export duties, there is little doubt that at an early date 
capitalists will become acquainted with the la; rge production 
of nitrate to be obtained from these deposits .. in view 
of the axticle being free of export duty in Bolivia 
(F-0- 16/1899 1st May 1876) 
Pierola, the principal opponent of Paxdo and-the Civilistas, had 
been allowed - even encouraged - to use Chile as his bane throughout 
the mid 1870a and, according to Pike (1967j p. 138), promised the 
Chilean capitaýists advantageous concessions in the nitrate and other 
industries in return for their support for his revolutions. It would 
1. Klein writes: "Peruvian capitalists with the aid of U. S. funds 
had attempted to counteract Chilean development of the Bglivian 
littoral" (19719 P-13) 
appeax that he was also able to enlist some British help in hie 
numerou. 6 attempts to overthrow the government. On the 
12th February 1875 'The Financier' noted, regarding the reaction to 
tha laotancol, that, Ile, the nitra-Le worku balolig to xoj? dj6jjUj: W; , 
hence the protection given by the people of that province (Tarapaca) t 
to revolution under Pierola .. Ill and in October 1876 Consul Graham, 
in a letter to the P. O. giving details of the monopoly, also reported 
another Pierolista, revolution: 
"It is generally supposed here that this revolution has 
received material assistance from Chile and Bolivia, with 
an ulterior view to some benefit accruing to these countries 
with regard to the nitrate fields in the one case, and of 
obtaining a good seaport in the other 
(P. O. 61/294P 13th October 1876) 
In May 1877 Pierola, in one of his most spectacular attempts to 
defeat the government, captured the Peruvian ship 'Huasearl, and, 
may even have received support from certain British capitalists. 
On the 12th July 1877 Rowe wrote to Huth that: 
"The goverment has granted an a=esty to a-11 engaged in 
the late revolution. and the country is now quiet. The 
claim on the British Government on account of the 'Huascarl 
affair, has been referred to the Peruvian Minister in 
London, who will trait direotly with the P. O. there on this 
subJect. 11 
I (Ms. 10#703/2) 
On the whole, the country was so torn by internal conflicts during 
these years that Pardo was compelled to return the gove = ent to 
military men, and, after violent elections, he was succeeded by the 
m? -71- 
more popular General Prado 
1. But despite the restoration of military 
rule, only a few months before the Chilean declaxation of wax, Peru 
was again unaer attack ýrom the South. In llebruary 1879 
I 
Spencer St. John reported to the F, O. that: 
"Pierola, the insurgent chieft left France for Chile 
early in January, and is expected in Valpaxaiso during 
the course of the present month. His movements axe watched 
with some anxiety, as it is feared that the discontent in 
. the South may encourage him to attempt a landing there. 
Some ships of wax have been stationed in the Southern 
ports to intercept any expedition which may a=ive from 
Chile 
(P. O. 61/318) 
Professor Kiernan, in an axticle on foreign involvement in the War 
of the Pacific (1955, p. 16), put forward the view that originally 
only wax with Bolivia might have been intended. I have tried to show 
that in fact the Peruvian province of Tarqpaca had long been a focus 
of Chilean economic activity and thus formed part of Chilean 
annexationist ambitions; furthermore, especially after the testancolp 
it was supported in its expansionism by important elements of British 
! cspitalism, and aided by the internal conflicts within the Peruvian 
oligarchy. Further examples of anti-Peruvian activity in the South, 
during these years, may be cited. After the 1873 decree annexationist 
societies called Icaxabineros' were formedl mainly by Chileans, in 
Antofagasta. In thel3. te-1870s, after default on the foreign debt and 
The 
' 
Civilista administration had clearly been preoccupied above all 
else with the restoration of the financial basis of the coastal 
elite, and, despite the alliance with other socioTeconoriicigroýipsp 
Ithis was partly attempted through the imposition of a regime of 
fiscal austerity on other sectors of society. This increased the 
generalised unrest and provoked charges of class politics and 
oligarchic rule (Chavarria, 1972, p. 129) 
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failure to pay off the nitrate certificate holders, guano and nitrate 
bondholders made common cause against the Peruvian Goverment and 
lobbied H. M. G. to take up theirIcase (W. J. Dennis, 1931, p. 69). 
Nitrate certificate holders requested help in regaining their 
properties, and indeed many, after 1878, simply returned to, operating 
them. Obviously this does not necessarily mean that the situation 
was now felt to be satsifactory, since there was always the possibility 
of the Peruvian Goverment re-imposing state ownership. In fact the 
certificate holdersl together with the guano Bondholders, are said to 
have purchased warships and mm-. Litions from the USA for Chile, in 
anticipation of wax (Bulnes, 1911-1919,119 P-107)- Most 
effectively, they applied informal pressure on the Stock Ebcchange to 
prevent the Peruvian agent - Pividal - from obtaining a loan. The 
mishanaling of the Bonaholaers h. -d resultea in the application of the 
ultimate penalty - Peru had been out off from the London money marketq 
and since the entire economy had come to be predicated upon loanal 
collapse was not fax off. Gibbs was well aware of this:, 
"Until the Government Is fully convinced of the futility 
of its attempts to raise money in Europe we think our 
policy is to remain tranquil. .. When they have discovered 
what they cannot do they will probably come to us to see 
what we can do for them. " 
(Gibbs Ms-119471/3, London-Valparaisot 3113t August 1877) 
-a cleax statement of the general superfluity- of direct H, M. G. action 
in support of British capitalism abroad during this period; on the 
whole, the imperialism of free trade and the power of the London 
Money MPWkqb Parflopas 
I 
The tenor of Greenhill and Millers' (1973) study implies that 
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British capital was not alienated by the expropriation policy and 
did.. not therefore play any significant part in the outbreak of the 
War of the Pacific; their analysis centres on the role of Gibbs as 
nitrate consignees. They point to Gibbs' willing collaboration in 
the lestancol as proof that there was little opposition to the scheme. 
I have already demonstrated that this was not the case. With regard 
to Gibbs, in Greenhill and Millers' own words, the merchants ".. were 
anxious to maintain a place in the nitrate trade. Elsewhere in Peru 
the interests of the House were steadily declining .. " as a result 
"the House's commitment to the business was high. Expensive plant 
had been erected and property acquired to a .. 
(great) extent .. 
Gibbs could not now depart quickly from the West Coast or transfer 
resources .. " 
(1973, pp. 119/120). 'A letter from Gibbs' Tarapaca 
branch to Head Office, written in the middle of 1875, makes it quite 
clear that despite the slump (which was. in paxt due to fears of the 
coming expropriation) there was no thought of abandonment of the 
industry (Gibbs'Ms-11O4/9A9 Tarapaca to London, '30th April 1875)- In 
view of this, collaboration was the only sensible option. It does 
not imply happiness with the policy, (even though Gibbs obtained 
genqrous terms) especially since the house gave up the contract in 1878 
to James Sawers & Co., after a difficult two yearalhaving rejected 
government plans for the reorganisation of the trade. 
By the end of 1878, Gibbs' position in Peruvian nitrates was therefore 
inse=ýe, while as major shareholder in the Anglo-Chilean Antofagasta 
Company'in Bolivia, it would naturally feel threatened by the Peruvian 
policy of monopoly and logically be in favour of Chilean annexationist 
ambitions. It is truel howeverg that at first Gibbs was pleased to 
ý274- 
accept the consignment contract. It was to receive high interest 
on ýhe advances it made to the bankst and generous commission. 
Greenhill has also asserted that Gibbs liked working with governments, 
because "competition was automatically eliminated" (Greenhill, 1977, 
p. 184). In the event this. was not the case, because of the operations 
of the Antofagasta Company and because the Peruvian Government had 
failed to expropriate all the nitrate works in Taxapaca. In 
December 1876 Graham Rowe wrote to Huth: 
11 this vast project is being so grossly mismanaged between 
tho: m (the banks) and the goverment, that unless energetic 
measures axe speedily adopted to check the eiports from 
free producers in Iquique, the expropriation scheme will 
prove a disastrous affair 
'(MS. 703/1-29 27th December,, 1876) 
and in fact the large profits hoped for were never realized. Moreover, 
according, to W. M. Matthe. wy Gibbs, did not like working with Peruvian 
Governments, since they were ".. -of proven unreliability and uncertain 
durability. " (1972, p.. 16p). The partnership ended with the attempto 
through Pividal, to re-establish Peruvian credit by negotiating an 
agreement which would provide a solution to both the guano Luid xdtr"Lu 
problems. Singe the previous two years had proved largely unsatisfactoryl 
and since Gibbs was not interested in a joint nitrate-guano businessp 
due to the poor quality of the remaining guanog the house relinquished 
its contract, in Spring 1878. During this period, the Peruvian 
ýGovernment on average received onlY 4d. a ton from nitrate sales. 
According to Greenhill and Xiller's figures, frora August 1876 to 
August 
. 
1877 1.95 million quintals were shipped, and were sold for 
91.2 million; howeverp these exports produced a mere C34,000' after 
costs (1973, pp. 124/5). 
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After Maxch 1878 the Peruvian Government handed over to the Cia. 
Salitrera direct administration of the business. This may be seen as 
another example of government action designed to benefit the 
oligarchy rather than the 'nation', since the banks, (by now only the 
Providencia, and the Nacional were involved) had proposed this step 
which they hoped would solve their by now desperate financial position. 
The Consignment contract was given to the'Sawers House. However this 
arrangement was no more successful than the previous one, and Sawers 
collapsed after a while. The Peruvian Goverment then turned to 
Graham Rowe to act as consignees, whog howeverg due to Gibbs' 
continued involvement in the trade, and their greater experience and 
contracts, had little success. They were in turn succeeded by the 
Ba#ngs House, but, by mid 1879 war had broken out, and the lestancol 
was effectively finished. 
, 
The Peruvian nitrate monopoly could-well be considered almost a 
complete failure. It did not save the Peruvian economy and oligaxchy 
from the slump'; it did not even enable the Peruvian Governnent to 
recommence interest payments on the foreign debt following default in 
January 1876. Daring 1876 Rowe's letters to Huth report strikes, 
bankruptcies, soaxing inflation, political unrest and the abandonment 
of Peru by several major Peruvian capitalists. On the 
27th January 1876 he wrote; 
"We enclose invoice for the bax silver and regret the high 
costq the price having risen fully 1QY6 during the past 
fortnight owing to a positive panic having seized upon 
c. ertain private persons, inducing them to get their capital 
out of the country at any cost. " 
,#. - (ms-10703/1-2) 
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Fifteen months later the estanco had not improved the situation:. 
"The financial situation here. continues very critical 
Strikes amongst the labouring classes are frequently 
occuring and prices of everything axe rising in an 
alarming fashion, while .. manifestations of discontent 
are matters of daily occurence and greatly aggravate a 
state of affairs which is not improved by: a feeble and 
incapable gove=ent. 11 
Ms, 10-70""P 12th July 1877) 
Howeverg this chronic financial situation was partly, as Rowe notedl 
artificia. 19 being laxgely due to the world depression and to Peru's 
extreme dependence on loans. 1ý. rpsumably, if it had not been for the 
Wax of the Pacific, Peru would have eventually recovered when an 
upturn in the market occurred, with its commerica. 1-infrastructure 
relatively intact and indigenous ownership of many key industries 
maintained. Bat the nitrate monopoly not only failed to bring Mach 
inmediate financial relief, it also antagonised important foreign 
interests. Furthermore, the commercial report from Arica, dated 
the 31st December 18769 discussed the situation in Peru and Bolivia, I 
and the results of the lestancol, in the following unfavourable way: 
"At the beginning of the yeax trade wore a favourable aspectj 
and there was reason to hope for a prosperous year for all 
branches of commerce, but the disastrous state of the finances 
of the countryl the alarmleaused by the projects and decrees 
of the government attacking and um=ping private interests 
in the nitrate districts, the rapid depreciation of the 
notes of the Lima banks with which the whole country was 
inundated, and political disturbances in many portions of the 
country, have brought an a result different to what was 
anticipated at the conmencement of the year. .. Besides the 
monetary crisis, the disturbed political state of Boli-vial 
and the continual fluctuations in the price of silverg have 
added their share to reducis comerical opportunities in this 
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department... Exports have fallen off, whilst by the 
injudicious action of the government an unhealthy impulse 
was given to imports .. parties .. were-not 
in a position 
to compete with the influx of goods brought into the market 
under more advantageous rates, and much distress and 
commercial embarrassment has been caused to houses of 
middle standing. " 
(Commercial Reports (Arica), P. P. ILXXVIq lfý74; wj emplýasis) 
Moreover, as well as having exacerbated the slump in Perug the 
monopoly scheme was misjudged, given Chile's heavy commitment to 
the 
nitrate industry and history-of expansionist ambitions in the 
Aýacama/Tarapaca area. As Rodriguez pointed out it was an inopportune 
moment for : ýeru to attempt the implementation of such a measure. The 
economic crisis had made the nitrate industry all the more important 
to the Chilean econo - however, Chile's financial condition was 
better than Pera'sq Chile had not alienated important European 
interests, was a cohesive state and had a strong army and navy. Peru, 
despite massive state expenditure on the army and navy did not even 
have the military superiority necessary: 
".. paxa hacer respetax sus derechos en el exterior. En 
tales eircunstanciaeg y teniendo por antecedentes el vivo 
deseo de Chile para conservax la libre yo casi exclusiva 
explotacion de los nitratos de Tarapaca. i Convenia al Pera 
1£Utzuxou oll wl nawino an la o-aul üü: vrla todou loci riüugou 
de una aventura financiera y aun los de serias complicaciones 
However, Chilean historian Vicuna MacKenna expressed the feelings 
of the majo3ýity--of. contempo: rary.. Chileans in hie'view of-thO 
affair in terms of racial destiny; according to him the riches 
of. Taxapaca ".. attracted to that Republic a human avalancheq 
an active, vigorous and intelligent race which was to be 
confronted with anotherg indolent, luxurious and demoralised 
from the climate and idleness.. " (1880, P-32) 
en sue relaciones exteriores? " 
(Rodriquez, 1916, X, P-323) 
Spencer St. John too attributed the wax to the expropriation policy: 
"Ever since President Pardo established the monopoly of 
nitrate of soda in Taxapacaq and thus irreparably injured 
Chilean influence in that province, the Government of 
I Santiago has watched the opportunity of regaining influence 
(29th April, 18799 P. O. 61/318, St. John to P. O. ) 
He also estimated that up to 40,000 Chileans left Peru on the outbreak 
of wax -a clear indication of the extent of Chilean involvement and 
interest in the Peruvian economy. 
Peruvian nitrate policyt hQweverq formed only one element in the 
complex web of events leading up to the disastrous wax, which was to 
virtually destroy the Peruvian pconomy. I shall now exaý4ine Chilean 
and British involvement in Bolivian nitrates. 
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CHAPTER 9-: THE HISTORY OF CHnEM-BOLIVIAN RELATIONS AU THE CAUSES 
OP THE PACTPTC WAR 
On the ourfacep the'Pacifio War would appear to have boon simply the 
result of a disagreement over tariffs'between Bolivia and Chilet into 
which Peru was drawn, owing to a defensive treaty with Bolivia. This 
'secret' treaty, made in 1873, dxaws attention to the matter at the 
heart of the conflict; it. was designed to prevent any attempt at 
annexation'on the part of Chilean and/or other foreign interests in 
the Atacama Desert. I 
The origins of the wax may be traced back to a longstanding boundar. y 
dispute between Chile and Bolivia. As already mentionedg boundary 
disputes between the new South American states were common throughout 
the 19th century, and all contained the germ of a conflict similar 
to the Peruvian/Chilean war. They arose because of the nature of elite 
Auto-VIU", 'ruulloa 'IjY Lila ax1riL01400 U-C lulld w1a 
frequently unexplored frontiers, which had not been clearly 
established on Independence, and were almost invariably triggered off 
by the discovery of raw materials of interest to European or North 
American capitalism. Chile was actually involved in such a dispute 
with Argentina at the time of the outbreak of the Pacific Waxj and the 
origins of this latter qu=el'also conincided with an important 
preliminary stage in Chile's expansion Northwaxds into Bolivia and 
1. I Peru Purther similaxities between the two disputes lie in the fact 
1. - Because of this, attempts were made in 1873 to attach Argentina 
to the Peruvian-Bolivian allinace against Chile, but as Argentinian- 
Chilean relations deteriorated even further as the decade wore onj 
the Peruvian Government decided that Argentini4n adherence was too 
risky, and the negotiations were dropped. However, shortly before 
the wax of the Pacific, the Chileans suffered a reversa in their 
attempt to expand into territory claimed by Argentina. Interestingly 
this set-back was seen by Lavalle as a factor in Chilean determination 
to go to wax with Bolivia. (Basadre, 1976, P-56) 
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that Chile's Southern policy was motivated by the discovery of guano 
in Patagonia and Tierra del Paego, and by a determination to dominate 
the Straits of Magellan (G. Smith, 19699 P-49)- 
When the independent states of Bolivia and Chile were establishedq 
it was asmimmed that the old colonial limits that had demarcated the 
Audiencia of Charcas from that of Santiago would continue to serve: 
the limits were generally defined at either 260201 South latitude, by 
the Rio Salado, or even as fax as 27 0 201 South, on the river Copiapo. 
Hoever, towards the end of the colonial era the settlement of a group 
of 6hilean Indian fishermen at Paposo had effectively extended Chile's 
Northern frontier up to 25 0 latitude South (C. R. Markhamt 1882t P-83)- 
This boundaxy is confirmed by a number of contemporary sourcest including 
Chile itself in decrees passed in 1822,18239 1828t 1832 and 1833- 
Jel3i Pentlandl aoting for H, MqGq go a sojentifio investigatorp 
presented a reýiew of Bolivia to the F, O. in 1831 in which he wrote: 
a small paxt only of the Bolivian territory borders on 
the sea; where between the 21 0 and 250 oý South latitude the 
desert province of Atacama forms the littoral of the Pacific 
Ocean. " 
However, he went on to highlight the factors that would later provide 
Chile with opportunities for expansion: 
"It would be a difficult and useless task to endeavour to 
fix within any probable limitep the superficial extent of 
the Bolivian territory, owing to the imperfect date we 
possess respecting the true geographical position of its 
limits with the surrounding states. " 
(P. O. 61/20,24th October 1831P J. B. Pentland to P. O. ) 
and as early as 1033, Wilson reported to Palmerston that, Cobija 
(Atacama's port) was mainly populatedg not by Boliviansq but by 
"Chileans, Buenos Ayreansq Americans and French .. " 
(F. O. 61/23P 
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5th March. 1833)- 
It was in the 1840s and 1850B that the South American republicap 
in general, were beginning to participate more actively in the world 
economy. This was partly due to internal factorst such as a degree of 
greater stability of political and social structures in some of the 
republics, but'it was largely brought about by increased Europeang 
and in paxticulax British, demand for raw materials. A major 
requirement of British capitalism at this time was the increased 
productivity 9f its agricultural sectorg andq as a resultl fertilizers 
were most valuable commodities. Peruvian re-incorporation into the 
European orbit thus took place through the extraction and exportation 
of guano. The bird dung became the most important fertilizer for 
British agriculture for isevera. 1 decades (Mathewl 1970 and 1972)p and, 
on the basis of this vital product the'Peravian economy became fixed 
in a monoproductive, exporting roleg a dependent appendage. of British 
capitalism (Levin, 1960)., Because of the. splintered nature of these 
republics$ which was compounded by the absence, of even a potential 
domeatic. market, raw material exports, and sea communicationsg were 
indispensable for any economic development to take place 
1. Chile's 
inýerest in, and later claims, to, the Bolivian Atacama Desert were 
thereforet-not surprisingly, prompted by the search for profitable 
exports, and in particular guano. As M. C. Shurtleffj writing in the 
1. This was especially true of Peiu and Bolivial wherej due to their 
elitist and racist social structures ana general povOrtyl CaPitalism 
was always a mercantile, export phenomenon, generally uninterested 
in industrial enterprise. The extreme export-orientation which 
characterised the Peruvian economy was in turn a contributory factor in the failure to develop a cohecivet integrated state 
and internal market. (O. r. - Gootenberg, 1982) 
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West Coast Leader in 1928, explained: 
"Guano was discovered in the desert of Atacama in the early 
1840s and in 1842 the President of Chile sent a commission 
to explore in that territory, whose findings he reported to 
the Chilean Congress, July 31fit, 1842, and that body enacted 
a law on October 31st, providing that ".. all the guano 
deposits which existed in the province of Coquinbol in the 
littoral of Atacama, and in the adjacent islandsq are hereby 
declared national property. "" 
(13th November 1928). 
This exploratory mission marked the beginning of Chile's expansion 
Northward, and the expedition Eruzveyed the coast from 290 35' to 
2306, south latitude, therefore penetrating well into Bolivian 
territory (F. O,. 61/95, Masterton to Bidwell, 25th November 1842). 
At the time however, the Bolivian upper classes were engaged in bitter 
internecine struggles (Klein, 1971, p. 12), and thereforev apart from 
issuing a formal protest, the Bolivian goverment was unable to offer 
effective resistance. Moreover the Chilean minister to Bolivia 
subsequently adopted a conciliatory approachq comparing the desert to 
a river and claiming that it was a 'no man's land' that should be 
divided equally between the two countries (in Fiferl 19729 P-53)- 
Then, in 1845, the Chilean Juan Lopez discovered the Mejillones guano 
beds and Chilean and foreign capitalists began to move in. The 
Atacama Desert was to become a boom region over which Bolivia would be 
unable, in future, to exercise its rightful sovereignty to the full. 
Bolivia was in a difficult position from which to repulse these 
advances, partly because the coastal region was inaccessible and 
distant from the central zone of the country, the altiplanO- 
Moreoverg Bolivian internal politics were characterised by factional 
conflict which generated unrest to a degree that inhibited the 
1 
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pursuance of capitalist enterprise on the scale demanded by the 
Ataqama deposits. In W. J. Dennis' words: 
"With this great treasure under the sands of her desert 
littoral, Bolivia remained indifferentl apparently more 
interested in the struggles of her 'barracks presidents' 
while the followers of President Bulnes in Chilej 
t Manuel Montt and Jose Perez, encouraged the development 
of the industry. "' 
(1931v P-36) 
The Bolivian social formation contained the same problems as the 
Peruvian structure, but to a greater degree. Its creole leaderep 
on Indpendence, had envisaged it fulfilling the role of a buffer 
statel but in fact, for most the 19th centurys it was merely a 
pan in Peruvian/Chilean relations* Post-Independence history, thus 
fulfilled many of Bolivar's fears with regard to the future of this 
isolated Andean republic, The creole elitep when planning its future 
in the 1820s had overlooked the dependence of Upper Peru on imperial'- 
communication links and administrationj andl in particulart on the 
Peruvian port 9f Arica (Pifer, 19729 p. 24)- From the very begiming 
of the republican eraq therefore, the 'Problem. ' of the Pacific' 
dominated the preoccupations of serious Bolivian statesmen$ and the 
lack of a good seaport also effectively prevented Bolivian 
participation in the mid-19th century export boom, Howeverp the 
solution to these problems of communications was linked to the 
creation of a viable state order, which would enforce some uniformity 
of language and culture and institutionalize political processes 
throughout the republic. After Independence the fragile unity of the 
upper class6eq that had emerged in order to create the republict 
shattered, and the country disintegrated into a multitude of warring 
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factions, and cultural and regional enclaves. Even more than in 19th 
century Pera, the state as a concept meant little or nothing to the 
Bolivian Indians (who formed the ovýrwhelming majority of the population) 
(Klein, 1971 P P-7), Whilet the elite was divided by a vaxiety- of 
ideologies, sepaxatist projects and personal ambitions. Consequently 
the Bolivian 'gove rnm ent', which had an extremely imperfect purchase 
on most of the'altiplanol, and was certainly unable to control its 
population in outlying areas, could do little to assert its legitimate 
rights over such an empty and distant part of the country as the Ataca-m 
Desert. Furthermore, frequent changes of president resulted in a 
totally inconsistent policy, an oscillation between blustering defiance 
and overgenerous capitulationg as pro-Chileans were followed by pro- 
Peruvians (H. Osborne, 1964, PP-50-58). The anarchic nature of 
Bolivian society at this time, and the inability of governments to 
establish harmonious relations with foreign powersv even deterred 
I 
metropolitan capital; H. M. G., after some humiliating experiences had 
been undergone by British representativesp refused to establish a 
consulate there However a British consulate was set up in Atacamay 
After a long period without British representation in the Bolivian 
'altiplano', Mr. Duffield wrote to the F*O. in 1872, indicating the 
fact that Bolivia was beginning to participate more fully in the 
world economy, and requesting the appointment of a British 
charge d'affaires to Sucre: 
"You would confer a great favour upon several merchants and others 
in the city if you could inform them that there was some 
probability of diplomatic relations being re-established between 
Great Britain and the Republic of Bolivia. " 
He went on to describe Bolivia as ".. one of the richest countries 
in the world", suggesting that its unfortunate propensity for 
'_'miserable revolutions" might be curtailed by II.; 
l 
nf__wn-rs and 
railways .. " 
(Duffield to Lord Granvilles P. O. 1190 
1ýth August 1871). However, Muffield's imperialist fervour received 
a temporary set back in 1875 wheng partly in response to-his requeSto 
St. John visited Bolivia to consider the establishment of a British 
diplomatic mission thereg but found the republic far too uncivilinedo 
anarchic and impoverished to be worthy of a British Consulate. (St. John to the F. O., P. O. 61/294t let Januaryt 1876) 
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indicating Chilean control of the area, and its importance to British 
capital. Since the region was dominated and claimed by Chile, and 
sixýce Chile was a satisfactory collaborator, unofficial support was 
therefore leant this claim by the foreign capitalists in the area who 
preferred to work with Chile than Bolivia and who treated Atacama as 
a Chilean domain. 
Bolivia wag thus unable to comyete with Chile'in any sphere and 
militarily was totally inferior. This resulted in the gradual 
involvement of Peru in the dispute'for various reasons. Peru was partly 
motivated by dislike I and foax of Chilean aggrandisementj partly by its 
traditional linkages with Upper Peru (Bolivia)q and partly because unless 
it clearly suppotted the Bolivian cause, Bolivian statesmen would ally 
with Chile, cede Atacama, and annex the Peruvian port of Arica. 
Howevert Chilean military superiority also meant that the Bolivian 
response to Chilean encroachments was initially cautious, and the 
dispute was at first pursued through the medium of petitionst 
examination of official papers and diplomatic representationsp 
throughout all of which Bolivia continued to. claim. 'the 26th parallel 
as its frontier. ' 
Negotiations continued in this form for'21 years, during which time 
Bolivia sent 
ý 
separate'diplomatic missions to Chile to prove ownership 
of the territory, ' without achieving any concrete result (Dennist 19729 
PP-40-45). Meanwhileg Chile continued to assert its power. In 1847 
a Chilean expedition landed at Mejillones to work the guanog and later 
that year a warship from Chile stopped and released some workers who 
had been imprisoned by Bolivia (P. O. 16/119). The soldiers also built 
a small fort near Mejillones, over which they raised the Chilean flag. 
Apart from these provocative infringements of Bolivian sovereigntyp' 
-286- 
penetration of tho roaion algo PrOugOdOd in the fomn of Wommod 
conpercial activity. However, Bolivia did not renounce its claims 
over the desert, and did manage to officially maintain nominal 
jurisdiction over the disputed territory for most of the time up 
until 1857, when the Chileans suddenly adopted a more aggressive 
policy. During the intervening period the dispute was in a state of 
deadlock. The most positive action that was taken was the 
occassional expulsion, by both countries, of guano shippers working 
under licenses from the'rival governments, from the Mejillones area 
(Dennis, 1931, PP-33-36). However commercial activity mushroomedp 
-an infrastructure was established (laxgely through British capitalt 
and British and North American engineers) to facilitate the extraction 
of the raw materials, and urban facilities were expanded. The Atacama 
I 
desert played a major part in the boom experienced by the Chilean 
economy from 1845 to 1860 (Blakemore, 1974, pp. 6-8), and the axea 
became integrated into its economy. North American railroad buildersp 
employed by a Chilean company (oppenheimert 1982), constructed a line 
to Copiapo (in Chile) from the sea, and built UP for it a now port at 
Caldera;. this ýecame a regular stop for Wheelwright's steamline. 
Gradually the influence of Chile and Britain -extended Northward in the 
form of capital, entrepreneurship, trade with Antofagasta and Tarapaca, 
ajad a labour force. Diversification into other fields also took place 
(Pa Caracolino'(Antofagasta) 16th June 1873)- One important British 
concern, The Copiapo Mining Company, was not only involved in the 
exPloitation of the rich mineral deposits that had been discovered in 
thG'Atacama, but was also engaged in stock and alfalfa raij3ingp and in 
general commerce. 
: C11 1857 a new stage in the Antofagasta question was reached when the 
-287- 
Chileans, taking advantage of the warfare in Bolivia between the 
factions of Jose M. Lin I ares and Jorge Cordoba, took possession of 
Mejillones, and ordered all nitrate and guano operators to obtain 
Chilean licenses or face expropriation. Soldiers were landed in the 
province and a Chilean warship stationed off the coast (Barry 19749 
p*89). Bolivia immediately sent an envoy to Santiago and demanded 
withdrawal as a necessary precursor to discussion; Chile refused 
(F. O. '16/126). ' The matter dragged on until another Bolivian diplomat 
was accredited to discuss the issue, but the Chilean plenipot , entiary 
refused to agree to neutral axbitration and suggested, insteadq 
division of the te=itory. The question had become of national and 
international importance, and appeared l3o-explosive that both Peru 
I 
and the United States offered mediation. Pe I ru contirmed to be 
motivated, by fear of Chilean expansionism and by its own pretensions 
to a role as the West Coast policeman/arbitrator'. In any caseq 
according to. Thomson, British representatives in Chileg ".. it was 
rumoured that an agent was about to'be dispatched on a secret mission 
to Peru with the view of persuading that government to support the 
cl4ms of Bolivia to the sovereignty of the district of Mejillones". 
(F. Os 16/1259 Thomson to-P. 0e, 17th Maxch 1863)2 The United Statest 
1. 'El Peruanol, 17th February 1864, reproduced the Peruvian offer of 
mediation which dwelt on the evils of war between South American 
republics, partly because of the opportunities it offered foreign imperialists. The effect of war was to: ".. disminuir nuestras deficientes poblaciones , alentar protensiones de extrano quo aprovecharian por soyuzga=os de rmestras esciciones inte=acionalest 
y agostar'todos los germenes de prosperidad .. " (extract of mediation note dated 4th February 1864) 
2., However Thomson also reported that it was "not unlikely that (in the event of war) Chile would propose to Peru a joint action against Bolivia .. " introducing a further possible dimension tothe complex West Coast power relationships. (F. O. 16/126, let August 1863) 
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on the other hand, hoped to utilise the situation to expand its sphere I- 
of influence, while protecting the North American concessionary 
interests already granted by the Bolivian Goverment (Pifer, 1972, 
PP-54-55). Moreoverg the Bolivians made an overt attempt to enlist 
North American help too, giving, further concessions to United States 
citizens, ancl requesting official support. (P. O., 16/125i 16th June 1863, 
Thomson to F. O. ). On the 5th July 18639 therefore, feeling that it had 
the backing of the United States and Peru, the Bolivian Legislative 
Assembly authorized the executive to declare war (F. O. 16/125, 
Thomson to F. O,, 17th July 1863)- However, in the eventg the crisis 
was averted, partly because a new threat to the West Coast emerged 
with the Spanish seizure of the Peruvian Chincha, Islands 
1, 
and 
negotiations continued through diplomatic channels (F. O. 11/18). 
The Spanish attempt to re-establish imperial power in South America 
forced the West Coast elites to. temporaxily resolve their disputes 
and unite to face this new danger. At about the same time a military 
coup in Bolivia brought General Mariano Melgarejo to power 
2; Melgarejo 
1. The wax arose out of Spanish-Peruvian clash over the treatment of 
workers on a'haciendaat Talanbo in is63, and flared into war in 
18649 when'Admiral Pinzon occupied Peruls guano islands (P. O. 
16/126). At first the Spanish appeared to have been victorious 
as they induced the Peruvian president, Pezet, in 1865P to accept 
" humiliating and costly treaty. Howeverl this was overturned by 
" populax revolution against Pezet led by Prado from Axequipa, (IEl Comerciol, 7th March 1865)- Prado then went ong in alliance 
with Bolivia and Chile, to defeat the Spanish. Despite final 
victory, the wax was most expensive and contributed to Perals 
deteriorating economic situpýtion. 
2. Melgaxejo is described by Osborne as a "grotesque tyrant and 
habitual drunkard" (1964, p. 98), and by Klein as a "caudillo 
who was not above selling vast amounts of national territory to. foreign powers for personal profit" (1971P P-13) - 
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was pro-Chilean and very much under the influence of the Chilean 
Minister to Bolivia - Aniceto Vergaxa Albano. Their close 
relationship, together with the anti-Spanish collaboration$ resulted 
in an entangling alliance of fatal consequence for the Bolivian and 
Peruvian elites. The Treaty of Limits, concluded in August 1866, 
recognized the, 24th parallel as the boundary between Chile and 
Bolivia; furthermore, the guano from the Mejillones-beds situated 
North of paxallel 240, along with minerals extracted from the zone 
between paxallels 23 0 and 25 0, were to pass through what amounted to 
a joint customs officel and the two countries were to share the income 
from the export tariffs collected there (F. O. 16/141). The treaty of 
1866 therefore effectively divided the sovereignty of the Atacama 
Desert between Chile and Bolivia, and was thus cleaxly to the 
disadvantage of the latter country, especially as more richest in the 
form of abundant nitrate beds, were discovered in the very same year - 
and conceded by Bolivia to Chilean busines. s interests. A further 
reagon for acceptance by Bolivia of these unfavourable arrangements 
is contained in the later writings of Melgaxejols chancellort Manozo 
who was also strongly pro-Chilean. Manoz explained the willingness to 
hand over Bolivials coastal region in the following way: 
11o. bajo la formal promesa de que Chile apoy=ia al 130livia 
de modo mas eficaz para la ocupacion armada-del litoral I 
peruano hasta el Morro de Jalta .. en razon de que la unica 
salida natural que Boliva tenia al Pacifico era el puerto 
de Arica 
(in Basadre, 1976, p. 12) 
This was not the first time that*such a proposal had been put forward. 
During the earlier struggle in the 1830B with the Peruvian-Bolivian 
Confederation, Argentina had also become involved, hoping to annex 
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the Bolivian province of Tarija- In return it was proposed by Chile 
and. Argentina 'that Bolivia might be compensated with the coastal part 
of the Peruvian province of Arequipaq in which Arica was situated. 
The idea of appropriating the Bolivian, and part of the Peruvianp 
coastline, while compensating the former power with Peruvian territoryl 
had remained a consistent objective for Chilean statesmeng whilst 
knowledge of such schemes continued to provide a strong motivation for 
Peruvian involvement in Bolivian 
. 
/Chilean quarrels. This factor 
highlights the aspect examined earlier, central to a consideration of 
the War of thp Paolflo - tiningly 11te n1tronin powpr r4t4nttrLS1V li-W-Vil 
the Peruvian and Chilean elites which had, dominated West Coast 
politics ever since both states had achieved independence. Although 
Professor Kiernan, in his examination of the wax, generally rejects 
the charges of British involvement in the quarrel, and points out that: 
anyone who may possibly have encouraged Chile at the 
outset may have intended no more than a war with Bolivia 
alone 
(1955f p. 16) 
in fact, the history of relations between Peru and Chile cleaxly 
indicates that Peru was always the intended victim of the conflict. 
As was observed in a despatch to the P. O. on the 24th April 18799 it 
was clear that Chile had always intended to wage war on Peru "since 
the 
I 
hostilities with Bolivia, a country not possessing a navyq does 
not call for the necessity of maintaining a fleet and army in 
Antofagasta, nor for the erection of harbour fortifications 
(St,. -john to F. O., F. O. 61/318), Not only was Chile, by 1874, fully 
aware of'the 'Secret' Treaty concluded between Peru and Boliyia in 
Lima'on the 6th Februaxy 1873, which would involve Peru in any 
Chilean-Bolivian conflict, but it also continued in its attempts to 
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befriend Bolivia and isolate Perut whilst sheltering disaffected 
Peruvian revolutionaries. In August 1875, in a-secret letter to, the 
F. O. 9 British Minister Spenser St. John discussed the negotiations 
that were then underway between Brazil and Chile: I 
11.... Brazil, intends to take possession of Montevideo .... 
and in order to lessen the opposition likely to be offered 
by Buenos Ayres, Brazil has agreed to sign a Treaty with 
Chile, not'only guaranteeing her Patagonia but also the 
-ma itime province of Bolivia. To prevent Bolivia offering 
obstaoleal it is proposed that it should be comyonsated at 
the expense of Peru, and that it should receive the province 
of Moquegua . .... It has not been settled which republic 
is to obtain the valuable province of Tarapaca, but Chile 
is well known to covet it. " 
(F-0- 177/149,26th August 1875, St. John to F. O. ) 
The war against Spain, however, had, as with Bolivian-Chilean 
relations, also brought about a temporary relaxation of the 
hostility between Chile and Peru; butj during the war, the naval 
imbalance between the two countries increased, while the importance 
, of navalpower 
had been clearly demonstrated'. Chile had been 
prevented by British neutrality laws from receiving delivery of two 
modern corvettes it had ordered, while Peru had obtained two very 
powerful ironclads before the outbreak of the war. After the defeat 
of Spain, relations between Peru and Chile (as well as between Chile 
and Bolivia) quickly deteriorated againg and the struggle for naval 
supremacy intensified Ma Prensal, 4th October 1872). The tension 
1. Long before the war with Spain, however, the Chileans and 
Peruvians had carefully observed each others' navies, and 
Chile had linked the West Coast balance of power with both 
naval power and guano and salitre. 
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was further exacerbated during this period by an increase in Chilean 
activity, both political and economic, in the Atacama Desert. Such 
activity not only posed a military threat to Peruvian Southern 
borderlands, and represented a challenge to the West Coast balance of 
power, but also involved competition with, and even encroachment on, 
Peruvian-industry in Tarapaca. It was the Bolivian Atacam Desertp 
however, that provided the principal axen, a for this intra-oligarchic 
I 
struggle. 
In the 1840s and 18508 the lack of population onjand the great 
distance from Lima. ofthe Peruvian Lobos Islands were cited as reasons 
for a British take-over of Peruvian guano reserves (F. O. 61/136 and 
F. o. 61/137). In the sane way, the isolation of Atacama from the main 
body of Bolivianterritory, together with its emptinessp were utilised 
and produced as justification of Chilean expansion intoýthe desert. 
As ýas already been mentioned, Chile's first economic'activities 
centred on exploitation of the Mejillones guano beds. This interest 
was quickly expanded by mineral discoveries, and copper mines began to 
be worked. The infrastructure that was built up and the industrial 
aotivity that developed in the 1850s and 1860a on the basis of these 
\ -products has already been touched upon in chapter6 - It is important 
to note-that this economic activity further served to blur the boundary 
limits, as operators' interests stretched across frontiers and 
commmication links between the three countries were strengthened. 
Just as jurisdiction over the desert was shared between Bolivial Chile 
and Peru, so too the entire regional economyl from the North of Chile 
to the-Southern states of Pera, became a mosaic of Chileang Peravian 
and British interests, while legal ownership rights remained in dispute. 
Although by the mid 19th century about one third of Bolivian international 
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commerce passed through Atacama's main port, Cobijq, 
. .- 
Bolivia's 
only. (barely) serviceable outlet on the coast - Bolivia never 
participated in the economic boom others enjoyed in the desert, even 
in the 1860s and 1870s (Fifer, 1972v P-58). The main centres of 
Bolivian life were several. days journey bý male from its coastlineq 
and'this fact, together with a severe lack of capital and the 
continued preoccupation of the Bolivian elite with political 
infighting, left foreign interests to thoroughly exploit the riches 
of the littoral. According to Klein*(1971, P-4)t over 90% of 
communication between Cobija and the interior population of Bolivia' 
was controlled by foreign nationals. 
Interest in the Atacama Desert increased even more wheng in the 
eaxly 1860s, more guano and nitrate deposits were discoveredi. These 
rich finds occurred at a crucial stage in the hostilities between 
Bolivia and Chile, and strengthened the latter's determination to 
make no concessions. According to Thomsop's despatch to the F. O. 
early in 1863, the deposits were extremely abundant: 
IIA, rough survey of the deposits has been made, and it is 
supposed that at least two million tons exist in them 
The quality of the guano 
is 
said to be superior to that of 
Paquica which is quoted in the latest Liverpool price at 
P-10 to Z8 per ton; and if-it be true that two millions 
of tons exist, the value of the whole may be safely 
estimated at sixteen millions sterling .... 
(17th March 1863, F. O. 16/125) 
1. In, October 1860, D. Forbes wrote to the F. O. that: 
"The newly discovered deposits of nitrate of soda near 
Tocopilla axe now in full working activity. The quality 
of the nitrate of soda is stated to be excellent and A 
contains considerable iodine of sodium (20th October 1860, P. O. 11/17) 
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Then, in the mid 1860s, 'more #ch nitrate deposits were found in 
the. region. Castro y Luna Victoria wrote that: 
"Ingentes capitales extranjeras salieron aquel ano (1865) 
de los mas acaudalados bancos no solo para explotax el 
nuevo mineral descubierto en Caracolesq sino para 
establecer nuevas industrias 
(18849 P-10) 
This discovery occurred at a-time when the importance of guano to 
British and European agriculture was beginning to diminishq as it was 
realised that different fertilizers were needed for different crops 
(Mat thew, 1970, p. 116); consequently the nitrate industry had begun 
to boom. On the 20th May 1875 the Peruvian newspaper 'El Comerciol 
. 
Qwly been invading the field hitherto reported that I',. nitrate hap P1 
reserved to guano. It continues this invasion daily Chilean 
capitalists had long been involved in Peruvian nitrate in Taxapaca, 
and Chilean labourers made up a major paxt of the industry's 
workforce - after the expropriation of the 1870S there was estimated 
to be over 109000 Chilean workers in Tarapaca (F. O. 61/259, no-79)- 
Th6 first Chilean nitrate operation in Bolivia was set up in 1866 
when Jose Santos Ossa and Francisco Puelma were granted a concession 
by the Bolivian Government to extract borax and nitrates from their 
discovery at Carmen Alto. This enterprise, the Compania Explotadora 
del Desierto de Atacama, was at first run only on a small scale; 
however, it soon expanded into the major nitrate works in Bolivia, 
and indeed became one of the principal firms in the whole region. 
The original I concession was improvqd in 1868 when, in line with his 
pro-Chilean sentimentaq Melgarejo granted the company freedom from 
duties for fifteen yeareg' permission to construct a road to 
Antofagasta on the coastq and rights to a $league of land' on either 
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side of the road (Kinsbruner, 1973, P-103). In order to realise the 
advantages offered by this exclusive privilege, the company looked 
around for more'investment and succeeded in attracting the capital 
of the Anglo-Chilean businessman, Augustin Edwards. Edwards in turn 
brought in the British merchant house, Gibbs Brothers, which, as has 
alreaay bpqn mentioned, had oubgtantial int@regto in Tarapaoa nitrate. 
The new expanded company called itself the Sociedad Explotadora, del 
Desierto de Antofagasta, later changing its name to Melbourne, Clark 
& Co., and, finally, in 1872, the Antofagasta Nitrate Company. 
(I 
shall use the latter name when referring to it) Interestingly, one 
; of the reasons for the expansion of the Company was the adverse 
reaction from British and Chilean capital to the Peruvian 'Estancol 
law. When the monopoly was first proposed the F. O. reported the 
hostility which it had aroused and commented: 
".. there is a great dea. 1 of (nitrate) in Bolivia, and I 
believe a very strong company has been got up or is in the 
course of formation, to work itv consequently they may 
compete and perhaps be able to undersell the Peruviansp 
should the proposed Government monopoly be carried out.. " 
(P. O. 61/272, Jerninghan to Granville, 28th November 1872) 
In its new enlaxged formp the company quickly expanded its 
operations, u-sing the mat modern machinery. By the early 187089 
with the discovery of several more important mines and their 
-Ito WQrXOj 
QhJ1 
-U 
j pital ingorpQrAtign W9 thQ Qa=on A -dtrate Qa was 
-0a 
producing a little less than Peruvian capital and more than English 
and German capital combined. Moreover, the prosperity of, the area 
(F-0- 16/1899 1st May 1876)9 and of the Antofagasta Nitrate Company 
in particular, had began to attract, in increasing numbersp investment 
from leading members of the Chilean oligarchyq including many top 
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government officials (J. R. ]Brown, 19659 P-384), The importance of 
the. desert was enhanced even more, as nitrate prices continued to 
rise, and as the immense wealth of the Caracoles silver mines became 
1 
apparent . The mines were discovered in 1870 in the Bolivian littoral 
by Jose Diaz Gana, ana Chilean exploitation of them quickly commencea 
(Cox, 1963, P-323). These silver minesq even more than the nitrate 
works, brought a great influx of Chilean workers and resulted in a 
large Chilean settlement and the building up of the port of Antofagasta; 
as a resultv according to contemporary observer Guillermo Grellv they 
2 were a major cause of the war . According to Grellq Chileansq in 
paxtnership with some English capitalists ".. se apoderaron casi por 
completo .. del nuevo pais ... II to such an extent that "los mismos 
materiales de las casas de las nuevas poblaciones procedian en buena 
parte de Valparaiso; hasta la iglesia de La Plaoilla, en el centro del 
distrito minero de Caracoles, se debe a la iniciativa y celo de la 
esposa de un consul chileno". (in Basadre, 1976t p. 64). 
The increase in Childen activity in the littoral had not gone 
unnoticed by observers in Bolivia, some of whom, by 1872, were seriously 
alarmed. The United States Minister in La Pazo L. Maxkbreitt wrote 
to the State Department: 
"Since the'conclusion of this Treaty (1866) it has been found 
that the guano deposits at Mejillones are of considerable 
I value, and about two years ago the wonderfully rich silver 
1. The entire'desert area was extremely rich in many mineral-so 
offering far more business opportunities than did Chilean territory (November 1876, F. o. 16/189). 
2. Pen-aloza c. onfirms this view, considering that. their discovery brought tho tension in the area to a head, since they weret from 1870 to 188o, the most prolific silver mines in the' 
world. (19469 Vol. II, pp. 124-5) 
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mines of Caracoles were discovered by a Cbilean,, Diaz Gana. 
It is now feared by the Bolivian Government that Chile may 
attempt to possess herself of these mines, as of the gaano 
deposits of Mejillones. .... It is claimed*that Chile is 
greedily awaiting for some excuse, however trivial, to take 
this course. .... I have had several unofficial conversations 
with the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs upon 
this subject and have found that their only hope seems to be, 
should such an emergency arise, to secure the. intervention 
of the United States. Of course I have been careful not to 
commit .... our government nor myself. 
The guano depostis at Mejillones axe vaxiously estimated at 
between four and ten million tons, while the mines of 
Caracoles 
.... are said to contain immense riches. The 
capital invested in the latter place,, 
_chiefly 
by Chileans, 
amounts at the present time to about 914,000,000. The 
population consists of about 5,000 souls; while two years 
ago all that region did not contain a solitary inhabitant., 
A commission is now in session in ... 
(Ta Paz) which has 
before it twenty-eight pr9poeitimp made to the Bolivian 
Government for the construction of a railway from the coast 
to the mines 
This morning a battalion of infantry left this city for 
Caracoles, with the avowed purpose'of maintaining order 
among the miners, but the real object evidently is to 
be,.... prepared to meet any hostile movement on the part 
of Chile .... 
(Foreign Relations of the-United . Statest 18729 p. 64; qr emphaois) 
The overthrow, of pro-ýChile'an"diotator Melgarejo had resulted in a 
changed attitude in Bolivia towards its c'Oastal: 'province and Chilean 
activity there. Bolivian statesmen 
I therefore made a-positive claim of 
their country's rights over the Caracoles mines. In response, Chile 
asserted that the dividing line established by the 1866 Treaty Of 
Limits ran North of the silver mining centraq and WaL thu 111.1"uri woývu 
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therefore within Chilean territory. Friction also arose over the 
preqise definition of the nature of the byý-products of nitrate - 
s4pbur, borax, iodine - since it depended on whether they were minerals 
or metals whether or not they caiae under the treaty's joint-benefits 
provision (Dennis, 1931P PP-52-53). As the apprehension of certain 
Bolivian statesmen increased, they began to moot the idea of a 
Bolivi&-Peru-Argentina alliance. Aware of the increasingly anti- 
Chilean attitudes within the Bolivian Government, the Chilean state 
was again able to exploit the intra-elite conflict endemic amongst its 
MUISI)IJOUVOI 44440. rr-LU1441 UWIJIWtOA4L3(J W40 81VVII tU U11 dXPdd: LL-tUIis riltt: d 
out in Valparai, so and led by the pro-Chilean Bolivian Generals Quevedo 
and 11moz, to overthrow the Bolivian goverment. The expedition 
failed, but, as a result of a violent protest to the Chilean 
Goverment, the Bolivian envoy in Santiago, Bustillo, was asked to leave. 
- Peru, too, was seriously alarmed by this demonstration of Chilean 
determination to dominate Atacama, and, in. protest, held a nava. 1 
demonstration off Mejillonesq and sent an official note to the Chilean 
Government, making it clear that the Peruvians would intervene if 
Bolivian territory was invadedi. Peru, by this time, was motivated not 
just by the desire to maintain the West Coast balance of powerp but 
also by the need to curb, and, hopefully, eventually eliminatep the 
competition that Chilean nitrates in Antofagasta offered to Peruviazi 
nitrates and which therefore threatened the Peravian, economy and 
capitalist class. This need became, of course, an ever stronger 
motivation with the establishment of the Peruvian monopoly, the 
This action highlights once again the fact that the Chilean 
Gove=ent must have been well aware that its movep against 
Bolivia iý 1879, would involve Peru too. 
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lestancol, which, if it were to be successful, required Bolivian 
co-operation and control over the nitrate industry. Meanwhile, 
Chilean awareness of the imperatives of the Peruvian nitrate policy 
inc eased its-antagonism and fear of Pera (IL a. Patriall (Valparaiso. '. ) 
23rd'November 1972) and pushed Chile ever closer'towards a pre-emptive 
strike. 
Heavy pressure'to act decisively'and aggressively was also exerted 
on Chilean gove = ents by commerical interests in the nitrate districts. 
It was pointed, oufthe extent to which the great prosperity of the area 
was'almost entirely due to Chilean efforts. In June 1873 
'EL Caxacolino', (Antofagasta), in reaction to the tense state of 
Bolivian-Chilean-Peruvian relations Wrote: 
t' Que va a ser de los chilenos en Bolivia ei estalla la 
gue=a por conseeuencia de la poca habilidad de las dos ý 
republicas? La costa de Bolivia y el asiento de Caxacoles 
son un centro, industrial cuya, poblacion no tiene menos de 
16,000 chilenos, y cuyo comercio y mineria. no representan 
menos de S/. 20pOOO, OOO de pesos. Colocados en, el desiertov 
, estos chilenos 
han £=dado ciudadesq han hecho puertosg han 
iniciado el eomercio, han laborado mas de 5,000 minas, han 
hecho eaminos, han dado vida y movimiento a estas . soledades. 
Las cartas paxticulaxes nos aseguran que el Gobierno no 
-vacilaria en echarse sobre eate territorio si ya poseyera los 
buques que ha mandado construir 9*9911 
The Chilean taie-over therefore, was to await the arrival of naval. 
reinforcements. This article is especially interesting in the light 
of Mayo's remarks (1980)9 discussed below. 
Due to Bolivian weakness in compaxison with-Chileg Bolivia's attempt 
to modify the Treaty of -Limits took the form of diplomatic discussions. 
As a result of these talks, on the 5th December 1872, a new arrangement 
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was concluded, known as the Lindsay-Corral Agreement. This 
agrqement, while it modified some of the contentious axeas of the 
IP44 TvpaLyj wag "8"144 0444004OTY favwl-w"141p W 01411p, TL malltýalw'a 
the joint-benefits system and kept. the Chilean-Bolivian boundary at 
South Latitutde 24 0 (F-0- 16/178 and F. 0- 16/202). As a result the 
Peruvian Government advised Bolivia to reject it, and since 
President Ballivan was also fully aware of the dangers inherent in the 
-situation the agreement was shelved. Instead, on the 6th February 1873Y 
I 
a 'secret' offensive and defensive Treaty against Chile-was entered 
into by Bolivia and Peru. In fact this Treaty, fax from being 
secret, became known almost immediately to the British diplomats, 
and subsequently to the Chilean government (F. O. 61/3189 
22nd April 1873)- 
once more it is clear that Bolivia was largely a pawn in Peruvian- 
Chijean rivalryv si 
. 
nce Peru was motivated by fear of, and hostility 
to, Chile. Peru also hoped that Argentinaý would shortly join the 
alliance, and quickly began attempts, in the form of the Irigoyen 
mission, to persuade it of the advisability of also adhering to the 
treaty. The crucial failure to acheive this, combined with the 
valiaerability ?f Bolivia, meant that the treaty actually Ineman-sP4 
the dangers to Peru, given the intense Peruvian-Chilean competition 
over nitrates'; indeed it was used by Chile as justification for its 
1. And also the growing deterioration in Peruvian-Chilean relations. 
On the 26th September 1876 the report submitted by the Chilean 
Minister for Foreign Affairs to the National Congress in Santiago 
reported on the ".. conditions of Chilean subjects in Peru, and to 
the many reported cases in which the laws have been violated to the 
'grevious injury of Chilean subjects and the minister remaxks that 
when the Government see .. hurtful acts to which the political 
authorities of that republic are not alien, occur with n6table 
frequency against honest and hard working subjects of Chilev they 
would be wanting in their duty if they remained indifferent to 
such acts, which, when repeated, give ground for belief int-or are 
indicative of, a systematic hostility towards the Nationality, with 
the defence of which they axe entrusted. 11"(F. O. 16/189, Drummond 
Hay to Derby, 26th September 1876). 
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declaration of war on Peru. On the 12th April 1879 the Chilean 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alejandro Fierrol issued a war circular 
which contained the*following passage: 
"The Treaty of 1873 owed its origin - hidden as a sharaeful 
act to the measures adopted by Peru at that epoch, to 
justify one of the most audacious and cruel exploitations 
witnessed by countries submitted to a regime of common 
respect toward the industry of all nations* 
Peru desired to monopolise and appropriate the nitrate works; 
and in order to sustain its daily diminishing creditp adopted 
the supreme measure of. ruining an industry to satisfy the 
fiscal voracity that could not satisfy itself with the ordinary 
resources of a country that has lived, thanks to its territorial 
wealth, in 'complete obliviousness of economy and labour. 
It in evident that Peru nought in the Treaty of 1873 to protect 
the financial measures it-i meditated against an industry that in 
any commonly scrupulous country would have had the right to 
develop itself freel . 'What it desired was to strengthen the 
nitrate monopoly without considering the sums invested in that 
industry;..... the Peruvian-Bolivian convention was for Peru 
the cold calculation of a trader .... The jnnnnnnTIsj= interest 
of (Peru) and the international illfaith of .... Boliviap 
find their faithful expression in that document. " (my emphasis) 
(in Voreign Relations of the United. Staies (Bolivia), 1879t pp. 168-172) 
By the beginning-of 1874 Chile was, therefore, already aware of the. 
'secret' Treaty, and as a result President Erazuriz requested prompt 
delivery of the new Chilean ironclads that were then under construction 
in Britain (Bulnes, 1911-1919, Vol. 1, p. 86). This increase in Chilean 
military strength, together with the failure of Argentina to join the 
aAiance, led Peru to advise Bolivia to adopt a more conciliatory 
approach and enter into further negotiations with Chile. Therefore 
in 1874 Bolivia finally gave in to the Chilean Ministers') 
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I Walker Marinez, demands, and the Treaty of Sucre was concluded between 
I 
the two countries. Superficially this new agreement appeared to 
represent a partial advance for the Bolivian causeg since Chile 
0 surrendered all claims and rights North of parallel 24 " However, this 
concession was to be made in return for confirmation and even an 
extension of the priviýeges of the Antofagasta Nitrate Companyt 
demonstrating the extreme importance of this company to the Chilean 
nalional economy and elite 
1, A memo to Gibbs from the British manager 
of the Company, Hicks, summarised the advantages embodied in the 
Treaty's provisions (26th March 1874, Gibbs 14S. 11128). The company was 
to be able to use, free of charge, any lands it required, and it could 
build a railway to Salinas together with any necessary branches, whilst 
also being granted use of the Bolivian Government railway. Its rights 
were to be extended to five square leagues at Salar del Carmen and 
fifty square miles at Salinas, and to all the nitrate to be found in 
this area. Most important of all, no export duties were to be imposed 
on the company's exports from Antofagasta, and all imports of goods, 
machinery, tools and other necessaries were also to be untaxed. These 
provisions transformed the company's Ifiefl into a freetrade zonel 
which would generate no feedbacks into the Bolivian economys represented 
a dangerous threat to Bolivian sovereignty 
2 
and was enshrined in an 
international Treaty. 
1. It was generally hold that the Treaty was extremely favourable to 
Chilean interests and detrimental to Bolivian and it was consequently 
predloted tliat It would not be ratified (Rumbold to F. O., 
15th September 1874, F. O. 16/181) 
2. Subsequently. Bolivian leaders were increasiýgly hostile top and wary 
of, Chile, which in turn provoked further Chilean interference in 
Bolivian domestic policies and increased Bolivian antagonism. A 
secret memorandum to the r*. O. reported: 
"As General Frias, the President of Bolivia is looked upon as 
friendly to Peru it is reported that Chile is the supporter of 
any movement destined to weaken his hold on the country. " (St. John to F. O., 26th August 1875, F-0- 177/149) 
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As the decade wore on and the depression that had begun in 1673 
deepened, the importance of nitrates to both Peru and Chile had 
increased. By the mid-1870s the Peruvian monopoly in Tarapaca was 
virtually complete, but was threatened mainly by two large competitors. 
One of these was a field in the Bolivian littoral, Tocopillat which in 
ID74 Pulsvin lpai; P4 to Joba MQlaargo who, in turnt transferrPtl It to 
the Peruvian Covernment. The only remaining major rival was 
represented by Chilean and British capital in the Antofagasta Nitrate 
Company, which was continually expanding its operations and which, 
since it was untaxed, was consistently able to undercut Peruvian 
nitrate prices. Just as this company therefore threatened the entire 
viability of the Peruvian lestancol, similarly Chile felt threatened 
by the necessity of Peruvian nitrates to establish a complete 
monopoly$ especially since, as J, R. Brown (1963, P-384) has pointed 
out, the industries of Atacama had come to represent the only hope 
for Chile of averting economic stagnation and bankruptcy . As a 
reault of thisq following the Treaty of Sucrep the company had 
expanded and the interests involved had changed. Mayo (19809 P-5) 
has 
I 
shown that since 1872 the capital represented by the company had 
doubled,, and stock had been sold to leading Chileansv including 
On the 9th October 1878, the Commander in Chief of the British 
fleet stationed off the West Coast, apparently anticipating 
trouble, wrote: 
"In Chile eveWhing ig quiet but finangial Affaire PXQ 1rQrY 
unsatisfactory. I am informed that they have had recourse 
to the kind of expedient of nations verging upon insolvencyl 
viz: the issue of inconvertible paper money, and that they 
are contemplating a loan-to pay off other loans. " (P. O. 61/309,9th October, 1878) 
However, the Peruvian economic situation was in a far worse 
condition. 
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prominent statesmen. Amongst the names of the shareholders we find 
Sotomayerg Mackenna, Errazuriz, Urmenete, and Pinto, and at the end 
of 1878 these men were joined by future president Domingo Santa Maria 
and the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alejandro Fierro. The 
other major ahareholders continued to be Edwards and Gibbs. On the 
basis of the increased amount of investment in the company, and the 
extraordinary privileges granted to it in the Treaty'of Sucre, a 
railroad had been constructed, rock-crushing equipment installed, and 
a distilling plant for water established. With so much at stake, 
Chile and the company was alert for any action from Peru or Bolivia 
that might threaten the Atacama industries. 
Bolivia had much cause to be provoked into action. Not only had 
Chile in practice, if not on paper, completely usurped its sovereignty 
over its coastal province, but also the Antofagasta Nitrate Company 
represented a potential lucrative form of income for the bankrupt 
Bolivian Government. Furthermore the irascible Bolivian dictator, 
IIIIaWIU'& 13-ar-as Wats c. LLrouidly tuiLl-ChIlowt tuul iza U-114,1 LI till, 'UJa acaply 
resented the foreign control of Atacama, exemplified by the Chilean 
monopoly of all mmicipal offices in Antofagasta. Foreign observers 
frequently assumed that Atacama was in fact Chilean. In November 1876 
the British consul in Chile, DrummondHayq wrote to Derby concerning 
the quantity of minerals in the area: 
I 
"In the province of Atacama there were in 1875,199 mines of 
ailver and lead and one of copper, silver and gold .... the 
n=ber of silver mine's worked in other parts of Chile may 
be estimated at from eight to ten. " (my emphasis) 
(r*O* 16/1899 Hay to P, O., 28th November 1876) 
The cituation naturally led to frequent disputes, and at the beginning 
of 1877# the P. O. documents reported that a revolution had occurred in 
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Bolivia, causing serious trouble at Caracoles. British Minister to 
Peru, Graham, vrote to the F. O. that: 
"These mines are principally worked by Chilean labourers 
who are also largely employed in the nitrate fields, and 
between whom and the Bolivians much Jealousy prevails .... 
(F-0- 177/1499 18th January 1877) 
It would appearg however,, that the Chileans wished to provoke the 
situation by enflaming even further Bolivian feelings: 
is ". some short time agog owing to a serious riot having 
occurred, the Chilean Vice-Consul at Caracoles addressed 
a despatch to the Bolivian Local Authorities which was 
couched in such strong and .... even in such offensive 
terms, that President Daza revoked his exequatur. This 
proceeding has led to an energetic protest and re=nstrance, 
and the despatch of a frigate on the part of the Chilean 
Gove = ent .... Chile has long been suspect of casting a 
covetous eye on that wealthy part of the Bolivian Republic. " 
(P-0.177/149# 18th January 1877) 
11 Certainly Hicks seemed to hope that the Bolivians would provide a 
justification for Chilean action, and in July 1878 expressed a wish 
that Chile would 'deliver the Pacific Coast from this plague of 
Bolivians$ (in Mayov 1980v P-7)- 
The Bolivian Gove = ent, even more than the Peruvian, was a most 
unsatisfactory, and unpredictable collaborator from the point of view 
of metropolitan capital2v and in 1876 worries wF---e expressed 
1. Member of Gibbs' firm and inan er at Antofagasta. 
2. British capital was involved in more enterprises in the area than 
just the Antofagasta Nitrate Company. In 1873 a request was made 
by a Dr. Neile to be appointed as a Vice Consul at Mejillones because, 
11D. =ing the last two years so much business has been done in 
the exportation of metals and guano from here, necessitating 
an it does the presence of a considerable population of 
English subjects requiring protection. " (P. O. 11/22t 31st May 1873) 
This request was granted. 
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with regard to the ".. disturbed political state of BoliviaP 
(P. P, q LXXVI, Co=erical Report 
(Arica), 31st December 1876). Ever 
watchful for any Bolivian misdemeanoursq Hicks reported at the 
beginning of 1878 that the Government was discussing the possibility 
of putting a tax on nitrate exports, and wrote that he 'feared some 
barbarity from these people .. ' 
(Mayo, 19809 P-7)ý In fact Hick's 
views of the Bolivian character perfectly exemplify the racist 
attitudes held by the British with regard to the South Americans, and 
found their counterpart in London in papers such as the 'Man of the 
Worl4l, ror whom Itlippo peoplul with the exoeption of tlu,, Chileans, 
were ignorant half-breeds. Such attitudes played a not insignificant 
part in dete=ining the policies of the British Government and the 
decisions taken by institutions such as the London Stock Exchange. 
In March 1878 Hicks armounced to Head Office that the project to 
tax nitrate exports had been passed by the Bolivian Congress; 
immediately the Pha holders of the company began to use its influence 
to enlist government support and ensure an aggressive Chilean response. 
As Gibbs rem-q ed, 
".. we have several very influential Chileans amongst our 
shareholders and should the government not carry out the 
promise made to take immediate action in the matter, strong 
pressure will be brought to bear on them in Con&ress 
(W. Gibbs - A. Gibbsq 26th March 18789 MS 11470/2) 
in the event, the crisis blew overg but in December 1878 the Bolivian 
Government finally decided to definitely impose the tax, and this was 
done in January 1879. The company took i=ediate action; since it was 
clear that there was a section of the Chilean elite that was not in 
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1 favour of involving itself so closely with its affairs In order to 
defeat this point of view one of the company's directors proposed: 
"spending some money in engaging writers in some newspapers 
to publish articles of a -patriotic nature, viz: on our side 
of the question, and this was agreed so that we may now 
expect the immediate appearance of a series of such articles 
in a Santiago paper .... and a Valparaiso paper 
(11ky 
PlItI111FU444) (qootpa In Mp4os 1900# p*O) 
This campaign was successful, and despite Gibbs' anxiety at the 
caution initially displayed by the Chilean Government (W. Gibbs to 
A* Gibbst Valparaiso, 14th Januaxy 1879,143 11470/3), their doubts 
were unJustified, and shortly afterwaxds on, the 14th FebruaXy 1879 
Chilean troops landed at Antofagasta. The, official cause of war was 
therefore the infringement of the Nitrate Companys' privileges, thus 
providing an excellent example of the ability of foreign capital to 
determine national policy. 
In an article, written to refute the charges of British culpability 
in the war, John Mayo attempts to demonstrate that Chile was not the 
agressor: 
11 it seems clear'that Chile did not make the war. The 
depression of the second half of the, 18708 was not a period 
of wax scares in Chileg unless with Argentina, and the 
arrival of two powerful ironclads was more a reminder of the 
prosperity of the first half of the decade, when they were 
Demonstrating that there'were, of courseq divisions among the Chilean elite tooe HOweverp the etrength of the, central 
state, and the influence exercised over it by British and Chilean nitrate capitalg overcame these differences. The 
Chilean Commmist Party, in 1937, therefore accused a section 
of the oligarchy of deliberately fomenting the War of the Pacific in order to further its interests, and thus avoid the'tax reforms and protective duties proposed by the ilýcumbent 
president, Anibal Pintol'as a solution to the depression. 
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ordered, than, an indication of wax-making plans. But it 
did indicate a capability for wax. And if it is clear 
that Chile did not look for wax it seems equally so that 
the depression, despite debilitating the economy and 
reducing the country to a condition most unsuitable for 
the prosecution of a wax of aggression, also produced in 
the rulýng elite what one writer has called 'A willingness 
to wax"' 
(J. Xayo, 1980, p. 11) 
Purthe=ore: 
"The British role can be quickly disposed of. Only Gibbs 
were closely involved and they were fully ipfOrmed of all 
that went on, but the evidence is that they were, content 
to allow their Qhilean co-shareholders to make the ninning- 
with the Chile= Gnvernmentg and fuxtherl that their 
interests were best served by a continuation of the 
Bolivian concession. Heavily involved in nitrate in both 
Peru and Bolivia, and doing well in both, they - in 1878 - 
had no obvious gains from a change in the territorial 
status quo in the region. " 
(op. cit., p. ll;. my eqphasis) 
and for Mayo, the argument against British involvement or influence 
in the affair is, given further weight by his allegation that warlike 
action from Chi le was unexpected, and therefore could not have been 
counted upon by the British, and specifically by Gibbs. 
Mayo's views, as expressed in this article, represent the unanalytic 
and apologist school of the historians of imperialist powers. On 
close examination not only do the facts belie this argument, but also 
I 
the underlying logic of this approach may be seen to be loose and fall 
of internal contradictions. For instance, Mayo's implication that the 
depression of the 1870s (which in fact began in 1873 and not 1875) 
ha. Ited 'Chilean warmaking plans' is not only based on an ahistorical 
assumption since economic depressions can be held to have generally 
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heightened competition for markets and investment opportunitiesp in 
this epoch, and easily led to armed conflict, but is also factually 
inaccurate. The depression of the 1870s, as Brown has pointed out 
(1963), in fact greatly increased the importance of the nitrate 
industry and therefore of the Atacama region to the Chilean national 
economy, -and to an important sector of the Chilean elite. As a 
result, tension between Chile, Peru and Bolivia, remained high, and 
the latter two countries continued to be apprehensive of latent 
Chilean aggression. Furthermore, for Mayo to add the caveat that 
perhaps Argentina alone continued to be an object of Chilean 
b-ellicosityg but that Chile was not in general 'looking' for war 
(though "willing for war ... 11) is tautalogical. A predatory attitude 
towards Argentina demonstrates the underlying imperialist project 
immanent in Chilean economic and foreign policiesq which had been a 
consistent aspect of Chilean, national policy since the 18408 to both 
the South and the North. Furthermore, Chilean imperialism was unlikely 
to sudaenlY cease irl the North ana persist with regara to the South, 
I 
especially as the North became of ever increasing economic importancel 
and success became vita. 1 there to counterbalance the 'defeat' suffered 
in the South. 
Above a. 119 however, it is the misguided preoccupation with national 
or individual intentiona-lityl rather than with the underlying web of 
conflicting economic interests and diplomatic relationships, that is 
a consistent feature of this school of thought, and that lies at the 
root of a series of misinterpretations of empirical evidence. 
In fact Mayo's own evidence highlights quite clearly not only the 
imperialist nature of Chilean policy, but also the importance of the' 
Antofagasta Nitrate Companyl and in particular Gibbal in encouraging 
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Chilean aggression, and the'general involvement of British capital in 
the internal policies of the region. His approach to historical 
problems, however, leads him to attempt to discuss the wax in terms of 
clear cut demonstrations of guilt, and, on the basis of this type of 
analysis, to attribute blame wholly to Bolivia, because it was Bolivia 
that provided Chile with the immediate casus belli. In factp to accept 
the propoganda, of the Chilean state and nitrate capitalists that 
military seizure of the desert was the only possible response to the 
Bolivian abrogration of the Treaty of Sucre, is not even backed up by 
Mayo's own examination of the evidence. The historical record clearly 
reVea1w tile PrOVU04tiVe attltUdu tuia 1j1wiaxu1Uw4 V: LujuL ur 'U, ImpuvLCUA 
sector of the C4ilean elitel which not only also coincided with the 
interests-of certain powerful British groups, but also was not 
unacceptable to either H. M. G. or the British Bondholders. In view of 
this, an attempt to re-exaxaine the issue of British involvement and 
interest in the War of the Pacific should focus primarily on the role 
of the British press, the Bondholders, individual merchants and the 
unofficial influence wielded by H. M. G., rather than naively searching 
for examples of overt intervention. To attempt to '. exonerate' British 
capitalism from any role inthe wax on the basis of an analysis of 
Gibbs' activities in Chile seems to be both methodologically limited 
and also empirically and theoretically unacceptable. Yet Mayo's own 
use. I of 
Gibbs' NS. and his investigations of the actions of the merchant 
house serve to reveal the great extent of the influence exercised on 
Chilean national POlicy--making by Gibbs. Neither does the conclusion 
that Gi. bbs did not feel that it would gain from a change in the 
terTitOrial status of the desert emerge even from Mayo's owri researoh 
finclings- An ? Xmination of Gibbs' Manuscripts (in particular 
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MS 11t4719 Vols. 3-7; ]ME 11,471, Vols. 7-8)9 demonstrates that the 
merchant house did prefer to work under Chilean rather than Peruvian 
or Bolivian Governments. Furthermore, by 1878j Gibbs was no longer 
involved in Peruvian nitrate, and was determined to maintain its 
interests in Bolivian Atacqmn-. 
I However, the war is of interest not simply from the viewpoint of 
individua. 1s' actions, but because it was the logical culmination of 
the external orientation of Peru and Chile, and their general 
subordination to the needs of metropolitan capital; and also because 
bgth the causes, and the wax itself 
_, 
sprang frQm elite factional 
conflict whilstýbeing determined by the activities and interests of 
foreign capital. Moreover, it is appaxent that many contemporaxy 
observers, even before Blaine's wellknown allegationt considered 
foreign capital to be implicated in the dispute. Daza announced his 
breaking of the Treaty of Sucre, by declaxing that he had: 
".. fregado a los gringos, decretando la revindicacion de 
las salitreras y no podran quitaxnoslas 
(my emphasis) 
and far fromperceiving Chile as the principal opponent in the conflict, 
he wrote: 
"Espero que Chile no intervendra en este asunto 
(in Ahumada Moreno, 18849 PP-93-94). 
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1 
CHAPTER 10 t THE PACIFIC WAR AND INTETUL DIVISIONS., 
V "Bu verdadera. fisonomia y sus rasgos caracteristicose 
su realidad actual# estan determinados por la Guerra del 
Pacifico. ES al heoho Maximo, 91 hecho sintesis. TodaR 
nuestras tristezas moralesp tOdaB nuestras erroreB economicast 
todas nuestzas males pDliticasq so sintatizan y se resumen 
en la Guerra del Pacifico. " (Davalos y Lissont 1919t V01. I-Vt P- 154) 
The Pacific War has been seen as representing a watershed in West 
Coast political and economic life, and, moreover# some commentators 
I 
have identified it as the source of many of Perul's subsequent problems. 
It was the culmination of a period of intense intra-eUte conflict 
which had characterised the internal politics of Peru and Bolivia 
almost UC6SBantly since Independence, and which had spilled over into 
international disputes with Chile, and resulted in poor relations with 
metropolitan capital. The war was both the inevitable outcome of 
thIse xultl-f; ýceted disputes, and, in turn, clearly illuminated the 
different levels of economic development and state fOnlatiOn in the 
region, as well as bringing to the fore the ethnic cleavages and class 
conflicts which fragmented Peru. 
Historical Setting 
Whilst the first Chilean act of war was made against Bolivia o On the 
whole this republic played almost no part in the fighting. Ever since 
Independence Bolivia hadg in practiceo been a backwardt isolatedg and 
effectively landlocked state, and Chile's swift and efficient naval 
campaigh quick3. y barred it from effective participation in the ware 
and also ofticially reduced it to a country without a seacoast. 
In 
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Febiuary 1879 St. John wrote to the F. O. ooncerning the Chilean 
campaign against Bolivia: 
to 
too in my despatch of' February 19th 1879 t Idrew Y-our Lordship *a 
attention to the dispute between Bolivia and Chilet and of the 
armed occupation by the latter of the port of Antofagasta. 
The Chilean forces have now advanced 90 miles inlandg as far 
as the silver mines of Caracoles and established themselves 
there; they have also occupied ... MejIllones and stationed one 
ironclad at Cobija .... as yet the Bolivians have offered no 
resistancel havingt in factt no forces on the sea coast, but 
they are ieported to be collecting in the interior... " 
(F. O. 61/318t 26th February 1879) 
Three weeks later the Bolivians had still offered no military resistance 
to the Chilean advance. St. John's contempt for the republic is clearly 
ievealed in this letter to the F. O. 9 written on the 12th March 1879: 
".. as yet no collision has taken place between their forcest 
but Chile appears to be strengthening her positions and awaiting 
Pvpnts. In Dolivia much enthusiasm f'or waT is said to have been 
shown .... This enthusiasm is not likely to last long in that 
famine stricken country, which is actually being fed, by supplie3 
drawn from Mile. 14 (F. O. 61/318) 
ý 
Thus Bolivar's gloomy predictions concerning the future of the 
republic named after him appeared to contain a large degree of truthlo 
and it quick3, y became apparent that President Daza had wildly under- 
estimated Chilean strength and intentions. In a letter written at 
the beginning of 1879, Daza said of Chile: 
11 -. -. su conducta con, la Argentina ievelade una manera 
inequivoca 
su debilidad e impotencia... oil 
He also made it clear -that he was relying on Peruvian adherence to 
the 
Bolivar w: rote to Sucre in 1826 that Bolivia was haxdly viable as 
a states and would eventually be destroyed by Brazil or Argentina. 
(Bolivar to Sucre, 12th May 1826, In Fiferp 1972t p. 17) 
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Tr. eaty of 1873s 
". -si nos declaran la guerral podemos contar con el apoyo del 
Peru, a quien exijiremos el cumplimiento del tratado r-ecreto.. " 
(in Ahumada Moreno, 1884, pp. 93/4) 1 
In the events following the iatial strike on the 14th February 1879# 
Chilean troops went on, in just over four weeks, to conquer the major 
centres of the Bolivian Atacama Desert. By the end of March Bolivia 
had effectively been defeated, and Chilean attention was switched to 
Lima and Taxapaca. 
I Mcqueen (1926, p. 10) estimated that appradmately one third of the 
Government revenue had been expended on the armed forces since the 
beginning of the Guano Boomg and in 1868 'El Comerciol observed thats 
I" ,. Ias listas militares devoran lor. caudales pequenos 
de las 
Tesorerias'.. "(24th January 1868t Lima) 
But despi" this massive, investment# the poluvian ailAy and ravy Rt th@ 
end of the 1670s were badly equipped. Moreover, since they functioned'. 
more as regional aimed bands than as cohesive national institutions# 
they had little discipline, training or even patriotic fervour, and 
were top-heavy with officers. These features of the Peruvian armed 
forces had actually been exacerbated by the Civilista attempt to 
create a professional military force subject to civilian state control. 
Of 
- Beruf , 1978 t PP - 35-39). The economies carried out 
by M-rdo had 
reduced the army In size from 79000 to 3,000 ment and greatly cut the 
annual expenditure on the military. As a resultt on the outbreak of 
War the Peruvian armed forces were relatively diminished in te M. s of 
both manpower and equipment. On the other hand, the Civilista reforms 
"ILI 
lalloLl Lik It& o4tsuct o;. 41pollil Inail, usil 
tPry rol vsx ()II i, VIP C-Ont-rfiry, 
they had created new dissensions within the armed forces t between 
the military and civilian elites and between pro-Civilista and 
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pro-military groups. Conscious of these. deficiencies in the army and 
navy, atid of the appallW economic state of the republic', the Peruvian 
Government hoped to avoid involvement in the Chilean/Bolivian conflict, 
and had immediately instructed the ]Peruvian Minister in La Paz, Quinones, 
to offer his services as a mediator. His peacemaking effortat howeverl 
had been quite unsucces5ful because of the determination of both the 
Bolivian and Chilean leaders to fight; the Bolivians, he wrote on the 
13th February 1879, were relying on: 
la justicia de au causa y con la lealtad del gobierno del 
Pezu en el cumplimlento del pacto secreto de alianza de-6 de 
febiero de 1873. " (in Basadre, 1976, p. 44) 
Quinones also made two other important observations; firstly, that the 
Chileans were clearly preparing to wage a major struggle 9 and secondly 
that there was the danger that the Bolivians might yet give up the 
littoi al to tho Wilicaum , who wuuIA Umn s3uppuj L Uto Im ino) Lo a 
LUD I it 
2 their- tiaditional goal of Arica 
Meanwhile the Chilean Minister In Lima, Godoyg subsequent to some 
In August 1876 Graham reported to the F. O. on the decrease that had 
taken place in Lima's population in the 2"t ioux yesir,, ".. the 
reason beine the excessive cost of living hexe, and the stsppition 
vhich exists in all branches of trade# which obliges an those who 
formerly derived their living from the numerous schemes and 
speculations which were constantly got up to seek their foxtune in 
othex places. Many families have also xetized to cirip. 11 courit: ry 
towne, finding the capital too expensive for them. " (F. O. 61/2911, 
31d August 1876) In March 1879 St. John wrote, "The difficulties 
which the goverment are encountering in proewing the smallest 
advances to meet the current expenses should warn them of the danger 
of an armed contest.. " (r,. O. 17ý/1499 St. John to Sallsburyt 
12th 
March 1879) 
This outcome was a genuine possibility. In July 1879 St - John 
wrote to the F. 0-% "The Peruvian Minister today came to me to lead 
Ime documents showing that Chile had been making efforts to detach 
Bolivia from the Peruvian alliancet and that for this purpose Chile 
had proposed, after annexing the most Southern portion of Pezu in 
which its nitrate and guano deposits were containedo to annex to 
Bolivia a iurther portion lying immediately North of this district 
.. to offer to the capital .. easy communication with 
the sea.. " 
(F .0- 61/ 317,21st July 1879) 
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pxelWnar-y discussions with President Prado, wrote to Santiago that 
in view of the lestancol, Peru would be most unsuitable as an 
arbitrator. Furthermore that, in contrast to PradO's cautiong public 
opinion in Lima had quickly (but temporarily) become extremely 
I 
enthusiastic in support of going to the aid of the Bolivians. All 
newspapers except Ila Tribunal, and the official government publications 
1 'El Peruanolp were in favour of declaring war on Chile Godoy wrote 
to fierro that it was obvious what lay behind this bellicosity: 
st, el gdio hacia nugßt«rß Pälra enarna-dg en muchQlä ngtgblcc 0 
influyenies personajes; el interes mereantil de todos los que 
estan ligados de algun modo a la vasta especulacion salltrera; ". 
He also observed that the pro-war attitudes of some sprang from the 
lactional infighting endemic to Peruvian politics: 
11 - los calculos politicos de los desafectos gl Gobierno y 
de los 
que ambicionan altos puestos en la administracion... *Be 
(Godoy to Fierro, 5th March 1879, in Moreno, 1684, p. b2) 
Lima public opinion, together with the eagerness of Godoy for war 
with Perug therefOTe combined to impede the Peruvian peace mission 
undertaken by Lavalle to Santiago. 'Lavalle's mission was dismissed by 
the Chileans as an attempt by. the Peruvian Government to gain time and 
pTepaye for wa: rz. TurtheTmOTeq the demand by Peru that the Atacama 
1 Amongst the elite g pro-war/Boliviat and pro-Chile groups tended to 
correspond to the Pierolista and Civilista factions (cf. Gibbs Ms. 
11,120,16th February 1E79, & MS. Uo470/3t 2.4th February 1679). 
2. This allegation appears to have been largely true. Godoy, in his 
letter to lierro, wrote that: "La unica consideracibn. -poderosa que 
mantiene la indecision es, no la remota esperanza.. de que la Legacion 
Lavalle logre inducir a nuestro Gobierno a un avenimiento pacificO 
con Boliviag sino la conciencia de su pesima situacion fiscal y de I la inferioridad de sus elementos navales comparados con los que Chile 
posee ... Pero de esta ultima consideracion.. ha nacido.. su empeno de 
alistar sus naves, incrementar su ejercito.. " (5th March 1679t in 
Moreno, lbL4, pp. 81/2). and a week later he stated le.. 1a mission 
confiado al Sr. Iavalle trata de ganar tiempo --" (12/3/791 ibid -P- 
83) 
Furthermore, St. John reported to the F. O. thats".. Peru is collecting 
a considerable force on the frontler.. of Taxapaca, 2,00o troops hav- 
ing already landed in Iquique. She is also working at her fleet. 
(1.0.177/149t 12-th March 1679) 
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Desert be evacuated by Chilean troopst without the concomitant lifting 
of' the Bolivian decreet as a prerequisite to negotiatim, doomed the 
. mediation attempt to failure. Consequentlyt on 29th March 1879t Fierro 
telegrammed to Godoy to leave Perut since the two countries were now 
at war due to Peru's failure to declare neutrality. 
The first stage of' the war was brief* and onesided. On the outbreak 
of' hostilities the Peruvian Government was drawn six months ahead upon 
payments f'xoa such sources as the Cia. kdministradoxa del Estanco del 
Salitre and the Peruvian Guano Companyg and had defaulted on the 
payment of the external debt three years previously(Mcqueen, 1926, p. 10). 
But victory hinged upon naval strengthg (St. Jckm described the war as 
a "war of' launches", '. F. O. 61/319,25th August 1879)9 and consequently 
Peru had to obtain more ships. The Chileans were well aware of this 
fýct, and were determined to prevent any enlargement of the Peruvian 
fleet. Godoy, in his-letter dated the 5th March 18799' wrote to Fierro 
that it had come to his attention that the Peruvian Government: 
11.. cuenta con adqUirir Un buque blindad0 pode-roso en un termino 
de no mas de 50 dias .... este Gobiernot pelsuadido de la 
in1811011dad de §U clementoß navalen lempecto de log de 
Chile 9 ningun esfuerzo 9 ningun sacrif Icio omiti«x ia por adquirir 
otros. to. " (in Ahumada morenot 189k#P. 62. 
) 
HoweveTq Peru's bankrupt finances and reputation in the London Money 
Market made it impossible to obtain cxeclit to purchase naval reinforce- 
ments (quitik apart from Britain's strict enforcement of the neutrality 
laws, on its shipbuilders and on the seas. ) Its unfortunate relation- 
ship with the Bondholders and H. M. G. may therefore be said to have been 
1 
a contribution to Peruvian defeat. Spencer St. Johno howevert Pinpointed 
a fuithex barrier to the succesful piosecution of the wart namely 
the 
internal social and economic rtyuctu3, e of Pexu. In a despatch written 
Thi, i, point. iti eýxpjored in Cluaptex. 
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in May 16'79 St. Jokm : reviewed the various x easons behind Pexu Is 
failure to reach a satisfactory settlement with the Bondholders: 
"There is no doubt that in common with the rest of the worldl 
tx-ad: e is depressed in Perul but that is not the real reason 
why this republic has not paid what is due to the Boýdholders- 
Tho real reason is that the Govexnment is afraid to xaise the 
necessary taxes which the people could pay with greater- ease 
than in almost any othby. country in Amorica. 
I have elsewhexe observed even in this crisis, of their 
count, yyls fate, the members of Congress would not impose the 
taxes necessary to carry on the war, but were ready to vote 
either loans or issues of iy-redeemable paper money... " 
(F. O. 177/149, St. John to F. O., 20th May 1679) 
By the. end of 1679 the Chileans had achieved substantial victories 
in the SoUth. One of, pexu, s two ironcladso the Independenciat had I 
been lost in May (1'. 0.61/318t St. john to 1.0., 28th May 1E79), 
severely weakening the Peruvian navy. Then in October the Chilean 
fleetj in the Battle of Angamosq captured the Huascars and effectively 
decided the outcome of the war(F,. o. 61/319# 14th October 1879). 
Twenty days after, this battle, on the 28th Octobert the Chl-Wd" 4ýýbY 
invaded Taxapaca, and, at the beginning of 1861t went on tb OCCUPY 
Lima. The Treaty of' Ancons however# was not concluded until Octcber 
IE83p despite Chile's swift and decisive naval victoryl this was 
becauseq duTing the intervening years# the entixe social and political 
fabric of Peru collapsed. 
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B. The Pacific War and Peruvian diSintegiation: symptom or cause? 
The Pacif ic War brought out all the existing centrýfugal tendencies 
which had been endemic to Peruvian society ever since ln*pendence. 
While the Chileans were carrying out a campaign to bring about the 
'capital disaccumulation4of Peru, featuxes such as intense xacial hostilityt 
. the isolation and fragmentation of the ruling classest xegional, frictionst 
lack of Class solidarity and the identification of the ruling classes 
with external forces shattered the Peruvian social and political 
structure from within. These features axe sometimes atty-ibutedp in parto 
to the Pacific War itself. In fact, howeverg they should rather be 
viewed as elements intAnsic, and even functionalg to an incoherent 
social atzvocturet and were created in Colonial Peru, MoreoYerl these 
pre-capitalist characteristics of the Peruvian polityt whilst emerging 
most clearly during the war,, were in no sense caused by it, but in fact 
contributed to its outbreak, They were also the major reasons for 
Peruvian defeat. Iglesias, in his address to the Cajamarca Assembly 
on the 12th of January 1884, cleaAq Tecognised thiss 
"... los odios de faccion, las rivalidades internas# laB furias 
de las pasiones, vivan aun ante el peligro de la patria, hacian 
imposible todo plan serio y decisivo de ataque o de defensa... " 
and went on to plead for peace, since the wars were destroying Peru: 
"La guerra desde Febrero de 1880t no se hace a Chile, sino a 
nuestros propios desventmados pueblos. " 
(in Ugarteche and San C-Astovalt 1943; Vol lls ppe 
During the first months of the war# the Iaruvian elite had tit 
maintained a xelatively united fronto andg despite the appalling econ- 
Omic conditions, the Government managed to raise Some funds with which 
it was hoped to purchase ships and armaments (Mcqueen 9 1926, pp. 
10-11) 
However, this was achieved mainly through currency manipulationst 
and 
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I. 
'by the middle of 1879 British P. O. documents speak of the wmillingness 
on the part of Peruvian capitilists to contribute'to the war effort 
(F,. o. ' 61/317, st. John to Salisburyt llth June 1879); while in 1881 it 
was observed that Peru Is wealthy citizens had abandoned the country at 
the first hint of trouble: 
"Los Pocos hombres de fortuna han abandonada hace anos la capital 
Para meterse en los palacios de (Note, n. a. Ito 
Chilean Protectorate in Limag March 1881, in Ahumada. Moreno, -' 
IU49 pp. 27.5-6) 1- 
Then, on receipt of the news of'. the disasters in the South t Piado Is ýl . 
government appeared to collapse. - St. John wr, ote to Salisbury in Qcý00e": 
nt there appears t' be no go' "At prese 0 vernment whatever; the Vice- 
kJOL21joilt, Id ý, UjjrjjjC"j LU 1110 L#cd. .... Evaj y LhIsir, aplica i in Lu lic I it 
a chaotic state; 'there is no general named to command the army, 
nothing is being done to sti-engthen their l'orces.. Peru appears to 
be St: ruck as with paralysis .... the people themselves seem as 
indiffe3,. -ent to the futu-re as-the governing classes who are think- 
ing more of their personal ambition than the velfaze of their 
country. " (F. o. 61/319, St. John to Sa lisbuTy, 29th October 1879) 
and he commented once again on the continued opposition from Congress 
to the imposition of taxation: 
"They pref erred giving the Government the almost unlimited 
Powers to'issue paper money# than to run the risk of raising 
any opposition among the tax-PaYing, cla"" (ibid. ) 
According to St. Johng howeverp confidence was briefly restoxed in mid- 
December when President Pxado returned f rom the Bouthp only to collapse 
again when% 
I 
61,0n the 18th.. the people wexe astonished to hear that General 
PradO had eribarked ... and sailed for the 
United States. " 
(St' John to Salisbury, F-. o. 61/319# 22nd December 1879) 
His flights nominally to acquire weapons to continue the wart was symbolic 
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t1 
of the attitude of a large sector of the upper classes towaids the war 
It also marks the beginning of' the fxagmentation of the Peruvian society 
and government into several rival factions,, and the end of' a coherent 
programme of war. In his despatch dated the 22nd December, St. John 
enclosed an extract from the'South Pacific Timesýwhlch clearly reflected 
the desperation felt in Limal 
"An empty exchequer; no credit-I war; loss of impoitant territory 
, that may never be recovered; poverty among the people unexampled; 
naval officers on pay and no ships; taxation in every form and 
shape; bread increasing in pricel and paper money decreasing in 
its power to buy it; pensioneis without pensions; public employees 
unpaid; families of* men who have, fallen into the, hands of' the 
enemy# or have perishedg pennilessi a rapidly decreasing population; 
commerce ruined; Agricultwe neglected; Arica bl9cloded itnd the 
chance of Callao sharing the same fatel with a general paralyzation 
of everything, socially and politically. This little catalogue 
of drawbacks to national happiness will at least assist in des- 
cribing the situation 
And where is to be fourd the remedy? The question creates an 
echo not an answer ... , (in F. O. 6V319) 
Two days later it appeared that the' Igeneral paralyzation, was at an 
end, as Pierola "&arched into Lima as dictator.. " (r. O. 6V319t St. John 
to 1.0. p 24th December 1879). Even St. John appeared hopeful of' 
the 
new president who, he thoughts 
Izope I will not .. an intelligent mang and having resided much 
in E 
we hope fall into the errors of, his ignorant predecessors# who 
have been Interfe-ring In every possible way with the freedom of 
comneTCeg endeavouring to secure a monopoly ol 1sudar coml I*Ilvcl 
issuing arbitrary decrees in banking and businesol'and foibidding 
More than four persons to meet in a group In the streets-" (ibid. 
) 
1. It also of feTed to the British clear conf Irmation of the widely hold 
view of' Peruvian politics as a corrupt and despicable affair. 
The 
Peruvian collapse into anaTchy merely fulfilled British expectations. 
Subsequentlyl frequent xefexences are made to politicians motivated 
purely by personal ambition and financial greed. 
(e. g. F. 0.61/325 
26th February, 1880) 
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However, St. John was soon disappointed. Pierola's over-riding concern 
Was tO 88CUTe hie dictatorship and crush his old enemies - who wprp not. 
Chileans, but Peruvians'. St. John described his policy as one 
designed to upset: 
11-almost everything existing in this country with the sole 
object of apparently putting in every postg persons who are 
favourable to the present dictator... 
Nothing that can be changed appears to be forgotten: the 
armyg the navyq the magistracy.. even the monopoly system has 
been upset9 the E. sterling has been proclaimed the legal 
currency in the Republic; as there is no gold in the countryt 
the Government are forced to content themselves with paper 
issues ...... The whole state of the country gives me the 
idea 
that a great collapse and bankruptcy are inevitable 
(F. o. 61/325,21st January 1880, St. John to F. O. ) 
This is a clear description of clientelist politics. A few months 
later St. John illustrated the populist element in Pierola's 
I 
approach, one aspect of which was his attack on the Civilista 
oligarchy and foreign merchants: 
of $0 the action of the revolutionary authorities 
in this 
Republic makes us fear that we shall soon have a kind of 
organized commune under the.. direction of M. Pierola. 
4" The object is eviAently to ruin 
the fiftancial clft, 9868 
whom the Pierolistas look upon as their enemies.. 
,... 
foreigners dealing in provisions are closing their 
stores.. I fear that the next stage will be an organized 
pillage under the pretence of securing the necessaries of 
life for the poor. Forced loans are.. openly spoken of.. the 
partisans of Pierola are openly hostile to fo: reigners.. " 
(F. O. 61/325P 12th May 1880, St. John to F. O. ). 
for the Lima-based elite, and especially for the foreign mercantile 
community, it was becoming evident that Chilean occupation might 
well be preferable to rule by 'altiplano caudillos'. 
Highlighting the degree to which Pierola subordinated the national struggle to his personal cause, he gave no assistance to operations in the Southo since they were commanded by the Civilista Montero. Instead he organized his own army in Lima$ as much to oppose Montero' 
as to fight the war. These 2 armiesl, observed 'El Ferrocarril de 
(I 'Polial follnWIVIER (111 MQ pill). INA oanti, qgn, WPI-P III IPAIILY '91' rival I)PT pe 
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On the l7th January 1881 the Peruvian army surrendered, and on the 
the 2nd February the North American MinIsterg Christiancyp reported 
that the disbanded, Peruvian forces# together with the 'lower orders', 
I 
were looting and buzning Lima, until the Chilean army arrived to take 
control. Consequently the foreign communityg he wrotes dreaded the 
departure of the Chileans because they would be : 
"... subjected to the prejudices$ the passions and the hatreds 
of the Peruvians of the lower orders ..... they fear that the 
*foreigners, will then be accused of having aided the Chileans 
to take possession of Lima.. " (Foreign Relations of the United 
States# Christiancy to Washingtong 2nd February 1881) 
St. John reported the events in a similar vein, Implying, however, that 
it was not only the foreign community that welcomed the protection of 
the Chilean army: 
". A110 Ical U1 tho retu=1 01 t1lu Government of Piez-Olut tiupported 
as it is by the lower orders who but the other night committed 
such excesses, makes all those who possess property desire that 
the Chileans should prolong the occupation of the country... " 
(F. O. 61/333t St. John to Granville, 22nd January 1881) 
i 
After Lima had fallen to the Chilean army the location of the war 
switched to the regionsq bringing about the change in its nature 
already touched upon in the above despatches. on the one hando the 
Chileans continued their military operations in the form of a series 
of raids into the hinterlando designed to capture booty and postpone 
Pez-u's eventual recovery by the systematic destruction of railwaYso 
sugar and cotton plantations and the levying of, forced 
loans. 
' These 
1. dn the 16th February 1881 ChristriancY wrote to Washingtons 
"It is 
evident that Chile means to leave Peru In a condition which 
shall not 
render her a dangerous neighbour hereafter. " 
(Foreign Relations of the 
United 'States )and on 23rd August 1881 St. John reported a, 
debate in the 
Chilean Congress which dealt with this plan to effect the capital'dis- 
accumulation'of the Peruvian elites"I. Ahe policy of the 
Government is 
the most judicious: the occupation$ prolonged until Peru was reduced 
to 
a Otate of decadence beyond recovery.. t,, (F. O. 
61/334). The oligllctV 
reactea by transferrW their properties to 
foreign capitalists who 
often already held a mortgage on the propertieso e. g. F. O. 177/164. 
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actIvILIcog howuvai , had the added ellect, 01' bringing the opprelised 
classes into the war to a far greater extent than previously. This 
occurred through their incursions into the Northern coastal plantationsp 
which led to the involvement of the Chinese and the Blacks, and through 
their attacks on'altiplano'villages. In the middle of 1881 'la 
, 
Situacion', Limal reported on the impact of the Chilean expedition 
to Canete: 
leo,, que tan duramente ha sido azotado por una de esas teribles 
tormentaB que se conocen en las haciendas del Peru en el nombre 
de levantamiento de los negros ....... 
Canete y sus fundos opulentes cayeron en seguida en poder 
de los negros alzados para el pillaje y la matanzao a pretexto 
de las simpatias que la desventux-ada y miserable colonia asiatica 
de esos valles habia manifestado por el ejercito de Chile ....... 
I 
(17th June 1881, in Ahmada Morenop 1884p p. 149) 
and in 1883 Alfred St. John remarked: 
"The poor Indians have been the greatest sufferers throughout 
this war..., " 
and yet$ he addede underlining their marginilisation to Peruvian 
soeietyt 
".. they scarcely know why it was brought about or why it 
continues. " (1'. 0.61/347, A- St- John to F. O. p 23rd August 1883) 
On the other hand, the Peruvian military chiefs hadg naturallyl 
moved their bases into the'altiplano I after the Chilean victory, 
nominally to continue the patriotic struggle. In reality most of 
their eftorts quickly became concentrated on fighting each other# and 
Caceres alone carried out a serious campaign against the Chileans. , 
This too obviously led to the increased involvement of the Indian 
peaBantB, either as'montoneraBs guerrillaB on their own accounts or as 
victims. In, this way, the national war and the internal disputes 
LOOLWooll UIC; al-1101caL COULU. 10 U1 U10 Uppor "1ADQC)g3' a1141 
L110 4,40111204111011L 
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disorganisation of Peruvian society loosened the horizontal and vertical 
adhesion of class and clientelist relations and widened the conflict 
into a full-scale social and racial war. These different aspects of 
the war also became intertwinedl Pierola had proclaimed himself the 
'Protector de la, Raza Indigena' (Basadret 1969, Vol. V111, P. 244)9 
and was accused by the Civilista Garcia Calderon of "... sembrando la 
anarquia en las clases sociales. .e . "(Calderon to the Congress at 
Chorillos, 10th July 1881, in Ugarteche and San Cristovall 1945, P. 117)t 
and whilst this was purely populist rhetorict his use of the masses 
to intimidate his rivals increased the divisions amongst the upper 
classes and weakened--still further Civilista commitment to the national 
struggle. On the 17th April 1881 Christiancy wrote to Blaines 
".. some wealthy Peruvians who support the provisional Government 
(under Calderon) haye been heard t9 express their wish that 
Chile might take and govern the 'WhOle of Peru; and there are not 
wanting strong suspicions among the Peruvians that this is the 
ultimate purpose for which the provisional government is working. " 
(Foreign Relations of the United States) 
In realityg however, Caceres alone among the national leaders could be 
said to have had any genuine commitment to a radical programmet and in 
his campaign against the Chileans$ his Indian soldiers also attacked 
white property owners. A; the war continued, this aspect of his 
1 
campaign became predominant; in January 1882 St. John reported 
to the 
F. O. on the extension of Chilean controlinto some of the provinces: 
"An expedition has.. started South to take possession of the 
Province of' Ica, which is overrun with guerrilla bands of the 
worst description ....... If the officers conduct 
themselves wellp 
LIMY W111 I. C) Iciokad Vjj, ()jj AR 1110PI'At, 01A. 
" 611'11(). Proth JskD- 
uary 1882, St. john to p. j). ) 
He also commented on the absence of any of the national 
leaders in the 
area j making it clear that many of 
the peasants were now acting 
independently. 
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Bonilla, in an article (1978) based primarily on British F. O. recoxds 
and an interesting piece of research by Favre (1975) , has given us an - 
excellent account of' the social dimension of the pacific War. The 
objective of his research isg he statesp to examine : 
14'... the solidity of the national assumptions which underlay the 
foundations of the Peruvian republic 60 years earlier..... "(P. 94) 
and the Pacific War provides an exceptional opportunity* to carry out 
this task since: 
"There is no better way of testing the foundations of a society 
and the motivations of its members' behaviour than a situation of 
crisis. 11(ibid. ) 
He then goes on to approach this question by considering the two main 
aspects to the problem which we have discussed above; firstlyt the 
position of the Peruvian upper classes# and$ secondly. the racial 
conflict engendered by the war. 
The first aspect is examined in terms of the solidity of the loligar- 
t4alu =LaLol, wislob Ito implipa ws%F; established by the Civill8tas during 
Pardo's period of office. In order to assess thist he discusses the 
lack of patriotism displayed by the export bourgeoisiet and the rifts 
between the Civilistas and Pierolistast commenting: 
"This civil war reflectedl at bottom# the irreconcilable interests 
of' the individual chie: ftains and patrons and their dependants and 
f'ollowers. Since none of them enjoyed a sufficient base of' 
autonomous powerp the result was profound instability. 29-11 
the support of-the Chilean army o: r occupation could enable a 
government to maintain or_enlarge its sphere of authority_. _ 
(p. 1001 my emphasis) 
Unfortunatelys Bonilla does not enlarge upon the last pointo but goes 
on to clearly demonstrate the growin 
.g 
desire for peace on the part of 
both the Lim based elite, and the regional upper classest as their 
, social and economic positions became increasingly threatened by revolt 
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irým below. He concludess 
"The disintegration of the oligarchic state thus demonstrated 
the profound instability of' Peruvian societyl and how extremely 
vulnerable was the national cohesion achieved by the rule of the 
oligarchy ... "(P. 100) 
I 
In looking to the Pacific War to demonstrate the fragility of a 
hypothetical I oligarchic state I, Bonilla might perhaps be accused of 
tilting at windmills; as I have demonstrated in Chapter7 it was quest- 
ionable whether the Civilista period of government could be said to 
have established an oligarchic state at all. The infightiz)g during 
the Pacific War was in fact simply an intensification of the internal 
disputes which had characterised Peruvian society ever since the 
Declaration of, Independences and which had been greatly exacerbated 
by the Givilista attempt to assume political control. (cf. Chavarriat 
1972# P-129). It is highly debatable in fact whether it is possible to 
speak in terms of national cohesion at M stage in Republican Peru's 
131-0- wal 11114tory, "1141 11011111A 'Ira Own d1mounplon or Lim aUmlo d1vialman 
that cut through Peruvian society surely demonstrate this. As we 
have discussed above, the nation state can be seen as a wholly 
inappropriate unit of analysis for most peripheral formations at 
this stage, and particularly f or Peru 
1, 
and Solivia . In this context t 
, Chile must be seen as the exception rather 
than the rule. The 'social' 
dimension' of the War of the Pacific therefore simply highlighted the 
n. b. the American Minister's comments in 1881: ".. 1 am unable to 
discover any sufficient elements here for establishing an indepen- 
d6nt or even any kind of' regular or permanent government of Peru; 
certainly no form of popular government by the Peruvians themselves. 
and he attributed this deficiency largely to the *enslavement' of 
the Indiansl Blacks and Chinese. (Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Chriatiancy-Blaine, 4th May 1881). obviously the comment 
springs partly frou self-interest and ethnocentricity. 
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1 
external orientation of the Peruvian social structuret which# in a 
sense, had provided its sole cohesive force. It is hardly surprising@ 
therefore, that: 
"a prolonged occupation. would be welcome not only to foreignerst 
but to a large number of Peruvian proprietors who fear civil war 
and military revolutions. (F. O. 6V333t St. John to Granville 
6th April, 1881) 
By 1864 the Peruvian elite felt its position in Peruvian society to be 
even more insecuret 
"The Peruvian Government are negotiating with the Chilean 
Authorities with the object of inducing them to leave a part of 
their army in the neighbourhood of Lima till July next. " 
(Alfred St. John to Granville, 1,. 0.6V353, llth March 1884) 
Implicit in the above quotations is the weakness of the Peruvian 
upper classes vis 'a vis the oppressed groups within Perug andt indeedl 
as the Ohilean forces began to Withdrul British F. O. and North AmericUl 
diplomatic papers dwelt increasingly on the frequency and ferocity of 
Indian uprisings. On the 20th February Alfred St. John reported to 
Granville that the'montoneras'had taken possession of Trujillo and the 
port of Salaverry (F. O. 611353); on the 7th May he wrote to the F. O. 
that an Indian rising, led by partisans of Cacerest had taken 
Huanuco, (F. O. 61/353), and then on the 5th of June he reported engage- 
ments throughout Peru, as far apart as Cuzco and Cajamarca (F. O. 
6V353). 
From the point of view of the white upper class the situation had 
deteriorated even further by the end of 1885 as. Caceres continued to 
It is significant that one of the major issues of contention between 
the Civilistas and FieroliBtas during the war continued to concern 
guano and Dreyfus, as Pierola carried on his negotiations with the 
French capitFtlint, to the detriment of Peruvian nstiorvil finances, 
provoking ttie comment I-rom t3t. Jotin timitt "It Its gauviallY bell"Vad 
that Sr. Pierola has been a sleeping partner in that firm ever since 
the signature of the Guano Contracts...,, (F. O. 6V344,24th Oct. 
1881ý 
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gain ground; U. S.. Minister Buck wrote to the Secretary of State, Bayard: 
"Caceres seems to have the organized sympathies and interests of 
the Indian race with him in a degree to which, they have perhaps 
IiUL 01ten boon excited tsince the i1xvil overthrow ol the 111ca power 
there. There seems to be something of a national race phase to 
the conflict which'is exceptional as compared with previous 
revolutionary movements in Peru. " (Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 21st November 1885). 
As I have shownt Peruvian bankruptcy, loss of exports and credit, and 
national war had combined to provoke the complete disintegration of 
Peru's fragile political and social structure. As the economic 
relationship with metropolitan capital was interruptedg the force which 
had held together the different labour systems in Peru also ceased to 
function. The resulting vacuum loosened the vertical patron/client 
ties which held the Indian peasants In placet whilst also permitting 
the Phinese and Black labourers to revolt against their social 
oppression. 
1 
The second part of Bonilla's paper concerns the resulting 
race war; f irst of all, he considers the impact of the Chilean inva- 
sions on coaBtal labour. 
The decades of civil strife beginning with the Wars of Independence, 
had resulted In a. drastic fall in populationj and also the displacement 
of large numbers of the rural labour force(F. o. 61/2l 15th July 1824). 
Consequently there is frequent mention . in contemporary sources of the 
severe scarcity of labour# especially in coastal Perus and this problem 
1. just as republican Peruvian history prior to the Pacific 
War had been 
characterised by virtually continual intra-elite conflicto so 
too had 
it witnessed frequent locallsed uprisings on the part of the 
different 
oppressed groups; for instancel in 1870 U. S. Minister Hovey wrote 
to 
Fish reporting an insurrection of about 2000 Chinese labourers on 
the 
large cotton estates of pativilca(Foreign Relations of 
the United 
States# 14th September 1870), and in 1876 a large-scale coolie revolt 
took place ("Stewart, 1951), whilst Macera (1974) notes that the 
hacendados'never had complete control over the Indian peasants, andl 
lor example$ in 1866 an uprising in Huancane broke out. 
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54 (cf. was exacexbated by Castilla's manumission ot the slaves in 18 
1 
Davýlos y Lisson, 1919, Vol 1V-, - Camprubit 1957, Vol lt P- 57 and Copello 
and Petriconi, 1876). Alleviation of this shortage became even more 
urgent as the Peruvian export economy began to expand with the increase 
in demand from'Europe and North America for Peruvian agricultural 
products. Just as the capital to exploit the guano and coastal agri- 
OUltUr&l ftedoýa hacl originally come from abroaA, BO too the solution 
to the labour problem was found outside of Peru. In 1849 Congress 
passed Ila Ley del Chino', Peru's first immigration lawq permitting 
the introduction of 'coolie, indentured labours and in the same year 
the first shipload of Chinese immigrants arrived. This trade cont- 
inued until 18799 and it is estimated that in these thirty years from 
between 100,000 to 160,000 Chineýe laboureres (single males) were 
introduced into Peru (Wong, 1978, p. 342), many having died in mid- 
passage (Thompson, 1979, P. 576). The working and living conditions, of 
these workers were, in general, appalling. In 1876 Gibbs discussed 
their plight in a general report on Perus 
".. their condition as a rule is far from satisfactory. In the 
Usa UlipL 10nop Liko ImoULluil of- ROMP nr thP )V: kO16$1V1AR 
'a 
that the coolie is entirely at the mercy of his master... Many of 
these Chinamen are engaged in the guano deposits ... Besides 
being 
worked almost to death, they have neither sufficient food nor 
passably wholesome water ... During the 
last quarter of 1875... 
there were 355 Chinamen employed at Pabellon de Pica alones of 
whom no less than 98 were in the hospital ... it is often said 
that the advancement of Peru depends upon the importation of 
Levin points out that a scarcity of labour was not the whole problem: 
".. centuries of f orced labour in the Spanish mines and plantations l- - 
and the mmiunal tra4itionB, of the 1ý3dianst made them unwillirg to be 
wage labour on the coast again", therefore, ". At was the high 
4egree 
of 
, 
immobility of Peruvian labour - its failure to respond to monetary 
incentives - which choked off its supply. Custom, experience I institu- 
tions, and the law itself made labour immobile. "(1960, pp. 40/1) These 
observations also neatly demonstrate one of the major problems for a 
Peruvian transition to capitalism i the resistance of the Indian and 
ihe 'relative ýveakness of the embryonic bolageoivie- 
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"of Chinamen .... "(Foreign Relations of the United Statesp GibbS 
to Pishp 13th March 1876) 
Interestingly# not only did this reactionary solution to Pexuls 
labour problema rpriect the Pxtsmt to witivi, tho ; tUlLue. 100 ul L11C, CJL- 
port bourgeoisie had been over-determined by the cultural attitudes 
discussed in Chapter 19 but it further stigmatized Peru in the eyes of 
foreign capital. Here 'Ia Flandre Liberale' (Ghent) unfavourably com- 
pares Peru and Chile in the context of their differing approaches to 
labour: 
"The moral superiority of the Chilean people.. assured victory. 
They have always given a kind welcome to foreigners who have 
settled there. Whilst Peru brought in Chinese labourers to 
exploit their rich deposits of guano$ and reduced them to a 
state of' semi-slavery, Chile relied rather on the free immigrant 
labour" (26th January 1881, in Ahumada Morenot 1884t P-217 (MY 
translation)) 
A similar attitude is adopted by the Peruvian newspaper *E1 Nacionall- 
which, in February 1876, reported on the news that Chinese immigration 
I 
was to be re-establisheds 
"Two daily newspapers have received this news with ... great rejoi- 
cing.. the great interest of industry has been savedl threatenedg 
as they were, by a tremendous crisis for the want of hands for 
labor ....... 
Since Asi&tic immigration was established in our ports, slavery, 
.. was re-established do facto... 
That which is wanted Is a laborer who works. from sunrise to sunsetj 
who can live on two rations of rice; who earns one sol a week, 
which in the majority of the cases is discounted from him for real 
or supposed damages occasioned by himl and who can drag chains$ be 
flogged .... Under those conditions it will certainly be impossible 
to obtain day-laborers in this country. 11(in Foreign Relations of 
the United States, Gibbs to Fishp 13th March 1876) 
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Bonilla's evidence on the spontaneous eruptio 
1 
n of the Chinese workers 
during the war is therefore unsurprisingl and is corroborated by my 
,. own 
findings. However a further, and apparently less explicable, 
aspect of the racial conflict was quick to emerge, involving conflict 
within the oppressed groups, 
Z: 
"This time it was not the revolt of the oppressed Chinese 
against the oppressor group of whitesp but the sack of Chinese 
shops and massacre of their proprietors by Indians and mestizos 
from the disorganized and disbanding Peruvian army ... similar 
events took place in Canete.. 
It, D61ePm1, PT 11179 Awl Real', W 1i'Q1o1tW1Y LhIn JaajiwMLIL, ý 
racial conflict among the popular masses reached peaks of 
intensity..... in 1881 the negroes of Canete took the opportu- 
nity to attack estates, killing both white owners and Chinese 
labourersl even though objectively the Chinese were in a similar 
situation to themselves. No doubt the secular frustrations and 
humiliations of the black slave population found a compensatory 
release in this race war. Colonial division and oppression had 
not me2: ely impeded the articulation of the collective interests 
of the oppressed as a group, but also concealed the real enemy. 
(Bonilla, 1978, pp. 108/91 my emphasis) 
Whilst Bonilla is clearly quite correct in his analysis of this phenom- 
enom in terms of Peru's colonial history# his, interpretation of the 
plight of the Chinese is less satisfactory. It is in fact evident ' 
1. Bonilla also points out that the widespread rebellion and flight of 
the Chinese workers was a major cause of the plantation owners des- 
ire for peace and he cites a letter from Adolfo Salmon# prefect of 
La Libertad, to U. S. Consul Mountjoys "What chiefly grieves me is 
that the Chinese are all off, after having caused great disorder. 
They can be of no use to themo but we need them very badly. If you 
could.. persuade Lynch to sell them again to the estate owners, I 
'would buy them for their weight in gold. Do see what 'you can do 
... because this is extremely important for us ... 11 
15th October 18809 
(Bonilla, 19ý&, p. 108) 
2. St. John comments on this side of the conflict: ".. at Canete. -a fierce 
quarrel has broken out between the Chinese and BlaQRsl and FVrdQr§ 
and destruction of property are aaily occurring. "(Fooe 61/333,9th 
March 1881); and on the 27th July 1881 he reported that since the 
Chilean army had left Canete the bandits (Indians and'mestizos') had 
come down from the sierra and were ".. burning and destroying, a-yery- 
thing. (F. O. 61/334) 
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'that the situation of the Chinese workers was differntiated from that of 
other oppressed groups in several important ways. Presumably Chinese 
workers were highly attractive to plantation owners not simply because 
of their adaptability to the climate of' the Peruvian coastal zone, but 
mainly because of' the almost negligible reproduction cost of this form 
Of labour. This factt however, would constitute an irritant for neigh- 
bouring workersq whether black former slaves orlmestizos's since the 
Chiýese were therefore competitors in the labour market at a far lower 
cost than other oppressed groups; in fact, the expansion of' the coastal 
haciendas, of which thelcoolie, trade was an integral part, had dis- 
placed other sectors of the coastal community: 
".. el sistema de las grandes haciendas ... ha hecho desaparecer la 
poquena agricultma do pan llevart I& roblacion indigena h& 
desaparecido, para dar lugar a la poblacim china.. "(Copello and 
Petriconi. 1876, p. 28; my emphasis) 
It is also clear that when the Chinese ceased to be plantation workers 
and emigrated to the towns, setting up small businesses# they represented 
a threat to the urban working classes and petty bourgeoisie, due to 
their willingness to work long hours for little reward; a historical 
characteristic of migrant labourt 
"As the Chinaman is laborious and industrious, being satisfied 
with small gains and having no luxurious vices or habits, he sells 
cheaper and gives a better article for less money than shopkeepers 
of other nationalities"(Foreign Relations of the United Statesq 
Gibbs to Fish, 13th November la76) 
And in May 1677 Gibbs wrote to Evartst 
".. the Chinaman is an industrious, hardwo-zking and patient 
labomer;, the climate all along the coast... suits him; his wants' 
are fews and he saves money, when other races live in_penu-ry and 
miseryunder the same circumstances,. " (ibid. Ilth May 1ý77) 
When it is itmembered that at this time the Peruvian economy was in the 
griP. ' Of' a major crisis, and was characterised by soaring inflation 
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and unemployment, it is hardly surprising that the Chinese woxker 
came to occupy the position, traditional to the migrant workerp o-. F 
scapegoat. In any case, historically, all-male migrations have always 
been viewed as threatening; 'El Nacionall clearly articulated this view- 
point which held the alien to be immoral and contaminating: 
"The Asiatic race, who ...... advanced very little or nothing 
in 
more than a 1000 years, have a civilization different and contrary 
to ours. 
... it is true that the Asiatics are intelligentg and have few 
necessities-they would be strong competitois to our working 
class, and for which 
' 
reason'they could woik cheap... 
In exchange the Chinese gamble is vicious and voluptuous. To 
restrain the contagion of these evils the introduction of Chinese 
women would be necessary... 
I Why then that-anxiety to augment.. the current Of Asiatic immigra- 
tion ... ? They bring degeneration and nothing else.. 
" (11th 
February 1876, in Foreign Relations of the United States9 Gibbs 
to Fish'p 13th March 1876) 
Fundamental to this feeling of Asian degeneracy was the competition over 
V9PPA which inevitably arose , apa which was a major grievance 
for other, 
male workers; to quote from Gibbs once mores 
"They (the Chinese) intermarry with the lower class of whitest 
mestizas, and cholas, and by tliese are looked upon as quite a 
catch, f'or they make good husbands9 industrioust domestic, and 
fond of' their children, while the cholo, husband is lazyO indolento 
often a drunkard; and brutal to his wif'e. I often meet childxen 
in the streets whose almond-shaped eyes show their Chinese origin" 
(Foreign Felations of' the United States# Gibbs. to fish, 13th 
November, 1876) 
Finally, a large propoition of blackformer slaves had become small 
I 
scale subsistence farmers in the vicinity of the plantatiOm- As such 
they would be unlikely to have any shared interests or feelings OfSolid- 
axity with the Chinese indentured labourers. Similarlyt the interests 
ol LIko c3lcj iaii Ist, 11ait' lic-pasiLp. witaLhoo ciagagod 
It% imunumin 
I Pat ItlIII LUI 
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or working under a feudal relationship with a'hacendado, were-not 
likely to be in accord with those of either groups. 
In one sense theyefore, the reactionaryg slave-owner mentaUty of 
the Pexuvian upper classes, which saw the solution to its laboux- piob- 
lems on the coast in terms of an all malepcaptive workforce, generated 
yet more cleavages within an already highly divided society. The prin- 
cipal actors in the racial war, however-, were not the Blacks or 
Chinese, but the Sierran Indian peasants# whose xelationship with the 
Whites remained that of subject and colonizer. Bronner notes that 
the lipaniah conquobt haa ploduced in kcius 
".. an absolute division of labourg alienating the conquered 
while enth-yoning the values of the conquerors"(1978, p. 5) 
1 
and compares the colonial system to an apartheid regime. The Repub- 
lican state had not succeededlr4or attempted to, fuse the 'Two Eepublics I 
ý the racist and colonial nature of Spanish legislation concerning the 
Indian was largely retained, but its protective aspects were discarded 
(Steward and Faron, 1959p. 157). Integral to the Republican state was 
the destruction of the community enshrined In Bolivar's attempt to 
liberate all land for capital formation - collective ownership of 
land was made illegal. However legislation legitimising the semi- 
feudal and caste-like social xelations characteristic of' the colonial 
p1riod, was maintained; in 1826 two decrees re-established the old 
system of colonial tribute as the primary source of income for the 
state, andg furthermore, continued to explicitly, distinguish between 
the various ethnic divisions within the oppressed groups (Yepes 19720p. 42) 
1. The Spanish had not attempted to assimilate the Indian; on the 
contraryp an anthropology of Tacial differentiation was constructed 
(cf 
- Pielt 1970, P-108) in order to facilitate her/his exploitation (see Chapter 2 ). In turn the Indian survived by retaining her/his 
cultuxe, and aspects of the commununal mode of production. In this 
differentiation and oppression was to be found the fuel for regular 
Indian uprisings, ranging in form from local jacqueries to large- 
scale zesistance movements, generally messianic in form (Piket 1978). 
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Political power was restricted to those literate in Spanisho and the 
Indian was excluded from the common law of the Fepublic (Piels 1970); 
and yet approximately 9C% of* the population, at the beginning of the 
1 Rýpublican era, were classed as Irldian peasantse 
Butp despite the clearly discrWnatoTyq racist and elitist nature 
oi the new republic and the oppression, repi-ession and exclusion of 
the Indian peasant by the white and mestizop it appeais clear that 
the upper Clxasset had been to ubAelic-d Ud divided by the long wars 
and preceding economic depression, that just as they were unable to 
assume central political control, so too* their power in the sierra 
was, in practice, not wholly predominant (Macera, 1974). Spalding 
(1975) speaks of a constant struggle in the pre-Pacific Var period 
between Ach peasantaq Indian communities and'hacendados' # all of 
whom weie involved in the production of 'Wool foT the U. K. p over land 
and giazing rights. This is confirmed by Deere's findings (1977) 
that in the Northern sier-ra the'hacendados'did not succeed in making 
diastic inioads into communrl lands until the mid-century onwards; 
Whilst hobe: rt's study of Huancayo, in the central highlands, (1976) 
xeveals an area piedominantly made up of small farmers. The 
WYLIzIlQu appealm Lu ouiaWailloL 11millIn Is; iintilivPtIon (fl Ff -rPg1on 
entirely dominated by the'hacienda, or by central power. Whilsts 
therefore, the Eur-opean-oriented elite had succeeded in establishing 
a state clearly derivative In fozm and ideology, which excluded the 
vast majority of the population, it had failed to achieve control of 
The marginilisation of the Indian to the Peruvian yepublican state 
was an important factoy'in Chilean victory; Granville commented on 
the Bolivian Indiana: ' lack of patriotism (P . 0.61/348P 
13th December 
180)and Gonzalez Prada, wondered why an Indian almy. should defend a 
nation f: rom, which It had been excluded: "Like the serf of the dle 
Agesg he will only fight for the feudal lord. " FurthermoTes the 
sierran elite also resisted central state power and undermined the 
concept of nation: " (The) 'haciendas' are separate kingdoms in the heart- 
land of' the republic. . Is cited in -Latin 
AmericaA Perspectives, 82 pp 21. 
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that state, or therefore of' the rest of the country. Moxeovert since 
thIF; 
-st;; 
i, p stiuetai)p w;; F; so In;; pj1rnpvi; 1ts- snd F; inop im ntip atol1j) WAF% 
able# through control of it, to achieve political hegemony, the 
Peiuvian nation state was in reality a fiction, incapable of imposing 
its sovereigntypoi homogeneity of language or culture within Peru. 
This fiction was thoroughly exposek by the War of the Paciiicg as was 
the weakness and disunity of the upper classes. The failure of the 
Peruvian state was largely due to the uneven and contradictory nature 
of social relations and systems of production, wýich were articulated 
only by external demand, and whose divergence was underlined by : racial 
difterences. This stxuctural : fragmentation was expressed most clearly 
in the extreme dissimilaxity between the Andean and coastal xegionst 
which inczeased throughout the 19th century. The divergence further 
undermined the solidarity of* the white upper classes, andp in turnp 
their ability to es. tablish a unitary state and destroy the Indian 
community and cultuie. In factp it even b7: ought about a superficial 
degree of regional unityt which complemented the vertical ties 
established by pation-client relationships. Van den Berghe and 
Pyhov writai 
".. at one level, the whole Andean population can be said to 
share an Andean cultuxe that sets it apart from the criollo 
cultuxe of the coast and which it shaies with the A ean paT-ts 
of the neighbouri! 2g EcuadOT and Bolvia. Syncretistic -yeligious 
beliefs, a more or less Quechuaized dialect of Spanish diet, 
musical tastes, and many other cultural traits distinguish a 
serrano from a costeno. "(19771 P-10) 
As a result, as the coast increased in prosperity due to the guano 
boom, and the sierra sank into relative obscurity, the differences 
within the Peruvian upper classes were intensified. The resentment 
felt by the sierran oligarchy towards their more prosperous coastal 
counterparts was exemplified by Pierola's long and bitter struggle 
against the Civilistas. Consequentlyq In one sense the civil waT 
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within the national war may be seen as. the culmination of the xegional 
stmuggle between coast and sierra. This aspect of the conflict high- 
lights most neatly the shallowness of' the appeal of nationalism for 
both seCtOTS of the uppeT classes, as the coastal property owners 
sought salvation first with Chile and then Americal and the Pierolistas 
placed theix hope in a plan for unification with Bolivia, (Pinillos, 1947). 
The conduct of any aimed stxuggle In Pezu, however, relied on the 
participation of Indian soldiery, and also signified a dislocation 
in the local, and/or- central, mechanisms of domination and therefore 
both piovided an opportunity and framework for Indian revolt. It was 
f-rp, pir-Mly nooppFznry, iii f*act, to mpkp r-oncessions to tho lnillsn 
peasantss either as individual clients or sometimes as a social group. 
This is xeflected in certain decrees which demonstiate a concern for 
the Indian in contradiction to the generally oppressive tenor of Peru- 
vian legislationt and in the populist approach of certain'altiplano 
01 caudillost notably Castilla, Pierola and Caceres. Moreovert Bolivar's 
legislation permittine the byeak-up of the communal lands was SUS- 
pended. until 1650t although this was largely because of' the dependence 
of' the Peruvian TxeaBUTY on the Indian contributiont which was based 
on collective responsibility (Piell 1970t P-119)- By the late 
1870s, 
however, social and xacial relations in the Bierra were, in generalt 
under greater stress than previouslyt as the position of' the Indian 
had deteriorated. Consequently, as illustrated above, the Indian 
I 
guerrillas: 
".. once in arms.. naturally turned not only against the Chilean 
1. Xubler notes that caudillos from the sierra, used their Indian clients 
to maintain themselves in power, and that this influenced 
their polr 
iQtes; fox examplej Caceres, governmentt which: 11 depending upon 
Inclian atlly petsonneIg had a great Interest 
in the maintenance of the 
communities; therefore a high degree of laissez-faire was permitted 
them.. "(19639 P. 354) In general# however$ the pro-Indian 
legisla- 
tion was not implemented, and the 'caudillos'be came dominated 
by the 
coastal elite. 
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army but also against thei3- more ancient and immediate 
oppressols. " (Bonilla, 1978, ptill) 
The practical results of this have already been touched upon; in 188ZP 
B3-iti. sh Consul Graham described events in this ways 
"Montoneya bands and large numbers of Indians forced Chilean 
troops which occupied the interior to withdraw.. in withdrawing 
they destroyed all the towns and villages in their line of 
ma, Ych. No quarter is given on either side, and the war is 
fast-becoming a butchery.. 
Considerable fears have lately been felt here by foreigners 
regarding their fate in view oi the approach of' the 
montonexas, accompanied as they are by hordes of-Indians who 
have been driven to desperation by the outiages which have 
been committed upon them by the invaders and who are now 
starving, as the whole of the interior' is lying waste.. " 
(F--o- 61/34o, Graham to F. 0., 4th August 1882) 
The effect of this was to speedily ze-=Ite most sectors of the 
Peruvian pyoper-tied classes in their desire for peace. 
The impact of mayket forces in the shape of increased demand 
for wool from axound the 1840s onwards generated the development of' 
two conflicting dynamics within the Andean region, in the shape of 
the iich peasant farmer and the semi-capitalist 1hacendado', who 
clashed in incTeasing competition over the labour of the poor 
i, ndian peasant(Spalding, 1975a). This rivalry, together with the 
increase in commercialisation and land concentration, began to 
seriously disrupt the structure of sierran society, and intensified 
existing ethnic and class hostilities. Obviously the greatest 
sufferex in this pyocess was the poorer- community peasant ; however# 
... Jpalding writes that: 
"the expansion oý the hacienda-based elite took place at the 
eXpenbe nut only 01 Iwt%. L Villaao t3v4.; 1oLY Owl Uar- 1311all 'In"1101 
but also at the expense ol the local town and quasi-urban 
centiest whose populations were primarily engaged in activities 
-Y+O- 
that were also undermined by the expansion of the hacienda: 
transport, petty commerce, and minor buxeaucratic office. " 
(1975v p. 4) 
Pike, too, notes that : Cy.; Dm the mid-19th century onwards the Indiansp 
both -rich and poo-Y, weie inc3easingly depTived of thei-r communal I. Ands 
by the 'hacienda,, (1978). 
1 
The complex results of the expansion in the demand for. wool are 
considered by '.., mith in a detailed study of Huasicancha in the Central 
, Peru vian Highl, -ýnds. He notes that the ielationship of 
the petty 
producer to dominant capital can be of three kinds: 
",, rent paid to the controller of- productive means.. ., surplus 
paid to the merchants in the process of circulation, and.. sale 
of labour power... as polarisation progresses, the same three 
relationships become evident among the petty producers them- 
selves. " (1979P P-287) 
However this increase in the exploitation of surplus labour within 
the 
I 
community is partly disguised by the traditional relationships 
between the peasantry (consequently, the white 11hacendadol Jr. always 
perceived as the prime enemy, both on class and racial grounds). 
The nature o. -, ' communal tasks (via faenal and Ila minira, ) and exchange 
of labour (lel aynil), backed up by the links of kinshiplecompiadazgot 
4P4 WItU. 
-TV-1 991144111-ty 1 
1144 41wap E-@T-Ygd 0 mok tho BUAWAP4 
nature ol such communities, which were in fact based on assymetrical 
xecipiocity (cf. Meyer and Albexti, 1975 and Chapter 4). As Such 
stratification increased with the penetration of' the commodity 
economy 
1, the 'hacendadosllsupply of' cheap labour was in danger 
'Favie(1977) notes that in order to escape flom the oppies5ion of the 
Ikulakslo poorer peasants began to leave their villages for moie 
inaccessible regions: 'Trom the beginning of' the l9th centul-y there 
is evidence of a continuous movement of' the population to the higher 
ground.. "(p. 256) Once there they resisted presswe from the wealthy 
faimeis to take part in communal activities. Moreover-, con1lict was 
fuT-thez exacerbated within parts of the sierra by an early expansion 
oi the population and the consequent development ofland hunger. It 
should be noted too that peasant discontent was also evident at this rime in Bolivia and Ecuador. u Zubritskil 1979). 
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of being monopolised by the Indian Ikulaks'. Consequently the 
'hacendadol sought to eliminate such competition by attacking the 
community andýrelmposing a torm ot serfdom on landless Indians. 
It is cleax therefore that a cxystalli., -; ation1 of feudal ielationz 
Mriy t, --I: e pD, ce in : r-esponse to market demands, p-roducing 'commodity 
feudalism'. Banaji describes the effects of' this processq using 
the example of 
"Both major phases of expansion of the 'hacienda' in Chile 
coincided and were closely tied up with the expansion of 
demand Jor Chilean grain. The 'hacendado, could expand his 
volume of sales in such periods only by tyanBfoiming peasant 
production into feudally-subjugated simple reproduction. In 
the course of successive booms, the older la: rrendataxiol 
gradually disappeared from the countryside of central Uhile, 
ieplaced by a new serf population o-. ' *inquilinos' concentrated 
in the areas which produced forthe wheat market. Peasant 
11 1 -V I Ill Y 91 114TAPW R t$ý(l I r) th IS VT Of-pr- A, I 'Pqr, "A 
holdings degenerated into subsistence plots, and the ea: rlieT 
moye deeply differentiated structure of the peasant Population, 
sepayating MOTe prosperous tenant households from the Temainder, 
collapsed into a more or less uniformly impoverished mass"(1977, p. 26) 
The petty bouigeois group of small traders and wealthy or middle 
2 
peasant faymeys provided the 1ýadership necessary ioi- the sustained 
mobilization of the peasantry that took place duying the Pacific Way 
in the central and southern highlands; unsu: rpiisinglyt they took 
advantage oi the stxuggle to attack white pioperty-owners as. well. 
5mith notes that the increased'hostility and oppiession from the 
SoU f er and Howe (1981) discuss the development oi a similar py ocess 
in 19th century Brazil# and the consequent increase in stiuctural 
violence within patron-client relations; as the articulation between 
merchant capital and pre-capitalist agricultu: re became established 
there de 
I 
veloped a need to regularly, extract a dependable -BuxPlus 
ixom thepeasants. This was largely accomplished by the imposition 
on them*oi* increasingly exacting bonds by the local patron'. 
Pike (197L) notes the ability of this social gloup to act both as 
bioke3, s'and shamans, with knowledge ol Indian and White cultuyest 
and thus unite the diffeTentiated 2uial masses behind a radical, 
POPUUSt plognSmme (see Cha ter 
-ý 2- 
I 'hacend-Ldos' in the Huasicancha xegion drove the peasants to take 
advantage oi the waT to invade the Hacienda Tuclet and divide its 
livestock amongst themselves (1979P P-290)- 
The StYuggles developing within the centyal highlands prior to the 
War ol the Faciiial which culminated in the campaign of La Brena' 
under Caceres, were theiefore partly rooted in earlier contlictst and 
in some ways may be seen as the successois of the Tupac Amaru 
rebellion. Tav3-e (1975) cites a Chilean commander who, in November 
-repoyted that the Indians had: 
".. declaied that theiT' objective was not to fight the Chileans 
or the Peruvian peace party, but the entire white race. " (p. 
63) 
However, these struggles weTe rendered moxe complex by the changing 
composition, and class tormation of. thp regi6n noted above; the actors 
were motivated by many diffeient objectives - some were anti-capitalist, 
some anti-Jeudal, some anti-communal and some may even be termed 
Quechua nationalists/populists. As a 7esult, once mobilised the 
initial unity evaporated, and the pooier Indian peasants began to 
turn on all thei7 opp3: essoys - both rich peasants and mestizos - and 
act independently of the leadership. Even after theii abandonment by 
Cacer-es 1 the stxuggle continued, and spoyadic outbieaks o. r Indian 
xesistance continued to take place throughout the xest of the 19th 
centui-y. in 16. e5, in Ancachs, a layge-scale Indian upi-ising tqok place 
Once in power Caceres largely capitulated to the demands both of 
fo-yeign capital, in the foym, of' the Grace Contyact, and of the 
oo; 4st, -11 Plitp. The Rtitlsh Minister commentedi -.. it 
is evident 
that the j)-j ozldcriL hats ituý4 Lhj uvai h1jazall citLlj CI. Y I&iL, a Llic as IUS3 
of the Civilista, Paxty.. Genexal Caceyes will now become a puppet 
in the hands of men adToit as well as of superior intelligence, 
and who will manage him with more tact.. " (F. O. 177/139 Mansfield 
to F. O., 7th October 1886). However-, the coastal oliga-ichy did not 
achieve dixect control of the state machinery until after lE95- 
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in : response to an attack on the communities by the white upper classes 
in the form of an increase In taxes and the -re-establishment of forced 
laboux duties on the communities (of. Klaiber, 1977; Pike, 1978)- Once 
again an early form of lindigenismol emerged in response to this attemp- 
ted extension of state power, and the 'hacendados" p: rogyarruae of' ze- 
feudalization. 1u:, the: r more, this airain divided the peasant Yevolu- 
tintipilps lilto Mor- who Choiigtht in i. piroR nf n Qiiavblin 1,4PI-P -at-01 
unconditional, xepiession of the whites and mestizost and the moderates 
who wished to caxry out a petty-bourgeois revolt based on an alliance 
oi' Indian peasantst and mestizo and pooi white farmeys and tTadeTS 
against the 'hacendados'. The former st-xand won, but both voups 
were crushed by the militaxy force sent out : ýrom Lim (Yu Zubritskit 
1979t PP. 144-5) 
Mtex the Way of the Pacific the balance of, power in the slerra 
shifted decisively in favour ol' white p: toperty-owners. The Indian 
communities and mestizo towns gave way before the 'haciendall and in 
lc93 bolivails law Tegarding the byeak-up of communal propeTty was 
revived (Piel, 1970). The increased penetration of' capitalism thus 
I 
resulted in a xe-ieudalization and ruralization w' the highlands, 
as desayibed by Banaj! (1977t Op. cit. ). This widespread concentration 
04 land and economic function took place la2, gely because ol the 
'hacendados" political supremacy, enshAned in republican law and 
'Pjqssq4 in thell mon al officet 
know ppoly oj voting powerl politic 
ledge oi the lawt control oi patron-client, systems and connections 
with the Lima elite. Prior to the 'War of the Iracifict 
the weakness 
of cent: ral state power- and the disunity of 
the upper clatsser. had 
meant that the provincial oligarchies were unable 
to utilise these 
advantages fully. liowevex, after 1E95, a modus vivendi was 
established 
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I 
between the semi-ieudal, semi-capitalist 'hacienda' with the coastal 
elite 
1. 
This was symbolised in the alliance concluded between Pierola 
and the Civilistas, which was in tuin based on the xelationship with 
foieign capital. Via the iailways the piovincial elites were also 
Able t9 participate In Foruto export economyj and achieve political 
and economic hegemony within the sieira. The siezian-coastal alliance 
also expiessed the contiadictory and compromised nature of- the 
2 oligarchic state . On the one han( 
extended, via the xailways and via 
lands. At the same timet however, 
continued to be limited by foyeign 
the Political autonomy ir, 6xent in 
1, cent-zal state powey was finally 
the 'hacendado 1, into the hieh- 
zhe effectiveness of' centyal power 
capital (cf. CotleT, 1979) and by 
the 'haciende. 19 and by Lima's 
need to rely on such local 'patrones' to control the xegiond. This 
compiomise expressed, in tuin, the articulation of 'commodity feudalism' 
with capitalism. The development of capitalism in Pezu relied for 
investment partly on f oi-eign capital and partly on surpluses from the 
IetYI,:; I spAoi , whic, 
h ;; lF-,, ) Rupplipa Inlioill witholit t114- vor. t. r. of Us 
1. Members of' the provincial and coastal elites were also allied 
through ties of kinship and'compradazgo, (Bravo Bresani, 1970; 
Gilbeit, 1977), and by commercial and financial ties (Fcdriguez 0., 
19C-, O) 
2. This was expressed in the control of the executive by the coastal 
bourgeoisie, and of the legislature by the sierran landlords. 
however, this more IoTde7ed, variant of clientelist politics was 
still inevitably vulnerable to Jactional, regional and personal 
difierences, and areas of conflict increased as the interests of 
the upper classes became more heterogeneous with the divers-ifice-tion 
of the economy, and growing independence of the capitalist sector 
(cf. Miller, 19E2). 
3.5oiffer and Howe (1962) discuss the changes in elite , 
/state relations 
that take place as seildom is extended in response to increased 
market opportunities; Forman writes: "the key broker of 
the apical 
political exchange was the JCOTonellp the backlands chieltaing 
whose place in the hierarchy was dependent upon his ability to 
delivei municipal votes to the state oligarchy " (1973, pp. 
166-167; cited in ! ýoiffer and Howe. Cf. discussion in Chapter 
7). 
The changes -yesult in both a strengthening of the 'pat-ron's' control 
(vis a vis the peasantry) and a limitation, due to his collaboiation 
with central power, which ultimately extends the influence of 
the state. 
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repioduction (cf. Meillassoux, 1964; Terray, 1972; Bey, 1975). In 
1 a discussion ol the defeat of communal landholding in Bolivia, 
also beginning in the mid-19th century, Fodriguez 0. descyibes 
an almost identical development; 
"The gestation of capitalism thereloye 
Teinfo-rced the feudal styuctuye ol agricultuie 
to use it accoiding to the requixements of the 
pattexns oj accumulation.,, (19LO, p. 64) 
0. 'Ethnic' conflicts-, Inter- or Intya-class divisions? 
"No longe-r is it possible to take seriously the 
view that the peasant is an object ol histoxy', 
a foTm ofsocial life over which histoTical 
cha-WB Pasoo but which contylbutes nothing 
I to the impetus of these changes. " (Baiiington 
Moore, 1977, P. 453Y 
Spalding (1975) emphasises the political and economic 
alliance between the feudal and capitaliBt sectoTB as the 
: Lactox in the p: redominance of the 'hacendado' In the Bierrat 
since it enabled him to utilize his political advantages. 11owever# 
the dei'eat of the Indian peasantiy must also be explained by 
the p2-oblems that stood and stand in the way of all peasant 
. 
xebellions, and which are,. in a sense, exemplified 
rc" 1. This attack on Indian agricultuye by white pToperty owne - 
w--, s Pxpyp--sptl In ClPaTly TaClSt teTMS. (q. v. Chapter 
3, section 
on internal yaoial divislonij,. 
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by the struggles during the Pacific War. Marx recognized that the 
peasants could be a revolutionary forcep observing that the popular 
rebellions of the Middle Ages were Initiated in the countrysideo but 
that they generally failed because of the isolation of the peasant 
(in Harding, 1982, p. 101). The peasant is isolated in two sensess 
firstly because of the nature of' the work, 'which is generally 
individualized, and, secondly, in geographical terms. Moreovero the 
peasantTy, as noted above, is divided amongst itself; it is in com- 
petition for landp and stratified in terms of class relationshipu 
with each other. Furthermore, the very material conditions of the 
peasant's work and the impossibility of continuing to struggle with- 
out facing future starvation, makes any sustained uprising very 
difficult, without careful organization. This brings us to the main 
ingredient for the successful prosecution of a peasant war - an 
external leadership. In a discussion of peasant rebellions, Wolf 
identifies the above problems and points out the consequent necessity 
of outside leadership to undertake the organization and co-ordination 
of the peasantry, and the difficulty of finding such leadershipt 
,, The rich peasant.. is unlikely to embaxk on the course of 
rebellion. As employer of the labor of others, as money- 
lender, as notable co-opted by the State machine, he exercises 
local power in alliance with external powerholders ... Only 
when an external force.. proves capable of destroying these 
other superior power domains, will the rich peasant lend 
his support to an uprising. " (1971, p*2.69) 
Thq ýacifiq War resulted In the collapse of authority relationst and 
also provided an external leadership in the form of Caceres j Who 
successfully recruited the rich peasantry and mestizo traders to 
lead the poor peasants. However$ the class divisions witýln the 
movement were clearly exemplified by the development of a sepaxate 
consciousness among the poor, Indian peasantry p which was manifested 
through their subsequent independent action against all their 
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oppressors 
1. This complex stratification of the oppressed groups, 
and the collapse of the external leýdership ultimately defeated the 
popular resistance, and enabled the white upper classes to establish 
their complete predominance. 
Unfortunately an analysis of the multitude of divisions within the 
oppromd groups in Feru in terms of olaas as well as athnicity is 
largely neglected by Bonilla. The main problem with his discussion 
Of the racial dimens ion of the War is his assertion that "ethnic 
confrontations .. in Some ways cut across class lines. " It is bizarre 
to assume class identity between three(or more, given the internal 
differentiation of the peasantry) groups arising out of historically 
differentially produced systems of labour exploitation; this 
lacuna, stems from Bonilla's failure to place his argument in the 
wider context of the hybrid nature of the Peruvian social f ormtion - 
Analyses which endeavour to hive off' some conflicts as resulting 
exclusively from lethnicity 11 (by which we will assume Bonilla means 
cultuxal difference) or 'race 11 (by which we assume he means identif- 
U"PID 1,101%)dlsal 
411frisrslisipp), oRn Is# miFalo-AdIng or voitntor-11roduntivet 
and this has been a persistent theme of *race relations studies' to 
the present day. As Stuart Hall points out: 
"The class relations which inscribe the black fra. ctions Of' 
1. The, question of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry is 
clearly far more complex than the above brief discussion implies# 
however It unfortunatly largely lies outside the scope of this 
thesis. It is clear, forAnstance, that to understand the internal 
struggles that developed within the peasantry, and in turn defeat- 
ed them p one should examine the position and role of all the dif f- 
erent categories of peasant -1 hacienda colono I, poor-, medium- 
and rich peasant, and of their allies, together with a consideration 
of the regional variations. Another point is that it is evident 
that the ethnic distinctiveness of the Peruvian peasantryp together 
with their social and political marginilisationt transformed their 
. 
Jsct rebellions in the late 19th century into a revolutionary-RLO - 
designed to overthrow societyl or establish an Inca state. R, ecogni- 
tioh of' this led Mariategui to formulate an Indo-American version of 
Marxism, centring on the notion of a peasant/worker alliance. 
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the working class function as race relations. The two 
are inseparable. Pace is the modality, in which class 
relations are experienced. " (1978# P-394) 
A comparative analysis would enable Bonilla to Bee that in-the 
United States at the same period, for example, there was a similar 
three way hostility between former Blave labour, white working class 
labour and imported migrant labour. "The Chineseoll said the Governor 
of Calif oinia in 1869 j "axe a stream of' filth and prostitution 
poýrlng from Asiag whose servile competition tends to cheapen and 
degrade labour" (in Brockq 1973, p. 436), and in 1877 mobs invaded 
Chinatown in San Francisco, looting, lynchingo robbing and raping. 
Whilst other Andean xepublicso during the same period, witnessed 
peasant uprisings in response to land usurpationg and their failure 
largely because of the stratification within, and consequent disunity 
oft the peasantry; for instance, the peasant revolt led by Zarate 
Wilka in 1898-9 in the Bolivian Highlands. Howeverg the situation 
of the Indian is more complex since her/his consciousness could also 
comprehend Itself as a class f'or itself due to its chronic Cultural 
oppression by the white conquerorst even though it was not, as 
already observedt a coherent class in itself. Varese writes: 
"In all of these ethnic groups there is a common historical 
condition which underlies Indianity as a unifying consciousness. 
Thust there is a commonality between the nations that have 
suffered colonizationg invasiong military occupation, 
territorial and social fragmentation and blockade" from 
the civilizing point of view. " (19829 P-39) 
IJUL LhIc OulnPlex IiiLc. L-"cczvjIj6 uj uvci-%IcLc. LmIuaLIujIM ul 4.; ulLwal alld 
biological diff-erences should not prevent us from examining the way 
in which these various forms of labour exploitation interacted with 
each other in class termal the Pacific War provides us with an 
insight into this interaction, howeverp detailed research on this 
basis has yet to be adequately undertaken. 
-349- 
CHAPTER11: THE PACIFIC WAR: A CONTEST Bl, PWT--T.,. N RIVAL METROPOLITAN 
POWERS? 
A. Introduction 
0 
The external orientation and fundamentally reactionary character 
of both the Peruvian and Chilean upper classes was illuminated by 
the Pacific War. In the Peruvian caseq the intense social 
disturbances generated by defeat produced a variety of responsesq 
f ew of which could be said to be characteristic of a national 
bourgeoisie. 1 By contrast, Chilean victory may be substantially 
attributed to the successful working relationship it had established 
wi. th British capital, whilst even the causes of the conflict may 
be located partly in the alliance of British and Chilean nitrate 
merchants. Furthermore, Chilean aggression was also stimulated 
by the collapse of its export markets and external sources of 
credit. However Chilean capitalists appeared unprepared to 
build upon their earlier industrial achievements, and create 
a domestic market. They refused to accept Pinto's proposed tax 
reforms, because, in O'Brien's words, they were: 
11 ... unwilling or simply incapable of restructuring the 
nation's economy. It was by no means unusual for a 
society entangled in such a dilemma to seek an escape 
in foreign adventure. " (19799 P-107). 
Other writers, howeverg have neglected the Chilean and Peruvian 
For instance, in 1881, St. John reported to Granville that it 
appeared that Pierola was ready to sign any agreement with the 
U. S. A., in return for support, (P . 0.603531 22nd June, 1881)9 
whilot moot wealthy Paruviano had already fled th@ country, 
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part in the war in favour of what Bonilla neatly describes as a 
'phantasmagoric interpretation of national history' (1978# P-95)9 
W. J. Dennis, one of the foremost exponents of this school of thought, 
wrote: 
"The war growing out of high nitrate finance camel although 
it is probable that few people saw the hands that were moving 
these nations like small pawns for a sacrifice play for big 
stakes of nitrates. 11 (19729 p. 64). 
This viewpoint stems mainly from the allegations Blaine made 
before the U. S. Congress in 1882, which credited Britain with the 
@ntirc mpgnaibility for the W-Arj -arid -allowed Chile no indppQnd@nG@ of 
6biectives or actions whatsoever, (in Kiernan, 1955, p. 23). However 
such accusations, apart from demonstratin .ga strong sense of Anglo- 
Saxon superiorityl in fact formed a crucial element in North 
America's own imperialist design$ by which it was hoped to discredit 
Britain and establish a North American sphere of influence 
' (cf. 
Lafeber, 19639 pp. 9and 21). In June 1882, Secretary of State 
Freylinghuysenq having replaced the more aggressive Blaineq and 
revised much of his policy, nevertheless wrote to U. S. Minister 
Logan: 
"The interest which we feel in these belligerent republics 
does not rest solely and entirely upon a sentiment of 
neighbourly goodwill towards governments moving with us 
lot tho Pama 11 vcs)Llms, Pool wl lit wiwrm poiqllc wo slorsi I'm 
I., 
cultivate close relations of a commercial character ..... 
We have many political interests entirely separate from 
Blaine's remarks also, partly, rested upon the observation of 
the minister in Lima, who wrote that Chile's rumoured plan 
of establishing direct government of Peru ... "would be equivalent to establishing the ascendancy of English over American influence 
on this coast ... 11 
(Foreign Relations of the United Statesp 
Christiancy to Blaine, 4th May, 1881). 
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the interests of European governments and in some respects 
in conflict with them. " (Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 26th June, 1882). 
lit a mosiao 
thavortera. n ocmLr; vI PPI-no-1. oW tho was, 
1loi-1110 Ilin of-sirl lot 
between# and involvement of, the two rival powers. 
Kiernan's refutation of Blaine's charge of British involvement is 
well-known. He has shown that the British interests concerned Were 
of almultifarious and contradictory nature', and remarked that the 
F. O. found Chile to be as 'obstinate as Peru' (19559 p. 28). This 
appears to be a rather specious and even tautalogical argument since 
British capital was obviously not homogenous (of. Bradby, 1975P 
pp. 129,149); however a state may act in the collective interests 
of capitalg or it may simply respond to the strongest and most 
influential interests. Moreover, whilst Chile was a strong and 
relatively independent (and consequently 'obstinate') state, 
there is abundant evidence that not only did this provoke British 
admiration, but also resulted in far better conditions for business 
and trade. This pro-Chilean attitude is explicity expressed by 
Spencer St. John in a letter to Granville, written at the end of 
1661; 
"It appears that there is no other republic on this coast 
susceptible of any marked development. Chile has had for 
many years a steady Government, an honest administrationt 
well ordered financesq and has shown remarkable military 
qualities. 
Should the result of the war be to secure to Chile the 
provinces of Atacama and Tarapacaq it will certainly be to 
the advantage of foreign commerce ... 11 
(P. O. 61/3349 
. 
St. John to Granville, 27th Decemberg 1881, my emphasis). 
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Furthermorej the extremely poor relations that existed between the 
Bondholders and the Peruvian statet and their enthusiastic support 
for Chile, arý well known; at the beginning of 1880 the 'South 
American Journalldescribed Chile as the: 
"Abdiel of South American financeq among the faithlessv 
faithful only she .... 
(in Blakemore, 19749 P-70) 
and, even while the outcome of the war was still uncertain# the 
I Standard'(London) commented that Chile: 
11 alone amongst the South American republics is worthy 
of our sympathy, and ... is now engaged at great cost 
to herself in upholding fairdealing and treating faith 
against two semi-barbarous opponents ... 
(24th April, 
1879, my emphasis). 
One problem in evaluating the respective involvement of the 
Unitt; d : jtt%Lt-, b twid lJVILalit III Usc wav, $all tho 0 111931 vc 
question of the style of the intervention. 
1 The blatantly 
aggressive and crude character of many of the North American 
pronouncements on their role, actual or aspired to, in Latin 
America, contrasts sharply with the guarded communications between 
I 
the British diplomatic corpsin Lima and the F. O. Howeverg 
I 
this is not simply a question of styles of diplomacy, but also 
involves an understanding of the central and immediate role 
played by the progressive cycle of racist ideology and expansion 
Note well Marx's comments on the variable form of the state 
according to different national boundaries, which clearly 
contradicts the notion of a uniform capitalist state; 
(Pritiq 
- 
lip of the Gotha Eragmamme in Marx and Engels, 1968, 
P-327)e 
-353- 
in North American history from the mid - 18th Century onwards (Bolt, 
1978P p. 110; Stedman-Jones, 1972,, pp. 213-215). This ideology was 
not the prerogative of the slave owning South (Gutman, 1976, pp. 
293-301; Dubois, 1961, pp. 24-5; Brock, 1973, p. 102), but was also 
a constituent element of the political groupings who achieved power 
during the Civil War and in the period of Reconstruction (Brock, 
op-citep PP-366-388). Whilst racism was equally an integral 
aspect of British domination of its colonial empirej and of its 
appr9ach to most Latin American states (Kiernan, 1972t PP-316-317), 
the geographical distance facilitated the mediation of this racism 
through 'scientific' anthropology and popular liteýaturet rather 
than crude anthropology. In 1912 North American historian Kinley 
admitted that an obstacle to friendly United States/Latin American 
relations was that: 
"Too many of us have been inclined to think of the people 
of South America as uncivilized barbarians or even savages.. " 
(19129 P-59). 
Whilst politician Adee noted that many of Freylinghuysen's plansr 
as articulated in 1882-39 for Latin America had fallen on stony 
ground since his contemporaries generally: 
"believed no good goverment or good faith was to be expected 
of'half breeds' and Iniggerste" 
and consequently saw no future: 
"except indefinite continuance of the Spanish American 
regime of revolutionsq repudiation, debased currencyt 
and bankruptcy .... 11 
(Adee to Secretary of State, Elihu 
llnot. 24th Novpmbt-t-, 19061 Doevint-Tit. 0, in Williwilp 
1970). 
The British, on the whole, held identical views, especially with 
regard to Peru and Bolivia, but were generally more circumspect 
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in their expression. 
The difference in diplomatic styles and policies was also rooted 
in the differing needs of British and North American capitalism; 
each stage of capitalism has its corresponding dynamic and form 
of expansion, which largely determines the nature of its relationsip 
with non-capitalist modes. The very immaturity of North American 
capitalism, and UIL- WtýaknekW 01' Its purilLloji 11i k)ULI, A... 
forced Washington to resort to annexationist and interventionist 
tactics. At this stage the overriding need of North American 
capital was for markets and -raw materials (together with cheap 
goods to alleviate domestic class conflict)v and this was apparent 
in every major foreign policy speech of the period (see documents 
cited below). The acquisition of markets generally requires the 
use of force or at least forceful diplomacy (cf. British tactics 
from the 1820s to 1840st which helped to'persuade'South American 
governments to adopt free trade). By contrast, by the 1870s 
British interests were firmly established in the area, although 
the economic depressiong the development of competitiong and the 
inc F easing need to protect British finance capitalq were beginning 
to encourage a slightly more interventionist approach. A further 
difference, of course, lay in South America's proximity to the 
United States which both fostered the 'backyard notion' and also 
made it the obvious markat for North American goods, whereas it 
was inevitably of less concern to Great Britain. 
The result of these differences was a sharp divergence in diplomatic 
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styles (which may also be attributed simply to unprofessional 
gauc erie or naivety on the part of the Americans. 
1), 
which in 
fact served to mask an underlying similarity of intent. It is 
an extreme irony, thereforeq that skilful British diplomacy should 
have helped to bring about the Grace Contractt which became one of 
the major mechanisms by which the United Statest in spite of its 
diplomatic blunoora, would finally achieve hegemony in Peru* 
B. The United States and the Pacific War 
The Monroe Doctrine (2nd Decemberp 1823) enshrined the principal 
themes that would characterise North American involvement in Latin 
America during the l9th Century. Enunciated in part as a response 
to the threat of intervention. by the Holy Alliance, and in the 
rejection of a proposed joint United States/British guarantee of 
Latin American Independence, it attempted to establish the former 
Spanish empire as a uniquely North American sphere of influence. 
Integral to this strategem was the subsequent refusal to recognise 
Lila a $if' ally Sol hal. I1t*wot, p Lai Jill C31. vcllo is$- 111041 IP to III ally Way 
in Latin American affairs. This stance was justified by North 
America's position as the first ex-colonyq (Stedman-Jones, 19729 
p. 201) - the 'older sister 12- and by its consequent moral superiority, 
1. Kiernan notes that this was also the result of the absence of a 
traditional aristocracy, and that consequently the United States 
had no diplomatic service "worth the name"; furthermore "America 
had no notion of official employment being more reputable than 
commerce and it was unquestionably less lucrative". (19749 pp-105 
97). This helps explain too the frequency with which Nqrth American 
diplomats became involved inýcorrupt deals, 4. v. Appendix. 
2. In 1878 , Gibbs described Peru as ".. a young republic struggling to open and receive commercial exchanges from her older sister.. * 11 (Foreign Relations of the United States, Gibbs to Evartst 25th June, 1878). 
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which stood in sharp contrast with European decadence. Stemming 
from this was the supposed uniqueness and uniformity of American 
sociopolitical conditions (Petras, Erismang and Mills 1973). and 
this, in turn, was used to justify the establishment of supra- 
nationalv Panamerican organisations through which the United States 
W1111111 gappal. 
l. ]toll It IIP IIIIII Cal PIIII CoI1114,11111, loallorphl Ll "r III- 
ilICIII 
. 
In reality, the North American attitude towards Latin Americans was, 
as indicated above, even more racist and insular than was the 
British. The Darwinian views of clergyman Josiah Strong were by 
no means exceptional: 
"Then this (Anglo-Saxon) race of unequalled energy, with all 
the majesty of numbers and, the might of wealth behind it - 
the representative, let us hope, of the largest liberty, the 
purest Christianityt the highest uivilization - having 
developed peculiarly aggressive traits calculated to impress 
its institutions upon mankind, will spread itself over the 
earth. If I read not amiss, this powerful race will move 
down upon Mexico, down upon Central and South America, 
out upon the islands of the sea, over upon Africa and 
beyond. And can anyone doubt that the result of this 
competition of races will be the 'survival of the fittest'91' 
(1885; in Chilcote and Edelstein, 19749 P-15). 
During the first half of the 19th Centuryq however, North American 
expansionism was largely confined to seizure of adjacent territories) 
and to th. @ milm of Ange Thip inyloible empir@ gf com-orcial 
ascendancy in South America was, as yet, beyond the industrial 
capacity and competitive ability of the United States, However 
the vision of the internal continental empire implicit in the Monroe 
Doctrine, continued to be fostered by such ideologues as Mathew 
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Fontaine Maury who (as an adviser on problems of transport and commerce 
to Southern businessmen)l in the late 1840s and 500 propounded the 
view that the Mississippi and Amazon rivers should be united to form 
the basis of a huge continental maritime complexq under the aegis of 
the United States. He also proposed the building ofan Isthmian 
Canal, together with a Pacific railroad, hrough which the United 
States could not only politically dominate Latin America, but also 
overcome the: 
110 ... barrier that separates us from the markets of 600 
millions of people - three quarters of the population of 
the earth. Break it down... and this country is placed 
midway between Europe and Asia; this sea (Gulf of Mexico and 
we Caribbean) becomes the centrie W* Vie woria urid Lhod focuti 
of the world's commerce". (cited in Vevier, 19709 p. 2889 
my emphasis). 
North American jingoism was stimulated by the successful prosecution 
, of the U. S. - Plexican Wart and, in its exuberant aftermathq an 
influential group in the Democratic Party adopted the slogan 
'Young America'. At the centre of their philosophy lay an expansive, 
'macho' republicanism, which conferred upon the American people a 
mission to extend its institutions throughout the worldq beginning 
with the annexation of Cuba (Kiernang 1974, p. 102). In 18529 Edmund 
Burke wrote to the nominee of the Democratic Party: 
"The grand ideas which are potent in the election are sympathy 
I for the liberals of Europe, the expansion of the American 
Republic southward and westward, and the grasping of the 
magnificent purse of the commerce of the Pacific, in short# 
the ideas for which the term 'Young America' is the symbol. " 
(Burke to Pierce, cited in Curti, 1970, p. 249)t 
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and 
I 
it was in the mid 19th Century that John L. O'Sullivan pronounced 
it to be the 'manifest destiny' of the United States to embark upon 
territorial expansion. 
However, in practices during the first half of. the 
19th Centuryl the MGM@ Doctrine waa contradicted by the reality 
of British ascendancy. But, despite the limited nature of United 
States actionsq and presence in the Southern hemisphere, the South 
Americans were not blind to North American ambitions, nor wholly 
deceived by the high moral tone of their pronouncements. In 
1838 the Peruvian Ambassador to Paris made the following cynical 
analysis of North American foreign policy: 
"Pour ce qui regarde les itats Unisg leur politique se 
montre plus a d6couvert. L'affaire de Texas nlest pas un 
fait isole; il se lie b.. un plan d1operations qui se poursuit 
avec constance. Au commencement de 1838, le 'North Carolina' 
des 102 canons, ayant a son bord 50 caisses de fusils, et 
une vaste provision de munitions de guerreq se presenta 
sur les eaux de la Mer Pacifique ob deux frigates de 
L7,14al-'ro C; L 
144. IoLp 
P11101-10allio, I-01'ClIPPOIll. S16. 
jký L4111a 
que suffisans pour la protection de leur commerce dans 
ses pasagese., 
Il serait en outre trop long .... de detailler toutes les 
petites tracasserieso que les gens diplomatiques et consulars 
des Etats Unist ne cessent de susciter tous les jours aux 
gouvernements Sud Americains .... tous les actes de jalousie 
006 pour les quels ils font connaltre leur dýpit contre I 
11influence anglaise; toutesles demarches qulils ont faitesq 
et toutes les seductions qulils ont mis en oeuvreq pour 
approvissioner excluaivement de farine tous les marches du 
Perou... " (P. O. 61/56, Mora to P. O., 17th December, 1838)- 
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By the late 1860s and 70s a variety of factors had coalesced to 
produce both a more favourable environment for the aspirations of 
the United States, and urgent need for their fulfillment. 
Connolidation of the North American polity together with a huge 
expansion of its industrial and agricultural capacity, coincided 
with the 'closing of the frontier'. Reconstructiong following 
the Civil War, was consequently accompanied by a determination to 
implement the Monroe Doctrine (Crapol, 1973, PP-43-63). Earliers 
on the eve of the Civil Warg Secretary of State Seward had predicted 
that the moment for 'positive' action in Latin America was approaching. 
"I can look to the South West and see, amid all the convulsions 
that are breaking the Spanish American Republicst and in their 
rapid decay and dissolution, the preparatory stage for their 
reorganisation in freeg equal and self governing members of 
the United States .... 11 
(Speech delivered in Minnesota, 16th 
Septemberg 1860t document 19 P-314 in Williams, 1970, Vol-I)- 
and in a letter to the North American Minister in Lima, he made it 
clear that this involved the elimination of all forms of Luropean 
influence: 
1"... there cannot permanently exist two antagonistical systems 
of government upon this continent, nor can there always be 
two commercial systems upon this continentg one of which 
must have its centre here, and the other in Europe. " 
(Poreign Relations of the United States, (1663), Seward 
to Nelson, 19th June, 1862). 
It is evident that in general North American foreign policy at 
this time was designed to fulfill the role of imperialist adventure 
as indicated by Marx (in Feuer, 19599 P-404)o to alleviate cl ass (and intra-class) conflict at home, recently intensified by 
the Civil War and a cycle of severe economic depressionsy (Lafeber, 1963, pp. 11/12). At this stage, U. S. capital therefore 
required markets and raw materials (cf. Luxembourg, 19729 pp. 
59-60). The need to export capital was not a prime consideration. 
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An opportunity to expand North American influenceg arid consequently 
win marketst presented itself with the Peruvian-Spanish War; therefore 
offers of mediation were madep along with attempts to prevent any 
European involvement in the affair. As with the Pacific War, the 
United States sought to establish its unique prerogative to protect 
and regulate Latin American affairso and in 18679 the American 
Minister Kilpatrick reported to Seward, with some relief, that the 
proposed French and English arbitration, accepted by Spain, had 
been refused by the West Coast powers: 
it *** the proposition - was rejected... on account of, s 
a want of confidence that the allied republics have in the 
sincerity of the friendly feeling manifested by the governments 
of England and France. 
I have watched with no little anxiety, the efforts ... made 
... to adjust this difficulty, knowing... the great advantage 
it would give these two powers onthis coast if their efforts 
proved successful. " (Foreign Relations of the United Statesq 
LO ý; cwczL-Ll, 12ml Jaiiuavyo I(JUI). 
However, in fact, the North American proposals were also initially 
refused but in 1870 President Grant was able to announce'to the 
United States Congressq in an illuminating annual messagethat: 
"The long deferred peace conference between Spain and the 
allied South American republics has been inaugurated, in 
Washington under the auspices of the United States .... 
The allied and other republics of Spanish origing on this 
An integral aspect of this self-ascribed role was the extraordinary 
myopia and self delusion that characterised the North American 
approach, which resulted in cycles of ludicrous overconfidence 
followed by humiliating rejections, and diplomatic failures. 
Despite North America's own history of expansionism in the areaq 
in 3.864 Nelson wrote to Seward that: ".. the change of conduct 
and policy of European powers towards the republics of this 
continent is attributed to the existence of the rebellion of the 
'United States. But for this, it is thought that there would have 
been no interference in the affairs of Santo Domingog Mexicop or 
Peru... " (Foreign Relations of the United Statest Nelson to- 
Seward, 16th May, 1664). 
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continentq may see in this fact a new proof of our sincere 
interest in their welfare; of our desire to see them blessed 
with good governmentsl capable of maintaining order and of 
preservin their respective territorial integrity; of our 
sincere wish to extend our own comierical and social 
relations with them. The time is probably not far distant 
when, in the natural course of events the European political 
connection with this continent will cease. Our policy should 
be shaped ... so as to ally the commercial interests of the 
Spanish American states more closely to our own, and thus 
give the United States all the pre-eminence and all the 
advantages which Mr. Monroet Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay 
contemplated ... 11 
Grant then proceeded to discuss the desirability of 'acquiring' 
Santo Domingo; which would, also be: 
"an adherence to the Monroe Doctrine. " 
He went on to produce all the justifications of such a policy that 
would later be, used in defence of North America's penetration of 
Latin Americaq linking it to a great moral cause and describing 
it as: 
It ... a measure of national protection; it is asserting our 
just claim to a controlling influence over the great commercial 
traffic soon to flow from West to East; it is to furnish new 
markets for the products of our farms, shops and manufacturersO 
9*o it is to furnish our citizens with the necessaries of 
everyday life at cheaper rates than ever before.. " 
(Foreign Relations of the United States, (Peru, 1871)9 
Presidential Annual Message to Congress, 5th Decembert 1870)- 
In facti control of certain Caribbean islands constituted the 
strategic element in a general offensive on the Latin American 
economies. 
1 
1. Grant was also the first North American President to clearly 
formulate the non-transfer principle, by which, together 
with anýactivel Monroe Doctrineq it was hoped to supersede 
Europe. 
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t 
The War of the Pacific was seized upon by Secretary of State Blaine 
(a fervent expansionist) because of its potential for strengthening 
the North kmerican position on the West Coast through the strategy 
of peacemaker. The situation also presented many features feared 
by the United States. The close connections that had always 
existed between sectors of the Chilean and British elites, recently 
stimulated by collaboration in the nitrate industryg together 
with the independence and solidity of the Chilean statel represented 
a potential threat to vorth Americalu pruteiaii(, tai. No I. -V: 4. ) V V. 1, 
Chile had long'made it clear that it was aware of North American 
ambitions; it had expressed grave objections to the 'United States- 
Mexico War in 1846, and, later on, had successfully squashed a 
'Uni-Ced States project to purchase the Galapagos'Islands, throligh 
f 
its cautionary advice to Ecuador. More recently, relations 
between the two states had deteriorated further as the Californian 
market for Chilean wheat began to be supplied by. California itself, 
and as increasingly vicious racial attacks were-perpetuated against 
Chilean migrant workers in the United States (Evansq 1927)- Then 
in 1867 Washington's initial attempt to hold a Peace Conference 
in order to arbitrate the Spanish-Peruvian war was torpedoed by 
Ch; lels refusal to'attend. Furthermore, on the outbreak of war 
the commerce between the. two countries was very slight, and no 
Trade Treaty was in existence. 
By contrast North American influence in Peru did appear to be 
In a sense Chile and the United States were competitorst in 
economic terms, as major wheat exporters, and in the sense 
that both sought to establish their predominance on the 
Pacific Coast of South America. 
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expanding; notably in the shape of such entrepreneurs as Neiggs 
and Graceg and through increased capital goods exports9 (Bollinger 
1972 Moreover, with the consolidation of Prench interests9 
through the Dreyfus contractp 
1 together with the deterioration 
of British-Peruvian relations in consequence of the default on the 
external debtt and the 'Estancol policy, it was apparent that 
British predominance was less assured than in Chile. It therefore 
appeared to be an opportune moment to attempt the creation of a 
North American sphere of influence. 
United States policyq during the Pacific War, fluctuated as 
foreign affairs cane under the directorship of three different 
secretaries of State, whilst a bewildering succession of generally 
incompetent diplomats represented North America on the West Coast. 
In 1879 President Hayes observed that it was the Nation's destiny 
to annex all neighbouring lands, including Canadat (In Kiernan, 
19749 P-104)9 and at its most extremeg North American policy did 
encompass the possibility of territorial annexation. However 
Evarts, Secretary of State at the outbreak of war, was mainly 
votioc, rilool It, of)IO-PPI 1-4ir, q)t-; an Inrli)ptioo throiiiih 1111i1; 4IP1,; 41 
mediation on the part of the United States. Consequently he 
The interests of Dreyfus and his associatesq the Credit Industriel, 
were dyammetrically opposed to those of the British Bondholders. 
Consequently a complex relationship was later established 
between Calderon, who needed support as the President of Ferul 
French capital and the United States. Blaine was later 
accused by a Congress Investigating Committee of agreeing. 
to establish a North American protectorate over Peru, in 
exchange for Credit Industriel lending Peru enough money to 
pay an indemnity to Chile. In return the Credit Industriel 
would retain control of the guano. 
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refused to join European proposals (made in 1880) of joint mediation 
10 
andinstpad organized the Lackawanna Conference. The total failure 
of this peacemaking effort, (P. O. 61/326,13th September, l8d0)j 
made Washington, according to a prominent North American newspaper, 
the laughing stock of South America (Peterson, 1969, p. 6. ). It also 
set the pattern for subsequent efforts to bring about a settlement, 
all of which were clumsy, unsuccessful and resulted in the unnecessary 
prolongation of the state of war. 
In March, 18819 Blaine became Secretary of State; Peru at this 
stage was alreadyq effectively, a defeated country. However, 
undeterred, Blaine initiated an aggressive policy designed to 
preserve Peruvian territorial integrityl and deter British and 
Chilean'machinations :2 In this he was encouraged by the vision 
I 
of the 'man on the spot'; in May, 1881, Christiancy reported the 
many benefits that a monopoly of Peruvian trade would bring to 
the United States. Furthermore: 
"The great mass of all classes of Peruvians feel a very 
strong attachment to the United States and a bitter hatred 
to Enplan, d,.,. the only effectual way for the United S 'tatea 
to control the commerce of Peru, and to preserve a commanding 
In the middle of 1880 St. John wrote to the P. O. describing 
the reaction of the North American Minister to the invitation 
issued by himself and the French Minister to consider joint 
mediations, "... his instructions were strongly to oppose 
any attempt at intervention on the part of other nations. 
As far as we are aware in Lima no foreign power has ever 
thoughtof intervention in the affairs of this republic, 
and we cannot imagine at what government this warning is 
especially aimed. " (P. O. 61/326 , 7th June, 1880). 2. He also hoped to obtain (secretly) nitrate concessions 
for North American capitalists, and this was obviously' 
a fuether reason for the need to preserve Peru's 
territorial integrity. Calderon wasvLlling to grant 
such concessions. (Pike, 19679 P-148). 
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or even a material influence along this coastl, is either 
actively, to intervene in eompelling a nottlefhont Or peace 
upon reasonable terms, or to control Peru by a protectorate 
or by annexation ..... 
Unless the United States takes one of these courses in the 
present emergency the 'Monroe Doctrine' will be considered 
a myth in all South American states .... 11 
Consequentlyt Christiancy proposed that Peru be annexed for ten 
years, during which time, throughinvestment and the immigration 
of approximately a hundred North Americans, Peru would be thoroughly 
'Americanized', and could even be 'admitted' as one of the States: 
"In that ten years Peru would become wholly North American 
in its ideas. These projects have lately been often and 
sharply pressed upon me by Peruvians... Peru under the 
control of our country, we should control all the other 
rpmiblies of Soijth America, an(] tht- Mony-op Doetritit- wniild 
become a verity ... 11 
(Foreign Relations of the United Statest 
Christiancy to Blaine, 4th May, 1881). 
and Christinacy's extravagant schemeswere continued by his successor 
Hurlbutt 1, who considered that the time had come: 
11 ... for the United States .... to say very kindly, but 
very firmly, to Chile, that war has fulfilled all its 
legitimate purposes ... 11 
(Poreign Relations of the United 
States, Hurlbutt to Blaine 10th August, 1881). 
Blaine's attempts to preserve Peruvian territory intact and thus 
convert Peru into a client state and captive marketq were doomed 
to failure not because of any unwillingness on the part of the 
1. IAs well as by the North American Minister in Bolivia, Adams, 
who wrote: "Should, with our help, peace be established, 
the bearing on our future relations and our commerce can 
hardly be estimated... This country .... needs only 
some American enterpriseq capital and immigrants to make 
it one of the most prosperous countries in the world. " 
(cited in P. O. 61/3339 St. John to F. O., 22nd June, 1881). 
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, Peruvian coastal elitel but because of Chilean military strength 
and the calibre of his diplomatic staff. He was considerably 
hampered by the doubtful and speculative activities of Christiancy 
(cf. P. O. 61/326,10th December, 1880), and later Hurlbuttq both 
of whom became involved in a variety of shady deals with Peruvian 
and Vorth American capitalists, making it ultimately impossible 
for Washington to support them. Hurlbutt developed a particularly 
close relationship with Calderon, which resulted in the almost 
I 
total dependence of the Provisional Government on the North 
American Ministert and its consequent dissolution. The sequence 
of events in 1881 demonstrates quite clearly both the lack of 
national consciousness on the part of the Peruvian propertied 
clasm, and th@ wholly mgative eff@Gt of North AmeriGan 
diplomacy, for Peru, on the outcome of the war. 
On the 24th August Quimper, the former Minister of Internal 
Affairst and a personal friend of Chilean President Santa Maria, 
informed Hurlbutt that it appeared possible that Chile might 
accept an indemnity instead of territorial concession. (Shurtleff, 
192B). Consequently the North American Minister wrote to the 
Commander of the Chilean forces in Perul Lynch, that the United 
States recognised Chile's right to an indemnity, but would most 
strongly oppose territorial annexation. (Poreign Relations of 
the United States, 25th August, 1881). As a result of this 
intpi-vniition T-ytit-h sPI7, Pd the Penivinn trPasury; howpvPr thip 
appeared to push Calderon even closer to Hurlbutt, to whom he 
made available all government papers, offered the United States 
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the use of Chimbote, and handed over to Hurlbutt the partially 
built enimuote railway line. (P. O. 61/339,22nd harch, 1062). 
This not only involved too great a commitment on the part of 
Washington for Blaine, but also moved the Chileans to arrest 
Calderon. St John reported the news to the F. O.: 
"It is stated that not only was the Provisional 
Governmentýprepared to cede the working of the guano 
and nitrate to the American Companyq but that Mr. Garcia 
Calderon actually signed a secret convention with the 
American Minister by which the fine harbour of Chimbote 
was to be handed over to the United States as a naval base 
(P. O. 61/334t 22nd November, 1BBl). 
However Blaine's own efforts to prevent Chilean annexation 
of the nitrate districts were almost equally incompetent and 
unsu6cessful. On receipt of the news of Calderon's exile to 
Chile he sent out a special mission, in the form of Trescott and 
his son, William Blaine. Their instructions were to demand 
that Chile explain its treatment of Calderont permit the 
I'mylAno to got vp 4 new gwernment, And Agm to peace Qn 
the basis of payment of a reasonable indemnity by Peru. Furthermorep 
if Chile refused to comply with these requests, Trescott was 
instructed to break off diplomatic relations. In the event Blaine 
was replaced by Preylinghuysen while Trescott was still en routeg 
and the new Secretary of State did not wholly endorse Blaine's 
hectoring approach (P. O. 61/3409 29th March, 1882). 
At the end of 1882, in the annual Presidential message to Congressq 
President Chester A. Arthur conceded that the North American policy 
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in the Pacific War had been an utter failure. 
1 (in Peterson, 1969, 
p. 16). As a resultt support for Iglesias and peace with Chile 
gained in popularity, whilst Montero requested European mediation. 
The British diplomat, Graham, was highly unenthusiastic: 
"I pointed out that on several occasions Great Britain, 
acting with some of the other great nations of Europe, 
had offered to mediate between the belligmntg and had 
been unceremoniously set aside by the Peruvian'Governmentq 
who had preferred to throw themselves into the arms of the 
United States, and that .... now the much vaunted intervention 
of that country had ended in complete fiasco, Peru wished 
once more to turn towards European support..... 
In 1890, prompted by North America's success in establishing 
an International American Conference (or Pan-American Congress), 
Sir Julian Pauncefote drew up a memo summarising the principal 
aspects of the United States intervention in the Pacific War: 
"Mr. Blaine was drawn into a diplomatic intervention .... His 
first position was that the United States had a moral right and 
duty to use its good offices in preventing embitterment and 
devestation among the American nations, which could only 
injure Republican institutions, and promote an assumed desire 
on the part of European powers to exploit the American Continent 
for their own sinister advantage. This intervention was 
resented by Chileg which suspected Mr. Blaine of a primary 
ptirpapoa, L-- inhalmIr. c Lho I'rtit Ln oF v I-. hwy , asid LA Pico-1111: 41-y 
purpose to establish the United States as the self-constituted 
arbiter of the political affairs of the American Continent. " 
The failure of this approach caused Blaine to change his 
tactics; he therefore, "declared that the arrangements proposed 
by Chile respecting Peru were incompatible with the national 
interests of the United States, and with the ..., obligations 
of Peru to certain American citizens ... 11 When this arid the 
subsequent Trescott mission also failed "Chile and fleru 
were both left in a state of resentmentl the abortive 
intervention having prolonged the war. " Pauncefote then 
proceeded to discuss the reasons for North American policyl 
which he considered to be overproductiong severe industrial 
depression and a widespread popular demand for foreign markets. 
Consequently a Committee on Poreign Relations had subsequently 
been set up to produce schemes designed to enlarge North 
American trade with Latin America. The Pan-American Cpnference 
formed part of one such scheme and clearly represented a threat 
to British interests. However, Pauncefote noted that "South 
American social and intellectual intercourse are with Buropell 
'and that "Chile did not favour the Conference... She Is not 
lamenting the absence of North American influence and intercourse 
South of the Darien Isthmus. " (F. O. 177/1999 15th 1'ebruaryj 1890). 
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I also availed myself of the opportunity to point out that 
a great deal had been written and' spoken for some time 
past respecting the Monroe Doctrine, and that we had heard 
often the statement of "America for the Americans". but that 
I gathered from my long experience in these countries and 
in Central America that the doctrine really meant 'America 
for the United States'. and that I doubted very much whether 
countries such as Great Britain, who possessed a commerce ten 
times more extensive in South America than that of the 
United States, and whose interests were incalculably more 
engaged in the welfare of South Americaq being desirous 
of lending its support for furthering the views of the 
politicians whose ambitions had placed the United States 
in her present unenviable position in the whole of the 
continent. " (P. O. 61/339, Graham to P. O., 18th May, 1882). 
I 
C. The Question of British Involvement 
In an assessment of the role of the British and North Americans 
in the War of the Pacific, written in 1928t Shurtleff commented.: 
IlEngland's influonce in Chile made her very unpopular 
in Peru by March of 1880, since many of the businessmen 
of Chile were Englishl as were the majority of the efficient 
men in her navy. Added to this was the acceptanceg by 
many English holders of Peruvian bondsp of the proffer of 
Chile to take guano under Chilean authority from Peruvian 
guano beds, which intensified the hostile feeling of the 
Peruvians for the English, and many Peruvians suspected 
the captains of steamers to be furnishing Chile with 
information concerning Peru. " (in 'West Coast LeaderIq 
13th Novemberg 1928p pq. ). 
There is clear evidence to sustain Shurtleff's allegations of support 
for the-Chilean cause by private British citizens. 
1 However, in 
Although Kiernan (1955) largely refutes Uy substantial British 
involvement. 
-)-/U- 
I 
contrast to the openly interventionist policy adopted by Washington, 
the question of the policy of the British government is controversial, 
and serves as a paradigm for the debate over the correct charcterisation 
of the H. M. G. Is role in South America during the l9th Century (cf - 
Platt, 1966,1972&, Robinson and Gallagher, 1953; Mayo, 1980; Brown 
1963; Mathew 1968; Ferns 1960; Winn 1976). 
Platt's apologia for British capital may be summarised by his 
assertion that: 
"equality of treatment was all that was asked. " (196B, 
P-312). 
This observation is founded upon his interpretation of Gwtlereagh 
and Canning's policies as being totally non-interventionistq and 
on this basis he attempts to demonstrate that charges of imperialism 
or informal empire are irrelevant to the Latin American experience: 
the claims that (British diplomacy) ... had anything to 
Px(, Plt. in tlif- most indirect, si-nn(-, with tbP pnlil. ir-pl 
condition of Latin America after the Emancipation is 
misconceived ... Latin America alone was wholly apolitical.. 
British statesmen resolutely refused to intervene or to 
become entangled in the internal political affairs of the 
Continent... " (1968, P312). 
It is clear that in part the disagreement arises from a semantic 
difference; Platt's interpretation of 'political' and 'imperialism, 
appears to be extremely narrow, political presumably referring to 
the machinery of government alone, whilst imperialism can only 
be conceived of in terms of formal empirest forcible plunder and so 
on. 
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However, even employing these concepts in Platt's limited sense, 
his conclusions are highly questionable, as the earlier discussion 
(in Chapter 7)of foreign capital in Peru indicates. Platt glosses 
over all instances of British interventionism as exceptional; thus 
the fierce, and crucials diplomatic attack on the policy of 
protfationism in the early history of the republics is reduced tog 
"a brief and painful exception in the 1840r- 
and strict non-intervention: 
It ** . was the policy which was observed thereafter*" 
(ibid, P-316). 
Furthermore all subsequent examples of direett political involvement 
by H. M. G., or by British capitalists, are dismissed an aberrationsg 
(cf. Mayog 1980), whilst the need of the Latin American economies 
for the expertise, and capital of the British is'constantly stressed. 
Consequently, in Platt's schema the emergence of, collaborationist 
elites in Latin America 
1 
does not demonstrate the success of 
British imperialism, butq instead, is evidence of the weakness 
of the British in South America who were forced to co-operate with 
local elites (1972a, )P- 311)- Platt writes: 
"While something which could be described as a controlling 
relationship undoubtedly existed in particular areas of 
contact betwPen British entrepreneurs and Latin Americans 
.... we skiould be careful in aufiniug 'pre-emincriculp 
'hegemonyll 'supremacy' ... before such blanket terms 
are used in the context of British financial and commercial 
The emergence, or resurgence. of such a comprador group in Peru 
by the late 1840s obviously did lessen the need'for diplomatic 
interventions (cf. Gootenberg 1982)q as did free trade policies, 
and the British competitive advantage. Non-interference therefore 
did become the norm. 
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activity in Latin America before 1914... When the study of 
simple, legitimate business enterprise, on the small scale 
common in the 19th Century is taken further, the emphasis 
is more likely to be on the limitations to the discretion 
and authority of the foreign entrepreneur ..... His only 
1-cal wao 
1110 111111s311011onl1i III. Y ..... it 
('I wjýle% I.. ý( it.. 
my emphasis) 
and in fact: 
"British enterprise in Latin America before 1914 provides 
a rare example ... of private enterprise operating on a 
large scale in an underdeveloped area without diplomatic 
promotion or assistance. (ibidq p. 296). 
This abstracted empiricism and microscopic interpretation (phrased 
in notably emotive language) has been adequýtely refuted by the 
findings of a body of historical research (for instance, Yepes, 
1972, ]Bonilla, 1970; -Gootenberg, 19829 Macera, 1974) including the 
present study, (cf. pp. 192-96 ). Even Castlereagh, the supposedly 
steadfast proponent of the 'fair field and no favourl policy, 
advocated that England employ its power to oppose the pretensions 
of 
Lropean 
rivals to establish British ascendancy and direct its 
policy to: 
"creating and supporting an amicable and local government, 
with which these commercial relations may freely subsist, 
which it is alone our interest to aim at, and which the 
poople of South Amarioa muot equally delgires" (In Winn, 
19760 p. 102) 
Such objectives are in fact not dissimilar to those of the State 
Department in the 1870s (which I imagine few would describe as 
non-intervenionist or 'apolitical'). In 1877 President Hayes 
gave his blessing to a proposed mission by the 'Associated 
Industries OrganisationIq which stated its aims as being: 
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11 0. not merely to sell a few goods and 
to obtain the 
small proceeds of irregular sales; it is to introduce 
into their entire social system the general features 
of our own social life, with its far greater production 
and consumption of the products of skill and industry. " 
(Blodget to Hayes, 3rd December, 1677v cited in Crapol, 
19739 P-54). 
However, what is fundamentally at issue is not simply a semantic 
difference or a selective use of historical evidence, but a total 
misunderstanding of the meaning of imperialism, and, thereforeq 
of the dynamics of capitalism and the correlated motive forces 
generated in'the 'periphery'. It is clear that, like the State 
Department in the 1870s, the twin factors in the 1840S of violent 
class conflict at home and the need to obtain markets abroad 
impelled H. M. G. upon a course of direct intervention throughout 
the non-capitalist world. 
1 As Marx and Engels noted in their 
wel LliiC. -aas I l-o lraia4 , Lblo Its Litt's i vcxr, i, ii cio i, i i-i to ii n r, . rmn t. i, -i i 
of the economies at the periphery of the international system, 
and their redirection towards monoculture for export. Howeverg 
the degree of intervention depended upon a variety of other factors, 
centring on the perceived potential of the area for future 
exploitationg and the presence or absence of a collaborative 
group (Robinson and Gallagher 1953). Once markets had been 
secured, the importance of this 'feudal/mercantile - imperialist' 
alliance (cf. Cotler, 1979, p. 262; Gootenberg, 1982) became 
paramount in order to establish a political and legal system 
In fact British intervention in the War between Chile and the 
Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation (of. F. O. 61/58 Wilson to 
F. O., lst Februaryq 1839) may be compared to the North American 
I diplomatic effort during the War of the Pacific. 
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suited to the needs of expanded reproduction Thereafter, 
until the classic 'Age of Imperialism', when both competition with 
other capitalist states and heavy overseas investment increased the 
importance of H. M. G. 's active protection 
2, there was no need for 
policies of direct control or 'political' involvement. 
However, one of the interesting aspects of the War of the ]Pacific 
is its occurence at the time of the development of the 'new 
imperialism, 3, and its coincidence with French and British 
intervention to retain control of Egypt. Furthermore, there are 
1. Certain states offered better guarantees fQr business than did 
others, because of the ability of the export oligarchy to achieve 
national integration and regularise class conflict (i. e. Chile); 
as indicated throughout this workj suitable political and legal 
conditions were never really established in Peru or Bolivia 
before the War of the Pacific, which is why, as will be shown 
below, H. M. G. and British capital backed Chile. In 1882, 
Graham wrote from Lima: 11 ... almost all foreigners would look 
upon the departure of Chilean forces with fear and apprehensiong 
as being the signal for fresh series of revolutions and 
disturbances of a sanguinary nature, such as have always marked 
the history of this unfortunate countr since the day it shook 
off the yoke of the mother country. " 
ýP-0.61/339t 
12th Apr4p 
1882, Graham to P. O., my emphasis). 
2. Kurth writes: ... the inability of weak-and corrupt governments 
to meet their bond payments led Britain in the 1870s and 1880s 
to intervention and even annexation. Thus began the first 
steps toward 'the new imperialism'. " (19799 P-344); and a 
contemporary commented on the invasion of Egypt in 1882: "It 
is a stock-Jobber's warg we shall very likely have more of this 
sort of thing. " (cited in Owen, 1972t PP-195-6). However this 
form of invogtment was not tho maJor cause of the now interventioni 
afr I shall indicate below; whilst the cause of the Bondholders 
was a popular one, it was generally preferred by both public 
and government that H. M. *Gls involvement be low-key. Military 
interventions were usually made only when they were considered 
to be in the collective interests of British capitalism and 
state, even if the immediate casus belli was default on a 
government loan. 
3- Of which North American expansionism and competition with the 
United Kingdom was a prominent feature. 
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clearg if superf icialq parallels between the Egyptian and, Peruvian 
casesq apparently demonstrating the homoficence of capitalism 
(Reyo 
1973); both present excellent examples of 'enclave' societies, 
(Cotler, 1979). 
I 
A free trade policy was imposed in Egypt in 1841 after which 
the national economy gradually became dominated by an export 
sector based on cotton, and employing semi-capitalist relations 
(Clawson, 1981). This modern #enclave'was controlled by an alliance 
of European and Levantine merchants whose: 
"commercial success enabled them to corrupt and'exploit, 
but not to reform or direct, the politica regime. " 
(Robinsong 19720 P-131) (cf. the Civilistas). 
Therefore political and social conditions were never wholly 
satisfactory for business interests, whilst the political anarchy 
itself derived partly from the simplifcation and transformation of 
the Egyptian economy in conformation to the needs of international 
capital. The great financial boom following the end of the first 
railway era in the 1840s led to the easy availability of capital 
10 
which was especially attracted to speculative investment abroad 
(Landes, 19589 pp-47-68). The Khedivate, like the Peruvian 
2 GoverTimpni. was thus abl p to borrow enormous amount S, which v; prp 
used partly in an effort to create a modern state structureq (Owen, 
1972f pp. 202-4) and partly on non-productive projects such as 
3 
prestige public works, the military and patronage. 
On the 2, Oth Wovember, 1869 'The Times' noted the over-abundance 
of capital and remarked that "the only legitimate means of 
disposing of it must be by lending it to foreign nations.! ' 
2. On default the Egyptian external debt amounted to approximately 
U00 million (Owen 1972, p. 201) and the Peruvian to C-32 million; 
both were owed to predominantly British and then French'bondholders. 
3- Thus demonstrating the same contradictory and transitional 
features embodied in the Peruvian state. 
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With the onset of the world depression Egypt became bankrupt 
(1876). From this point on Egyptian and Peruvian history diverges, 
as the British and French Governments stepped in to impose financial 
andconstitutional reforms in order to prop up the Egyptian state, 
(although'such reforms were also requested of Peru by the. Bondholders 
H. M. G and Dreyfus). As a result of this intervention, the fragile 
and fragmented social and political structure of Egypt collapsed; 
Robinson describes a series of events similar to the sierran - 
rebellions and the anti-Britishq Pierolistarevolution: 
IIBv 1881 ... the collaborating Khedivate had lost control V 
of indigenous politics to a neo-traditional reaction .... 
riding a wave of popular anti-foreign feeling. Confronted 
with the collapse, Britain and France had two choices: 
to scrap their commercial interest in the country or to 
IdUk Uji Llic 1dr. UcId clild Vr--UuImLj. '%IoL Hin issil Itilsoij-PI Ivn 
mechanism by throwing their own weight into Egypt's internal 
politics. ", (Robinson, 1972, p. 131). 
Several factors differentiated the disintegration of the Peruvian 
state from the Khedivate, making British overt intervention quite 
unnecessary (however it will be shown that II. M. G. was involved in 
the Pacific War). As discussed below, prior to the war the 
British had three main grievances against the Peruvian state - 
the default on the external debto the'generally anarchic condition 
of society, which at times seriously disrupted business, and 
Peruvian interference with trade 
1 
and industry, most notably 
Relations had frequently been poisoned by British complaints 
about government decrees; in 1877 a member of the Board of 
Trade reported on new trade regulations and the duties that 
were to be imposed on guano and nitrateg and recommended that 
a strong protest be made to the Peruvian government, since the 
new regulations were 11 .. arbitrary and injurious to trade... " (B. T. 12 12 157 (465) Giffen to F-0.5th Plarch, 1877). 
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in the form of the 'Estancol. These problems could generally bo 
overcome, or alleviatedg by Chilean annexation of the districts 
most important to British capitalism and on which the external 
loan had been hypothecated. Since therefore British and Chilean 
capital were united by mutual interests and objectives, and since 
Chile was a cohesive state and clearly militarily superior 
21 
off cial intervention on its side by H. M. G. was both inexpedient, 
undesirable and superfluous. It would exacerbate the Anglophobia 
already widely felt in Perug and provoke a confrontation with the 
U. S. A. Furthermoreq unlike Egypt, Peru was essentially of no 
strategic importance to Britain, and was not located in an area 
ofq and close, to, traditional @oonomic intmotes Foru wag nQt 
perceived as the gateway to vast potential wealth. The survival 
of the Egyptian state (under British Control) was seen as vital 
to the collective interests of British Capitalism 
3, 
whereas in 
1. This is not to imply that the Chilean elite was a mere puppet 
in the hands of the British; their interests coincided. 
2. Kiernan's assertion that prior to the Pacific War it was 
generally considered that Chile was weaker than Peru is 
unsupported by evidence; furthermore given the history of 
Chilean victories against Peru and Bolivia, the organised 
and bationall character of its army and navy and the British 
belief in its almost Anglo-Saxon qualities, it is quite 
illogical. In fact the Chilean navy (which owed much in 
terms of organization and ships to the British) was recognised 
to be almost equal to the North American fleet. 
3- Indeed Lord Cromer wrote that by the time of the British attack 
on Alexandria: "the question of protecting European financiAl 
interests in Egypt had fallen completely into the background. " 
(-. 1 L-0 It. EI -vm-lm. 1"7,1 1 V-1-1,11Rti r1r()veFdF1 to iýniflt. 
out that: "the cry of 'India in danger' was a eutivuitiuIlL 
one for financiers arid concession-hunters.. '. for anyone with 
an eye on Burmese timber, Yunnan railways, Malayan rubber, or 
Persian oil.... it was a plausible excuse... *I' 
(ibidg pp. 82/3)- 
-378- 
the case of Peru, in the words of the British representative in 
Chile: 
"I cannot think that makind in generalq and this countryg 
(Great Britain) in particular will suffer by her (Peruls) 
enfeeblement, or even by her extinction as a state. The 
Tlew World, which it was Mr. Canning's boast to have 
called iriLo buing to redj. -E; kiu Ltiu ulti, Ilat, 1, t: uIl tj 
disappointing creation, with the exception, I think, of 
Chile. " (. P. O. 61/3519 Horace Rumbold, Memo to P. O. 
llth Nay, 1883). 
In the 1870S only the Bondholders had consistently and forcibly 
t 
pressed for large-scale British, intervention in Peruvian affairs 
and, whilst H. M. G. was clearly, as time wore on, becoming increasingly 
sympathetic to their caseq diplomatic representations were all 
that were seriously envisaged, 
1 (cf. F. O. 61/323, P. O. Minute, 
16th October, 1876). Moreover, although, in general, public 
opinion had supported the Bondholders' claims, and sections of the 
press had been virulent in their denunciation of Peru, this did 
notlindicate any widespread support for gunboat diplomacy to 
solve the problem: 
"No Fir. Croyle! (Chairman of one of the Bondholders Cormnittees) 
H. N. G. have a good deal too much on their hands to meddle 
with Peruvian finance. Those who lend to dishonest and 
impecunious agglomerations of half breeds in South America 
must do'so at their own risk and peril .... it could not 
be tolerated for a moment that the machinery of government 
should be put in motion in order to force these rotten 
Given the fLctors already indicated ttogether with the relatively 
small size of British interest overall, the great distance 
separating Peru from Britain and the effectiveness of such 
mechanisms as exclusion from the London Money Market, further 
action was always unlikely and inappropriate in an area where 
British mercantile capital still predominated. 
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states to keep to their engagements. OThe Truth's 
26th Februaryq 1878). 
Generally, in fact the Bondholders could exercise little influence 
(except through the pregg) in comparisdii t6 merehantn 6r induatrialieto, 
since, until they sold their shares (in a panic) to the professional 
speculators for next to nothing, they were generally composed of 
small investors - hence the term widows' consols: 
"The f lotat-ion process f ollowed a unif orm. pattern .... 
After enthusiasm had been aroused to a high pitch, a selected 
group of insiders - participating merchant-bankerR and 
swindlers - received large blocks of bonds and it wan 
promptly announced that the issues had been completely 
sold out ... This caused further excitement and a feverish 
scramble of eager applicants 0000. The great majority of 
British investors - namely allq or nearly all, who were 
not admitted into the inner sanctum of the favoured group- 
probably purchased their bonds somewhere near the peak... 
LIIP titled aristocracy (was) in the van (of this Jnvestment) 
as company promoters and managers... " ("'I)PYI, !! ), )It 
and 36). ' 
Few such small savers ever benefitted from their speculation. 
Furthermore, defence of the Bondholders was founded more on the 
notion that in, order to maintain British economic and political 
ascendancy throughout the world, it was important to assert the 
t 
rights of all its citizens (of. Palmerston's 'Civis Romanus numl 
speech), than on the importance of the investment itself. 
2 The 
1. On the. other handq racist ideology was also employed at times 
to urge intervention: "We cannot believe that our British 
Government will allow her own subjects... to be swindled and 
pauperized by a set of Peruvian robbers and their German 
Jew accomplices ... 11 
(Plan of the World', 30th November, 1878)- 
2. However, if the assertion of British political pre-eminence was 
I required by British capitalism in generalt the cause of the 
Bondholders' represented a popular justification of gunboat 
diplomacyg since it was seen as the protection of the 'small man' 
against the racist stereotype of the perfidious Idagol (for instance 
in the 1840s)- 
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direct investment made by merchants or bankers was far more 
profitable than the portfolio loans to governments (Rippyl 
OP-cit., P-35), and merchants' interests in general represented 
the lions' share of British capital in Latin America; they were 
also, obviously, directed by substantial and important men who 
had direct access to British diplomats in South America and whose 
needs carried weight with H. M. G. Consequently the interests of 
the merchants were generally paramount 
1, frequently to the detriment 
of the bondholder. For instancet the Treaty of Ancon was 
unsatisfactory from the Bondholder's point of view, however the 
P. O. was persuaded against exertion of pressure on Chile by the 
leading British West Coast Merchant, housesq since it might 
antagonise Chile against their 'more durable' and substantial 
investments (F. O. 61/3589 Gibbs, Balfour Williamson and others to 
GritnVii1q, 5th May, 1884 2 In replyl Lord Fitzmaurice informed 
Gibbs that H. M. G. agreed that the Bondholders had no right to 
look to Chile for assistance with repayment of their loan. 
Moreover, the P. O. note of protestg sent to both Peru and Chile, 
did not represent support of the Bondholders as such, but wan rather 
inspired by a duty to protest: 
By the late 1870s however, the Bondholders' cause was represented 
by two powerful pressure groups headed by men with some authority 
in the City. Consequently they were beginning to exercise 
some influence on the P. O., and this increased as their support 
of Chile during the war coincided with the interests of the 
merchants. But their eventual success was due more to the 
involvement of the influential and wealthy Irish-American 
merchdntg Grace, and their own efforts, than to the assistance 
of H. M. G. (The settlement also benefitted Grace's interests 
more than anyone elsels). 
Offpring an example of effective private intervention on 
lie I tal f ul G It IIc aj! lj. IiIbL 1*0 eu j Usa ot. 1 it I 1--ts I .. II in I . $I I. II$.. I -I C, IoI 
demands was to be the responsibility of I-eru even though Chile 
was now in possession of the nitrate and guano deposits. 
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against any arrangement between Chile and Peru which 
deprives British subjects- of their rights of property 
will do all in their power to guard against their action being 
used for speculative purposes, but at the same time, they consider 
that, although the British Bondholders are not entitled to 
look to them for assistance in obtaining payment of their claimst 
H. M. G. would have failed in their duty had they allowed the 
Treaty to be signed without protesting against an act which is 
not only prejudicial to the rights of British subjects, but 
a violation of the principles of justice and of the practice 
of' tipitions.... " (F. O. 177/1RO, li"i L7. mailrice to 1nI. h MRv, 111114). 
It is apparent therefore that had H. M. G. been prepared to launch 
a largescale diplomatic initiative, or some form of military 
intervention against Peru this would have been on behalf of the 
wider interests of capitalism rather than in support of the Bondholders. 
However in contrast to Egypt the objectives of the important merchant 
community were better served by an official stance of neutrality - 
as long as the Chileans were victorious. 
1 
Consequently it was 
important that there should be little or no proof of British 
invdvement. Obviously we know that no form of gunboatj or overtly 
- anti-Peruvian, diplomacy was embarked upon. However the suspicion 
of a degree of support by H. M. G. for Chile lingers. Kiernan has 
opposed this on four main counts. 
This is one of the points of contention with Kiernan, who does 
not agree that the interests of British capital were so uniformly 
ardsolidly behind Chile. However, he does concede that: 
"There was .... a mercantile section which held that a Chilean 
vJQtory would be good for trade in the long run, because Chile 
wag the most efficient and energetic of the Pacific Coast 
Republics, " (19559 P-17), and all the evidence already presented 
in this work demonstrates the consistently pro-Chilean inclinations 
of the British. Furthermore, all major British merchant houses 
operated in Chile as well as Peru and usually had their head- 
quarters in Chile. 
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One of his main objections is that there is no evidence of official 
(o private involvement). However since we are discui.; sint., a care of 
putative covert support, clear evidence is not likely to be discovered. 
Interestingly, Kiernan himself, in a later workq provides a reason wby 
there can be little likelihood of uncovering hard data in support of 
the thesis that II. M. G. 
1 
assisted Chile: 
"It iN U d0lusiOn of archive searcherst .... to suppose that 
ministers and under secretaries are careful to leave behind 
them all the documents required for a verdict on their actions. 
They are at least as careful not to do so. That no record of 
discussions be put on paper wan the strictest rule of cabinet 
meetings. " (1972, P-76). 
I 
Secondly, Kiernan asserts that it was generally believed, prior to the 
war, that Chile was weaker than Peru; I have already dealt with this 
point and indeed it must be evident from preceding chapters that such 
2 
an observation does not bear scrutiny Thirdlyq he states that 
originally only war with Bolivia may have been intendedg and that 
certainly the British could not have foreseen that the conflict would 
develop into an attaek on Peru. Once apain I have tried to show, 
throughout this work, how the real rivalry was always between Chile 
and Peru. lurthermore Perultj iiiLeal, c polloy w-AS' 
I.. lioun t% I 1611ml oil 
Chilean (and Britisjý interests3 and the existence of 'Secret' Bolivian-Perui 
1. Whilsthe also notes that in some ways, for inntanne with regard to 
Chilean annexation of the fpiano islands, 11 ..... Great Britain appears to have slipped into something less than neutrality. " (1955o P-25)- 2. "Peru has some good naval officersq but no trained crews so that 
it will take a considerable time to prepare the men to meet the 
Chilians who have always kept their vessels and their crews 
ready for action... " (F. O. 61/3189 St. John to P. O. 12th March, 1879) 
3. In a retrospective consideration of the place of theEstancol and Gibbs in the causes of warl St. John wrote to Granville: "There 
can be no doubt that the salitreros look askance at- the Government 
monopolyt and it was perfectly true that the 'nitrate districts 
were the real and direct cause of the warl. " (P. O. 6113440 27th December, l8al). 
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Trt-aty, whivii woubi itivoiv, - 11pru iti any ChIlf-an-Polivir4r) P(IIII'l Ir. f., 
was, ýn fact, no, secret. Kiernan's final point concerns the nature 
of private interests in the affair - firstly that they were in 
disagreement over whom to support, and, secondly, that the Chilean 
partisans were mainly 'men on the spot', whose influence lay at 
Santiago rather than London (p. 16). 
In support of his claim that the people concerned were divided, 
he cites an observation by the 'Economist' that: 
"the confusion at present existing amongst the rabble of 
Peruvian Bondholders is almost beyond description. " 
(17th Januaryq 1880; p. 16). 
However it would be ludicrous to expect total uniformity of opinion 
from Ouch an enormous group of people, largely composed, as already 
observed, and as the'Economist's 
I comment implies, of small-time 
investors with little financial expertise or knowledge of South 
American affairs. 
1 The leaders of the Bondholders, however$ 
who were well-informed with regard to South American finance 
and politics were united in support oý Chile, and it was also 
the opinion of St. John that a Chilean victory would benefit them: 
"If the Raphael contract be ended through this war it 
will certainly be to the advantage of the bondholders 
(P. O. 61/3189 St. John to F. O., 22nd April, 1879). 
Whilst Kiernan himself demonstrates the widespread support for 
Chile by his citation of another report by the'Economist; in which 
it was stated that: 
Only a relatively small group was inclined to argue for pupport 
for Peru in order to prevent it losing the natural resources 
hypothecated to the Bondholders, and their influence was 
counteracted by Chilean realization of the need to restore 
private enterprise in Tarapaca, permit guano and nitrate 
exports and negotiate with the Bondholders (cf. Sir P. J. 
Reed to Pauncefoteg F. O. 177/188,22nd Marchq 1886). 
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"the rise in Peruvian bonds is due to Peruvian defeats 
(27th December, 18791 p. 16). 
Moreover, although any war was clearly bad for tradet it appears 
that, on the whole British commerce was not disrupted, 
1 
and St. John 
reported to the F. O. that in fact: 
"The only British subjects who suffer are shipowners.... " 
(1-1.0.61/3199 25th Augustj 1879). 
Finally, it is evident that men who had influence on the West Coast also 
had influence in London. The F. O. did not ignore the wishes and opinions 
of the merchants or its diplomats based in 'Santiago and Lima, but in any 
case all big British merchant houses obviously had a head office in 
botidni). II ip, qiwtly riot. t. pnablt- to assert. t. hit Gibbs was withotif. 
influence in the City and in the P. O., and evidence of such influence 
is provided by H. M. G. 's partiality in the Chilean/Peruvian conflict. 
H. M. G. 's involvement intertwined with private pro-Chilean action, and 
consequently may be considered simultaneously. Some evidence of British 
support for Chile has, already been provided, however let us now briefly 
examine further material to support this contention. 
Perhaps the main way in which the Chilean cause was supported was 
in the form of direct aid from British citizens, and an extremely 
lax enforcement of neutrality laws by H. M. G. 
2 In July 1879 
the Bolivian legation in Peru approached St. John on the question 
of Bolivia's decision to stop and board neutral vessels they suspected 
1. "The rumours of ... possible hostilities between Chile and Peru .... 
may ... help the price ... for were an open rupture to take place 
-between the 
two countries it would .... reduce... exports of Peruvian 
nitrate ... 11 
(Gibbs to London, 10th March, 1879, M. O. 119470/3) 
2. Implicit acknowledpement of this approach was given when C1, ile 
stopped a British ship and the F. O. warned Santiago that such 
'recurring indignities to (the) flag' might result in the 
enforcement by II. M. G. or a ntrict neutrality on Britiah nubjectn. (in O'Brieng 19799 P-109). 
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of carrying Bolivian nitratesq or other minerals. The P. O. refused 
to accept this as a 'belligerent's right' and attacked it an pure 
piracy. They also refused to interfere with British merchanta and 
representatives of the Bondholders who exported guano and nitrates 
from Bolivian and Peruvian territories The Bolivians declared 
this I activity to be illegal: 
"My government by .... 
(a) 
.. series of administrative measures 
.... have made an explicit.... declaration of the illegality 
of the so-called rights of the Nitrate Company of Antofagasta. 
Such decrees .... stamp the working of salitreras belonging 
to the State with a character of illegality; this character 
is even much legs questionable now that the working and 
exportation are protected not by any right whatever, but 
by the material force lent by the Chilean army to the service 
of private interests..... " (P. O. 61/319# 3rd July, 1879). 
However the Chilean army and navy were in turn helped by these 
private interestsq in the form of creditj supplies of war materials, 
and intelligence, and active British participation. At the beginning 
of 1880 British diplomat Pakenham wrote to Salisbury: 
"I believe that almost the entire transport of the Chilean army, 
their munitions and supplies of all kinds, besides the coal 
for their squadron, are directly or indirectly in English 
hands. " (F. O. 61/207t 17th January, 1880). 
No action to stop thin clear infrinpement of neutrality was proposed. 
There were, in fact, traditional links between the Chilean and -British I 
navies; Britain had helped in the manning and organisation of the first 
Chilean navy during the Wars of Emancipationj and its British Commander$ 
At the beginning of 18809 Pedro Calderon complained to'the P. O. 
that: ".. the saltpetre of Tarapaca... is being exported in 'neutral' 
ships, without the help of which Chile could not cosummite her 
crimes. " (P. O. 61/3299 14th January, 1880). In reply Salisbury 
affirmed the rights of both Chile and neutrals to trade. (P. O. 
61/3299 15th March, 1880). 
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Lord Cochraneq was regarded anlone of the founders of the Republic' 
(F. O. 16/2509 Montt to Salisburyq 14th December, 1887; cited in 
Blakemoreq 19749 P-9)- In the Pacific war too, thereforev the British 
WOVO III-t)II1111C, 111. III 111n 0111 Ing; l) linvy 
(11,41411sk. 191"'. 
There were also other ways in which British residents in Chile contributed 
to the war efforts; 'Le National' (Paris) recorded that British and Chilean 
commerce in Valparaiso was delighted at the outbreak of war Oth April, 
11879, cited in Ahumada Morenol 1684, p. 272), and thereafter provided 
Chile with valuable aid. 
1 The historian of the Merchant House 
Balfour Williamson & Co., writes: 
"The name of the new firm was originally to hiiýe been Milne, 
Williamson & Co. But .... Stephen Williamson's pro-Chile 
partisanship, in the War of the Pacificq (expressed in his 
usual lucid and uncompromising way in Parliament and in letters 
to 'The Times 12) still rankled so strongly in Peruvian official 
circles that it was thought it would be best to leave the 
title of the firm as it was. " (Balfour, Williamson & Co., 1960 
P-75). 
Howeverl given their major role in the instigation of Chilean hostilities 
against Bolivia (cf. Chapter 9), the Position of the Gibbs' merchant 
house 3 during the war is of most interest. 
In attempting to construct a clear picture of Gibbs' role in the 
1. For instancel in the form of credit and also through exercising 
their influence in London, on the press and on the F. O. 
2. Williamson therefore offers an example of the way in which the 'men 
on the spot' could act effectively on Chile's behalf both in London 
and on the West Coast. 
3- Basadre writes: "Un grupo comercial britanico, uno de. cuyon centros 
era la Casa Gibbsq sostenia que una victoria de Chile podia ser 
beneficiosa a la larga porque esta Republica era la maa eficiente y 
enerp , ica en el Pacifico sudamericano. Esta opinion gano terreno 
cuando los triunfos chilenos se sucedieron sin cesar y el aumento 
de trafico con el pais vencedor compenso las perdidas del intercambio 
con el Peru. " (1976, P-36). 
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conflictq we are confrontedt once again, with the obvious handicap of 
the., firm's reluctance to commit any indiscretions to paper. Given the 
prominent part originally played by the Antofagasta Company, It wan 
thought imprudent to give any further cause for Peruvian hostility: 
"As shareholders in the Artofagasta Company we may congratulate 
ourselves on the support and protection we have received from 
the Chilean Government, but we fear some time will pass before 
matters settle down and we can consider ourselves quite secure.. " 
(M. S. 119470/3, Valparaiso to London, 24th February, 1879). 
For, unfortunately, a side effect had been to increasethe antagonism 
of Peru and Bolivia: 
"Bbhl writes as though it were thought in Lima that the Artofagasta 
Company were desirous of war; or that they were not using their 
influence to prevent it ... " 
(ibidt 7th April, 1879). 
Consequently, in May, in an interestingly ambiguous letterg Valparaiso 
cautioned London: 
against expressing too much sympathy in favour or 
but proceeded to discuss the possibility of 'spending some money': 
it may have appeared inconsistent to You that the very 
next day we should enquire whether you would authorise us to 
open a credit which was to be applied in the way to be pointed 
out by Mr. Smith.... ; 11 
the main point, however, was to be discrete and take precautions: 
"We think you do well to address to us exclusively letters which 
contain anything that might be misinterpreted in Peru if seenby 
those for whom they were not intended ... 11 
(M-S- 11,470/39 Gibbs 
Valparaiso to London, privatelettert 30th May, 1679). 
But despite the consequently guarded nature of Gibbs' correspondence 
during the war evidence of both a pro-Chilean bias and practical assistancet I 
may be found. In considering the effects on Gibbs' interests in Peru 
were the dispute to widen into a Peruvian/Chilean war, Gibbs noted that 
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there was a possibility that if Chile took the Peruvian nitrate districts: 
lleeo it might be considered that the T. N. Co. 
1 had sold their 
property to the Peruvian Government and must look to them for 
it's value 
2 
... still, all things considered, our interects 
lie more with Chile than with the Peruvian side of the question. " 
(M. S. 11,470/3, Gibbs (Valparaiso) to London, 26th May, 1879). 
Consequently, at the outbreak of war, the Lima and Arequipa offices 
proposed to assist the Chilean war effort through the provision of a 
code; this was however viewed as most imprudent by Valparaiso: 
"I wrote to you a few lines of caution against allowing the 
House to be made use'of as a medium of telegraphic communication 
during the present difficulties .... 11, 
yet 
11 ... yesterday Miller received a note dated the 28th Ult. from 
'I qnqlose the press copy of a letter sent by the 
last mail to Mr. Read referring to a code of telegraphy to be 
adopted in matters referring to the Chile-Bolivian war, which I 
thought absolutely necessary to communicate to Commandante Lopez 
who... in the event of any attack from the North should receive 
immediate advice. ' 
This is evidence that Messrs Gibbs of Lima and Arequipa accept 
the positions of intelligence agents to the Chilean Covernment... 
The distribution of such a code is about the last thing I should 
have expected Messrs Gibbs to do for it is in direct contradiction 
to all their old principles of not mixing themselves up in any 
way to compromise their neutrality. " 
However it was the indiscretion rather than the pro-Chilean bias that 
was at fault: 
I. 'PAI-ainlon I'll Lratp Company eypropriated by the lleriivlan 
IES tancol. 
2. In the event Gibbs' close relationship with the Chilean Government 
ensured favourable treatment, and consequentlyg at the end of 1863, 
London commented on the difficulties reported by the Valparaiso office 
of obtaining compensation in Iquique: "we imagine there will not be 
much difficulty in delaying matters until the terms of peace are 
concluded when... the province of Tarapaca will be annexed to 
Chili.... " (M-S- 11,471/18, London to Valparaiso 20th Decembert 
1BB3)- 
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"If the code had been made out as an example of what the Chilean 
authorities might do for themselves it would have been all right 
eo. *" 
(M. S. ll,, 120, Valparaiso to Bbhl (Lima), 9th March, 1879). 
For as Hayne openly acknowledged: 
it the Antofagasta Company's existence may now be considered 
to depend upon Chile going on with what she has begun and being 
successful. " (M. S. 11,120, Hayne to B8hlj 16th February, 1879). 
And clear evidence of both Gibbs' true sentiments regarding the outcome 
of the conflict, and complicity in british aid for the Ckii1ean war 
effort, is afforded by Miller's enthusiastic description of the defeat 
of one of Peru's two battleships: 
"We have had such excitements here during the past fortnight ... 
First the Iquique seafight with its at the same time sad and 
glorious result for Chile ..... It is impossible to be sufficiently 
thankful for the loss of the 'Independencial as the whole Chilian 
coast has now been at the mercy of the 'Huascar" (Peru's one 
remaining ironclad) for 13 days owing to the mysterious absence 
of the Chikan squadron; the latest report is that it has gone 
on from Callao to Payta - perhaps to pick up the P. S. N. Co's 
steamer from Panama with Qontraband of war .... in the shape 
of torpedoes etc ... 
(M. S. 11,126; Miller to Combert 3rd June, 
1879; my emphasis). 
The Bondholders' Committees also rendered Chile invaluable assistance. 
The ItAlian Bondholders' reaction to the war, as expressed to the P. O., 
was typical: 
"The creditors of Peru havingg for a long time past received 
neither foreign capital n6r the interest of their debt$ Witnetmod 
with marked satisfaction the phenomenon of a war. " (F. O. 61/3579 
Tyler to Granville, 10th Pebruary, 1884). 
Help partly took the form of ensuring that Peru received nei. ther ships 
nor loans. In July, 1880 Russell (Chairman of one of the Bondholders' 
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Committees) informed the F. O. that he had heard that ships were being 
I 
built for Peru in England: 
"If the Peruvians get these ships away it is goodbye to our 
guano shipment. " (F. O. 61/3309 17th Julyq 1880). 
On the other hand the neutrality laws were breached for Chile. In 
May 1680 several swift torpedoes arrived in Valparaiso in sections on 
board British merchant ships (Markham 1862, P. 188, and cf. Oibbut 
m. s. ll, i26), having been constructed in England. Meanwhile H. M. G. 
refused the Bolivian Consul's request to stop a shipment of ball 
passing through Liverpool to Chile (F. O. 11/279 'Salisbury to Bolivian 
Consul Generalq 26th April 1879). and blocked Peru's efforts to 
negotiate a loan in order to purchase new ships and weapons (F. O. 
61/3199 St. John to Salisbury, 7th July, 1879). 
In February 18BO Chilean Minister Augusto Matte acknowledged the 
Bondholders' contribution in a letter to Rafael Sotomayor: 
"Recently I have sent a note to Mr. Proctor advising him that 
in view of the uniformity of opinion which exists among the 
rrp(litors of Perug the Government of Chile was willing to 
permit the exportation of Lruano .... The cret. IlLuvti 1,, Ivc 
held a'meeting approving of this and clamouring for the 
annexation of Tarapaca by Chile and the truth is that these 
gentlemen have, been a powerful lever in Europe to prevent the 
Peruvians from securing war elements and to create for us a 
beneficent atmosphere in the opinion of these peoples. " 
(6th Februaryq 18809 in O'Briqnt 1979, P. 109, my emphasis). 
The very next day a letter was printed in'The Bullionist' from the 
grateful First Secretary of the Chilean Legation: 
"It is my duty to explain personally to the Peruvian Bondholders 
how much indebted they are for any results that may attain 
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through the negotiations with Chile to, the ability and 
consistency with which Mr. Croyle has, from the very beginning 
of the South American War, sided with Chile and sought through 
our Government a favourable solution for their problem. " 
Oth February, 1880). 
Such public pronouncements formed part of the press campaign which 
helped to create the favourable 'atmosphere' towards Chile (referred 
to by Matte) that composed the second major element of British support. 
Typical of the attitude of the British press was the 'South American 
Journal' which announced on the Sth April 1679 that Chile was defending: 
"the most sacred principles on which modern society rests, 
Ili, = twhis, 11-11op of jiiOinp nntl tlip Hirld, F; nr iirntif-rtv. dil-cestlý? 
attacked by Bolivia... there are interests of British subjects 
mixed with the Cia. Chilena de Salitres. *. " 
1 
II 
Other newspapers also linked the conflict with the Estancog which, 
alone, was held to have justified Chilean action (Le Temps (Paris)) 
12th April 1879), and'The Bullionist' declared that all civilized 
nations should support Chilean occupation of Atacama and Tarapaca; 
furthermore their presence would ensure that the guano and nitrates 
would be 'properly' administered. (13th December, 1879). 
The partiality of H. M. G. is also evident, and, as Chilean victory 
became inevitables was not concealed particularly carefully. This 
was partly expressed in a refusal to recognise Chile as the aggressor; 
even Ithough it is clear, for instance, that St. John was aware of the 
history of the dispute (cf- P-0.177/149)t Peru and Bolivia were held 
to blame; 
St, John also acknowledged the importance of thist 11, it appears 
certain that the Chileans will conquer... Tarapac& ... the time 
has arrived to consider the very large amount of British interests 
in the province.. " (F. P. 61/3199 St. John to Salisbury, 20th 
Novembert 1879). 
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it appears to me that from the beginningg Bolivia has 
failed in her engagements towards Chile, and though the conduct 
of the latter has been very decisive and perhaps agpressive, 
it was probably the only course left.... " (P. O. 61/318,26th 
February, 1879). 
Whilst Rumbold stated: 
I 
"Chile was in no way prepared f or war and was not the aggressor. 
The hostile combination against her had, on the contraryt been 
prepared for some years... 9" 
(P. O. 61/3519 Ilth May, 1083). 
At the beginning of the hostilities, in 1879, in an extraordinary and 
naive misinterpretation of the history of the area, Pakenham had written 
to Salisbury: 
"Chile will endeavour to retake the strip of coast which of her 
own accord she gave to Bolivia for the sake of peace and quietness, 
and to put an end to apparently interminable bickering on the 
subject of boundaries. " (P. O. 16/2029 10th February, 1879). ' 
Not surprisingly such opinions intensified the Anglophobia already 
widespread in Peru; this in turn both confirmed the British diplomats 
in their poor opinion of the republicl and further alienated British 
interests: 
11... this hatred (of the English) is encouraged by very 
improper articles in the demi-official paper 'La Patrial ... 
The ... cause is the soreness felt at the almost universal 
condemnation of their dishonest financial conduct by the 
European powers .... kaltiu) L11c. 141-10a til Lhe I'citivIni, cp In 
deeply mortified by all the events of the warv where their 
opponents have shown themselves superior in courage, in 
discipline, in naval and military skill, in fact in every 
manly 
, 
quality ..... I am glad to notice that most of the 
English families are leaving the country.. *. " (P. O. 61/3259 
St. John to P. O., 10th Marchq 1880; my emphasis). 
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As the war progressed and it became obvious that Chile would retain 
Tarapaca as well as Atacam . H. M. G. became more open in its support. 
At the beginning of 1880 Pakenham spoke in terms of: 
" Llic fczy-141 c21- 1- --441-0 W11 It'll t 110 WQ VI IRP I Pý no I.. ... 
of (P 
. 
0. 
61/331, Pakenham to Salisbury, 28th Januaryq 1880, my emphanis). 
However even in 1879 St. John actively championed the cause of the 
Bondholdersq to the detriment of the Peruvian war effort; for instance, 
in April assistance was lent with regard to telegrams concerned to 
facilitate the Bondholders' arrangements for exporting Peruvian 
guano. (P. O. 61/3179 23rd April, 1879). But, as indicated aboveg the 
Bondholders' cause was not the principal factor behind H. M. G. 's pro- 
Chilean stance. 
A major'motivation of British government support f or Chile appears 
to have been connected with the growing strength and pretensions of 
the 'United States and the consequent threat it represented to British 
I 
capital in South America. In 1883 Rumbold announced: 
"I cannot but think that it is almost as much for our interest 
an it is against that of the United States to see her (Chile) 
firmly established as Mistress ofIthe shores of the South 
Pacific. " (P. O. 61/3519 11th May, 1883). 
This wao not only bocause Chilean ascendancy wan best for Dritiph 
commerce. In 1881 St. John had received a memo from the Italian 
Minister in Lima: 
it "0 on the subject of the policy of the European powers 
strengthening Chile as far as their influence can do so, in 
order that there be a nation capable of offering a sort of 
counterpoise to the influence of the United States. it 
certainly appears that there is no other republic on this 
coast susceptible of any marked development.... 11 (P. O. 61/ 
3349 St. John to Granville, 27th December, 1881). 
This British-North American rivalry also decided the British against 
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any idea of joint-mediation with the United States - for many of the 
reas. ons that Vorth America had not wished to co-operate with the 
Europeansq and also beoause it would alienate Chilel 
"The pretensions of the United States to hegemony throughout 
America are probably nowhere better understood or dreaded than 
in Chile. " (F. O. 61/351, Rumbold to Granville, llth May, 
1BB3); 
whilst St. John clearly hoped that one of the results of the Pacific 
War would be the establishment of a new power system which would 
challenge North American expansionism, and thus protect British 
interests: 
"The jealousy of the European influence shown by the United 
States appears extravagant and may have a contrary effect 
on these republics to that anticipated. Already the feeling 
is beginning to show itself that the South American Republics 
must turn for support to Europe, and in Chile England is the 
IK-wc* VI ht% 1.1 A IMM 1.4110141 IdprPil. " -InIIII tn 
Granvillet 4th January, 1882). 
Nervousness of North American intentions was also manifest: 
11 a circular has been sent by the Government of the United 
States to the different South American republics calling on 
them to send representatives to a congress to be held in 
Washington ..... It looks like a federation of the Republics 
under the protection of the United States, " (P. O. 61/339# 
St. John to P. O., llth January, 1882). 
and the 'men on the spot' were not alone in these feelinps, but 
reflected a growing apprehension felt by H. M. G. towards North American 
progress and British decline. In 1880 'The Economist' admitted: 
"The United States are running us hard in the race. " (cited 
in Crapolq 19739 P-43). 
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Summary 
1877 marked a watershed in North American/British commercial relationn 
(Beisner, 1975); for the first time the United States acquired control 
and dominance in its domestic market, displacing the U. K. as the 
country's primary supplier, but retaining its position as the leading 
exporter to Britain. Thereafter the United States reeularly maintained 
a favourable trade balance with Britain, while it began to overtake 
thejU. K. in terms of technological innovation and economic growth 
(cf. Hobsbawm, 19699 PP-176-181; Mathias, 1969, PP-316-320; Crapol, 
19739 P-49). This deterioration of the British commercial Position, 
especially vis a vis its erstwhile colonyq aroused deep concern and 
apprehension amongst politicians and capitalists, and this feeling was 
clearly reflec, Ud in both the contemporary pr@so 
(cf, 'Tho Economigto 
1873-1677). and foreign policy. 
1 The concomitant disappearance in 
parts of the world (notably Egypt) of the conditions that had facilitated 
British dominance through the Palmerstonian policy of informal empire, 
further exacerbated the British position, and alarm. 'British 
diplomatic muscleg thereforeq would need to be exerted henceforth in 
order to support its 'friend' - British capital (Lenin, 1963, P-743)- 
The principal location of British/North American commercial rivalry 
was obviously South America, and in 1878 Drummond issued a serious. 
warning to British merchants of North American aspirations in the 
'New World'. he declared that the time had come for a positive 
M1 LlcxLlvt; -- Cv-z L 111.1 La III 11mil 1,. 1*1 ,,, V I, I ipr own I. 
( 1'. 1'. 
. 
Tlppnrfq 
of H. Mls Secretaries of Embassy and Legation, 18789 Commercial no. 17, 
Gladstoneq in particularl was alarmed by the new state of affairs; 
however, other observers dismissed the danger as temporary. 
-396- 
Vol-72, P-455). The outbreak of the Pacific War at this precise 
moment, thereforeq presented an opportunity to'both metropolitan 
powers to attempt to consolidate, or establish, their positions 
on the continent. Both North AmericaAand British capital were 
motivated by the same objectives - dominance of the South American 
economy; however, other elements intervened to dictate different 
policies to their respective states. The differing degree of 
invn1v-rnPnf, rPf1P(-tPd the intervention of forces such as the differing 
stages of capitalist developmentl styles of diplomacys geographical 
location, British complacency and support for the winning , side. 
Purthermoret given the overall predominance of both the British 
position in Latin America and the world, and the strength of the 
Chilean stateg the type of assistance required for a Chilean victory 
was naturally distinct from the form of support necessary to prop 
up the Peruvian state. H. M. G. could, in fact, play a supportive 
role simply by displaying a strong preference for the Chilean case; 
however, as indicated aboveg there was a substantial degree of 
British involvement in the affair. It is, thereforeq possible to 
locate the conflict in a wider context of North American /British 
competition, and as such it formed a preliminary stage in the 'new 
im1perialism' (Campbell, 1976). Neither state was impartial, both 
backed one side or the other as the best means to achieve similar 
ends. Both H. M. G. and the State Department perceived the Peruvian 
State as weak and effectively non-viableg howeverg since the overriding 
need of the North American economy still concerned the export of goods, 
the nature of Peru's internal politics was relatively unimportant. 
On the contraryt the collapse of the Peruvian state offered the United 
States a possibility to establish a foothold on the West Coast. For 
the Britishl however, the structure of its economic involvement in 
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South America was beginning to be dordnated ly direct capital inventment. 
This took the form not only of the large bondholders' debtsl but also 
shares in, or ownership ofq railways, - public utility companies and 
plantations. Banking capital wan represented partly by jointly 
owned institutions or wholly by British banks, such as the Bank of 
London and South America. Merchant capital had become directly 
involved in mining enterprises, in export agriculture and, in Peru 
and, Boliviag in direct ownership of nitrate companies. The export 
of capital requires either direct colonization (Lenin, 1963, P-736-737) 
or stable and amicable political conditions. Consequently H. M. G. 
had no interest in supporting Peru; on the contrary its collapse, 
as Rumbold pointed out (P. O. 61/357). could in fact benefit British 
interests. 
In a sense both Britain and the United States derived concrete 
benefits from the war. Chile, partly in recognition of its debt to 
the British, re-established. private enterprise in Tarapaca 29 and an 
Evans observed: 
"England still dominated the Chilean markets. The promise of 
jr better business conditions in the nitrate fields when the proressive 
Chileans extended their administration there was not lost on the 
British investor, and as usual he was first in the field after 
the War of the Pacific. " (19279P. 135)- 
Whilst extensive British control was re-established in Peru through the 
Peruvian Corporation. However, ironicallyg nettlement of the Bondholders' 
claim also eriabled Lhd AiltS-W-Amat, It. aii ., a I -I Lal IoLI. ' a -a-, n Is. ii IiI Inn III rs 
railways and concessions to begin exploitation of the Cerro de Pasco 
1, Although this investment continued to be primarily mercantile in 
character. 
2. With the result that the nitrate industry came to be almost entirely 
dominated by the British, to the detriment of the Chilean economy, 
(Roxboroughg O'Brien and Roddick, 19779 PP-8/9). 
- 
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"Ifilf'ri. III-11-I(Itilp J11(i I, np -iltir or Uorth Amorirsin (Inninntif, ti nr flit- 
Peruvian economy (cf. Yepes, 1974t PP-101-109)- By contrast not only 
the Peruvian, but even the Chilean 'national interest' miy be said to 
have suffered as a result of the war. 
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CHAPTEF 
-121 
CONCLUSION I 
Introduction 
One of the main aims of' this thesis has been to demonstrate that 
there Pre reciprocal relationships of effectIvity between different 
levels of social formations. My detailed discussion demonstrates that 
the economic level cannot be seen as solely determinate but that there 
exists a complex set of inter-relationships$ most clearly illustrated 
in the issue of racial divisionsg but also reflected in the form of 
the state. Consequently, in many ways the study defies simplistic 
wimmarising. For examplej some discussions of Latin American 
aaciptipp iiAvp voppsi ttip wsup or iin4IPtYIPveIopmPnt Uralpy in 
geographical termsg namely an urban/rural dichotomy, or the deter- 
minate nature of spatial formations, Ultimatelyl howeverg this 
standpoint, as exemplified by Plekhanov's remarkst 
"We now know that the development of the productive forces, 
which in the final analysis determines the development of 
all social relations, is , 
determined by the properties of the 
geographical environment" (1969; cited in Banajis 1977; my emphasis)p 
demonstrates the very point at which Vulgar Marxism begins to lose 
touch with Marxism altogether. Nevertheless, within the context of 
this initial, crucial conclusion, I will now attempt to make some 
general comparative remarks. 
General Observations 
"The crisis continues precisely in the fact that the old 
is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum 
a great variety of morbid symptoms appears. "(Gramscit Prison 
Notebooks) 
This thesis has been an exploration of a period in an extended 
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transition to capitalism, and a discussion of the resultant contra- 
dictions to be found within the Peruvian social structure. The 
I 
stagnant nature of the societies involved in this kind of trunsition 
has been the subject of endless speculationt and has prcepted the 
production of many general, sometimes monocausal explanations of 
the phenonenom. The theoretical introduction to this thesis sought 
to explore the structural ambiguities of many of the concepts uacd 
in such explanations, and the empirical section attempted to delineate 
the complexities and historical specificity of the Peruvian instance. 
The Pacific War was selected as the empirical focus in part ... 
because it is in itself a subject of controversyg and also because 
it throws into relief Peru's problems of. integration, its failure 
as a nation-state, and the vitality of archaic social relations and 
attitudes. Furthermore, its occurrence at a time of increasing 
North American/British rivalry in IjLtin America highlights the over- 
determination of imperial' capital on Peruvian development. It 
also illuminates the differences between the early development of 
republican Chile and that of peru and Bolivia. 
The theoretical discussions have centred on four main issues: 
the questions of race and class, of articulation of modes of productionp 
of overdetermination, and the nature of the state. Clearly all these 
areas are interwovent finding their concrete expression in the forms 
of state established on the West Coast. A strong state has been seen 
as a crucial variable in the development of capitalism (Marx, 1974, 
P-703)p especially in the context of imperialism. The spectacular 
failure of the Peruvian state, in confrontation with that of Chile, 
was demonstrated to the full by, and during, the Pacific War. The 
causes of this failure must be partly sought in Peru's colonial and 
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pla- Gululliblall IlIbLui. y. 
The significance of Peru's stultifying ultramontane, monazbhist 
and bureaucratic heritage can hardly be overestimated. The central 
role played by both Bolivia and Peru (Alto and Bajo Peru) in the 
Viceroyalty resulted in a total lack of regional dynamic and 
autonomy , or social cohesion - the colonial administration simply 
representing the Absolute Monarch in absentia. On the other hand, 
the persistent strength and size of the Indian population and the 
institutionalisation of their conflict with the white minority 
provided an enduring obstacle to social and economic integration, * 
whilst at the same time reinforcing cultural traits in the oligarchy 
1 characteristic of feudalism . By contrast, in economic terms Chile 
was 
I 
able early on to develop a degree of independence and vitality 
largely closed to the Peruvian creoles, whilst socially, as a settle- 
ment colony lacking a large indigenous civilizationg it was relatively 
unaffected by the Spanish policy of divide and rule which accentuated 
the fragmOntAtI911 alrody inherent in the Feralim clase eyeteift, In 
Chile the emergence of a relatively united and organic upper classe 
motivated by a classýprojectý. was possible. 
A comparison of the weak and vestigial republican Peruvian state 
1. It is important# howevero to also bear in mind the nature of the 
Inca mode of productionj since its influence cn' the Peruvian and 
Bolivian social structures lay not simply in its transmogrification 
through racism and ýfeudalisml but also because 
it was clearly not 
pre-disposed to capitalist development either. its rigid character 
complemented the static and reactionary nature of Spanish 
Absolutism: "The absolute monarchy In Spain, bearing but a 
superficial resemblance to the absolute monarchies in Europe in 
general, is rather to be ranged in a class with Asiatic forms of 
government. " (Marxq 'Revolution in Spain', 18540 p. 26ý cited in 
Kiernan, 1974, p. 215). 
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with the strong state structure that developed in Chile does not, 
however, imply that other aspects of the Chilean social formation 
were wildly divergent from those of the Peruvian, t even though it 
enabled the Chilean upper classes to soundly defeat their Peruvian 
rivals. It is clear that Chile too was a transitional structure 
characterised, preclominantly by pre-capitalist forms of class 
domination. British diplomat Rumbold had the following to say on 
the nature of the Chilean peasantrys 
"The "inquilinos'.. are the mass of the resident peasantry 
who are allowed by the landowners to occupy certain patches 
of land, as well as their OranchoB19 or huts, rent free, but 
are bound, in return, to perform a certain amount of unremun- 
erated labour on the estate. This unpaid service, orlcorveel. 
is the distinctive feature of the system known as linquilinajel. 
but the amount of the service required of thelinquilinol varies 
greatly on the different estatesl and is determined by custom 
or voluntary agreement, there being absolutely no written 
contract between the owner and the linquilino' ... 
There being ... no real link between him and the 
land.. his only 
title to exist on it.. being in reason of little less than 
ticrvilfj LOILUIC ... Ila Djay W b&4141 W 
bo InuctlLully Iii c& tAaLc 
of vassalage.. the powers over him of the landowner, who 
frequently is Isubdelegado' or 'comandante de policia I are 
such as to check any excess of independence on his part... 
(19029 pp. 48-50) 
However, other characteristics enabled the Chilean oligarchy# on the 
basis of this predominantly feudal economyq to develop a political 
and legal system which both integrated the Chilean social structure 
and facilitated relations with metropolitan capitalg whilat also 
permitting a substantial degree of autonomy and congruence of the 
national political and economic spheres. The forms of politics to 
emerge after Independence in both Pezu-and Chile were clearly related 
to their previous histories, together with other factors such as 
differences in topography. The ability of the feudal 'hacendados, 
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of Chile to retain their unity and establish a cohesive national 
state must also however be situated in their traditional market 
orientation. The consolidation of feudal production in Central Chile 
early on in the republican eral in response to the demand for wheat, 
was both predicated on the virtual eradication of a free peasantry, 
and on the unification of the feudal landowners. This unification 
was crystallized in a state able to both reinforce their forms of 
class domination and effiolently regulate relations with the world 
market. In other words, the re-exergence of 'commodity feudalismIg 
despite the traumas of the Wars of Emancipationj both necessitated 
and rendered posýible the reconstruction of a modernized version of 
thý colonial Absolutist state (masquerading as European constitution- 
alism). Chile, at this stage, may be said to have represented a 
relatively dynamic transitional form. 
By comparison. the decadence of the Peruvian economy in the 18th 
century was the prelude to its total collapse on IndeperAence Into 
isolated and parochial autarchic units. Long before important sectors 
of the'economy fell under foreign domination (cf. Cotler, 1979)t its 
fragmentation and stagnation was such as to impede the emergence of 
a fraction capable of imposing its hegemony over other social groups 
1 
and constructing a strong state structure Insteadl despite the 
formality of a centralised state forml in reality state power was 
fragmented both regionally (and later internationally)o and in class 
and racial terms. In the slerra, the lack of market opportunities 
1. As observed 'above p howeverr colonial history 
had provided no basis 
for the emergence of such a national elite imbued with a class 
project (cf. the temporary unity of the Bolivian upper classess 
which was Rolply concerned with spurious dreams of a 
European 
type of nationalism, &ml which contstiquently dibitiLtsiSitaLad un 
Independence). 
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together with the weakness of the white elite effedtively resulted in 
the sharing of state power between the 'hacienda' and the Indian 
community, As a result the Peruvian republican state was unable to 
advance beyond 'vestigial absolutism's that is to say, no class 
fraction was able either to assume overall political control, or 
develop a centripetal economic activity. The effects of this failures 
as I have shown, was the intervention of even more contradictions 
into the social structures In the reinforcement of the pre-capitalist 
and anarchic nature of Peruvian political processes on the one hands 
and the penetration of foreign capital and West European ideas on 
the other. The later interaction of the Peruvian state and elite 
with foreign capital was to further accentuate the intermediary and 
contradictory character of the Peruvian social formation. The state 
was neither able to conduct a *satisfactory' relationship with 
metropolitan capital, nor to pursue a national project; its autonomy 
was further undermined, and the structural heterogeneity of the 
social formation increased, as it became over-determined by the 
needs of$ and dependent for its reproduction on, foreign capital. 
These aspects of Peruvian formation all found expression in the 
Pacific War and contemporary political movements. Týe structural 
violence built into social relations and the extreme fractional- 
ization and instability of clAss formation inevitably gave rise to 
ea? cly forms of populism - simultaneously radical and traditional 
multi-class alliances, generally opposed to f=eign capitale 
the 
commercial bourgeoisie and central state power. However this 
political development further inhibited control of the state 
by, 
the semi-capitalistt modernizing fraction of the elitee whilst 
in turn quickly disintegrating into reactionary class and racial 
struggles. 
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In Chilep on the other hando the successful -na early establishment 
of a nation-state not only enabled the elite to consolidate its 
position and proceed with capital accumulation, but also to diversify 
the economy (using a variety of labour forms), notably into extructive 
Wustry. It is evident that Chile's early development of a mineral 
exporting economy further contributed to the emergence of a more 
sophisticated and dynamic structure by offering substantial 
opportunities for the deployment of capital and development of 
productive forces. The vitality of Chile's mining industry, in 
comparison with the abandonment. until the aid-1870a of most of the 
Peruivan mines (apart, of coursep from the nitmte industry) presented 
the Chilean elite with greater possibilities for economic development 
of an industrial nature. In contrast the character of the modern 
sector of the Peruvian elite remained largely mercantile and/or 
1 
agricultural, and frequently mattivated by cultural considerations 
It is clear therefore that Cardoso and Faletto (1969) and Cotler 
(1979) are correct to ascribe decisive importance to the roles of 
national bourgeoisies, the state and foreign capital in the develop- 
ment of Latin American societiest but these must be discussed only as 
key variables amidst other factorag and should be situated in terms 
Ot tho wode of prWuction and concomitauL quotition or ova Wo to rultuAtion. 
The, nature (and roles) of the bourgeoisie must therefore be explained, 
both in terms of the endogenous social formation, and its relationship 
to the world market. It is not viable in the context of 19th century 
Latin America to talk about discrete* modes of productionj but there 
I does appear to be evidence to support Dandler (1976) and Bartra 
(1982) and the theorists of articulation as a form of extended or 
Similarly the predominantly feudal sierran 'hacendado' and the 
Indian community (cf. Mutcho 1980)1 this factor clearly provided 
a further block to the emergence of capitalist social relations. 
-406- 
partly frozen transition. However the existence of modes of 
production as historical agents is-clearly not unambiguousq because 
of the effects that the kinds of consciousness deriving from them 
have on social relations. This brings us back, once again, to the 
form of state which is createdg-or attemptede which may well be 
quite inappropriate to the development of capitalismt or may be 
more suited to the needs of the expanded reproduction of metro- 
politan capital. Generally it is in this sphere that the efficacy 
of British capital may be measured - through economic and cultural 
dominance$ rather than in the form of clumsier, direct political 
interventions by H. M. G. Howevert the Pacific War is of interest not 
only because it highlighted many of the above points, but also 
because it does provide an Instance of Oficial and private 
involvement, to the benefit of both North American and British 
CAPItAl I 
C. The impact of the war on Peru and Chile 
Ironicallyo despite Chilean victoryt the effects of the Pacific 
War on both Peru and Chile were to accentuate the dependent- and 
essentially monoproductive characteristics of their economies. 
A 
major element of the strengthened Anglo-Chilean alliance was 
the 
Jettisoning of the relative economic independence of pre-war 
days 
in favour of the wholsale adoption of economic liberalismi 
,, Laissez-faire policies resulted in a number of lost 
opportunities when the war was over. Chilean 
industry had 
expanded rapidly during the war with Bolivia and 
Perut 
IjuL whatt Uto war cisdoal aO Uso oumtLry wap ossop PP. Alti 
able to. import manufactured and luxury goodsp 
industrial 
growth slowed down.. Over the next twenty years most 
of the 
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nitrate mines passed into the hands of foreignerst and 
W "'1110's MUM(; prosperity came to depend on a mining 
enclave which was almost entirely in foreign hands.., - 
(Roxborough et al., 1977, P-8) 
Increasingly Chilean resources came under monopolyt foreign control, 
whilst the state was dominated by an alliance between the Chilean 
bourgeoisie and foreign (mainly British) capital. 
The re-construction and re-insertion of the Peruvian economy 
Into the international system resulted in (and from) sWlar 
2 
processes . After the War of the pacificg 
the penetration of 
metropolitan capitalt which had begun in the 1860s, was greatly 
accelerated, and the Peruvian economy recuperated' largely on the 
basis of its orientation to foreign requirementst and investment 
by the Peruvian Corporation. Moreovero whilst this led to the first 
significant development of capitalist relations of production in 
Peru, this not only re-emphasised the contradictions within a still 
predominantly feudal society, but was also largely in responee to 
the new needs of expanded reproduction in the metropolis rather 
than to an internal dynamic. Furthermorep despite the intensive 
development of copper, oil, silver and sugarl and the establishwnt 
of some light industryt the reprotuction of pre-capitalist relations 
of productiong outside of these enclaves# came to be, _esaential 
to 
the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production in Peru 
(cf. 
Yepesj 1974). 'Determined' fetulalism was evolving into a determined' 
1. There areg in factg interesting parallels between Chile's Nitrate 
Age and Peru's pre-war Guano Boom. 
2. Obviously the situation in the two countries was differentiated 
by the extreme poverty in Peru after the War of the Pacificl 
the bankruptcy of many-members of the Peruvian upper cla 
I sses 
together with the destruction of much of the infrastructure and 
modern machinery facilitated the take-over bylimperialist' 
capital (cf. Clavero's statistical breakdown on Income groups 
before and after the Pacific Warl 1896, p. 51). 
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form of capitalism, with equally disruptive effects on the unity 
and autonomy of the Peruvian upper classes, and sovereignty and 
i#egrity of the state. 
Consequently the War of the Pacific. despite the extensive 
devestation it brought to all aspects of the Peruvian soclo- . 
economic and political structure, in some ways represented no 
more of a watershed in Peruvian history than did the Wars of 
i Independence. Rather it accentuated certain features and perhaps 
hastened developments. The concept of stagnating transitiong howevers 
remained generally applicable to the social formation, whilst the 
limitations inherent in the more autonomous and dynamic transitional 
form represented by Chile were also exposed. 
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APPENDIX: A NOTE ON SOURCES. 
The historian (perhaps particularly if she is writing from a Marxist 
perspective) using documentary sources renders herself vulnerable to 
critcisa unless the work is adequately situated. Extensive use has 
been made in this thesis of the records of the British Foreign Office 
and the State Department of the United Statesg and occasionally they 
have been cited with reference to the internal affairs of the Andean 
states. While every effort has been made to contextualise these 
citations in situ, a general comment on the reliability of the material 
may be of assistance. 
The different character of the two diplomatic services has been the 
subject of commentary for many years (see for example Hartman, 1931). 
While the British foreign service contained a majority of career pro- 
fessionals (Hartman, op. cit. t Nightingalet 1930) and represented an 
adequate career for the younger sons of the aristocracy" the salaries 
of U. S. diplomats were fixed by statute in 1850 at*a low levelt and had 
become entirely inadequate by the time of the Civil War (Gelfond, 1982). 
Consequentlyt diplomatic posts were largely the subject of patronaget 
andýveniality. As has been discussed above (Chapter 11) this accounts 
for the degree of eccentricity which characterised American diplomatic 
performance. It also counsels caution in interpreting their evidence. 
The majority of the British diplomats cited conform to the stereotype 
of the impoverished aristocrat. Pakenhaml Consul to Santiago in the 
1870"S, was the seventh son of the second Earl of Longfordq and pursued 
a diploatic career which reached its 119th001515 in Amb§61560, dorlahips 
to Norway and Sweden. jerninghamg Charge d'Affaires at Lima in 1873P 
was a younger son of minor landed gentryt whose brother was also a 
career diplomat. However, this should not be read as the stigma which_ 
indicates a particulaýrly narrow view; one of the characteristics of the 
age was the desire to reflect and observe the strange environments which 
were being embraced by the Empire, as is demonstrated by the careers of 
Sir Horace Rumbold and Spencer St. John- I 
Rumbold, a contemporary of Pakenham's in Santiagolwas born 
in, India 
in 1828t the youngest son of a baronet1who was ruined 
by investing in a 
banking house which was driven Out of existence by the East 
India 
Company (apparently using barely legal methods 
(Rumbolde 1902)). Taken 
under the wing of the Earl of Derbyt he pickedo4the 
diplomatic service in 
a, casual way in order to make his livingg because of, 
his low expectations. 
His three brotherst howeverg all died prematurelYp apparently as a result 
of dissipation. His aristocratic connections stood 
him 1: 0 good. stead 
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and his career reached a climax at the court of the Emperor of Austria 
in 1896. His comments indicate that his relationship to Britain Is own 
landed aristocracy inclined him favourably to similar oligarchs where- F 
ever he travelled (he was a close friend of the Metternichs). Not 
surprisingly. he had a particularly low opinion of the Americans, in 
particular Meiggs, wh&se record as an employer he lost no opportunity 
to disparage, with the true hypoor-jay of the English. 
Spencer St. John came from rather humbler origins. His father was 
an eminent author and a prolific traveller, who was educated in a village 
school in Camarthenshire and subsequently became a leader writer for the 
Vaily Telegraph,. JA. St. John's sons all followed his example in 
travelling widely and writing; one edited a short-lived political, 
literary and industrial journal of the 1850's entitled 'Utopia' (but 
not after Proudhon)t and another edited a "History of the British Con- 
quests in India", before he became a bankrupt. Although Spencer's 
career was formally the most orthodoxg it led him to some of the most 
bizarre experiences any British diplomat must have experienced in the 
nineteenth century. As I have indicated in the texts, his career began 
with Sir James 'Rajah' Brooke, in his virtually single-handed conquest 
of Borneo; he developed a passionate loyalty to Brooke# whoselvictim- 
isation' by Gladstone after the Opirate massacre' of 1849 earned that 
politician St. John's lasting emnity (in his *Life of Sir James Brookelt 
pubUshed in the first year of the Pacific Warg he pilloried Gladstone 
for his hypocrisy). It is possible that this explains some aspects of 
St. John's career, for his next major diplomatic posting was to Haitil 
&WuL whl,. Ai ho waa alau Lu au6mcquciit . ly pulA1131% 1% ), auk, Is, szt, iLa or 
his evidently jaundiced view of contemporary Haitiv he appears to have 
developed foi his era a remarkably enlightened view of the slave revolt 
(which may, however, have been conditioned by his fxancophobia). Possibly 
more important than his views (which as we saw above were often racist)v 
is the evidence of an almost trained capacity for observations analysis 
and commentary (it's often a pity that this is not reflected in his 
rather dry Consular Reports)l which stands in sharp contrast to the 
farcical misconceptions revealed in the U. S. Foreign Relations documents. 
The issue of racism we have dealt with above; it must be said that 
for 
many British commentatorst religion was almost as important a factor - 
in almost all written records there is a unanimous hostility to the 
Catholic Churcht which is blamed for almost all the deficiencies which 
can not be attributed to race. 
A final notes it is a mirror of the small world occupied by the English 
oligarchy that Rumbold and St. JOhm, as literary men, shared 
the same clubs, 
1 
together with Henry Huck5 Gibbpp First Baron Aldenhamp founder of 
Gibbs and Co. t Director of the Bank of England 1853-1901, Governor 
of the Bank of England from 1675-77, Conservative M. P. from 1891- 
1892, and owner of 3,500 acres of rural England. Disraelit incidentazlyt 
was black-balled from the Atheneum on his first applications an experience 
which (almost) put him off Iondon club life for good. 
I can not close these comments without wishing good fortune to any 
woman who has ventured into the'machismo'of the academic world, in 
particular if she intends to undertake research in the epicentre-of 
academic machismo which I found Latin America to be. 
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